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ABSTRACT 
The operation of power within psychotherapeutic practice is 
explored within a media (radio) counselling setting 
utilising a discourse analytic approach informed by 
Foucault's later work (1988, 1992). 
I argue that psychotherapeutic practices tend to escape the 
problem of power and following a review of psychotherapy 
'process' research, a Foucauldian theoretical framework is 
presented - drawing upon Foucault's account of ethics (1992) 
- as providing a means to understand the counselling process 
as discursive and the operation of power In relation to 
regulatory practices of the self. 
A three-part discourse analysis is reported In which media 
therapeutic exchanges (broadcast telephone conversations) 
are explored in relation to (discursive) modes . of 
subj ection, processes of problematisation and the relation 
of the exchange to the overhearing audience. The results of 
the analysis are discussed with reference to the range of 
means through which clients may be made responsible for 
their own 'cure' and the manner in which therapeutic 
discourse has been able to adapt itself to a contemporary 
media setting. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The focal question in this study concerns the operation of 
therapeutic (counselling) discourse on the radio in relation 
to client self-formation as a means to understand the 
operation of power In a contemporary (for some postmodern, 
for example Lyotard, 1992; Eagleton, 1992) therapeutic 
exchange. Such a question is important given the lack of 
detailed reflection on the problem of power by both 
practitioners and critics who conceive of the problem In 
broad individualistic (and psychologistic) ways. 
I am primarily concerned then, with the operation of power 
in the (individual) counselling relationship and the extent 
to which psychotherapeutic practice is regulatory in 
nature 1 . These themes have become increasingly important 
over recent years (for example, Szasz, 1988; Masson, 1989; 
Rose, 1989; Rose, 1992; Rose, 1994; Miller & Rose, 1994; 
Rose, 1996) and their relevance has been underscored by the 
pUblication of client accounts of experiences of 
1 The distinction between counselling and psychotherapy is an important 
one, not least because there are a variety of explanations offered in 
the literature. On the whole however, a separation between the two is 
considered illusory while certain differences in overall aims 
(Patterson, 1995 :xvii) or 'client populations and settings' (Nelson-
Jones, 1992:3) are, for example, acknowledged. Here I analyse a media 
counselling setting in particular and refer to psychotherapeutic 
practices in general, assuming that both target (elements of) the 'self' 
as a site of transformation but where generalisations from one to the 
other must be made with great caution. 
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psychotherapy (for example, Dinnage, 1988; France, 1988; 
Alexander, 1995). Alexander (1995:1) offers a striking image 
of the potentially negative consequences 
psychotherapeutic practice: 
Some years ago I started taking drugs. I did not 
swallow them, smoke them or sniff them. I imbibed 
them, unwittingly at first, through some kind of 
emotional osmosis in the course of therapeutic 
encounters. Like their chemical counterparts, 
these drugs (administered by a process known as 
transference) turned out to be intoxicating, 
addictive, hallucinogenic and destructive. My 
dealers were respectable, middle-class 
professionals who meant me no harm. 
of 
It is difficult to imagine psychotherapeutic practice 
operating without some form of power relation between 
therapist and client. After all - considering power in its 
simplest sense - clients go to therapists to draw upon their 
expertise (and authority) and it is probably reasonable to 
assume that clients are, on the whole, more vulnerable than 
their therapists. Yet I will argue that psychotherapeutic 
practice tends to escape the problem of power wi thin the 
therapeutic relationship which we must always remember 
claims to offer the possibility of transformation and 
'healing' . 
In fact, it is very difficult to find any extended reference 
to power in counselling training and theory guides (Egan, 
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1990; Nelson-Jones, 1992; Dryden & Feltham, 1992; Patterson, 
1995 are four widely used examples) and I will now briefly 
explore a range of perspectives on power from five 
practising therapists and counsellors which will provide 
some general background to the research problem. 
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF POWER IN THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE 
In the following first example Aveline (1992:324-325) offers 
an account of the problem of power which serves as a useful 
illustration of the common and taken-for-granted 
understanding of its operation in therapeutic practice held 
by practitioners and researchers (we will see further 
examples in the following chapter) : 
The arena in which individual therapy takes place 
is constructed essentially by the therapist. 
Though subject to negotiation, the therapist 
decides the duration, frequency and form of the 
therapy. Ultimately, beginning and ending is in 
her hands, the latter being a powerful threat to 
the patient who is dependent or not-coping. with 
rare exception, the meetings take place on the 
therapists terri tory. The therapist, whether 
trainee or trained, is held to be expert in what 
goes on in the arena, certainly by the patient, 
who is relatively a novice in this setting. What 
procedures the therapist propounds, the patient is 
predisposed to accept ... All this gives therapists 
great power and, consequently, exposes them to 
great temptation. 
Here power is conceived primarily in terms of the control of 
the designation and arrangement of the therapeutic 
9 
relationship which lS in the hands of the therapist along 
with (expert) authority. Note that here power offers a 
temptation to the (presumably weak) individual therapist. In 
a similar way Mair (1989:244-245) also emphasises the 
problem of power as one of the desire to control another, 
though for him authority is understood in relation to 
scientific method: 
There lS a crucial issue of power ... We value, In 
science as in life, the means by which we can be 
protected and at a distance, in control, having 
power over the choices and destiny of others. 
Hardness is massively sustained by the rumbling 
tanks of the scientific methods we most value. We 
fear and despise and live in terror of our 
shameful weakness ... 
Both these practitioners conceive of the operation of power 
in relation to characteristics of individuals - 'desire' for 
control, 'hardness' masking a fear of 'weakness'. 
Most counsellors and therapists, I suggest, would accede 
that there may well be a problem of power in therapeutic 
practice and would conceive of that power in the 
individualistic (and psychologistic) terms presented above, 
(a notable exception to this individualism is Frosch, 1987). 
For example, Egan (op ci t: 78) advises 
counsellor: 
Helping can be dangerous if it lncreases 





values outlined earlier in this chapter permeate 
the helping process, client's will become 
empowered - capable of doing what they could not 
do, or thought they could not do. The notion of 
empowerment in human-service professions is a 
powerful one ... 
Thus, while the nature of counselling as a 'social influence 
process' (Egan, op cit:77) is accepted, the nature of the 
values provided by such influence remains taken-for-granted 
and therefore unexplored. Egan (op cit: 77) offers the 
following figure in response to the problem of 'reconciling 
self-responsibility and social influence': 
Such 
Imagine a continuum. At one end lies "telling 
clients what to do" and at the other "leaving 
clients to their own devices". Somewhere along 
that continuum is "helping clients make their own 
decisions and act on them". 
( empowermen t) concerns have increasingly been 
incorporated into counselling professional ethics. Young 
(1995:66-67) observes that: 
... the modern codes of ethics and practice are 
designed to address ... abusive elements, including 
client and practitioner dependency, and the issue 
of power ... At the very least, a client must be 
enabled to experience safe dependency (a normal 
relationship need). This is possible only if the 
practitioner is responsible enough to hold and 
balance the constantly changing power 
differentials, and to ensure that the client has 
taken her power back at the end of each session. 
This is the principle behind the ... 'client as 
expert', non-directive modern counselling style .. 
11 
The practitioner responsibility offered by Young as a remedy 
to the \ abusive elements' of counselling is - I suggest -
pivotal to the treatment of the problem of power by 
practitioners and researchers - where power is understood as 
something that can be given or taken away. Moreover, 
empowerment and/or the responsible use of power by 
individuals are key means by which the therapeutic 
professions have sought to deal with this problem. In fact, 
even within the so-called radical (in this case 
\ constructionist') therapies this view of power (and its 
remedy) that is, where power is to be regarded as an 
ethical issue - prevails: 
Power should be neither celebrated nor 
demonised ... one could say that the problem for a 
therapist is neither to be powerful nor to succumb 
to power. Rather, the therapist should take 
responsibility for his or her power of 
construction within the constraints of the 
relational/social domain. (Fruggeri, 1992:47) 
Thus, we might agree that counsellors and psychotherapists 
are little concerned with a fine-grained analysis of power 
but rather conceive it in broad though individualistic 
terms. Those counsellors that consider themselves as having 
power wish to use it responsibly or to give it away, while 
others seek to constitute the client as powerful (as expert) 
and others still simply refuse the importance of power in 
their practice and hence do not include it in their manuals 
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or handbooks. Moreover, at the same time the validity of a 
therapeutic intervention (for example, an interpretation) lS 
judged by its success in producing affect and/or change, 
thus - as with the problem of power - avoiding a detailed 
consideration of the nature (in particular the implicit 
values) of such change. I suggest the key point here is that 
in this way therapeutic practices in fact escape the complex 
problem of power - which is transformed into a problem of 
responsible use; along with an ideal of the empowerment of 
clients. Given this, a detailed analysis of the operation of 
power in the therapeutic relationship (including the notion 
of empowerment) appears urgent and pressing. 
1.2 EMPOWERMENT AND THE REGULATION OF CONDUCT 
The problematic nature of empowerment has recently been 
highlighted (Baistow, 1995; Woodhead, 1995) with respect to 
the mUltiple demands that it meets which may entail the 
regulation of empowerment 'candidates' in addition to their 
, liberation' . Baistow (1995:37) conceives of the shift 
towards empowerment mobilised to ' .. free citizens from a 
network of professional, bureaucratic regulation .. ' as, In 
intimately bound with contemporary ethical 
imperatives: 
Taking control of 
aspects of it, is 
intimately connected 
one's life, or particular 





reformation of the self as empowered, it ~s 
increasingly becoming an ethical obligation of the 
new citizenry [original emphasis] . 
Baistow identifies a key paradox with the notion of 
empowerment, not only the extent to which it may constitute 
a 'soft' form of regulation but also its ethical operation 
in that the empowerment 'candidate' is invited to take 
responsibility for their own "government". Here I use the 
term "government" in relation to recent analyses of 
contemporary political rationalities that are understood as 
implicated - albeit in diverse ways - within aims to govern, 
in part, through the constitution of a ' ... well-regulated 
and "responsibilised" liberty.' (Barry et al, 1996: 8). As 
Barry et al (op cit:1) argue: 
If one thing unites these different aspects of 
poli tical thought, it is the ways In which they 
seek a form of politics "beyond the state", a 
politics of life, of ethics, which emphasises the 
crucial political value of the mobilisation and 
shaping of individual capacities and conduct. 
Moreover, empowerment, in particular its role In the 'self-
esteem movement' (Cruikshank, 1993 :328) has been linked to 
the very fabric of democratic society. Cruikshank 
cit:328-329) quotes the Californian Task Force (1990:4): 
Self-esteem is the likeliest candidate for a 
social vaccine, something that empowers us to live 
responsibly and that inoculates us against the 
lures of crime, violence, substance abuse, teen 
(op 
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pregnancy, child abuse, chronic welfare 
dependency, and educational failure. The lack of 
self-esteem is central to most personal and social 
ills plaguing our state and nation as we approach 
the end of the twentieth century. 
Thus, we might understand empowerment as bound both to 
contemporary orders of the self and their relationship to 
complex societal problems including even the foundations of 
the conduct of democratic government: 
Personal fulfilment becomes a social obligation in 
the discourse of self-esteem according to an 
innovation which transforms the relationship of 
self-to-self into a relationship that is 
governable. (Cruikshank op cit:328) 
1.3 AGAINST THERAPY 
Interestingly, even the most injurious of attacks upon 
therapeutic practices, Masson's (in) famous polemic Against 
Therapy, offers an identical perspective on the operation of 
power within the therapeutic relationship to that of the 
practi tioners discussed earlier. Masson (1989: 290) suggests 
that: 
The therapeutic relationship always involves an 
imbalance of power. One person pays, the other 
receives. Vacations, time, duration of the 
sessions are all in the hands of one party. Only 
one person is thought to be an 'expert' in human 
relations and in feelings. Only one person is 
thought to be in trouble. This cannot but affect 
the judgement and perception of the party less 
powerful [original emphasis] . 
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For Masson then, given this imbalance of power, all 
psychotherapy is corrupt and constitutes nothing more than 
'emotional tyranny' (Masson, 1990:7) . Moreover, this 
imbalance of 'power appears to constitute the overriding 
theory of the operation of power wi thin his critique (see 
also [1989] pages, 224, 231, 289) and where he - as with the 
practitioners above - considers power as the desire for the 
control of another: 
A prison warden, a slaveholder, and a 
psychotherapist have in common the desire to 
control another person. (1989:189) 
Note that in this way Masson relates the operation of power 
to its possession and use by individuals which is similarly 
evident in his comments about Perls' therapeutic groups: 
Perls made no bones about arrogating to himself 
all the privileges and power of a traditional 
guru. Implicit in this power is the ability to 
cause great pain and destruction to others ... Perls 
seemed positively to revel in the power he held 
over the people in his groups. (1989:257) 
I do not wish to overstate the problems with Masson's work, 
his critique is a pertinent and consequential one but it 
does serve to illustrate the need for a more complex 
understanding of power In the therapeutic relationship. 
Masson's slightly later (1990) chapter offers a useful 
example of the shortcomings of his position given that 
16 
within this edited volume there is a response to Masson's 
thesis from J. Holmes (a consultant psychiatrist) followed 
by a rebuttal from Masson and thus we are able to gain some 
access to the debate between critic and practitioner. 
A major element of Holmes' (1990:29-36) response is an 
interpretation of Masson's character as childlike and 
regressed, I will quote the entire analysis: 
Masson's child's tongue pours out the invective 
and we watch, painfully but with some fascination 
as his claims become more and more wild and 
outrageous, rather as one might witness a child in 
a rage laying waste to his immediate surroundings, 
hitting out at anything in sight, especially at 
the parents whom he holds most dear, and by whom 
he feels most let down ... We are in a perverse and 
faecal world ... in which everything is smeared and 
besmirched, in the discourse of graffiti where if 
you are not part of the solution you are part of 
the problem. (p.34-35) 
Masson rebuts this interpretation with accusations of 
'error' and 'arrogance' which once again remain at the level 
of individual or professional responsibility and more 
importantly fail to engage with Holmes' language-use which I 
will suggest is precisely where we need to focus our 
attention. Masson replies (1990:37-38): 
It is hazardous to analyse anybody, under the best 
of circumstances. But to analyse somebody you have 
never met, on the basis of a paper he has written 
critical of your profession, is particularly 
liable to error ... The arrogance behind .. 
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[his] .. assumption is revealing because it is the 
arrogance which I accuse the profession of 
harbouring, indeed, encouraging. 
If we return to Holmes' language-use and consider it in a 
little more detail we can observe that he offers an account 
in which Masson's words are those of a child - 'Masson's 
child's tongue', and where such behaviour has an origin in 
Masson's regression, an aetiology which relates to his 
parents along with a symptomology - 'everything is smeared'. 
Moreover Holmes implies that the reader shares his 
discomfort at Masson's conduct 'we watch, painfully but 
with some fascination'. What is important in relation to the 
discursive operation of Holmes' interpretation is that it 
shifts the 'problem' away from Masson's claims concerning 
psychotherapeutic practice towards Masson's psychological 
ill-health; though we must also remember that Holmes' 
interpretation only makes sense where there is at least the 
possibility that it will be read as authoritative in some 
way (as opposed to say a personal opinion) . 
Given Masson's individualistic (and psychologistic) 
understanding of power as the desire for control over 
another, his project must always remain lacking because of 
the limited theory of the operation of power at work there, 
in particular, I argue, with respect to the ways in which 
power operates through language. In fact it might be 
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offered that such a limited theory considerably weakens his 
argument in that - as we saw above - practitioners can reply 
that Masson cites instances of the abuse of power and that 
its responsible use or its transformation into a gift 
constitutes ethical (right and proper) professional 
practice. Thus, although Masson explicitly suggests that the 
abuses he charts are not exceptional (1989:293) he is unable 
to sustain this position given his individualistic 
understanding of power which paradoxically is identical to 
that of practitioners themselves. 
1.4 THE COUNSELLING CONVERSATION AND THERAPEUTIC SUBJECTION 
It would be useful at this point to consider an example of 
counselling conversation cited in a training manual (Dryden, 
1992:64-65). The following extract is employed within the 
context of a professional account of therapeutic practice and 
is interesting precisely because it has been chosen by a 
practitioner as In some way defining the proper operation of 
therapeutic discourse (in this case in relation to 'rational-
emotive' counselling) Taking an excerpt at random it is 
possible to look at the sample of transcript offered and the 
commentary that accompanies it. 
In the following extract the counsellor 'Windy' is talking to 
his client 'Steve' about the homework which was set during 
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the previous session (note that 'homework', that is practices 
of self-inspection performed outside the therapeutic 
encounter is ' ... a central part of the counselling process .. ' 
within the rationale-emotive approach, [Dryden, op cit:21]): 
Windy: How did you get on with your homework assignment, 
which was challenging your irrational beliefs three 
times a day? 
Steve: Well, like the curate's egg. Good in parts. 
Windy: What do you mean? 
Steve: Well I made a good start. I went over the tape of 
the session and made notes about how to challenge 
my self-defeating beliefs using the three arguments 
we discussed and I did what I agreed to do for the 
first two days. Then it tailed off. 
Windy: What do you mean 'tailed off'? 
Steve: Well, let me see. I made a note of what I did and 
didn' t do. On Monday and Tuesday, like I said -
three times a day. No problem, and I was getting 
pretty good at it. On Wednesday I missed the 
morning, did it hal f - heartedly in the af ternoon, 
and then nothing until yesterday, but that was out 
of guilt. 
Windy: OK, first let's acknowledge that you did really 
well for the first two days. Now let's have a 
closer look at what happened on Wednesday. First, 
what did you tell yourself to miss the practice on 
Wednesday morning? 
Steve: It's getting tedious. 
Observing the operation of this exchange, we can ask what 
kinds of utterance does the counsellor deploy? Early in the 
extract the counsellor primarily questions his client: 'What 
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do you mean?' and 'What do you mean by "tailed off"?' which 
are followed by an acknowledgment, a further question and a 
form of interpretation. Thus far even wi thin this short 
extract - we are able to identify a variety of discursive 
features. The following utterance is of particular interest: 
Windy: What did you tell yourself to miss the 
practice on Wednesday morning? 
We might ask what actions does this question perform? I 
suggest at least four are evident: 
a) it constitutes the self in relation to itself, 
b) makes the client accountable, not only to the therapist 
but also to himself, 
c) locates the cause of .. 'miss [ingJ the practice on 
Wednesday ... ' in self-dialogue, 
d) implies that self-dialogue lS the substance to be worked 
upon by the client. 
This single utterance then, is doing a great deal of work In 
terms of the counselling process and which - in relation to 
the problem of power we might consider as a form of 
subjection, that is the client is constituted as the subject 
of therapeutic discourse in such a way as to problematise the 
client's conduct in relation to self-dialogue as the 
'substance' for the client's attention If we now turn to 
21 
the professional account of what is happening, within the two 
paragraphs that accompany this excerpt (p. 64-65) certain 
themes recur: 
Help him identify 
Encourage your client 
Assess 




Help him to challenge 
Encourage 
These terms constitute the therapist as active but 
facilitating (encouraging, helping, exploring), whereas I 
have suggested that the client is, In fact, being subjected 
to counselling discourse, that is he is being 'encouraged' 
and 'helped' to bear witness to the error of his ways and 
their means of rectification for which the client himself is 
responsible. In this way we are able to begin to establish a 
fine-grained analysis of the operation of power wi thin the 
therapeutic enpounter itself. 
1.5 THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE AND ETHICAL SELF-FORMATION 
In this study I argue that we should bring a more complex 
theorisation of power to bear upon therapeutic discourse, 
not however by examining the writings of key figures in its 
development (c.f. Masson, op cit) but rather its 'everyday' 
(discursive) practice in a contemporary setting. The work of 
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Michel Foucault offers a developed understanding of power in 
relation to psychological (therapeutic) discourse (Rose, 
1985a; 1985b; 1985c; 1989; 1994; 1996b) In particular, 
Foucault's (1988; 1992) later work suggests a means of 
mapping the language of counselling with respect to the 
discursive techniques employed by the counsellor and their 
effects upon the client's (discursively produced) self. 
Furthermore, Foucault's later work offers a framework for 
understanding the therapeutic subject's self-formation, for 
example Foucault (1988:18) speaks of 'techniques of the 
self' which: 
... permit individuals to effect by their own means 
or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct and way of being, so as to 
transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or 
immortality. 
Thus, Foucault's work leads in the direction of a fine-
grained analysis of the counselling conversation in which we 
might understand the therapeutic process as discursive In 
nature and which, in turn, may lead to a fuller 
understanding of the operation of power within counselling 
practice. An exploration of the language of counselling 
(including a consideration of linguistic features such as 
the use of figurative language) will enable an alternative 
understanding of its effects in general and the kinds of 
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problems and solutions it constructs In relation to clients' 
self-formation In particular (c.f. Hodges, 1995). In this 
way the individualism and psychologism of current 
understandings of the problem of power in counselling may be 
avoided. 
within the analysis undertaken here power is not a 
possession of individuals (or professions) but rather is 
articulated with discursive and non-discursive practices and 
understood in strategic and tactical terms. In Foucault's 
words (1990: 94) : 
Power relations are both intentional and non-
sUbjective. . . the rationality of power is 
characterised by tactics which are often quite 
explicit at the restricted level where they are 
inscribed ... it is often the case that no one is 
there to have invented them, and few who can be 
said to have formulated them ... 
Thus, an analysis of counselling discourse informed by 
Foucauldian theory enables a way of understanding the 
positivity and productivity of power relations that are 
played-out fundamentally through the therapeutic 
conversation itself rather than (individual) desire for 
control or the (mis)use of power. 
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1.6 THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The counselling exchanges analysed here are taken from a 
radio phone-in (produced by LBC, London Broadcasting 
Corporation) . These particular exchanges were selected 
because they afford a means to explore a very focused 
therapeutic interaction. Each exchange occurs within a rapid 
time-frame and therefore the various 'stages' of the 
counselling process will need in some sense to be 
condensed within each conversation. This media setting 
therefore provides an ideal opportunity for an in-depth 
analysis of therapeutic discourse (also given that there is 
no visual channel). Moreover these exchanges are interesting 
because the vast majority of people who experience 
counselling in this context will do so as members of an 
overhearing audience and the analysis will therefore need to 
be sensitive to the effects of therapeutic discourse upon 
that audience. 
Thus, the unique arena of the radio counselling phone-in 
condenses a much wider range of social processes than the 
more usual counselling situation which involves only the 
client and counsellor; in summary, within this media setting 
therapeutic discourse: 
1) is deployed within a highly condensed and focused 
exchange, 
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2) will be conditioned in some way by its relation to the 
overhearing audience and will concomitantly include many 
more persons (as overhearing listeners) than one-to-one 
counselling, 
3) will involve in some way the show's host and 
presenter (in this case Robbie Vincent); so that the 
exchanges will, at times, involve three persons (instead of 
two) in addition to the overhearing audience. 
The radio phone-in setting then, provides a focused 
\ snapshot' of an array of (public) social processes that 
will illuminate the operation of therapeutic discourse In 
ways unavailable within the more usual (private) one-to-one 
situation and where the operation of power will involve the 
host and the overhearing audience in addition to client and 
counsellor. 
Finally, the radio medium as a setting for therapeutic 
discourse is interesting in its own right given that: 
There is no image and no text. The .. medium.. lS 
utterly non-visual: the receivers, who are 
listeners, or collectively an audience, cannot see 
the sender or broadcaster as they can on 
television or film; nor are they offered the 
compensation of a visible and lasting message as 
they are in literature. (Crissel, 1986:5) 
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In particular, an interrogation of counselling discourse on 
the radio might offer some insight into the way therapeutic 
discourse has adapted itself to a variety of settings and 
media, for example television, self-help publications and 
'agony' columns; an area which has, as yet, recieved 
relatively little scholarly attention. 
1.7 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
In chapter two I revue the existing (psychological) 
literature relevant to the psychotherapeutic process and 
additionally consider (sociological) commentary concerning 
psychotherapeutic practices as they relate to contemporary 
culture along with the very scarce work on media 




methodological framework for the research 
revueing 
(within 
conversation analytical, discourse 
social psychology) and Foucauldian 
approaches and chapters four to six present the empirical 
analysis in three parts - using a disocurse analytic approach 
informed by Foucault's (1988, 1992) later work, including his 
four dimensions of ethical self-formation. 
In chapter four I show that the advisor's discourse very 
quickly shapes-up the caller's account of their problem and 
that this shaping-up along with the deployment of figurative 
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language operate as modes of sUbjection. In chapter five the 
exchanges are analysed In relation to processes of 
problematisation by comparing the caller's initial account of 
their troubles with the final 'therapeutic' account. The 
'therapeutic transformation' thus identified tends to move 
the caller's troubles - at least, in part - from the 'outer' 
to the ' inner' world, that is the caller's troubles are 
reinscribed onto a 'psychological' register which can be seen 
to operate within a wider moral order. 
In chapter six I consider the relation of radio counselling 
discourse to the overhearing audience. In particular, I use 
the analytic of 'implied audience' which enables the 
examination of positions of identification available to the 
audience as implied within the media 'text' itself, including 
forms of address and the extent to which the audience lS 
implied as gendered. 
Finally, in chapter seven I outline the findings of the 
study, consider their relevance to the research question, 
discuss problems with the methodological framework adopted, 
propose some ideas for further work and make some concluding 
comments. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The most clearly identifiable and enduring body of work that 
relates to the research problem outlined In the previous 
chapter - that is interrogating the operation of power within 
the counselling process as discursive is psychotherapy 
research within mainstream (as opposed to critical) 
psychology, though this includes other related disciplines 
for example psychiatry. This research focuses upon two main 
problems which relate to the question of efficacy (or 
'outcome') and the question; how does psychotherapy heal (or 
'process') . 
Given our research problem I will focus In this reVlew 
chapter on psychotherapy 'process' research, although, as we 
will see, the two 'process' and 'outcome' questions have been 
linked In what lS now termed 'process-outcome' research. 
Following an outline of the development of the psychotherapy 
research area, I will consider what has been termed the 
, "linguistic turn" in process research I (Russell 1989: 507) 
and finally discuss the work of sociologists and cultural 
commentators who have also analysed psychotherapeutic 
practice and which provides a link to the debates included in 
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the following chapter, although as we will see this 
(sociological) work offers a very different perspective to 
(psychological) process research. Lastly, I will consider 
some of the (very scarce) work on media therapeutics. 
2.1 PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PROCESS 
Although Carl Rogers and his colleagues were the first 
researchers to utilise recordings of counselling sessions for 
research during the early 1940's, it is claimed that a 
coherent discipline of psychotherapy research began with 
Eysenck's much cited (1952) study in which he transformed the 
existing issue of the purported uncritical acceptance of 
psychoanalytic practice and procedure especially In the 
united States into a challenge directed at the 
psychoanalytic establishment (for example, Orlinsky & Howard, 
1986; Eysenck, 1970,1992; Bergin & Garfield, 1994). 
Eysenck reviewed the efficacy of psychotherapy by comparing 
five studies of psychoanalysis and nineteen studies of 
eclectic psychotherapy, claiming that only 44% of 
psychoanalytic clients improved compared to 64% for the 
eclectic approach. However, the main controversy focused upon 
Eysenck's claim of a spontaneous remission rate of 67%, as 
this indicated that both psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in 
general were no better as healing processes than mere 
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expectancy, and by 1960 Eysenck was arguing that behaviour 
therapy was the only technique that produced improvement over 
and above the rate of spontaneous remission. However, by the 
late 1970's Eysenck's findings had been refuted by many other 
researchers, whilst the field of psychotherapy research had 
become much broader and the issues more complex. I offer the 
following major review studies as key examples of this shift. 
Bergin (1971) reviewed several of the papers included in 
Eysenck's original study and showed that by operating with 
different criteria of improvement, the success rate for 












spontaneous remission rate was estimated to be as low as 30% 
and later suggested that the exact figure was, In fact, 
irretrievable as it depended upon the length of follow up and 
the criteria of recovery used - along with the objectivity of 
their assessment - (c.f. Bergin & Lambert, 1978). 
Malan (1973) discussed reviews of control studies and 
concluded that evidence for the efficacy of psychotherapy was 
relatively strong, especially for psychosomatic conditions, 
however he found the evidence to be weak with regard to 
neurosis and personality disorders - for which psychotherapy 
was originally developed. Later he asserted that it was 
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important to consider the quality of recovery for untreated 
patients and showed that for a group of 45 untreated neurotic 
patients who were assessed both symptomatically and 
psychodynamically, (for general emotional and social well-
being), it was judged that 51% had improved symptomatically 
and 24% showed at least partial psychodynamic improvement. 
At the same time Luborsky et al. (1975), critically reviewed 
comparative studies and found little or no differential 
efficacy between different psychotherapies while claiming 
that controlled comparative studies showed a substantial 
number of patients gaining from psychotherapy, with as many 
as 80% of studies showing positive results. Other quite 
sophisticated studies (particularly controlled clinical 
trials) showed similar results; positive outcome but little 
differential efficacy. 
The best known example of such comparitive work is the Temple 
study (Sloane et al., 1975) which lS often cited as an 
advance on earlier methodology, (for example, Gregory, 1987). 
Sloane et al. (op cit) studied ninety four patients suffering 
from mild neurosis or personality disorder and who were 
assessed using a variety of measures including psychometric 
tests and peer/relative ratings. Patients were then randomly 
assigned to one of four groups the control group where 
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patients were placed on a waiting list and promised therapy 
within four months, or one of three groups receiving 
treatment from experienced psychodynamic therapists. Two 
measures of change were used; symptom assessment and 
work/social adjustment. Using this method it was found that 
the treatment groups showed a significantly greater 
improvement after four months with no difference between 
psychotherapy and behaviour therapy, while the improvements 
were maintained for one year or more after treatment. 
Thus, the newly recognised complexity of psychotherapy 
research began to provide alternative questions to the 
simpler; Does therapy work?, Does one therapy work better 
than another? and by the mid 1970' s most outcome studies 
seemed to be showing that therapeutics In general did provide 
a better rate of success than spontaneous remlSSlon. 
These early studies then, embraced Eysenck' s challenge and 
began to tell psychotherapists what they wanted to hear: 
psychotherapeutic practice was, after all, a worthwhile 
pursui t, providing a means both to specific symptom relief 
and general individual betterment. Mahoney (1980 :xi) , 
suggested that psychotherapy research not only faced three 
fundamental questions; is psychotherapy effective? when and 
why is it effective? how should psychotherapists be trained? 
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but also claimed that the first question had been at least 
partly answered, he continues: 
The latter two questions presume that the first can 
be answered affirmatively. Although I would hardly 
defend the generalisation that all forms of 
psychotherapy are effective for all clients, it is 
equally clear that there is now ample warrant for 
the contention that some of the things we do in our 
fifty-minute hours seem to have positive effects. 
However, this positive message incorporated a double-bind; as 
studies were at the same time showing little or no difference 
in the relative efficacy for diverse therapies (c.f. 
Garfield, 1990; Jones & Pulos, 1993), despite the results of 
comparative process studies which consistently indicated 
enduring differences in technique, (for example, Hill et al 
1979; Brunink & Schroeder, 1979; De Rubeis et al., 1982). 
Luborsky et al. (1975), suitably captured this situation with 
their often quoted subtitle taken from the verdict of the Do-
Do bird in Alice in Wonderland - 'Everybody has won and all 
must have prizes'; a conclusion which was further bolstered 
by major review studies, for example Smith et al. (1980), who 
undertook a very thorough and comprehensive review using a 
quantitative approach known as meta-analysis (this method 
incorporates statistical measurement to review substantial 
amounts of empirical literature), and existing studies that 
suggested that psychotherapeutic practices in fact contained 
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the same 'active' ingredients often those factors 
pejoratively termed 'non-specific' - a useful example is the 
early work of Frank (1973:27): 
Our survey has suggested that much, if not all, of 
the effectiveness of different forms of 
psychotherapy may be due to those features that all 
have in common rather than those that distinguish 
them from each other ... since the leading theories 
of psychotherapy represent alternative rather than 
incompatible formulations, it is unlikely that any 
one of them is completely wrong. 
More recent work in this vein has attempted to describe the 
"therapeutic alliance", (see for example, Marmar et al., 
1986; Hartley, 1985; Marmar, 1990), which researchers and 
practitioners currently appear to accept as the key variable 
in relation to therapeutic outcomes (for example, Marziali & 
Alexander, 1991; Kolden et al., 1994). 
Although process and outcome studies had been considered to 
be addressing entirely different questions, studies such as 
those described above and especially the more 
methodologically sophisticated, including Sloane et al. (op 
cit) , provide an illustration of the ways in which 
comparative research progressed by becoming more focused on 
the relation between process and outcome, for example by 
relating therapeutic outcome to specific measures of change 
and (later) particular symptoms and diagnostic categories. 
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In fact, perhaps the most enduring development has been this 
focus on the various links between process and outcome. For 
example Stiles et al. (1980) utilised the concept of 'session 
impact' as a bridge between process and outcome. They stated 
that comparison of process with long term outcome was not 
feasible but comparison of process measures with the impact 
of a single session was, and consequently the impact of many 
sessions with eventual outcome. 
Later, in their reVlew of process variables, Orlinsky & 
Howard (1986 ) suggested that psychotherapeutic practice 







therapist/client bond iv) 
therapeutic realisations 
(insight) and went on to link these processes to outcome by 
suggesting that the therapeutic bond, along with skilled 
interventions focusing on emotions, were the most effective 
ingredients. 
At the same time there was an increasing interest in relating 
discrete therapeutic events during sessions to outcome, as 
opposed to linking outcome to single or aggregate process 
measures. This development led to the so-called 'events 
paradigm' (for example, Rice & Greenberg, 1984; Elliott & 
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James, 1989) which was to have a significant impact on the 
concerns of process researchers and was said to have given 
the area ' .. a new sense of vigour', (Goldfried et al 
1990:669). Barkham (1992:290-291) describes the paradigm's 
utility in the following methodological terms: 
... the intensive study of significant moments 
occurring during therapy are [sic] more informative 
than the aggregating process of traditional therapy 
whereby considerable 'noise' is included in the 
data. 
Studies such as those above (within the 'events paradigm') 
provide useful examples of a broader trend which - as we have 
seen became known as the 'process-change' paradigm In 
psychotherapy research, (though its current form now tends to 
be referred to as process-outcome research; for example Tan, 
1995), summarised - at an early stage - by Greenberg & Pinsof 
(1986:12) as follows: 
[T] he new "process-change" paradigm. . . for 
psychotherapy research involves the study of 
patient change events over the entire course of 
therapy and follow-up periods... Our studies will 
require measurement of process variables at various 
levels of abstraction; employing different sized 
units of transaction; using sequential analyses as 
well as data-aggregate procedures; applying 
experimental, quasi-experimental and yet to be 
discovered methodologies; using group and single 
case designs; applying both discovery oriented and 
hypothesis testing approaches at all times 
keeping in mind the transactional context in which 
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Four 
therapy events occur wherein any factor may 
influence and be influenced by all other factors. 
years later, Garfield (1990:277) observed that 
researchers were, in fact, responding to earlier criticisms: 
.. some process researchers are attempting to study 
potentially more meaningful process variables and 
to bring somewhat more uniformity to the diversity 
of measures used by individual researchers. 
Importantly, at the same time, the process-outcome approach 
continued to incorporate concerns over the maintenance of its 
scientific status (for example, Martin, 1990). 
In their comprehensive review of the process literature, 
Goldfried, Greenberg & Marmar (op cit:669) too reflected the 
area's optimism concerning the developing process-outcome 
approach particularly in relation to improved intervention 
linked to specific diagnoses: 
The current generation of process research promises 
to forge a new link between assessment and 
intervention ... This calls for an understanding both 
of the determinants of any client's disorder and 
the mechanisms of change, and of the interventions 
needed to produce change for these determinants. 
Research must aim to demonstrate that for this 
determinant, this intervention produces this type 
of change process, resulting in this type of 
outcome [original emphasis]. 
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More recently, Windholz & Silberschatz (1988) claimed to have 
found significant correlation's between ratings of outcome by 
patients, therapists and clinical evaluators and two process 
variables, patient involvement and therapist offered 
relationship. Bachelor (1991) examined client improvement 
with three alliance measures focusing on the perceptions of 
clients and therapists, showing that client perceptions 
yielded stronger predictors of improvement. Moreover, there 
continues to be an interest in linking process variables to 
related outcomes, Jones & Pulos (1993) champion the 
continuing importance of comparative process research, while 
Hamer (1995) draws researchers attention to the conceptual 
and methodological problems with research into the role of 
counsellor intentions in process-outcome relationships. 
Furthermore, there has been an assertion that (consistent) 
findings which relate particular (key) process variables to 
positive therapeutic outcomes have been proven as fact (Tan, 
1995). Orlinsky et al. (1994:361) - much respected in this 
area - propose that: 
... consistent process-outcome relations, based on 
literally hundreds of empirical findings, can be 
considered facts established by 40-plus years of 
research on psychotherapy ... 
Despite such faith in the factuality of consistent research 
findings, alongside this scientistic approach there has been 
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some form of reflexivity. Stiles & Shapiro (1989:521) for 
example, drew researchers attention to their 'abuse of the 
"drug metaphor" , . They proposed that the disappointing 
progress in psychotherapy process-outcome research was, in 
part, the result of an implicit sUbscription to a figurative 
understanding of process which suggested that psychotherapy 
consisted of the application of active ingredients by the 
therapist; a high level of which was assumed to produce a 
positive outcome whilst the lack of such an outcome was 
concomitantly taken as indicating that the ingredients were 
inert (note there is no mention that these ingredients may be 
harmful) . 
One important methodological consequence of Stiles & 
Shapiro's (op cit) objection to the abuse of the "drug 
metaphor" (for them, its oversimplification and over-
extension, p.525) was that: 
... clinicians would be ill advised to abandon their 
theoretical positions concerning what is 
therapeutic on the basis of seemingly disconfirming 
evidence from process-outcome research predicated 
upon the drug metaphor ... (p. 539) 
Thus, Stiles & Shapiro's paper is not as reflexive as it 
might first appear, they were primarily concerned - as with 
many others at this time - with the (unproductive) separation 
between process and outcome and proposed the 'events 
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paradigm' we met earlier as one approach which might remedy 
it. 
Other examples of these (somewhat) more reflexive approaches 
include a sensitivity to context, for example Heatherington 
(1989) examined the practical and theoretical problems 
resulting from the failure to take context into account in 
observational coding and where context ranged from 'culture' 
through to 'the private unconscious context' ; whilst Herman & 
Heesacker (1991) and Shoham-Salomon (1990) explored the use 
of grounded theory. More recent reflexive approaches include 
qualitative and postmodernist approaches (for example, 
Clarkson, 1996) although the area remains dominated by a 
purportedly disinterested, (quantitative) conception of 
scholarly research in which the therapeutic process must be 
reduced to some form of (measurable) variables. 
How might we understand this body of work In relation to the 
research question of interest here? As I have suggested 
elsewhere (Hodges, 1995:301-302), for process researchers: 
Fundamentally, process is out there to be 
discovered, something that despite its transient 
and fleeting nature has a life of its own that can 
be captured by "scientific scrutiny". Psychotherapy 
process research within mainstream psychology ... 
embraces a rigorous scientific and (quasi-
scientific) methodology which stresses despi te 
some recent reflexivity.. objectivity of 
assessment, precision of measurements, comparison 
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trials, control groups and accuracy in the 
identification of process-outcome dyads, all 
concomitant with an ubiquitous faith in the 
(essential) reality of the therapeutic process 
[original emphasis] . 
2.2 LINGUISTIC APPROACHES TO THE PROCESS-OUTCOME PROBLEM 
From the field's putative inception (c.f. Bergin & Garfield, 
op cit), one of the primary methods in process research has 
been the analysis of aUdio-taped (and to some extent, video-
taped) therapy sessions. Thus, the analysis (usually in the 
form of 'rating', that is identifying and 'scoring' pre-
determined variables) of the verbal exchange has been ever-
present in the field. Here I want to consider what has been 
described as 'the "linguistic turn" in process studies' 
(Russell, 1989:507) and focus not only on the methods 
employed but also upon the (usually implicit) theories of 
language-use that inform this approach to the 'process-
outcome' problem. 
Stiles (1979) offers a key early example of the linguistic 
approach, claiming to provide a taxonomy of 'verbal response 
modes' (p. 50) which include, for example, Disclosure, 
Questioning, Reflection and Advisement. For Stiles these 
verbal modes can be understood as independent of their 
communicative (and wider) context pertaining only to 
discussion in general, reflecting the (methodological) 
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requirement within this approach to reduce language-use to 
discrete units (which are independent of context) : 
Verbal response modes are attractive for research 
on the process of counselling and psychotherapy 
because they characterise the therapeutic 
relationship while remaining independent of the 
content of the communication; any mode can be used 
in a discussion of any topic. (p. 49) 
Thus, the content of the therapeutic interaction is of less 
concern here than its form. We will see that, ln fact, with 
all the studies considered here, the communicative content 
is to be made sense of only in relation to the (assumed 
therapeutic) process-outcome relationship. 
Moreover, within his rationale for studying the verbal 
exchange Stiles (op cit:50-5l) offers unusual ln this 
literature an explicit formulation of the theory of 
language underlying his approach: 
A single experience is meaningless in isolation; 
it gains its meaning by association with other 
experiences and ideas. The associated experiences 
and ideas form the frame of reference ... The words 
used to express an experience are not the 
experience itself, but obviously they are 
associated with the experience. Thus putting an 
experience into words places it in a particular 
frame of reference. The frame of reference is the 
context in which the truth or accuracy of an 
utterance is intended to be judged. For example, 
the truth of the disclosure "I want an ice cream 
cone" must be judged from the speakers internal 
frame of reference. 
43 
For Stiles then, language is a system which provides a 
'frame of reference' through the association of 'experience 
and ideas'. This frame of reference will, in turn, relate to 
the truth value of the utterance in question, producing the 
means for its evaluation. Thus, Stiles' conception of 
language appears to occupy an ambivalent position between a 
representational and constructionist view of language. We 
will see that such an ambivalent conception of language use 
runs throughout the work considered in this section. 
The majority of the work conducted within the linguistic 
approach attempts to determine the frequencies of deployment 
of particular linguistic variables (usually termed 'units') 
which may then be linked to outcome, this has been termed 
the 'frequency approach' (Russell & Trull, 1986: 16). For 
example, Gervasio (1988) analysed an assertiveness training 
film using CALAS (Computer-Assisted Language Analysis 
System) which: 
.. . provides totals 
phrases, clauses 
sentences for each 
text. (298) 
for the number 
and blocks of 




For our purposes, this study offers a useful example of the 
frequency approach to the relation between linguistic 
'units' and process-outcome concerns. Gervasio sought 
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statistically significant differences in the deployment of 
particular linguistic units between utterances made by 
assertive and passive role-players (actors and clients) . 
Most importantly, the frequency approach aims at the 
incorporation of the study of language within the existing 
concerns of process-outcome research (outlined in the 
previous section): 
A taxonomy of linguistic styles may prove 
important In understanding the subtle 
conversational variables involved in therapy 
process, and ultimately of the relationship of 
such variables to outcome in behaviour therapy 
[and] traditional verbal psychotherapies. 
(Gervasio, op cit:303) 
Thus, despite an acknowledgement of the central role of 
forms of communication in the therapeutic process: 
Most verbal psychotherapies involve changing 
clients' communication patterns, and by extension, 
the ways they think about themselves and their 
lives. (Gervasio, op cit:294) 
this key relation between communication patterns and self-
understanding is left unattended and untheorised in favour 
of the (assumed) link between discrete linguistic units and 
favourable outcomes. 
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More recently, Stiles & Shapiro (1995:16) reported a 
comparative study of the verbal exchange (frequencies) In 
psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural therapies utilising 
a factor analytic approach: 
Verbal exchanges can be identified by factor 
analysis of the frequencies of speech act 
categories coded in encounters of a particular 
type, such as cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy 
sessions. Factor analysis gathers the coding 
categories into groups, based on their 
intercorrelations. According to this approach, 
reasoning categories that are used together 
("exchanged") will tend to be correlated across 
encounters and load on the same factor. 
Stiles & Shapiro then, adopt linguistic units that 
incorporate the exchange between client and therapist (as 
opposed to units from only one party In the exchange), 
aiming to identify and compare verbal response modes, for 
example story telling, across different approaches. 
However, there is no attempt to evaluate these units of 
"exchange" other than as means to a therapeutic (healing) 
outcome. I suggest that more importantly, the 'frequency' 
approach including Stiles' taxonomic approach above 
ignores the possibility of the detailed analysis of any 
communicative context other than the operation of process-
outcome variables. In other words the linguistic 'units' 
identified with this approach are solely understood as 
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operating in relation to a measure (or measures) of 
efficacy. No other context is considered. 
The frequency approach has· not been without its critics. 
Russell & Trull (1986) argue for the utility/efficacy of 
sequential (quantitative) analyses of language variables as 
preferable to the traditional 'frequency approach'. However, 
for Russell & Trull language remains something that can be 
counted, quantified and measured they use the term 
'language behaviour' (p.17) While they suggest that 
'meaning is primarily born of dialogue' (p.17) and criticise 
the frequency approach as unable to capture the dialogical 
quality of language-use, their rationale for sequential 
analyses still offers the context of language-use as the 
process-outcome relation: 
... changes in the sequences of 
therapist speech may be considered 
only if movement is obtained toward 





In other words, they are not criticising the frequency 
approach per se but rather wish to make such an approach 
more sophisticated, using more complex statistical 
techniques and above all - not unlike Stiles & Shapiro's (op 
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cit) concern with "exchanges" above incorporating 
dialogue within the analysis of linguistic 'units'. 
Other criticisms of the linguistic approach focus upon 
methodological issues pertaining to the form of linguistic 
units adopted by analysts, which has been termed the "unit 
problem" , (Russell & Staszewski, 1988: 191) and which, for 
them, relates to an inconsistency in the use of and lack of 
theoretical and methodological bases in choosing the unit of 
analysis In studies of therapeutic discourse. The so-called 
"unit" for these and other researchers ranges from 
para/extra linguistic to pragmatic features of utterances. 
Moreover, a discourse analytic perspective lS included in 
their description of the various 'units': 
A growing number of structural discourse units are 
available for use, the most popular being the 
utterance and exchange ... scoring units defined by 
more than two turns at talk... are now finding 
their way into process research with its new 
interest in episode and narrative units. (Russell 
& Staszewski, 1988:195) 
For these researchers, discourse analysis is akin to a form 
of content analysis - where, despite the recognition of the 
pragmatics of verbal exchange, research remains concerned 
with frequencies. So although these researchers are critical 
of a crude scientism and reductionism, for example in the 
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tendency of process researchers to seek the standardisation 
of units of analysis: 
... the quest for standardisation stems from an 
outmoded positivistic assumption concerning the 
requisite relationship between the 
universalisation of category definitions and the 
attainment of the much sought after "scientific" 
status of one's research (p.193) 
the welcoming of discourse perspectives does not include the 
relevance of conditions of possibility other than the 
process-outcome context. For them, therapeutic practice 
remains viewed as informed only by coherent and valid theory 
(p. 199). Garfield et al (op cit:670) - who we met earlier -
provide another example of this taken-for-granted nature of 
the context and operation of the therapeutic exchange: 
.. knowledge of psychopathology provides 
information about what to change, whereas our 
understanding of psychotherapy process tells us 
how change may be brought about [original 
emphasis] . 
Process research then, appears to take for granted not only 
the positive nature of the therapeutic process but also the 
validity of those elements that it targets for change. 
I want to move on now to analyses which offer a more 
reflexive consideration of the operation of language in the 
psychotherapeutic process. In their review paper, Small & 
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Manthei (1986), despite acknowledging the 'shaping' effects 
of the therapist's language in relation to that of the 
client, (p. 395) seem to favour the ambivalent model of 
language we met earlier rather than fully embracing the 
notion of language as constitutive. Here language remains 
the medium through which the therapeutic process occurs, 
thus they suggest the aim of the use of language in therapy 
lS: 
.. to establish a trusting, open relationship so 
that the process of therapy may develop with the 
least hindrance. (p.399) 
In fact, Small & Manthei are concerned primarily with the 
question of efficacy, that is with the problem of what is 
the most effective way of using language with clients? The 
possibly coercive nature of such techniques is subsequently 
overlooked: 
.. therapists trained in such [therapeutic use of 
ordinary language] approaches are urged to use 
their client's language as much as possible. Thus, 
although the therapists personal use of ordinary 
language is contrived or culturally typed, there 
should be little imposition on the client's 
assumptive world by the therapist .. (398) 
Thorpe (1992: 61) presents a similarly ambivalent approach, 
considering the role of language as simultaneously 
liberatory and entrapping and imploring therapists to 
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facilitate the opening of a 'potential space' best enabling 
the client to 'symbolise' their feelings/experiences: 
We may see the therapist's task 
facilitation and creation of optimal 
for symbolisation. (p. 61) 
as the 
conditions 
Thorpe considers language as able to (partially) capture the 
pre-ontological 'experience' of the patient and 
concomitantly therapeutic practice as the dialogue between 
symbolisation (language) and experience. Thus, Thorpe moves 
away from a simple representational model of language 
towards a conception of language which, rather than simply 
indexing a pre-existing reality, has a complex dialogical 
relationship with a pre-existing reality (in this case 
'experience' and 'feelings', p. 65). 
Such ambivalence towards a constructionist conception of 
language-use lS also evident in the following two studies 
which both claim to apprehend the normative function of 
therapeutic discourse. Friedlander (1984), despite offering 
a view of the therapeutic exchange as, In some sense, 
normalising (or socialising as 'social policy', p. 335), 
remains with the frequency approach (utilising computerised 
content analysis, DAAS discourse activity analysis 
system) - informed by the process-outcome context where only 
positive therapeutic outcome conditions the exchange: 
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To make meaningful inferences about the therapy 
process we must study not only the content and 
form of communication, but also the functions of 
participants' speech in performing acts that they 
consider critical for therapeutic effectiveness. 
(p. 340) 
Likewise, Cederborg (1995) offers a joint qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of a series of family therapy sessions 
involving seven children, employing a somewhat reflexive 
conception of the operation of language: 
... therapeutic talk may influence how the child 
perceives his/her problem ... The dialogue between 
the therapist and the family members affects the 
child's sense of self and also how the parents 
themselves come to understand the behaviour of the 
child. (p. 209-210) 
However, while she laments that, given we accept the 
therapeutic dialogue as a kind of socialisation, children In 
family therapy (and in general) are left to: 
.. sit on the sidelines as observers of the 
negotiations as to whether their behaviour is to 
be seen as normal. (p. 210) 
Cederborg, In fact, seeks to better include children In this 
process of normalisation, which one could argue is to call 
for greater social control over children rather than 
liberating them from neglect. 
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Finally, in his discussion paper, Russell (1989:509) 
presents a very sophisticated account of the (constitutive) 
role of language in psychotherapy: 
Language so permeates how we come to take persons, 
processes and things that it is impossible to 
imagine how things might be outside and untouched 
by our linguistically mediated construals. 
Moreover, he also refers to the link between language and 
the conditions for moral assessments and judgements of the 
conduct of self and others: 
In brief, language functions to open us up to the 
type of discriminations involved in making broadly 
moral judgements concerning our own and others 
activities. It involves us in assessing conduct 
with respect to standards that before and without 
language would be of no apparent concern. (p. 510) 
Unfortunately, Russell fails to follow this conception 
through to the operation of therapeutic discourse itself: 
Our knowledge of individuals and their place in 
society is seriously incomplete unless we know how 
they and their significant social interactants 
deploy. .. language functions in their habitual 
constructions of self- and social- discourses. In 
therapy, this knowledge must become explicit, and 
extend both backward in time through the course of 
the patient's biography and over the ongoing 
moment to moment construction of the therapeutic 
dialogue. In biographical reconstructions and 
therapeutic dialogue the principle clinical 
material consists in how the patient 
expresses / constructs him/herself linguistically 
and how the patient relates him/herself to the 
therapist (or, within the context of the patient's 
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narrative, to other significant protagonists) 
through the performance of speech acts. (p. 511-
512) 
Thus, despite a reflexive conception of language-use as the 
'principal clinical material' in psychotherapy and which 
provides the conditions for the moral assessment of conduct, 
there lS no consideration of the role of the therapeutic 
process in such moral assessment. Rather for Russell, the 
aim of the therapeutic process should be the making explicit 
of the patient's habitual linguistic construction. (In fact, 
I suggest that Russell has already made a moral judgement in 
constituting the individual as the responsible agent In 
their troubles in relation to their own language-use) . 
To summarise, I have suggested that the linguistic approach 
to psychotherapy process research has incorporated an 
ambivalent conception of the operation of language. In 
particular, although there lS some acknowledgement of the 
constitutive role of language, the dominant methodology 
(that is, an objective, quantitative (frequency) approach to 
the role of linguistic "units" in positive therapeutic 
outcomes), always draws this conception back towards a 
representational mode. 
Moreover, the adoption of discourse analytic techniques, 
amounts, I suggest, to little more than the incorporation of 
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larger linguistic "units" (despite the criticisms of Russell 
& StaszewskL op ci t) Most importantly, what unites the 
work considered here is an uncritical acceptance of the 
positive (healing) effects of psychotherapeutic practice, in 
other words where the largest context that conditions the 
exchange is the assumed link to desirable outcomes. 
The analysis of psychotherapeutic practice lS not limited to 
psychologists. I now want to consider how others In 
particular sociologists and cultural commentators have 
considered the operation of therapeutic discourse in Western 
society. 
2.3 SOCIOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE 
The normal is the good smile in a child's eyes ... 
It is also the dead stare in a million adults. It 
both sustains and kills like a God. It is the 
Ordinary made beautiful; it is also the Average 
made lethal. The Normal is the indispensable, 
murderous God of Health and I am his priest. 2 
The above soliloquy spoken by Peter Shaffer's tormented 
psychiatrist Dysart, embodies the chief tenet of much 
sociological commentary on psychotherapeutics. Such analyses 
have tended to provide accounts of the links between the 
2 From Peter Shaffer's (1973/1987) Equus. Harmondsworth: Penguin. p. 65 
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individual, social, political and ethico-moral processes as 
they relate to the therapeutic endeavour with some 
commentators lamenting the inadequacy of the therapeutic 
endeavour to the task of re~filling the 'ethical space' left 
in religion's wake. I will consider some key work in this 
area and relate it to the research question already outlined. 
Rieff (1966/1987), provides an early and eloquent example of 
sociological commentary on the therapeutic endeavour, using 
the term 'therapeutic' (as a noun) to refer to a shift in the 
Western cultural character ideal in which: 
... the dialectic of perfection, based on a 
deprivation mode, is being succeeded by a dialectic 
of fulfilment, based on the apetitive mode. (p. 49-
50) 
He goes on to map 'the triumph of the therapeutic' thus: 
At the end of the historical road taken by the 
Western spirit, there, waiting to waylay any 
founder of renewed faith and analyse away all 
festivals of divine recognition, is the therapist. 
Where public and family festivals of recognition 
were, there let private, even intimate, resolutions 
of transference relations be. So changed is the 
face of authority that, in fact, therapeutic 
authority has no face. (p.x) 
For Rieff then, the development of a moral ideal with well-
being as its goal has ushered in a form of authority 
unrecognisable as such, in particular given that for him: 
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... the death of a culture begins when its normative 
insti tutions fail to communicate ideals In ways 
that remain inwardly compelling. (p.18) 
In a different vein, Sennett (1977) - through an unashamed 
idealisation of our (more public) past life instead 
critiques contemporary privatism by linking the success of 
therapeutics to the breakdown of the distinction between the 
public and private spheres, where the inner self has become 
supreme. According to Sennett, the most valuable legacy of 
the Western cultural tradition lies within its means of 
regulating impersonal public relations, for example he 
suggests that during the Eighteenth Century sociability did 
not depend on intimacy, but rather, societal conventions 
currently considered to stifle emotional spontaneity 
established civilised boundaries between people, limited 
public displays of feeling and above all promoted 
'cosmopolitanism and civility' . In fact, In Lasch's 
(1979/1991:28) words, for Sennett: 
Conversation takes on the quality of confession. 
Class consciousness declines; people perceive their 
social position as a reflection of their own 
abilities and blame themselves for the injustices 
inflicted on them. 
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Lasch (1979/1991), alternatively lays the blame for the 
'culture of narcissism' at the door of bureaucratisation and 
professionalisation which he considers to be new forms of 
capitalist control the 'therapeutic' being another 
manifestation of our modern dependence upon expertise. At the 
same time however, the substitution of the Nineteenth Century 
utilitarian ethic with the modern therapeutic ethic has 
produced a void within the modern self: 
Our culture's indifference to the past which 
easily shades over into active hostility 
furnishes the most telling proof of that cultures 
bankruptcy. The prevailing attitude, so cheerful 
and forward looking on the surface, derives from a 
narcissistic impoverishment of the psyche ... 
Instead of drawing on our own experience, we allow 
experts to define our needs for us and then wonder 
why those needs never seem to be satisfied. (p. 
xviii) 
In a later essay Lasch (1985:215) draws attention to the link 
between therapeutic authority and our contemporary 
'therapeutic' morality (with its consequential lack of a 
sense of individual control, c.f. Giddens, 1991:174): 
... therapeutic morality associated with Twentieth 
Century liberalism destroys the idea of moral 
responsibility, in which it originates, and ... 
culminates, moreover, In the monopolisation of 
knowledge and power by experts. 
Whereas, for MacIntyre (1981), our reasons for regret are 
instead the loss of traditional duties and community bonds. 
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Likening the therapist to a manager, MacIntyre links the rise 
of the therapeutic to its alignment with a particular form of 
moral discourse - the discourse of the self-serving emotivist 
individual who rejects public responsibility in favour of the 
goal of self-improvement or other hedonistic ends. 
In a more overtly Marxist critique, Bourdieu (1984) suggests 
that therapists evidence the existence of a new ethical 
avant-garde, legitimating their claims vla 
objectivity/science. For Bourdieu however, these claims are 
both arbitrary and functional the ethic of hedonism 
satisfying the aspirations of a particular section of the 
petit-bourgeoisie to both service capitalistic culture and at 
the same time change the world for the better. 
More recently, Giddens (1991) provides an analysis of the 
'therapeutic' as a major 'abstract system' (p. 33) within 
which modern self-identity becomes reflexively ordered. For 
Giddens, the cultural commentary of Lasch and Sennett assumes 
an agent that is far too passive: 
In the work of Lasch, and many others who have 
produced rather cultural diagnoses, one can discern 
an inadequate account of the human agent. The 
individual appears essentially passive in relation 
to overwhelming external social forces, and a 
misleading or false view is adopted of the 
connections between micro-settings of action and 
more encompassing social influences. (175) 
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Rather, Giddens aims to emphasise the self-reflexive activity 
of the modern individual: 
It 
Therapy is an expert system deeply implicated in 
the reflexive project of the self: it is a 
phenomenon of modernity's reflexivity. Therapy 
should be understood and evaluated essentially as a 
methodology of life-planning. (p. 180) 
is important to note that Giddens unlike 
commentators above remains non-Judgemental (or 
the 
even 
supportive) of psychotherapeutics as a form of 'life-
planning' in late modernity. 
Kovel (1988) usefully draws our attention to the refusal of 
the 'psy' professions to acknowledge the social and 
historical context of their practices; other than in terms of 
the story of scientific progress: 
.. an opacity to the actual social basis of psy 
practice is one of the defining features of these 
[mental health] professions. Generally speaking, 
this deficit is covered over by a thick membrane of 
technocracy, which deflects any questioning in 
advance, indeed rules out the possibility of 
questioning the 'pure, value free, and scientific' 
pursuit of Mental Health. (p.119) 
The maintenance of a value-free position, in part asserted 
through recourse to therapeutic techniques, for Kovel cannot 
cover the profoundly coercive nature of therapeutic practice: 
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It only remains to be added that the seemingly 
value-free position subsumed into a purely 
technical approach to therapeutics has in reality a 
profound, if unspoken, value embedded in it, 
namely, that very value inherent in reducing a 
person to a controllable object. (p.151-152) 
Finally the work of Maranhao (1986) most closely connects 
with the analysis undertaken here. For Maranhao, if most 
schools of therapy can claim at least some success then there 
must be something that brings them all under the same 
umbrella and this something is therapeutic discourse - not 
discourse In its more common sense of verbal exchange 
rather a more Foucauldian conception: 
[Therapeutic discourse is] the complex of 
knowledge, power and rhetoric wielded by the 
healing social institutions, it is a cultural 
system invented in European and American societies, 
shaping the westerners worldview at all levels of 
life, and standing side by side, with its co-
cultural systems religion, science and politics. 
(p.xii) 
Maranhao also offers a sophisticated context to the rise of 
the 'therapeutic' in the West, emphasising the ubiquitous 
presence of the therapeutic in contemporary culture, 
especially its ethical operation: 
The psychotherapeutic imagination has indeed 
penetrated all spheres of life in our cultural 
heritage. It is an all pervasive mode of discourse 
in popular and elite culture: it enters the media 
and literature; it concerns philosophy and 
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science, and challenges politics and religion; it 
establishes a new ethics without asking permission 
to do so by forming in clinical practice a 
normative corpus of principles about how we should 
lead our lives. We can say, without fear of 
exaggeration, that we live in a Freudianized 
world, a culture of the therapeutic on which an 
ever-growing gamut of existential problems are 
deal t with by professional psychotherapists. 
(p.26-27) 
However, In terms of his analysis of the therapeutic process, 
although he produces an impressively skilled analysis he 
tends to equate the operation of therapeutic discourse and 
power with rhetoric at the micro-level: 
In the same way that we concluded that rhetoric 
could not stand up on its own, power only comes 
into existence through actions - and since we are 
talking about discursive actions, we can say 
through rhetoric - as well as through a system of 
knowledge which simultaneously defines it and 
leans on it to be reinforced, preached, or 
challenged. (p. 129) 
Whereas in this study I wish to avoid conflating the terms 
discourse and rhetoric but rather seek to conceive discourse 
as related to the technical machinery of the 'therapeutic' (I 
will discuss this in more detail in the following chapter, 
see also ch.4.S). In other words, I seek to understand 
discourse as articulated with other practices and techniques 
(of measurement, inscription and [self-] examination, for 
example) which are connected to lines of power. 
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Sociological work on psychotherapeutics then, provides a 
quite pessimistic view of the modern self and often urges us 
- in different ways - to lament the loss of some past era of 
fulfilment. However, despite the diversity of approaches this 
work does provide a useful core of factors for a broader, 
more contextualised understanding of psychotherapeutic 
practices. The following is a short summary of those factors: 
1) The self is historically situated. 
2) The move away from the public/private split towards 
understanding ourselves almost exclusively through the inner 
terrain has encouraged persons to take responsibility for the 
'reflexive project of self-identity' - via lifestyle choices 
- but at the same time has left Westerners with a 'psychic 
void' . 
3) This void is both a symptom and condition of capitalistic 
economies. Though - as we have seen - Gidden' s work is an 
exception here, providing a far more \ agentic' analysis of 
late modernity. 
4) The solution to this modern empty self has been to promise 
fulfilment via consumerism and therapeutics providing a 
cure but at the same time re-installing the void. 
S) The profession of therapeutics enables practitioners to 
claim/believe that they provide a cure for psychic ills 
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whilst, in fact they provide a means of aligning individuals 
with economic/governmental systems. 
2.4 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE AND THE MEDIA 
There is remarkably little work in this area with the only 
extended analysis relating to therapeutic discourse on 
American television (White, 1992). Before I discuss this 
work, I want to consider a recent and again, unusual 
case-report of psychotherapy over the telephone. 
In his brief paper, McLaren (1992) reports the successful use 
of cognitive therapy over the telephone with a client 
suffering from panic attacks and hypochondriasis. McLaren is 
primarily concerned - in accordance with the psychotherapy 
research we met earlier with the efficacy of telephone 
psychotherapy and the practical advantages it affords both 
therapist and client: 
This case illustrates the successful use of the 
telephone to continue cognitive therapy in a 
patient who would otherwise have been unable to 
continue and keep her job. The telephone therapy 
required less of the therapist's time, was more 
convenient for the patient and allowed the 
therapist to help the patient in her working 
environment. (p. 313) 
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Most useful for our purposes however are McLaren's (op 
cit:3l2-3l3) observations concerning the medium itself as a 
vehicle for psychotherapy. McLaren emphasises the unique 
nature of the telephone medium and the ways in which he had 
to modify his communicative style and deal with the problem 
of (presumably) the lack of a visual channel, which for him 
appears to have had a positive impact on the therapeutic 
process: 
My style was subtly modified and I asked more 
checking questions such as "How do you feel about 
that?". (p. 312) 
Openly addressing ambiguities in the communication 
appeared to increase trust and aided the 
therapeutic process. (p. 313) 
McLaren closes with a plea for further investigation given 
the possibility of 'distortion' in the channel, though once 
again he is optimistic concerning its remedy: 
There are real differences introduced by the medium 
which need more detailed investigation. It is 
essential that both participants are aware of the 
potential for distortions in the communication: the 
flexibility inherent in verbal communication should 
ensure that they can be overcome. (p.3l3) 
We might take from Mclaren's paper the importance of the 
particularity of the telephone medium and the problems and 
possibilities this affords therapeutic discourse (along with 
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its analysis). For example, the lack of a visual channel 
might lead to more clarification (McLaren states that he 
asked more 'checking questions' ) and the fact that 
counselling or psychotherapy are even possible over the 
telephone indicates that it is primarily the verbal channel 
that is required In psychotherapeutic practice. Thus, In 
relation to the present analysis, telephone counselling may 
offer some insight into the minimal conditions for 
psychotherapeutic practice and concomitantly into the key 
elements of its operation. Moreover, the telephone medium 
makes possible a novel spatial organisation in relation to 
therapeutic practice. Counsellor and client no longer need to 
share the space of the consulting room and in this sense the 
operation of therapeutic authority may rely more heavily upon 
the discourse itself. 
White (1992) provides an - again rare In the literature -
extended analysis of therapeutic discourse In the media, 
though tending to remain at the level of descriptive 
commentary and focusing upon the medium of television. For 
White, therapeutic discourse operates as a form of regulation 
of the subj ect' s discourse, which for her equates to ' free 
speech' (p.81) providing a special form of narrative 
involving confession and diagnosis: 
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... therapeutic discourse provides a ready made and 
familiar narrative trajectory: the eruption of a 
problem leads to confession and diagnosis and then 
to a solution or cure. (p. 177) 
... narrative context is provided, and regulated, by 
an authority who positions the confessional 
subject, orienting what the subject will say and 
how the subject will speak in advance. (p. 178) 
However, al though White emphasises the flexibili ty of 
therapeutic discourse (in that it is able to 'recruit' a wide 
variety of in this case - viewers and presumably in its 
adaptation to the televisual medium) : 
Like television itself, therapy offers something 
for everyone, or can be tailored to fulfil a 
variety of needs and fantasies. (p. 180-181) 
She tends to remain ambivalent about the regulatory nature of 
television counselling. Thus, while she identifies the 
problematisation of 'free speech' with respect to identity: 
The couple shows function as social regulation to 
the extent that they channel "free speech" in the 
terms of a therapeutic problematic with the power 
to diagnose social identity. (p. 81) 
She appears to - at the same time - down-play this regulatory 
function of therapeutic discourse in a way which conflates 
regulation and resistance; that is she fails to acknowledge 
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that the expression and recognition of 'social transgression' 
may, in fact, be deployed within a strategy of normalisation: 
But the production of meaning and of sUbjectivity 
is constantly re-negotiated, a process exacerbated 
by the daily renarrativisations of these shows 
where the very strategies of discourse that work to 
secure and regulate subjectivity are the means for 
expressing and recognising social transgression 
[resistance]. (p. 81) 
Despi te this, White usefully offers an analysis which, in 
some sense, mirrors the sociological accounts we met earlier 
with respect to the interpenetration of subjectivity and 
social forms (for example, institutional forms) : 
... these [couple counselling] shows delineate the 
ways in which public and private experience are 
equally permeated by institutional and impersonal 
strategies of power - including the community, law 
and psychiatry - while requiring the involvement 
and complicity of subjects who will speak for 
themselves in their capacity as free, private 
individuals. (p. 80) 
Thus with White's work we have the beginning of a framework 
through which to understand the operation of media 
therapeutic discourse as regulatory In nature, which 
includes confessional and diagnostic modes of discourse, is 
flexible and adaptive and operates, In part, through 
problematising the client's (for White) "free speech". 
68 
In the following chapter I will explore the methods that 
might be useful in analysing therapeutic discourse through 
such a framework and which will enable a close examination 
of the counselling (telephone) conversation itself. 
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CHAPTER 3: DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT METHODS 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Given the research problem outlined in chapter one and the 
lack of attention to issues relating to power and discursive 
processes In the psychotherapy research literature, I now 
wish to focus on the methodological approaches we might 
bring to bear upon the problem. Given my interest in the 
operation of power within psychological practices, I have 
suggested that the work of Michel Foucault might offer a 
profitable framework In which such practices are 
conceptualised as regulatory which I have also suggested 
would be a key concern for a treatment of the research 
problem. 
What then, is the starting point for considering counselling 
as discursive? I suggest there are three main (though 
related) frameworks available for such an analysis, 
conversation analysis, discourse analysis within social 
psychology, (henceforth CA and DA), and a Foucauldian 
approach drawing on the later (ethical) work. I will consider 
each of these in turn, aiming to discern the most appropriate 
methodological means to address the problem. (Please note 
that I will consider here issues relating to the 
methodological framework I wish to bring to bear upon the 
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problem. I discuss methodological concerns which are 
specific to the each of the three stages of the analysis at 
the beginning of each of the related chapters - chs. 4-6). 
3.1 CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 
CA concerns the identification of regularities In 
conversational interaction through rigorous analysis of 
transcript data (c.f. Schegloff, 1968), aiming to identify 
the underlying rules/systems that govern the production and 
operation of conversation, which is understood as a skilled 
accomplishment of participants (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; c.f. 
conversational openings). Thus, CA lS very much concerned 
with a micro-analysis, proposing to make up the shortfall in 
structural sociology which: 
... opted early for a theoretical construct of a 
"unit act" and decided against the study of actual, 
particular social actions and organised sequences 
of them. (Schegloff, 1980:151) 
Despite some capacity to analyse power relations, for example 
(in relation to gender), men's (mis)use of turn taking in 
order to direct conversational topics in mixed gender groups 
(Coates, 1986:101), such analysis of power relations lS 
limi ted In a double sense, firstly, through the prevailing 
emphasis on the micro-level of analysis and secondly, (though 
related to the latter), the assumption that social structure 
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is (nothing but) an accomplishment of participants 1n 
conversational interaction. 
To understand this conception of structure it 1S worth 
briefly considering the ethnomethodological roots of CA (c.f. 
Garfinkel, 1967). Ethnomethodology offers a very useful 
reminder concerning the (possibly unintentional) reification 
of structure. Zimmerman et al. (1991), describe this in terms 
of Merleau-Ponty's "retrospective illusion" - that is, once a 
pattern of social relations has been conceptualised as prior 
to/external to individuals we retrospectively assume its 
predominance over us. 
The comparatively recent perspective of ethnomethodology 
owes, in part, its development to Schutz's (1972) 
phenomenology; his application of Husserl's methods of 
identifying that which distinguishes an obj ect/phenomena to 
the social via 'typifications' and 'commonsense knowledge'. 
For Schutz meaning exists not inside (classical 
phenomenology) or outside the individual or 'member' 
(materialism) but rather between them, that is, meaning 
exists only in as much as we constitute it during 
interaction. 
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One important consequence of this position is that social 
structure is seen to be a product of interaction, existing 
only as a result of the work of members who strive for 
consistency and meaningfulness - this, in turn, operating via 
shared understandings. Garfinkel (1967), argues that the 
social structure/order is entirely fictional in that members 
'see' this structure/consistency only through a process of 
documentation or documentary method, that is once the 
features of an object/situation have been focused upon 
(chosen from an infinite number of possibilities), and 
conceived as evidence of some underlying pattern/structure, 
the process is then reversed so that particular instances of 
the underlying structure are seen as evidence for the 
structure itself. 
Garfinkel also stresses the 'context dependent' nature of 
making sense, that is the nature of the 
accounting/interpreting process will depend upon the 
situation as perceived by members in interaction. In this way 
the constitution of structure is always indexed, whilst the 
quality of that indexicality remains fictional; structure 
becomes structure-in-action. 
Schegloff (1980:106) in his consideration of the constitution 
and function of conversational 'preliminaries to 
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preliminaries' warns of the premature assumption of the role 
of power and status in 'action projections' (p.106) (that is, 
utterances which project the advancing occurrence of an 
action, for example the utterance 'can I ask you a 
question?'), when such an explanation lS not empirically 
favoured: 
It should not be taken... that "requests for 
permission" will be a common use of action 
projections employing nonconversational turn-taking 
systems, especially ones that partially restrict 
participation for some parties or constrain the 
form of talk for different parties. It may be 
tempting to use such occurrences as evidence for 
claims about such restrictions or for claims about 
differential rights, status, power and so on. For 
example ... Sometimes, as in doctor-patient clinical 
interactions this organisation is mapped onto what 
is seen to be a differential in status or power 
between the two parties ... This is not to deny that 
there may be differential... status in doctor-
patient clinical interactions ... The point is that 
caution is in order in too readily taking such 
materials as evidence of differential allocation or 
differential status, when an al ternati ve, 
empirically well-grounded analysis is available. 
(p. 145-146) 
However, such empirically well-grounded conclusions - while 
they appear robust amount only to conversational 
management, or more specifically the management of turn 
taking and/or delicate topics. Thus, CA's rigor has a cost in 
that structures (for example, power relations) beyond the 
conversational interaction itself are rendered less visible. 
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Such reductionism is further apparent in an earlier - seminal 
- paper by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974:727). For these 
researchers much of the technical aspects of the situated 
accomplishment of conversational exchange (for example, the 
local management of turn-order) can be explained primarily in 
terms of what they call 'recipient design' : 
By 'recipient design' we refer to a multitude of 
respects in which the talk by a party in a 
conversation lS constructed or designed in ways 
which display an orientation and sensitivity to the 
particular other (s) who are the co-participants. 
(p.727) 
Thus, Heritage's (1984:241, in Silverman, 1994:125) 
suggestion that conversational structures ' .. stand 
independently of the psychological or other characteristics 
of particular speakers .. ' obfuscates the implicit theory of 
the person wi thin CA as a skilled and empathic manager of 
conversational interaction. Such a theory always risks 
drawing the source of meaning away from the discursive and 
towards the individual (we shall later see that this problem 
has likewise been incorporated into much discourse analytic 
work within critical social psychology). Moreover, Heritage 
(op cit:242) further suggests that ' .. A speaker's action is 
context-shaped in that its contribution to an on-going 
sequence of actions cannot adequately be understood except by 
reference to its context ... in which it participates.' Here, 
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however, as we have already seen, context is understood only 
in terms of the preceding conversational interaction. 
Despi te the more recent appearance of CA work which aims to 
link' .. . interactional mechanisms .. [with] the production and 
reproduction of the varieties of social formations found in 
society' (Boden & Zimmerman, 1991:4), what is important here 
is that "conversation" is taken as offering the baseline of 
structure and function (or as occupying one 'polar type' of a 
'linear array' for example, with respect to turn allocation 
arrangements) through which its adaptation to other settings 
such as therapy sessions (c.f. Sacks et al, 1974:729) can be 
identified via a comparative approach. 
Thus, I suggest that CA implicitly makes participants the key 
players within conversational exchange (c.f. the central 
tenet of recipient design), whereas I wish to focus upon the 
strategic operation of therapeutic discourse. Moreover, CA 
renders an analysis of structures beyond the conversational 
interaction extremely difficult and is therefore unable to 
take into account what Foucault has termed the 'historical a 
priori': that is to say, the historical conditions which make 
it possible for certain utterances to be made at all, to be 
"in the true" - sayable and hearable. 
76 
However , given these problems, perhaps the most important 
point here for a discourse analysis of therapeutic talk-in-
interaction is that although conversational mechanisms need 
not take centre-stage as the motor of institutional forms for 
example, an analysis of the therapeutic encounter should not 
ignore them for it may be those same mechanisms that 
characterise the operation of therapeutic discourse. To 
ignore these would mean to risk missing an essential fragment 
of the therapeutic process and the wider therapeutic 
endeavour. 
3.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS WITHIN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
For our purposes, DA wi thin social psychology, unlike CA, 
offers a more critical and contextualised framework to 
investigate the operation of the therapeutic exchange. As 
Lovering (1995:12) has stated, a discourse analytic approach 
enables the researcher to establish a' .. cri tical distance 
from concepts of language and internal mental states'. 
Moreover, it enables a focus, not only upon moving linguistic 
analyses beyond the examination of single sentences, but 
additionally the association of language with cultural 
processes (c.f. Harris, 1952). 
Thus, DA, like CA, theorises the operation of language in 
relation to its effects, that is, its I action-orientation I 
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(Edwards & Potter, 1992:2), although the context lS usually 
understood as moving beyond the preceding episode of talk, 
incorporating broader social and cultural processes. 
Primarily DA focuses on the form and content of accounts and 
related processes of accounting, (for example Semin & Gergen, 
1990 c.f. everyday accounts), reflecting, in part, its 
development in relation to attribution theory and social 
cognition within the field of social psychology. It is very 
difficul t to offer any singular treatment of DA in social 
psychology because this term has been used to refer to such a 
wide variety of theoretical and methodological positions, 
some of which constitute entirely oppositional approaches. As 
Burman (1991:326) suggests: 
... it is very difficult to speak of 'discourse' or 
even 'discourse analysis' as a single unitary 
entity, since this would be to blur together 
approaches subscribing to specific and different 
philosophical frameworks. 
In fact, Potter et al (1990:205) propose that' ... at least 
four distinct threads of work [have] laid claim to the title 
of discourse analysis.' Two of these have played a major role 
wi thin social psychology and I will therefore discuss only 
these in relation to our research problem. Burr (1995:47) 
likewise describes two distinct approaches to discourse 
analysis within the overall area of social constructionism 
(which, for her, encompasses all anti-essentialist work 
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within psychology), though a useful distinction between 
discourse analytic and the more cognitively oriented 
approaches to the study of natural language has also been 
offered (Gallois & Pittam, 1995:7). 
The two approaches I consider here draw from two distinct 
bodies of writing; firstly (taken together) ethnomethodology, 
speech-act theory and conversation analysis (also the work of 
Wittgenstein), providing an emphasis upon a more traditional 
understanding of discourse as primarily a linguistic form 
(for example, Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter et aI, op cit; 
Edwards & Potter, op cit), and structuralism and post-
structuralism which within social psychology have engendered 
a more Foucauldian perspective, regarding discourse as 
intimately embodied within practices, 
institutional forms and modes of power, 
techniques, 
(for example, 
Henriques et aI, 1984; Parker, 1989, 1990, 1992; and to some 
extent, Wetherell & Potter, 1992), while DA has been combined 
with feminism (and gender concerns) within both these areas 
(for example, Walkerdine, 1990; Gill, 1993; Wilkinson & 
Kitzinger, 1995). Recently however, there has been a tendency 
to draw all these approaches together under terms such as 
social constructionism (for example, Burr, 1995) and critical 
psychology (for example, Fox, 1996). 
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I will offer some general shortfalls In relation to the 
research problem - with discourse analytic approaches taken 
as a whole and refer to particular work or strands where 
appropriate, not least because as the area has matured the 
bifurcation described above has become less and less useful. 
For example, Wetherell & Potter's later (1992:86) research 
incorporates much more explicitly work from post-
structuralism (especially Foucault) and theories of ideology 
(especially Gramsci). Moreover, the different approaches 
described above do share some kind of common framework, in 
particular the function and effects of language and 
'interpretive and reflexive styles of analysis' (Burman op 
cit:326). In addition discourse approaches offer a powerful 
challenge to the psychological (experimental) orthodoxy, 
which is evidenced in the reticence of many psychologists to 
properly engage in the debates that inform these approaches 
and to which I now wish to briefly turn. 
Thus, although DA has been increasingly incorporated within 
mainstream social psychology and research methods texts (for 
example, Hogg & Vaughan, 1995; Breakwell et al 1995; 
Coolican, 1996), there is not necessarily any acceptance of 
the critical elements of the approach, in fact there appears 
to be considerable resistance to them. For example, Hogg & 
Vaughan (op cit:25) acknowledge the humanist element (they 
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appear to conflate the role of anti-humanist influences) of 
alternative approaches to social psychology, which: 
... share a broad emphasis on understanding people 
as whole human beings who are constituted 
historically and who try to make sense of 
themselves and their world. 
but go on to warn the beginning student: 
Most social psychologists, however, respond to the 
problem of positivism in a less extreme manner that 
does not involve abandoning the scientific method. 
(p. 25) 
Likewise, Coolican (1996:181) in his introductory research 
methods textbook foresees the following problems 
discourse analytic and other qualitative approaches: 
How will students be stopped from mere journalism? 
How will radicalism in research be graded? will the 
tables turn (as with long and short hair) so that 
students will soon be rebuked for having too 
precise a hypothesis [original emphasis]? 
with 
Here DA and other qualitative approaches are constituted as 
extremist (Hogg & Vaughan) and faddish and methodologically 
careless (Coolican) Furthermore, Coolican subsequently 
prophesies the continued dominance of 
experimental/quantitative framework thus: 
The experimental and quantitative approach will no 
doubt 'prevail' for some time, especially in its 
strongholds and where quantification is clearly 
the 
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useful and productive. We need to know whether a 
child's language is seriously delayed, for 
instance, or whether perceptual task performance 
is affected in such and such an environment, and 
what to do about it, without having someone 
constantly demanding that we constantly reflect on 
our definition of 'delayed' and then comment on 
our definition and so on. While this is happening 
the child may be disadvantaged still further. (p. 
181) 
Coolican's plea for - I suggest rationality - above provides 
an opportune model of the taken for granted nature of the 
values and ideals within mainstream approaches to the 
discipline of psychology. Disinterested science (in 
particular, experimental method) lS unquestioningly 
considered as offering factual accounts of the (inner) world. 
For Coolican, continued reflection upon definitions is more 
than merely unproductive it is counterproductive. Moreover, 
it is significant that the example deployed here concerns a 
child, which serves to sharpen the moral location offered by 
Coolican - which might be considered a form of reclamation of 
the critical/moral ground of much qualitative work. The key 
point here is that Coolican implies that the reader shares 
the interventionist framework he seeks to defend. For 
Coolican it is self-evident that - for each and everyone of 
us - some (already agreed upon) matters must forever remain 
exterior to the political arena, (political in the sense of 
'open to contest'). 
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However, it is not only mainstream psychology that 
'pathologises' discourse analytic and qualitative approaches. 
In his usefully inclusive volume covering the analysis of 
accounts, Antaki (1994:119) also constitutes DA as extremist, 
although this time it is only the Foucauldian reading which 
is (subtly) pathologised (as extremism) in relation to the 
more conversation analytically styled approaches which Antaki 
clearly favours: 
At the furthest outpost of critical theory .. [talk 
in action] .. shades into abstract relations between 
cuI tural meanings and practices, not necessarily 
locatable in anyone person's talk and behaviour in 
anyone place or time, but infusing the general 
understanding of some institution like government, 
madness or sexuality. . . some reference to 
[Foucault's] .. work is, indeed, beginning to be made 
even in the middle range of discourse 
analysis ... but perhaps too tentatively to give us 
enough purchase on his work to apply securely here. 
So when we say 'talk in action', we need to come 
down the line a bit. 
I will consider here then, two primary (though related) 
problems with DA as they connect to our research question, 
firstly the theorisation and analysis of power relations and 
secondly the implicit individualism which I suggest relates 
to the social psychological concerns of theorists, in that 
explanation within social psychology has tended to be limited 
to the level of inter-personal interaction (usually among 
dyads or small groups) . 
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Within the first tradition described above (where discourse 
is considered primarily as a linguistic form), power tends to 
be understood as 'interest' that is, accounts will be partial 
accounts or versions. Thus, we might ask whose version of the 
world dominates? In whose interests are certain explanations 
of the world promoted? Given such an elementary understanding 
of the relation between the discursive and the extra-
discursive, this first tradition offers only a limited 
perspective concerning power. Here Edward & Potter's 
(1992:154) 'discursive action model' is useful in displaying 
this limited theorisation/understanding of power within this 
strand of DA work, and here I will quote three of the nlne 
overall elements of their model, (provided under three 
headings; 'Action', 'Fact and Interest' and 'Accountability') 
to illustrate this: 
FACT AND INTEREST 
4 There is a dilemma of stake or interest, which lS 
often managed by doing attribution via reports. 
5 Reports are therefore constructed/displayed as 
factual by way of a variety of discursive 
techniques. 
6 Reports are rhetorically organised to undermine 
alternatives. 
Thus, the model by (very usefully) attending to both existing 
social psychological concerns (for example, attribution) and 
the organisational aspects of discourse (for example, 
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techniques for the constitution of fact), at the same time 
disenables a full theorisation of power by focusing on the 
micro-operation of the interaction in relation to the dilemma 
between the construction of truth/factuality and partiality. 
This focus, I suggest, misses the key point of interest in 
relation to the construction of 'truth' in that there is only 
a dilemma here if we consider the construction of factuality 
as operating within language and impute interest or stake to 
the (inner) motives/intentions of the individual speaker(s) 
In other words, this strand of DA has tended to operate with 
a very narrow definition of discourse (as something which can 
be identified as (implicitly) intentional verbal behaviour, 
usually at the level of the dyad; disposed to analyse 
reported accounts for themes which might then turn out to be 
'repertoires', available for individual utilisation (c.f. 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987, Potter et aI, op cit) and where the 
complexi ty of the operation of power is thus rendered less 
visible as a result of equating it with stake or interest 
(both of which - I have argued - retain individualistic and 
psychologistic connotations) . 
Moreover, while the second tradition (drawing upon 
structuralism and poststructuralism) offers a more fully 
theorised understanding of power in relation to discourse, my 
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approach mus t differ from this given the import of 
psychoanalytic theories of the subject (c.f. Henriques et al, 
1984) and the incorporation of ideology and realism (c. f. 
Parker, 1992). Curt (1994:49) have usefully suggested that 
both these variants of (psychological) discourse theory have 
resulted from an attempt to deal with the problem of the 
relation to the extra-discursive, both 'inside' and 'outside' 
the subject: 
If it is the 'externalism' of 'critical realism' ... 
that has been brought to discourse theory in order 
to re-balance its autonomous subjectivism, then it 
is the 'internalism' of psychoanalysis which is 
most readily brought to fill in the 'inner' gap .. 
Thus, Henriques et al (1984:207) offer a cautious 
incorporation of psychoanalytic (Lacanian) theories of the 
subject (and desire) as a means to better understand the role 
of subjectivity in relation to discursive processes, In 
particular aiming to respond to the uncertainty of studying 
discourse at the expense of sUbjectivity: 
... psychoanalysis provides the clearest available 
theorisation of the psychic processes which 
contribute to our resistance to change, and why we 
repeat courses of action which are apparently 
detrimental to us, though its explanation of how 
change comes about outside the confines of the 
analytic situation is admittedly weak. 
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Thus, despite an acknowledgment of both the abandonment of 
the subversive elements of psychoanalytic theory through a 
tendency to focus on therapeutic practices and techniques and 
the historical specificity of psychoanalytic accounts of the 
inner terrain (p. 207), such an approach would not enable, I 
suggest, a 'critical distance' from the operation of 
therapeutic (which cannot exclude the incorporation of 
psychoanalytic) discourse that I seek to undertake here, 
though theirs is certainly a complex and compelling 
theoretical position. 
I now wish to turn to the 'critical realist' strand within DA 
work, exemplified by Parker, (1988, 1990, 1992). Parker 
(1992:22) suggests that: 
... in order to analyse institutions, power and 
ideology, we need to stop the slide into relativism 
which much discourse theory, and post-structuralism 
generally, encourages. We need some sense of the 
real to anchor our understanding of the dynamics of 
discourse. 
For Parker, a clear distinction between the discursive and 
extra-discursive is key to the political practice of 
discourse analysis which he offers in the form of a 
distinction between the 'expressive' and 'practical' spheres 
(1992:96) respectively. However, while the insistence on 
attending to the extra-discursive is concomitant with his 
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(somewhat) Foucauldian position, others have suggested that 
an overly clear distinction is unhelpful (Stainton-Rogers et 
aI, 1995:57): 
Some critical thinkers have found it useful to 
distinguish between the 'practical' .. and the 
'expressive' .. when teasing apart the different 
concerns that orientate our activity .. However, we 
would argue that any practice is concernful and 
hence expressive; and every expression is 
concernful and hence practical. Hence an overly 
clear separation is always distortive. 
The difficulty with Parker's position in relation to our 
research problem is that by emphasizing a split between the 
expressive and the practical spheres there is a risk that 
these will be understood as entirely autonomous, whereas here 
I aim to emphasize the operation of discourse as material 
practice; in other words, by focusing upon the distinction 
between materiality and discourse, we risk losing the 
materiali ty of discourse. Thus, I suggest that a realist 
position is unnecessary here - particularly given the risk of 
a return to reductionism which Parker himself acknowledges 
(1992:95) and further illustrated by Parker's (1992:37) 
understanding of a Foucauldian reading of discourse as 
entailing the constitution of the subject as a docile victim 
of power: 
Whilst the images of individuality, responsibility 
and autonomy which post-structuralists describe as 
part of the disciplinary and confessional symbolic 
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architecture of .. the West do become bizarrely 
internalised and so self-fulfilling .. , a realist 
view sees in those very capacities to reflect and 
remake the self the powers to change it. 
In fact, Foucault emphasises the inextricable link between 
power and resistance, even in methodological terms proposing 
that we might search for resistance as an indication that 
power is in operation. Thus, such a 'realist' view offered, I 
suggest, to escape an imagined (post-structuralist) 
discursive determinism, is not required. 
Finally, Curt, (1994:49-50) offer a useful solution to the 
problems of idealism and materialism: 
Subjectivity, as we see it, is not simply 
controlled or coerced by power, or regulated and 
influenced by discourse: it lS made up of these 
things. The analytic of textuality renders the 
subject, not as a stable entity or inner force that 
underlies the outer vicissitudes of daily life 
(like the concept of 'personality' in psychology 
which is ~eld to be constant despite situational 
variability ), but as a fold or invagination in our 
textuality which creates the impression of an inner 
and an outer. 
One problem with this approach however, is the constitution 
of an equivalence between discourse and 'textuality' which we 
will see relates to the individualism we met earlier (c. f. 
Edwards & Potter, op cit). In fact, it is possible to 
identify a 'textual' strand to DA approaches where, by 
'textual', I am referring to recent critiques drawing upon a 
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particular reading of post-structuralist worki principally 
relying on a Derridian theorisation of the social (and 
psychic) as ultimately having a linguistic form - as always 
already constituted by and through communication and 
representation, the most important medium being language. In 
this way psychic and social phenomena have the quality of 
texts and may therefore be studied as such. Shotter & Gergen 
(1989: ix) in their volume entitled Texts of Identity begin 
the book thus: 
.. all contributors share a concern with the issues 
of textuali ty, with the construction of identity 
and with cultural critique. They are concerned with 
the ways in which personal identities are formed, 
constrained and delimited within ongoing 
relationships. The major metaphor underlying these 
explorations is the text, both the finally produced 
text and the textually aware activities involved in 
its production. 
Thus, while 'textuality' - as we have seen - avoids the risk 
of ideal/material dualism (found wi thin critical realism), 
conceptualising the social and psychic as inherently textual 
invites - I suggest - a homogenisation of thought/experience 
into a heterogeneity of texts, once again failing to properly 
theorise the extra-discursive3 • This homogenisation is 
perhaps found in its purest form in the position taken by 
Curt (op cit:5-6) : 
3 I am grateful to Nikolas Rose for a discussion of this key issue. 
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· .. texts (human beings or human products) which 
impinge upon us by our position in space and place 
'story' our social world into being ... Indeed, we 
regard our social experience as always constituted 
out of mUltiply sedimented, de-formed and re-
formed textuality ... It is easy to accept that in 
our contemporary, media-saturated world, to 'pass' 
as culturally competent requires one to continually 
decode complex layers of text upon text... What 
confounding 'fact' with 'fiction' achieves is to 
make possible the shift into seeing that everything 
is like this. (Original emphasis) 
The most problematic consequence of this textual position is 
the illusion that text - as discursive practice - is entirely 
fluid and (inter) changeable, having the quality of a resource 
which the individual can utilise/voice and interrupt at will. 
Fundamentally, this particular theoretical use of discursive 
practice risks placing the site of analysis solely between 
individuals where understandings and accounts are seen as 
socially negotiated and between people (c. f. Gergen, 1985). 
More importantly, at the same time discourse becomes another 
consumable; its fluid and shifting character enabling an 
attractive flexibility of meanings/uses and an equality of 
opportunity to voice them. Gergen (1992:26) describes the 
advantages of such a conceptualisation of discourse: 
Patterns of human activity largely revolve around 
discourse; discourse serves as perhaps the critical 
medium through which relationships are carried out. 
And, because discourse exists in an open market, 
marked by chaotic and broadly diffuse alteration ... 
then patterns of human action will also remain 
forever unfolding. 
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It seems however, that in an attempt to theorise the 
indeterminacy of discourse as a space of resistance (a 
similar concern to Parker's [1992:37] above), we are in fact 
left with a liberal-humanist conception of discursive 
activity where each and every discourse is available to all, 
thus - as with the CA approach - rendering power relations 
less visible. 
What is required then is a not only a way of averting the 
relativism of the textual approach but also a way of 
understanding the role of discourse as embodied within 
particular practices, institutional forms, cultural products, 
techniques of measurement, assessment, registration, 
inscription and so on. It is suggested here then, that the 
notion of discursive practice as used in much constructionist 
work fails to properly consider these extra-discursive forms. 
In addition, Curt's (op cit:6) (post-modern) rejection of 
truth, that is, \ confounding "fact' and "fiction'" has left 
it unable to account for truth effects. Instead of analysing 
discourse as simply fiction we must attend to the ways 
certain fictions function in truth (where truth is bound up 
with material, including institutional, practices) thus 
enabling an analysis of power other than as perspectival 
interest. As Foucault (1990:131) has proposed: 
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· . truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power ... 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only 
by virtue of mUltiple forms of constraint. And it 
indices regular effects of power. 
3.3 FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Given the problems above, in particular the exclusion of the 
extra-discursive (in particular power relations), how might a 
Foucauldian analytical framework address the 
psychotherapeutic exchange, providing an alternative to the 
approaches outlined earlier? 
In order to understand Foucault's contribution to cultural 
analysis it is useful to set out the different components 
within his project. Foucault has divided his work into three 
stages with the analysis of the 'objectification' of persons 
as the major underpinning of his project. It is worth quoting 
Foucault's (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:208) own reflection 
here: 
My work has dealt with three modes of 
obj ectification which transform human beings into 
sUbjects. The first is the modes of enquiry which 
try to give themselves the status of sciences; for 
example, the objectivising of the speaking subject 
in grammaire genera Ie , philology and linguistics ... 
In the second part of my work I have studied the 
objectivising of the subject in what I call 
"dividing practices". The subject is either divided 
inside himself or divided from others... Examples 
are the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, 
the criminals and the "good boys". Finally I have 
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sought to study ... the way a human being turns him 
or herself into a subject .. 
Foucault then, divides his work into three stages. Firstly, 
the archaeological work which focuses on systems of knowledge 
warranting themselves through claims to scientificity. 
Secondly, the genealogical work with a focus on ' dividing 
practices' and associated with the analytic of 'discipline' 
and the figure of Bentham's panoptican. Finally, his 
elaboration of a field of ethics in which discursive self-
formation is interrogated in relation to sexuality (and the 
self) as a field of problematisation. 
In the earlier archaeological works Foucault's methods were 
most closely aligned to structuralism, earning him the 
unwanted title of 'neo-structuralist'. Foucault (1993: part 
III) claims in the Archaeology of Knowledge that discourse is 
a rule-governed system, autonomous and self-referring, 
however after the Archaeology he moves away from this attempt 
to develop a theory of discourse and draws upon the work of 
Nietzsche In developing a genealogical method. Kearney 
(1989:296) notes this shift thus: 
... Foucaul t 's final works [sic] may be construed 
as, amongst other things, an auto-critique of his 
former attempts to establish a system of autonomous 
discourse on the basis of a structuralist 
vocabulary. 
94 
In the genealogical work, discourse and episteme (a dominant 
discourse embodied wi thin a particular set of practices), 
become one element in broader (though particular) apparatuses 
of power/knowledge/discourse/practice/institutions. Dreyfus & 
Rabinow (1982:xxi) summarise this departure in method along 
with its relationship to the previous 'archaeology': 
[Foucault] ... uses Nietzsche's genealogy as a 
starting point for developing a method that would 
allow him to thematise the relationship between 
truth, theory and values and the social 
insti tutions and practices in which they emerge. 
The archaeological method is not rejected however. 
Foucaul t abandons only the attempt to work out a 
theory of rule-governed systems of discursive 
practices. As a technique, archaeology serves 
genealogy. .. This in turn, enables Foucault to 
raise the genealogical questions: How are these 
discourses used? What role do they play in society? 
It is the latter two questions that are of interest here with 
respect to Foucault's genealogical method as these questions 
clearly show the difference between a Foucauldian and a CA 
approach in that, for Foucault, discourses (including their 
conversational operation) can only be understood historically 
(via archaeology) and in relation to their operation within 
society (via genealogy) . This difference In the 
conceptualisation of context is usefully summarised by Parker 
(1992:37) who we met earlier: 
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Because of the existence of society as something 
that stands always already there in relation to 
persons, it is not possible to say that we create 
society, rather we must either reproduce or 
transform it ... [original emphasis] 
In this way Foucault (1980) introduces a useful means of 
conceiving the relationships between truth theory and values 
and the institutions and practices within which they emerge: 
the analytic of 'apparatus' (disposi tif) . Foucault 
(1980c:196) describes the apparatus as follows: 
... the apparatus is essentially of a strategic 
nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of 
a certain manipulation of relations of forces, 
either developing them in a particular direction, 
blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them 
etc. The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a 
play of power, but it is also always linked to 
certain co-ordinates of knowledge which issue from 
it, but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is 
what the apparatus consists in: strategies of 
relations of forces supporting, and supported by, 
types of knowledge. 
The concept of apparatus then, would serve to greatly broaden 
the notion of therapeutic discourse as used by many 
researchers and commentators (for example, Labov & Fanshell 
1977). Remember though that for Foucault, the apparatus is 
the system of relations that we might establish between the 
elements described above, that is, it is a mobile assemblage 
of force relations. Thus, the concept of 'apparatus' serves 
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as an analytic (I make this point with regard to the risk of 
reification) . 
3.3.1 THE THERAPEUTIC APPARATUS 
The analytic of apparatus then, enables an understanding of 
the extra-discursive elements obscured by some of the work we 
have already considered. Deleuze (1988) provides an 
interesting and illuminating outline of Foucault's analytic 
in which the disposi tif is seen as a machine that makes us 
see and speak, consisting of lines which run through it and 
pull at it. At this conceptual level the notion of 
therapeutic interaction would form only one part of a broader 
'diagram' or 'map' (Deleuze, 1988:44. Thus, analysing the 
dispositif means aiming to untangle the lines which make up 
such diagrams which for Deleuze (1988:44) lS not unlike 
cartography or drawing a map. Four categories of lines can be 
isolated: 1) lines of light, 2) lines of enunciation, 3) 
lines of force, and finally 4), lines of subjectification and 
in this way we see that Foucault's move from archaeology to 
genealogy shifts the field of analysis from the rules 
underlying discourse to the complex relations between truth, 
discourse and power, providing a means of interrogating the 
therapeutic process as much more heterogeneous In nature 
compared with the psychologistic approaches we considered in 
chapter 2. Such an analysis also offers an advantage over 
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Parker's (1990:196) definition of discourse which relies 
solely upon Foucault's earlier archaeological work: 
Discourses are, according to one post-structuralist 
writer, "practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972:49). 
Thus, an analysis of the therapeutic encounter would require 
the examination of all four lines above, reworking a question 
such as 'how does the therapeutic interaction provide a means 
of (re)shaping the psychic terrain?' into 'what part does the 
interaction play in constituting the self as a site of 
transformation?'. Moreover, I do not wish to reintroduce here 
a simple tension between the outside and inside but rather 
suggest a method for analysing their complex interrelation 
(c.f. Curt, op cit:50), enabling an understanding of the 
operation of the encounter within a complex field of power, 
truth and subjectivity; in other words, raising questions 
about the productivity of the encounter as opposed to the 
more usual (process/outcome) questions concerning its 
efficacy which we considered in the previous chapter 
(ch.2 .1) . 
Thus, I am not concerned with traditional questions of 
'outcome' , that is with the relative success of the 
interaction in relation to some pre-defined therapeutic goal 
but rather with the deployment of specific techniques and 
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procedures for making the self an object of therapeutic 
work/reflection, manageable to both therapist and client and 
which, to some extent, relates to the 'process' concerns of 
(mainstream) psychotherapy research, though rather than 
taking 'therapeutic' values for granted, aiming to 
interrogate the therapeutic process as intimately bound up 
with such values. 
I am arguing then, that therapeutic discourse might be 
analysed at the level of dispositif, broadening the 
conceptualisation of therapeutic discourse often used by 
researchers and making up some of the shortfalls described 
earlier. The elements of this 'dispositif' in our case will 
include technical operations, for example techniques of self-
inspection; institutional elements of the radio medium, for 
example issues relating to production; psychotherapeutic 
knowledge (including diagnosis) and its values; modes of 
discourse, for example confession and lines of force which 
will include those impacting upon the audience. Moreover, I 
am not interested in providing a genealogy of therapeutic 
forms valuable though this would be but rather with 
analysing what is usually ignored in Foucauldian work; 
contemporary forms of conversational exchange. 
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3.3.2 THE THERAPEUTIC EXCHANGE AS CONFESSIONAL 
Although In the History of Sexuality (vol 1) Foucault is 
concerned with the ways in which persons are subjectified (as 
sexual subj ects) by the operation of a particular kind of 
apparatus, Foucault makes several observations regarding 
therapeutics, employing the analytic of the confessional to 
illuminate the process of 'subjectification' within 
therapeutic and other discourse. Foucault (1990:59) describes 
the analytic in the following way: 
[T] he confession became one of the West's most 
highly valued techniques for producing truth. We 
have since become a singularly confessing society. 
The confession has spread its effects far and 
wide ... One confesses ones crimes, ones sins, ones 
thoughts and desires, ones illnesses and troubles, 
one goes about telling with the greatest precision, 
whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses 
in public and in private, to ones parents, ones 
educators, one's doctor, to those one loves; one 
admits to oneself in pleasure and in pain, things 
it would be impossible to tell anyone else .. 
Western man [sic] has become a confessing animal. 
If the confessional then, lS one of the defining features of 
the 'dispositif' under examination, we might ask in what ways 
might the therapeutic process work by subj ectifying in the 
way of Foucault's confessional scenario? Might the production 
of truth about oneself - via the confessional - provide a key 
to understanding one of the many processes involved in 
psychotherapeutic practice? Such an analytic would certainly 
provide an alternative way of conceptualising the role of the 
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therapist, less as a skilled professional who 1S able to 
uncover the problems of the client/analysand and more as an 
agent acting as the 'relay' between therapeutic 
discourse/practice and its action upon selves. 
However, perhaps the major shortfall of the 'confessional' 1S 
that it might potentially obfuscate the transactional nature 
of the therapeutic encounter, Stenson (1991: 9) makes this 
point in relation to social work discourse and the social 
work interview: 
Foucault's discussion of the confession as a medium 
of power .. depicts [it] as consisting of one party 
speaking and the other remaining silent.. [I] wish 
to argue that the process goes both ways, both 
parties in the social work interviews are actively 
involved in exchange. 
Moreover, while there are compelling arguments other than 
Foucault's that cast therapeutic systems as a modern 
replacement for religious practices (for example, Rieff, 
1966) ; a detailed analysis of current forms of 
psychotherapeutic practice would no doubt reveal not only its 
confessional nature but also that the complexity and 
diversity of the techniques deployed by therapists - so well 
documented in the 'process' research - renders the model of 
confession as lacking a critical factor: the client's own 
self-formation (that is, their work upon themselves). We will 
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later see however, that Foucault (1988) in his final 
writings - considers self-formation in much more detail along 
with the 'technologies of the self' that enable it. We must 
also remember that self formation here is much more than the 
construction of biographical knowledge but concerns practices 
and techniques which may be deployed to transform oneself in 
some or other way and where such transformation will reflect 
some or other system of values. Harre (1983: 260) usefully 
summarises this key relation between self-formation and 
morality: 
Self-knowledge requires the identification of 
agentive and knowing selves as acting within 
hierarchies of reasons. It follows that this kind 
of self-knowledge is, or at least makes available 
the possibility of auto-biography ... self-knowledge 
as history lacks the dimension of moral assessment 
that is at the heart of self-knowledge proper. I 
think it can be shown that self-knowledge as 
history cannot exist independently as self-
knowledge as moral assessment ... Self-knowledge is 
coming to see oneself in relation to moral order. 
Thus, we might understand the operation of the therapeutic 
exchange as in some way involving a 'therapeutic' reformation 
(and self-reformation) of selves that engenders a particular 
relation to moral order. 
3.3.3 FOUCAULT AND THE SPEAKING SUBJECT 
It still remains however, to account for the detailed ways in 
which persons are subjected through discourse via what has 
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been termed a 'technology of voices' (Rose 1989: 246) One 
important shortfall in Foucault's research was that he never 
extended his methods to the level of conversational 
interaction. This work seeks to therefore engage a 
Foucauldian analysis with one key element of the therapeutic 
apparatus, the conversational exchange. 
We have already seen that established ethnomethodological 
investigations of conversation as the skilled accomplishment 
of social actors have demonstrated its systematically 
structured quality and that those ascribing to this position 
have resisted making connections between micro-structures of 
conversations and macro-structures such as social 
institutions, assuming that the production of such structures 
takes place solely at the level of conversational exchange. 
We also saw that recently there have been some attempts to 
make such a connection. Perakyla & Silverman (1991) provide 
an interesting example; using conversation analytical 
techniques to analyse counselling sessions they go on to 
relate particular moves and strategies within the exchanges 
to counselling as an institutional form of talk. Despite this 
however, the (institutional) context remains conceptualised 
in terms of a skilled achievement of actors (Perakyla & 
Silverman, op cit:445) : 
103 
.. the context of interaction should be treated as 
something locally achieved rather than externally 
imposed. Social analysts should try to find out how 
the participants of an interaction "display In 
their conduct which of the indefinitely many 
aspects of the context they are making relevant". 
I have suggested that although the participants of an 
interaction - in the sense that they produce the talk - do 
achieve the local context, it would be useful to extend the 
notion of context to encompass not only institutional forms 
but also the broader apparatus of the therapeutic. Put in the 
form of a question, how might the moves and strategies found 
within the therapeutic conversational interaction find their 
explanation in the political, cultural and particularly - for 
our purposes moral relations within which they are 
produced? I offer that the strategic operation of discourse 
(as opposed to the strategic utilisation of discourse by 
individuals) provides a key means of avoiding the 
individualism and psychologism of the other approaches to the 
study of the operation of language. Foucault (1990:94-95) 
argues that: 
Power relations are both intentional and 
nonsubj ecti ve. If in fact they are intelligible, 
this is not because they are the effect of another 
instance that "explains" them, but rather because 
they are imbued, through and through, with 
calculation: there is no power that is exercised 
without a series of aims and objectives. 
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Put another way, context for a Foucauldian conversation 
analysis would consist of the entire apparatus of the 
therapeutic, whereby the therapeutic interaction becomes only 
one particular component of that apparatus - albeit a highly 
specialised one here in that we are considering counselling 
within a radio setting - as the site of the production of 
truth through the subjectification of persons within 
discursive practices/ techniques, including ethical self-
formation on the part of the client/analysand (or here, the 
caller) . 
Given this, I argue that Foucault's distinction between 
morality and ethics (c.f. the History of Sexuality, vol II, 
1992), might provide a key methodological element of such an 
analysis of therapeutic practices. For Foucault, morality lS 
understood in terms of codes, but codes which themselves do 
not determine in any specific way how persons conduct them, 
while the space of the ways one might conduct oneself always 
remains a space of indetermination. Foucault calls those ways 
in which individuals might relate themselves to the moral 
code a space of ethics. In this way the 'code' relates to 
techniques of government/biopower and 'ethics' relates to 
techniques of the self (that is, the self in relation to 
itself, as discursively formed) 
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Rose (1989:241) describes how the ways In which persons are 
produced (and produce themselves) within psychotherapeutics 
as subjects within a space of ethics might be conceptualised 
as a significant form of subjectification: 
... humans have been urged and incited to become 
ethical beings, beings who define and regulate 
themselves according to a moral code, establish 
precepts for conducting and judging their lives, 
and reject or accept certain moral goals for 
themselves. 
Prior to his death, Foucault began to write more specifically 
about the domain of ethics described above, outlining 
(1988:18) four major forms of (cultural) 'technology': 1) 
technologies of production, 2) technologies of sign systems, 
3) technologies of power, and finally 4), technologies of the 
self - which (as we have already seen) : 
.. permit individuals to effect by their own means 
or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct and way of being so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, puri ty, wisdom, perfection or 
immortality. 
The analytics then, of the site of the confessional, the 
space of ethics and technologies of the self, might provide 
links between the apparatus of psychotherapeutics and its 
conversational operations. Moreover, although the later work 
is sadly incomplete, we can identify certain directives that 
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might be useful in a study of psychotherapeutics. The (later) 
work in the History of Sexuality (Vols I & II, 1990; 1992) 
and the Technologies of the Self (1988) collection focuses 
upon the relationships between truth, power and self, and for 
Foucault it is the confessional that 1S the site par 
excellence of the production of truth about self. In the 
final paragraph of his chapter on 'technologies of the self' 
(1988:49), Foucault describes the way in which the 
confessional has more recently become less a means to bear 
witness against oneself and more a means to bear witness to 
new and better (transformed) selves: 
From the Eighteenth century to the present, the 
techniques of verbalisation have been reinserted in 
a different context by the so-called human sciences 
in order to use them without renunciation of the 
self, but to constitute, positively, a new self. To 
use these techniques without renouncing oneself 
constitutes a decisive break. 
Thus, we may begin to understand the therapeutic 
conversational exchange as not only involving confession, 
conceptualised as a ' .. form of subjectification that binds us 
to others at the very moment we affirm our identity.' (Rose 
1989:240), but also as operating within a space of ethics 
conceptualised as a space of indetermination and 
utilising/providing techniques of self-formation. 
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It is argued here then, that Foucault's distinction between 
morality and ethics might provide a formula for analysing the 
conversational interaction itself. We have seen that 
Foucault's conceptualisation of ethics lS quite different to 
that of the moral philosophers, aiming his analysis at a 
lower level (Couzens Hoy 1991); examining the ways the self 
regulates itself. We have also seen that for Foucault 
(1992:26) the most interesting questions are concerned not so 
much with the codes themselves but rather with the ways in 
which individuals practice them: 
Given a code of action and with regard to a 
specific type of actions (which can be defined by 
their degree of conformity with or divergence from 
the code), there are different ways to "conduct 
oneself" morally, different ways for the acting 
individual to operate, not as an agent but as an 
ethical subject of his [sic] own actions. 
Here then, Foucault introduces a third domain (in addition to 
the code and the individual's behaviour in relation to it), 
the ways in which individuals form themselves as the ethical 
subject of their own actions. Foucault (1992:26-28) devised a 
four-way conceptualisation of the self's relation to itself 
as follows: 
1) The determination of the ethical substance: 
.. that is the way in which the individual has to 
consti tute this or that part of himself [sic] as 
the prime material of his moral conduct. 
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2) Mode of subjection: 
.. the way in which the individual establishes his 
relation to the rule and recognises himself as 
obliged to put it into practice. 
3) Forms of elaboration of ethical work: 
.. the forms of .. ethical work that one performs on 
oneself, not only in order to bring ones conduct 
into compliance with the given rule, but to attempt 
to transform oneself into the ethical subj ect of 
ones behaviour. 
4) Telos of the ethical subject: 
.. an action is not only moral in itself, in its 
singularity; it is also moral in its circumstantial 
integration and by virtue of the place it occupies 
in a pattern of conduct. 
Thus, it is suggested here that therapeutic discourse - and 
the therapeutic 'process' - might be examined as not only 
providing codes of conduct In relation to a moral order but 
also as utilising the self's relation to itself to achieve 
its ends (that is, as a strategic means), most importantly -
I suggest - aiming to make the self accountable to itself. 
In relation to the four axes above then, therapeutic practice 
might be seen as operating through:-
1) The production of a particular ethical substance upon 
which the therapeutic process may work, for example the 
unconscious, the 'child within', aggressive impulses, a 
distorted world-view and so on. 
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2) Providing an interpellation wi thin which subjects 
recognise themselves as requiring therapeutic transformation 
(or as desiring this). For example, recognising that one has 
a 'problem'. 
3) Inciting the client to engage in particular forms of 
'techniques of the self' that is monitoring, measuring, and 
forming ones own conduct but always wi thin the ethical 
space provided for example diary keeping, relaxation 
exercises, self-instruction and so on. 
4) Providing models of patterns of conduct, modes of being 
and particular lifestyles; specifically, therapeutics 
provides particular models of the 'well-adjusted' individual, 
the 'functional' family and so on and in turn provides some 
of the resources for the projects of our own identities. 
It is important to remember however, that Foucault's four-way 
'map' of ethical self-formation does not necessarily refer to 
distinct obj ects or processes but rather offers a means of 
understanding subjectification, in other words they do not 
refer to planes of reality, that is to ontologically distinct 
zones, but offer a practicable method of cutting into the 
data under examination. 
The above model also begs questions concerning the relation 
between the ethical space exploited by therapeutic discourse 
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and questions of regulation and governmentality (c. f. 
Foucault, 1991b) , where governmentality refers, in its 
simplest sense, to political strategies "beyond the state" 
(Rose & Miller, 1992) concerned with the regulation of 
subjects as members of a population, or in Foucault's words 
the "conduct of conduct". For example, to what extent are the 
patterns of conduct within a particular therapeutic 'telos' 
concomitant with liberal forms of government? The key point 
here is that therapeutics can be understood as, in some sense 
related to the contemporary exercise of authority. In the 
words of Miller & Rose (1994:58-59): 
... the rise of therapeutics [should] be 
understood ... through analysing the formation of a 
complex and heterogenous 'therapeutic machine' 
which has attached itself to diverse problems 
concerning the government of life conduct, and 
which has connected these up with certain types of 
thinking and ways of acting. 
For Miller & Rose (op cit) the rise of therapeutics is 
closely tied to the rise of avdvanced liberalism as a 'mode 
of government' (p.59) because it has made possible the 
government of conduct through the shaping of the ways in 
which individuals practice their freedom (and for which they 
require guidance from experts of the 'soul'). Thus, the forms 
of problematisation brought into being by therapeutics are 
tied to contemporary forms of political rationalities which 
are concerned with the problem of governing 'too much' and 
111 
where the expertise of the 'psy' professions provides 
techniques for the conduct of conduct which operate within an 
ethical "register" and which thereby provide a novel means of 
intervention. 
These are difficult and complex issues, however Foucault's 
framework suggests that our analysis of power relations 
should commence by considering the therapeutic exchange as 
the operation of a micro-power, with respect to which 
Foucault (in Gordon, 1980a:99) has said, 
One must conduct an ascending analysis of power .. 
starting .. from its infinitesimal mechanisms .. 
their own techniques and tactics .. and then see how 
these mechanisms of power have been.. invested, 
colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, 
displaced, extended etc. by ever more general 
mechanisms and forms of global domination. 
Thus, before any of the broader questions above can be 
considered we need to begin by mapping the (technical) micro-
operation of therapeutic discourse conceptualised as a form 
of subjectification. In other words, rather than looking for 
'power' we should seek to understand it in terms of practices 
concerning the constitution and regulation of the self. As 
Miller (1987:17) proposes: 
... I suggest we dispense with the term power and 
begin to talk instead of regulatory practices of 
the self ... These are quite simply practices ... The 
emergence of practices for the regulation of the 
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self can only be fully understood in relation to 
the emergence and transformation of the practices 
of management of the state. 
A Foucauldian framework then, offers a means of reflecting 
upon the 'psy' sciences through a developed theory of the 
operation of power in relation to language and through which 
we might understand the regulatory nature of psychological 
(here therapeutic) discourse. Furthermore, Foucault's later 
work with its emphasis upon self-regulation and self-
discipline enables a consideration of the therapeutic 
transformation of selves as a form of subjectification 
(involving truth-telling) In which the ethical operation of 
psychotherapeutic discourse - its mode of subjection, ethical 
substance, ideal end state (telos) and the work involved in 
achieving these offers a way of understanding how the 
discourse gets 'inside' the subject. In other words, rather 
than conceptualizing some form of psychic processes involving 
desire (c.f. Henriques et al, op cit) by undertaking a 
detailed analysis of therapeutic sUbjection we might begin to 
understand the ways within this media setting that 
therapeutic subjects fold discourse into themselves. Rose 
(1996:142) outlines the way in which a notion of the 'fold' 
moves an analysis of the 'interior' beyond desire: 
The human being, here, is not an entity with a 
history, but the target of a mUltiplicity of types 
of work, more like a latitude or a longitude at 
which different vectors of different speeds 
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intersect. The 'interiority' which so many feel 
compelled to diagnose is not that of a 
psychological system, but a discontinuous surface, 
a kind of infolding of exteriority. 
In adopting a Foucauldian framework some problems however 
remain in that I am not aiming to use a historical method, 
that lS archaeology or genealogy while Foucault never 
considered naturally occurring talk and never addressed the 
media in a detailed methodical way. Thus, there is very 
little guidance for a fine-grained analysis of transcript 
data in the terms outlined above. 
3.4 ANALYSIS OF TRANSCRIPTS 
Given the above problems there is no identifiable procedure 
to turn to. I seek to analyse an archive, not of historical 
texts, but of transcripts of a 'naturally occurring' radio 
telephone counselling exchanges - where the central question 
is how does counselling discourse subjectify the client (and 
concomitantly how is this related to the audience?). In other 
words, my method must depart from Foucault's to some degree 
in that I have only the contemporary 'discursive practice' to 
work with and must therefore focus on the question: To what 
extent are the four (ethical) elements of subjectification 
operating within counselling talk-in-interaction? How then 
might these elements be applied to the archive? I suggest the 
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following questions provide four related means for a detailed 
interrogation of the talk for its truth effects: 
1) How is the client made subject to the discourse, that is, 
how is the client brought to recognise themselves as a 
therapeutic subject? How are they brought to relate 
themselves to the therapeutic code? (this relates to the 
'mode of subjection'). Here, this question will relate to the 
techniques of persuasion deployed through therapeutic 
discourse. For example, are there identifiable modes of 
discourse that, in some sense, align the caller to novel 
forms of self-understanding? 
2) What kinds of techniques are offered for the turning of 
oneself into a therapeutic subject? (this relates to 'ethical 
work'). What techniques for work upon the self can be 
identified within the data? What practices are callers given 
to 'take away' after the call? For example, we have already 
seen the 'homework' provided by the RET approach to 
counselling (Dryden, 1990). 
3) What kinds of substances are constituted as the 'prime 
material' for therapeutic practice? (this relates to the 
'ethical substance'). What are the objects with which callers 
must concern themselves? How are these related to the ethical 
work identified in question two above? What are their 
particular forms? 
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4) Towards what 'mode of being' (Foucault, 1992:28) does the 
discourse move its subj ects? (this relates to the ethical 
'telos'). Are there identifiable goals to which callers are 
enjoined to strive? What values are present within these 
goals? For example, what kinds of responsibility and 
culpability are operating within them? 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
What kind of method have we identified? We saw that CA was 
problematic because we are interested in the identi ty of 
statements and utterances, that is they are assumed to 
operate within an apparatus rather than themselves 
constituting social structures. DA (within social psychology) 
was problematic because primarily we are not concerned with 
the strategies of individuals but with a Foucauldian 
understanding of strategy as relating to the articulation of 
discourse with lines of power. Finally, a more rigorously 
Foucauldian approach also offered some difficulties in that 
we do not require a historical method but rather wish to 
analyse naturally occurring contemporary conversation. 
What then, are we left with? I suggest a form of discourse 
analysis (within critical social psychology) informed by 
Foucault's later work. What kind of procedure is indicated? A 
systematic working through the transcripts, identifying the 
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accomplishments of each statement (utterance) and focusing 
upon those utterances which appear to play an important role 
in the problematisation of the caller's past, present and 
future conduct and concomitantly the sUbjection of the caller 
through therapeutic discourse. Thus, the analysis lS theory 
driven as opposed to data driven. This lS an important 
difference from, for example grounded theory, but similar to 
(established) discourse analysis within social psychology. 
Foucault's later work then, enables a reconceptualisation of 
the therapeutic process as something constituted through 
therapeutic discourse; both its practice within the 
therapeutic interaction and its operation within a complex 
field of power, knowledge (including process research), 
practice, truth, self the disposi tif. We might utilise 
Foucault's work on ethics, with its attention to the ways the 
self regulates itself, to refuse the (scientific) discovery 
of therapeutic process and reconsider both therapy's subject 
and the subj ect of therapy - inviting the questions; what 
relations of self-to-self do therapeutic systems exploit? how 
are clients incited to tell the truth about themselves and 
what does this truth-telling cost them? what are they able to 
say and from what position can they say it? Remember though 
that clients are only able to "tell the truth" because what 
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they say is in some way placed upon a "register" of truth. It 
is truth-effects that are under investigation here. 
3.6 DATA COLLECTION AND TRANSCRIPTION 
Three complete broadcasts of the LBC (London Broadcasting 
Corporation) "counselling hour" were recorded off-air between 
August 1991 and May 1992 (exact dates: 12.8.91; 16.3.92; 
11.5.92) . From these broadcasts ten complete telephone 
exchanges were selected in order to provide: 
a) as broad as possible a range of problems/topics, 
b) a balance of gender (five women and five men) , 
c) a range of three different advisors, 
d) inclusion of the two different days/times of the broadcast 
(as the counselling hour went out weekly on Mondays from 9-10 
p.m. and Wednesdays from 12.00 - 1.00 a.m.) 
The exchanges were transcribed to the quality required by 
conversation analytic research using accepted transcription 
notation conventions (c.f. Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) - see 
Appendix A. In this way I sought a balance between a 
relatively limited amount of very detailed data (in contrast 
to the much greater quantity utilised wi thin ' linguistic' 
process research which has been subject to content as opposed 
to discourse analysis), and the representation of a useful 
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range of topics, advisors and broadcast times/dates (all ten 
transcripts are included in Appendix B) . 
However, despite the aim of providing a broad \ sample' of 
exchanges this is not intended to suggest that the exchanges 
analysed here are representative of media counselling or 
therapeutic practices in general. The aim of the analysis 
undertaken here is to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
discursive processes of media counselling and thus it is 
possible only to analyse a limited number of exchanges. In 
other words, I am attempting here to exemplify the processes 
involved and in that sense this study lS very much an 
exploration. 
Finally, I chose to let the original names offered by callers 
remaln during transcription given that caller's may have 
offered pseudonyms and that given this it would be 
(theoretically, at least) possible to replace such a 
pseudonym with the caller's real name. However, this is by no 
means an ideal solution to the problem of possible 
identification, particularly given that the public nature of 
the data negated the possibility of consent from callers, 
though ultimately this material was in the public domain at 
the caller's own initiative. 
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CHAPTER 4: COUNSELLING DISCOURSE AND MODES OF SUBJECTION 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter the theoretical framework 
informing this analysis proposes that the site of operation 
of the therapeutic process 1S discursive rather than 
psychologistic and that such a framework would enable 
consideration of the operation of power where 'power' might 
be replaced by 'regulatory practices of the self' (c.f. 
Miller, 1987). Moreover, I suggested that we can avoid 
privileging the individual discourse 'user' through the use 
of the Foucauldian analytic of , technique' . From a 
Foucauldian perspective then, I seek to analyse therapeutic 
discourse not only through the meanings it conveys but more 
importantly through its technical effects, or 1n other words 
through the practical (discursive) operation of counselling 
techniques. 
All the transcripts analysed here (with the exception of 
Charles where the advisor runs out of time) end with a 
solution offered in the form of a newly shaped problem. I a1m 
in this chapter (and also chapter five where I focus upon the 
transformation in the content of the caller's account) to 
show that counselling discourse produces complex ethical 
constructions, that is, complexes of responsibility, 
culpability and right ways of communicating and relating to 
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self and othersi of ordering one's life: not only through the 
provision of expert advice but more importantly through the 
reconstruction and reorganisation of the language brought by 
the caller to the interaction to account for themsleves and 
their problems. 
To summarise, I am concerned with the tactical (re-
)production of problems with self and others and the formulae 
for their management produced by counselling discourse 
through an analysis of its ethical operation using Foucault's 
four dimensions described in the previous chapter and in this 
chapter I focus in particular upon the discursive 
organisation (or form) of the exchange (which will include 
certain modes of communication, for example the deployment of 
figurative language). I will begin however, by considering 
how counsellors tend to understand the operation of language 
within their practice and discuss some existing studies which 
have examined therapeutic discourse. I also discuss the value 
of the 'rhetorical approach' within social psychology to the 
analysis of therapeutic discourse. 
4.1 COUNSELLING PRACTICE AND THE OPERATION OF LANGUAGE 
I firstly wish to consider the understanding of the role of 
language offered to counsellors through instructions relating 
to counselling technique. Counselling textbooks some of 
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which offer explicitly technical advice - have, in general, 
very little to say about the operation of language in the 
therapeutic process (see for example, Dryden, 1990; Nelson-
Jones, 1992; Egan, 1990; Dryden & Yankura, 1992; Patterson, 
1995). Dryden & Feltham's accessible (1992) Brief Counselling 
is perhaps useful here as it claims to provide - according to 
the subtitle 'A practical guide for beginning 
practi tioners '. At the same time, the guide concerns the 
model of brief counselling which, I suggest, relates - to 
some extent - to the form of counselling offered during the 
exchanges analysed here. 
Only one slight section In the book is allocated to this 
topic, termed in keeping with the book's step-by-step 
style - 'Use appropriate language and pacing' (p. 56) and is 
allocated approximately two and a half pages. I also found 
one other brief reference to language use and its effects In 
an earlier section entitled 'Elicit the client's Vlew of 
counselling and explain and demonstrate yours' (p. 34). Here, 
Dryden & Feltham (1992:35) suggest that: 
When you are explaining your approach it lS 
advisable to avoid jargon altogether. Use the 
language and concepts appropriate to your client. 
It is a highly instructive discipline to think over 
your work and theoretical stance in order to 
clarify your purposes and to test your ability to 
describe your service without mystification! 
122 
Dryden & Fel tham go on to state that any problems with 
therapeutic language are the result of a lack of clarity, 
'when you are explaining it is advisable to avoid Jargon 
altogether' (p. 35); or a lack of fit with the clients style 
or code, ' ... when working with clients use their 
language', (p. 57). Beginning counsellors are advised that: 
One of the ways in which uniqueness is expressed is 
through language. Class differences in Britain are 
still fairly obvious and are betrayed in people's 
accents. In an increasingly multicultural society 
the use of language becomes even more complex, rich 
and open to misunderstanding. (p. 56) 
Note that here 'multicultural society' contributes potential 
interference to the channel, albeit an apparently welcome -
though some might say patronising contribution of 
'richness' and 'complexity'. Above all, for these instructors 
then, language is conceptualised as a medium which somehow 
'contains' the counselling process. Furthermore, a 
particular understanding of the client is apparent here - the 
individual as unique. In fact, Dryden & Feltham's 
valorisation of uniqueness reflects the humanistic basis of 
much contemporary counselling practice including person-
centred, rational-emotive and transactional analysis 
approaches. Remember though that other approaches, for 
example the behavioural and psychoanalytic models make very 
different assumptions about the subj ect of counselling. We 
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need to take care not to homogenise the wide variety of 
practices subsumed under the term 'counselling'. 
The model of communication· implici t to Dryden & Fel tham' s 
technical advice is a familiar one; the transmission of 
information and ideas (Silverman & Torode, 1980:3), and 
belongs to what has been termed the 'process school' which 
Fiske, (1990:6) suggests originates from Shannon & Weaver's 
(1949) mathematical model. The major concerns of these early 
process theorists were the improvement of the accuracy and 
efficiency of communication through the reduction of 'noise'; 
successful communication (that is, the successful 
transmission of information), was deemed more important than 
the contents of the message (Fiske, op cit:7-9) . 
We might conclude then, that for Dryden & Feltham therapeutic 
discourse is something that above all must allow a clear 
channel of communication, ideally matching the clients own 
'style'. Summarising their language concerns they state that 
it is the client's unlqueness in relation to language-use 
that is important, as with the previous extract (p. 56). In 
other words, it is not the effects of the client's language-
use with which the beginning practitioner must engage but 
rather the unique individual expressed through it: 
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Be sensitive to the clients uniqueness in relation 
to language use. Adapt your own responses as far as 
you can, allowing yourself to be more or less 
informal. Avoid jargon. Be sensitive to the clients 
pace and adjust to it. (p.58) 
We will see later that in the media setting under analysis 
the advisor's utterances regulate, rather than adjust to, the 
client's pace. 
Furthermore, when Dryden & Feltham attempt to engage with the 
dialogical quality of counselling, rather than attending to 
forms of linguistic operation, they instead divide 
counselling practice away from everyday conversation via a 
special kind of therapeutic listening which they offer as one 
of counselling's distinguishing features: 
One of the features of counselling which 
distinguishes it from everyday conversation is the 
quality of listening. (Dryden & Feltham, 1992:43) 
Once again, there is no consideration of the discursive work 
involved in counselling practice. 
We might deduce from the statement above that listening 
counts as a major element of the therapeutic process, Dryden 
& Feltham are once again referring to the 'channel of 
communication' model. Moreover, this notion of 'quality of 
listening' serves, I suggest, to obfuscate any consideration 
of the discursive work involved by implicitly constructing 
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the selective nature of this 'listening' In terms of 
accuracy. Note also that Rogers who '[m]ore than any 
individual ... was responsible for the spread of professional 
counselling beyond psychiatry and psychoanalysis to all the 
helping professions ... ' (Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1990:3) 
made 'accurate empathic understanding' (Kirschenbaum & 
Henderson, op cit:15) central to his version of the 
therapeutic process: 
The ability of the therapist to perceive 
experiences and feelings accurately and 
sensitively, and to understand their meaning to the 
client during the moment-to-moment encounter of 
psychotherapy, constitutes what can perhaps be best 
described as the "work" of the therapist after he 
[sic] has first provided the contextual base for 
the relationship .. 
In other words, I am suggesting that by placing an emphasis 
on the clarity of the supposed 'communication channel', 
Dryden & Feltham's later instructions concerning those 
elements of the client's account to which the practitioner 
should attend, or (somewhat more passively) hear, are shorn 
of their ethical nature; accuracy obfuscates discursivity. 
For example, Dryden & Feltham produce a list of 'common 
questions' (p. 49) which I will quote in full: 
1 What are your social circumstances? (Family? 
Friends? ) 
2 What are your financial circumstances? (Employed? 
Solvent?) 
3 What are your living conditions? (Homeless? Poorly 
housed? ) 
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4 Do you have any current illnesses? (Physical or 
mental? ) 
5 Have you had any major illnesses or accidents? 
6 Are you currently using any med~ation or substances? 
. k I 7 Do you drln , smoke or overeat? 0--, 
8 Have you been involved in any criminal activity? 
9 Are you receiving any help from other professionals? 
10 Have there been any major losses or separations in 
your life? 
These 'common questions' each potentially index an element of 
the client's identity, that is they are less concerned with 
the simple description of clients' behaviour, for example 
with the questions; what are you doing? what have you done? 
and more concerned with the client's conduct which must 
always relate to the question; what kind of a person are you? 
Given this, each of these common questions therefore requires 
an answer which will indicate some or other value and invite 
some or other judgement. 
Interestingly, Nelson-Jones (op cit:31) in his chapter on the 
person-centred model of counselling states, ' Person-centred 
goals are the same for clients, for counsellors and for 
everyone.' He goes on to very usefully list the commonalities 
of Roger's and Maslow's sometimes differing 'goals for 
counselling and for living' (p. 32-33). Remember that these 
are the qualities necessary for any fully functioning person 
to become in Nelson-Jones' words 'effective persons' (p. 33) 
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although the exact nature of this efficacy is not made 
explicit. Again I will quote them in full: 
1) REALISTIC PERCEPTION 
A self-concept which allows all significant sensory and 
visceral experiences to be perceived is the basis for 
effective functioning. 
2) RATIONALITY 
A feature of realistic perception lS that it allows for 
rationality. 
3) PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The term 'personal responsibility' refers to people's 
taking responsibility for their self-actualising and not 
just feeling responsible to others. 
4) SELF-REGARD 
People with a high degree of unconditional self-regard 
will prize themselves, even though they may not prize 
all their behaviours and attributes. 
5) CAPACITY FOR GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS 
Self-acceptance means that a person is less likely to be 
defensive and hence more likely to accept others. 
6) ETHICAL LIVING 
.. . self-actualising people .. are careful not to infringe 
on the rights of others while pursuing their own ends ... 
they appear to be able to distinguish sharply between 
ends and means and between good and evil. Qualities 
which are likely to contribute to such people's ethical 
living are: trust in internal rather than in external 
authority; an indifference to material things, such as 
money and status symbols; an attitude of closeness to 
and reverence for nature; and a yearning and seeking for 
spiritual values that are greater than the individual. 
These person-centred goals are saturated with values and 
judgements. What Rogers has called the 'person of tomorrow' 
and Combs & Snygg (1959) the 'adequate person' (Nelson-Jones 
op cit:32), has very clearly defined qualities which include: 
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realistic perception allowing rationality, responsibility not 
only to others but also to oneself and ones 'growth', along 
with a high degree of unconditional self-regard and self-
acceptance leading to acceptance of others. Most importantly 
we are offered a description of 'ethical living' (p. 32). 
Interestingly, the use of the term ethical here, offers the 
notion as having a commonly shared and taken-for-granted 
meaning, there is no definition or explanation of the term 
itself - variability in ethical systems is entirely absent. 
'Ethical living' (p.33) then, concerns: 
1) Care... not to infringe the rights of others while 
pursuing ones own ends ... 
2) [A sharp distinction] between ends and means and 
between good and evil. 
Note that these forms of conduct are given as those of 'self-
actualising people', (p. 33) We are subsequently offered 
'qualities which are likely to contribute to such people's 
ethical living' (p.33) which - as we have ssen - include: 
1) Trust in internal rather than external 
authority. 
2) Indifference to material things. 
3) An attitude of closeness to and reverence for 
nature. 
4) A yearning and seeking for spiritual values that 
are greater than the individual. 
The prescriptive element of these forms of conduct then, lS 
down-played by linking them to a personality-type (that is, a 
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complex of traits) understood in terms of a life-goal, 
described as 'self-actualising persons'. We are offered 
ethical living as something such people have been found to 
do, along with qualities they 'appear' to have; naturalised 
prescription is offered as normalised description, (c. f. 
Burman, 1994:4). From a Foucauldian viewpoint, the goals for 
living along with their implied values and judgements, In 
fact, constitute a certain type of "normal" person - but one 
which is less an average and more an ideal. 
In other words, these 'goals for living' offer a clear 
picture of an indi vidual who, through rational self-
acceptance and self-regard is able, in turn, to operate as a 
good person who takes responsibility for governing 
themself, rather than being governed by external authority, 
though reverence must be saved for 'nature' and 'spiritual 
values' greater than the individual. That this ideal is right 
and proper or 'ethical' is taken by Nelson-Jones (1992:32) as 
self-evident. 
Dryden & Feltham's questions then, along with the person-
centred attributes of 'effective persons' above, have been 
offered as highlighting those potential elements concerning 
our relations to ourselves and others with which all of us 
might engage, indeed this point might be tentatively taken a 
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little further and the questions and qualities above seen as 
reflecting certain of those elements with which we are 
obliged to concern ourselves as contemporary selves tied to a 
project of self-identity (c.f. Rose, 1989:254; Giddens, 
1991:14). Moreover, I have tried to show that these goals for 
living are not as indefinite as they may appear, but rather 
are highly specific in that they can, in part, be seen to 
resemble the self-governing citizen of our contemporary forms 
of governmentality. Walkerdine (1988:5) usefully situates 
Foucauldian discourse analysis with respect to the operation 
of democratic government: 
The post-structuralist work of Foucault allows us 
to engage with the production of sign systems, but 
not as universal, trans-historical systems, but as 
specific historically generated bodies of 
knowledge. not only that, but modern scientific 
accounts ... can be understood as implicated in the 
production of our modern form of government - the 
democratic government of reason. 
While Rose (1989:256) further suggests that the regulatory 
nature of psychotherapeutic practices (and their goals) is 
intimately bound with practices of freedom: 
Their.. [psychotherapeutic solutions to the 
government of subj ecti vi ty] .. espousal of the 
morality of freedom, autonomy, and fulfilment 
provides for the mutual translatability of the 
languages of psychic health and individual liberty. 
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Thus, 'psychic health' operating as a sign of freedom and 
liberty paradoxically invites persons to govern their own 
subj ecti vi ty (in accordance with the ideals of democratic 
governmen t) . 
Finally, it lS important that the questions are presented in 
Dryden & Feltham's guide under the rubric of eliciting 
'crucial or helpful information' (p.48) and that their 
concerns lie with whether or not the client might find the 
questions intrusive along with the ways such activities may 
or may not match the practitioner's own model of counselling. 
Thus despite their assertion that: 
We believe that there is a directive element In 
counselling and that it is advisable to recognise 
this and use it to help the client. (Dryden & 
Feltham, 1992:35) 
this ' directive element' is not explicitly dealt with in 
relation to the forms of questions practitioners are guided 
to put to their clients. I will show later that during one of 
the broadcasts considered here, the counsellor's initial 
questions often heard as requests for information and 
clarification may have a clear ' shaping' effect on the 
client's account of their problem. 
The key point here, I suggest, is that to constitute these 
values, judgements and ideals in terms of the accuracy of 
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communication is to avoid confronting the moral and ethical 
operation of therapeutic discourse. Moral, in that the notion 
of 'effective persons' offers an ideal (code) to work 
towards, and ethical, 1n that this ideal is to be won, in 
part, within the space of the person's relation to 
themselves. 
4.2 COUNSELLING AND THE MEDIA 
Although - as we have seen, ch. 2.4 - very little has been 
written on the subject, media therapeutics also appears to 
utilise the 'process-model' of communication. Dryden's (1992) 
interview with John Cobb, the host of Thames Television's A 
Problem Aired, offers the following account of 
information that Cobb receives prior to a recording: 
[The initial interviews] .. cover both the past and 
the present problems, but from a totally non-
medical or even non-psychotherapeutic point-of-
view. They are just good honest descriptions. 
(Dryden, 1992:80, my emphasis) 
the 
For Cobb then, the information he is supplied prior to the 
recording 1S thoroughly objective, even to the extent that 
psychotherapeutic interpretation 1S entirely absent. Cobb 
goes on to provide some indication of the kind of client he 
requires for the brief therapeutic interaction that 
constitutes his broadcast and the problems they bring with 
them. This may have some parallel with the counselling 
offered in the radio broadcast, although I have no 
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information regarding the 'vetting' techniques which operated 
there: 
I am looking for an identifiable focused problem, 
and for somebody who is likely to be able to 
communicate in front of the cameras. Intelligence 
hasn't been an issue, but somebody who is very 
inarticulate or tends to be monosyllabic and 
difficul t to engage wouldn't be sui table for the 
programme. (Dryden, 1992:78) 
Cobb then, only accepts certain clients for his broadcast. 
The two criteria he lists above are interesting in that it 
would seem that acceptable clients are those who firstly 
in some sense - have already begun to work on their problem 
by constituting it as ' focused' and secondly who have a 
particular level of verbal ability. In other words, the 
client must be able to communicate and verbally engage with 
their problem not only during the broadcast but, In some 
sense, before it; while at the same time their account must 
present a clear picture of their difficulties. I will later 
show how one counsellor in the radio broadcasts aims to 
'singularise' the caller's difficulties by condensing the 
details of their utterances into a series of simplified 
statements. 
In fact, Dryden In a later book concerning rational-emotive 
counselling (1992:39) repeats his concern that the client's 
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account should be shorn of too much detail, instructing the 
counsellor as follows: 
There are a number of pitfalls to avoid while 
assessing A [the clients account of their problem] . 
When your client does give you a lot of detail, try 
to abstract the salient theme from what he [sic] 
says, or summarise what you understand to be the 
major aspect of A about which he [sic] may be 
emotionally disturbed. 
Dryden constitutes the initial stages of the therapeutic 
process - at least, implicitly in terms of a process of 
summarisation or abstraction, that is he implies that the key 
aspects of the client's account are left intact. In other 
words, the counsellor, at this early assessment stage, does 
not re-shape the client's account but rather summarlses or 
abstracts those aspects that pertain to emotional 
disturbance. There is an impression here that this process of 
abstraction is objective; I will show that even at this early 
phase in the counselling process we can see the constitutive 
nature of the counsellor's practice. 
Considering a broader view of the therapeutic process, Cobb 
offers the notion of 're-framing' which he goes on to 
describe as the provision of a different view-point: 
Very often it is a question of re-framing. For 
example, a patient may seem to be bogged down and 
unable to sustain relationships, but the problem 
may, in fact, be related to unresolved grief over 
the death a few years before of someone important, 
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for example. In such cases I would try to help the 
patient to look at his or her difficulties from a 
different point of view. (Dryden, 1992:80) 
Cobb further elaborates this re-framing in terms of promoting 
an 'intrapsychic angle' (p.80). The values which inform this 
position or 'angle' are entirely absent from Cobb's answers 
or Dryden's questions, suggesting that they are assured or 
pre-supposed. Interestingly, at the end of Cobb's reply he 
makes what might be considered a problematic, and certainly 
highly political, statement regarding an imaginary problem a 
woman might have with men: 
I try to promote a psychological, intrapsychic 
angle on the problem, to encourage people to see 
that problems stem from their attitudes and outlook 
and the way they react to the world. The reason, 
for example, why a woman seems to be let down time 
and again by men may be to do with her attitude 
towards men. (Dryden, 1992:80) 
Dryden does not engage with this last comment, immediately 
after which he asks 'Is this shift to a different perspective 
something that people can use later?' However, Cobb's example 
highlights the ethical operation of therapeutic discourse of 
interest here, through its attribution of responsibility -
which may lie entirely with the woman herself. 
In conclusion, for Dryden & Feltham (op cit) language 
provides a potentially corruptible channel of communication, 
whereas for Cobb media therapeutics relies upon initial 
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objective information about the client while the therapeutic 
process entails Ire-framing' the client's problem within the 
intrapsychic. Both the linguistic and the moral and ethical 
aspects of the process are absent for;m these understandings. 
j 
In this chapter I will show that such a model of language is 
wholly inadequate to a proper understanding of the 
therapeutic process. I have already argued for an alternative 
conception of the operation of language drawing on Foucault's 
work (ch 3.3) and here I aim to interrogate this alternative 
conception through an analysis of key excerpts from the data. 
In particular, I suggest that therapeutic discourse offers 
clients new ways of understanding themselves i new ways of 
describing their histories, their present experiences and 
their future goals. These descriptions offered within 
therapeutic discourse as objective and factual provide 
clients with the possibility of changing their idea of the 
person they take themselves to be. 
Hacking (1995:21) suggests that descriptions of certain kinds 
of person generate expectations from those In authority 
those experts able to offer the description - and operate 
within a feedback loop consisting of the constitutive 
elements of expert descriptions and the need for these 
descriptions to respond to changes in patterns of behaviour 
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which they subsequently are unable to capture. Hacking terms 
this process 'the looping effect of human kinds': 
People classified in a certain way tend to conform 
to or grow into the ways that they are described; 
but they also evolve in their own ways, so that the 
classifications and descriptions have to be 
constantly revised. 
This 'looping effect' refers to more than the linguistic 
construction of reality but suggests that sense of self is 
intricately bound up with the production of knowledges 
concerning it. Hacking (op cit:68) suggests that: 
.. constructed knowledge loops in upon people's 
moral lives, changes their sense of self-worth, re-
organises and re-evaluates the soul. 
Davies & Harre (1990:46) offer a similar understanding in 
relation to positions within discourse: 
Once having taken up a particular position as one's 
own, a person inevitably sees the world from the 
vantage point of that position and /n terms of the 
particular images, metaphors, st6ry lines and 
concepts which are made relevant within the 
particular discursive practice in which they are 
positioned. 
Within this setting then, therapeutic discourse can be seen 
to operate on clients' existing sense of self, which will be 
bound up with their existing everyday practices, in part 
through altering expectations of conduct; thus I will show in 
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this chapter that what makes therapeutic discourse special is 
its operation upon client's self-expectations. Fundamentally, 
descriptions of kinds of person open up new avenues for 
conduct: 
Inventing or moulding a new kind, a new 
classification of people, or of behaviour, may 
create new ways to be a person, and hence new 
actions under a description. It is not that people 
change, substantively, but that as a point of logic 
new opportuni ties for action are open to them. 
(Hacking, 1995:239) 
4.3 EXISTING STUDIES OF THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE 
I have found few comprehensive analyses of therapeutic 
discourse (Labov & Fanshell, 1977; Ilian, 1988; Ferrara, 
1988; White, 1992) The latter study (White, 1992) , 
specifically addresses media therapeutics and was discussed 
1n chapter 2.4. All three of the remaining large-scale 
studies show a commitment to a therapeutic process situated 
in the 'real', a conception of discourse as a resource for 
individual users (that is, the source of its meaning remains 
with the individual but 1S dependent upon the particular 
situation), and an acceptance of the general values and aims 
of psychotherapy. 
For example, Ferrara (1988) utilises a form of discourse 
analysis in which (and not unlike Potter & Wetherell, 1987), 
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cultural processes provide the speaker with a range of 
resources at their disposal for a range of interactions: 
Speakers may select from a variety of language 
combinations ... those permutations offered by their 
cul ture which best suit the interactional needs 
arising in a given discourse. (p.18) 
The claim advanced is that repetition and 
contiguity. . . are manipulatable resources of 
language which speakers can recombine in various 
ways to create meaning within a given context. 
(p. 2) 
In relation to the situation of the therapeutic wi thin the 
(extra-linguistic) 'real', Ilian (1988:2) takes the empirical 
nature of his method to an extreme formulation by likening it 
to slow-motion photography: 
To bring these processes of interaction into view 
is analogous to the study of nature by means of 
time-lapse photography or slow-motion film or by 
super-high-speed photography. There are significant 
features in the life processes of animal and plant 
species which can only be studied by either slowing 
them down or speeding them up. Just as in a time-
lapse film of a flower opening it is possible to 
observe things which are not observable otherwise, 
it should be possible in a "slowed-down" view of 
the interaction in psychotherapy to observe the 
processes by which interaction between a therapist 
and a client lead to change in the problem for 
which the client has come for help. 
Ilian's statement offers a vivid plea for both the 
objectivity of his more linguistics based discourse analysis 
and the concrete nature of the interaction he seeks to 
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elucidate; its form substantial enough to undergo a slowed-
down scrutiny akin to slow-motion photography. Ilian' s work 
is very much situated within a conversational analytic 
framework and therefore reflects a desire to 'tell-it-as-it-
is' , or, in other words, that the micro-operations of 
conversation described using this approach map straight-
forwardly onto reality; CA, when it offers descriptions, at 
the same time claims to "uncover" them. 
Note however that I am less concerned here with CArs claims 
to objectivity per se, than with its lack of treatment of the 
constitution of 'truth'. In other words my focus here on the 
production of truth and falsity (or the process of 
problematisation I say more about this in the following 
chapter), requires a method able to capture it; this method 
will thus need to move beyond an empiricist position. CA' s 
project to map the general rules for the production of 
conversational interaction closes too soon. So that even 
though some of its findings have been utilised In rhetorical 
and discourse analyses (for example Antaki, 1994), it offers 
only limited value for a Foucauldian perspective which 
seeks to scrutinise the strategic (and technical) operation 
of therapeutic language. 
141 
Ilian's (1988) investment in the 'real' is also very much 
evidenced in Labov & Fanshell's (1977) study of therapeutic 
discourse which focuses attention on the linguistic 
construction of the therapeutic process, detailing the 
interactional work that is required on both the part of the 
therapist and the client in the negotiation of the origins 
of the clients problem in this case anorexia nervosa. 
However, although they state that there is a sense in which 
the conversational work they chart aims at shifting the focus 
from 'surface' to 'deeper' emotional factors (generally 
initiated by the therapist), there remains a commitment to 
the independent existence of those objects constituted 
through linguistic activity: 
In the absence of intersubjective agreement on the 
coding of .. intonational contours, it is important 
for the reader to be able to view the data directly 
especially because there is often a one-to-one 
iconic relationship between the movements of voice 
and the emotions being conveyed. (Labov & Fanshel, 
1977:43) 
Labov & Fanshel, although providing a highly detailed and 
extremely sophisticated analysis, are concerned not only with 
the linguistic productions of participants but additionally 
with their underlying (inner) intentions. Their investment in 
the ' real' is further evidenced by their sUbscription to 
existing understandings of psychopathology. In fact, they 
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appear to reconceptualise pathology as having a linguistic 
operation, for example they suggest that: 
... there is no simple way to refer to Rhoda's 
weight without disturbing the smooth flow of 
conversation. On the other hand the various devices 
that people use to disguise, mask and mitigate 
emotion are so effective that it is possible to 
listen to very long stretches of conversation 
without picking up any obvious signs of what people 
are feeling. (p. 334) 
Moreover, in their analysis of 'the largest context that 
condi tions that interaction [therapeutic conversation] .. ' 
(1977:30), they choose not to provide a critique of the 
therapeutic endeavour itself or to engage with the power 
relation inherent within the conversation other than in the 
terms already provided by the existing process work: 
In the course of daily life, .. deep emotions are 
usually masked by the actors involved. However, 
their effects can be seen by the continued 
disturbance of family relationships and the 
neurotic behaviour that interferes with life goals 
of the family members. (p.329) 
I am suggesting that Labov & Fanshell's notion of the context 
of the therapeutic interaction is a very limited one which, 
in particular, fails to include any consideration of 
therapeutics as a value system and concomitantly the ethical 
operation of the interaction. In fact, they appear to fully 
accept the values of the therapeutic endeavour in that, for 
example, resistance on the part of the client is accepted as 
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problematic, providing difficulties for the therapist in her 
attempts to heal: 
We have seen what the therapist is trying to 
accomplish - to move from discussion of everyday 
events and the overt norms recognised by society 
into the areas of deeply felt emotions. We have 
also seen the kinds of resistance that the patient 
is capable of showing and the difficulties the 
therapist has in moving to her final goal. (p.327) 
Although the ethical operation of therapeutic discourse was 
not considered relevant by Labov & Fanshell (op cit) because 
their chosen conceptual framework does not include it, I 
suggest that the key point is that such a failure means 
losing a significant element of the therapeutic process. 
In saying this I am not suggesting that my analysis is 
necessarily a critique, nor that Labov & Fanshell should have 
provided one this clearly was not their intention given 
their linguistics-based framework. What I am suggesting is 
that to interrogate the therapeutic conversation for its 
ethical operation (c. f. Foucault, 1985) enables an 
understanding of its relation to lines of power or force. To 
conceptualise the therapeutic's operation as somehow external 
to power relations is to mlSS the key elements of its 
discursive operation. 
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4.4 PSYCHOTHERAPY AS PERSUASION 
In this section I wish to consider the utility of the 
rhetorical approach which has come to form one of the major 
elements of contemporary social psychology, I will focus in 
particular on the work of Billig (c. f. Billig et aI, 1988; 
Billig, 1991; Billig, 1996) as it is this work, more than any 
other, that has succeeded in bringing rhetorical analysis to 
the attention of social psychologists. Billig, (1991:34-35) 
offers an understanding of the role of language 
psychotherapy thus: 
The first psychotherapist was the Sophist Antiphon, 
who was well famed for his powers of persuasion. 
Antiphon hired a shop near the market place of 
Corinth and offered his services to the grief 
stricken. He claimed that no-one had a sorrow so 
powerful that it could not be dispelled by his 
special 'sorrow assuaging' lectures. Modern 
psychotherapists prefer to use the language of 
illness, rather than that of persuasion: they 
prefer to talk about 'patients', 'mental illness' 
and therapeutic cures. However, at root, perhaps, 
they are not acting in such a different manner from 
Antiphon, by persuading those sorrowful down-in-
the-dumps to cheer up. 
in 
What is interesting here concerning Billig's uncovering of 
the origin of modern psychotherapy is 1) the theory of 
history offered, that is the underlying similarity between 
the discourse of the Sophists and modern psychotherapeutic 
discourse, concomitant with a history of ideas and 2) that 
language use, or better its action-orientation is equivalent 
to persuasion. Persuasion, in fact forms a major element of 
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Billig's definition of rhetoric, which incorporates an 
emphasis on dialogic process, along with a conception of the 
subject as 'argumentative debater' (1991:45) in addition to -
more problematically, I suggest equating discourse with 
rhetoric: 
In speaking of the argumentative meaning of 
discourse, the image of the thinker has shifted. No 
longer is the thinker merely a rule-follower or an 
organiser of information. The image has been 
transformed into something more dynamic and social 
(even anti-social). It lS an lmage of an 
argumentative debater, and it is this image which 
is so peripheral to much of cognitive psychology, 
and yet which is central to the psychology of the 
ancient rhetoricians. (1991:45-46) 
For Billig, rhetoric, itself a result of conflict In almost 
every area of lived experience, operates as processes of 
argument and debate at the individual level and as contrary 
themes expressed as social representations and common sense 
at the level of the 'thinking society' (1991:72): 
The existence of contrary maxims, or opposing 
pieces of folk wisdom, illustrates that common 
sense possesses a dilemmatic nature. These contrary 
themes are the preconditions for those dilemmas in 
which people are faced with difficult decisions ... 
Our concern is ... with those contrary themes which 
under normal circumstances are reflected In 
people's thoughts. (Billig et al., 1988:2-3) 
For Billig the term rhetoric seems to operate as an umbrella 
term for a vast range of processes, as I have said it lS 
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equated with the production of ideological dilemmas, language 
and discourse and even general psychological processes: 
If one sets oneself up as an expert in persuasion, 
then one is claiming a certain psychological 
expertise. One is claiming to know how to move the 
hearts and minds of people, and to understand the 
psychology of audiences. (1991:34) 
Although the approach here certainly provides a very useful 
focus on language and persuasion, it seems also to produce an 
image of the subject as freely acting within the constraints 
of a dialogical framework, or better a never resolved 
dialectic. Moreover, in relation to the links between his own 
position and that of Habermas - particularly in the Theory of 
communicative Action - Billig (1996:16-17) suggests that the 
ultimate goal for Habermas is agreement, eventually leading 
to silence. In contradistinction to this, for Billig: 
Any accord which is reached is to be breached: one 
companion, with a playful smile, will say, "But on 
the other hand ... " All will start discussing 
without constraint, enjoying the continuation of a 
dialogue which moves forward creatively and 
endlessly. (1996:17) 
For Billig then, discourse, operating as an endless process 
of ideological dilemmas is something playful, something to be 
enj oyed by 'companions', while at the same time always and 
evermore progressing. Exactly where this progression might 
lead is left untreated and here - more than anywhere - Billig 
shows the grave limits of his position: discourse is reduced 
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to argumentation; a dialogue always aiming to persuade. In 
such a world the complexity of the operation of power is 
limited to persuasion through language (amongst equal 
debates) and I suggest this is a profoundly reductionist 
position. In the world of ideological dilemmas struggles are 
only played out (playfully) at the level of rhetoric while 
meaning is produced ultimately by the skilled direction of 
words - meaning, again, has its source In the individual and 
their relation to (the thinking) society. 
I suggest that Billig offers another version of the consumer 
of discourse we met earlier (ch. 3.2). However, Billig does 
very adeptly criticise psychology's painfully narrow 
conceptualisation of the problems with which persons concern 
themselves: 
... psychologists use such a narrow range of 
problems when 'problem-solving' is studied. These 
tend to be problems for which there is a 
demonstrably correct answer... However, the vast 
majority of everyday problems which perplex people 
in ordinary life, posses/ no such finite structure. 
For instance, the proble~s of ethics, of politics, 
of assessing the character of others, of deciding 
what to do with our own lives, possess no such 
definable end point which can be arrived at by 
correct dedication ... It is precisely these sorts 
of problems, and not those of filling and emptying 
water jugs, about which orators in the public 
assemblies concerned themselves. It is these open-
ended issues which constitute the subject matter of 
rhetoric. (Billig, 1991:38-39) 
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I would argue that although the ancient study of rhetoric 
does indeed concern problems of politics, ethics and so on 
this does not necessarily mean that the complexity of 
contemporary problem-solving is itself rhetorical in nature. 
This seems tautological in that the 'problems' addressed by 
the ancient rhetoricians may bear little resemblance to those 
of contemporary society. In fact, the major limit of such an 
approach is its reduction of discursive practice to 
ideologically constituted dilemmas played out in the minds of 
individual thinkers: 
... thinking is frequently a form of dialogue within 
the individual ... Yet the content of the dialogue 
has ideological and historical roots, for the 
concepts involved, and their meanings, are 
constructed through the history of social dialogue 
and debate. In this sense the social pattern of 
ideology is mapped on to individual consciousness. 
(Billig et al., 1988:6-7) 
What I am arguing then, is that rhetorical analysis in social 
psychology, by ultimately grounding itself in the process of 
argumentation (c.f. Billig, 1991), actually abandons any 
possibility of a detailed understanding of the ways problems 
come to be constituted in the first place (the discursive and 
ethical conditions of ancient Greece are very different from 
those of today). By focusing our attention on the conflictual 
nature of discourse; In other words by conceptualising 
conflict as the 'motor' of discourse, the rhetorical approach 
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fails to account for the limi ts of what it lS possible to 
argue about. Rather, what is required is an understanding of 
the particular forms that problems are given and the ways 
they are constituted as such, including the power of truth 
and claims to positive knowledge (expertise). So that for 
example, although problems might certainly be ' open-ended' 
(Billig, 1991: 39) there is a need to account for both the 
forms of contemporary problematisations of the self and their 
relation to the plethora of experts who lay claim to 
solutions (c.f. Rose, 1989). 
Billig et al (1988), use an example of media therapeutics -
in this case an advice column - to provide evidence for the 
dilemmatic nature of common-sense notions of gender which 
they suggest 'oscillates between judgements of similarity 
(categorisation) and those of individuality 
(particularisation)' (1988: 144) : 
Take, for example, the following advice given to a 
woman who finds that her kind and loving husband 
has been hoarding pornography: 'Either you have to 
decide that all men are foul, that you're husband 
has the mind of a psychopath in the body of a 
beast, making nonsense of his tender devotion to 
your well-being. Or you have to agree that he 
himself is the victim of sexual shyness (Phillip 
Hodson In She magazine, September, 1986). The 
answer is phrased in terms of a choice between 
generalisation ('all men are foul') and 
particularisation ('he himself'). (Billig et al 
1988: 131) 
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No doubt the choice offered between the categorical and the 
particular is an important one but I would suggest that the 
content of the argument in each 'choice' is equally, if not 
more, important. Thus we might consider the structure of 
Hodson's problematisation - by which I mean the contours of 
the problem Hodson highlights and down-plays - of the woman's 
worry. Hodson, in fact - although somewhat crudely - produces 
a form of logical argument (with one premise and a conclusion 
followed by a rebuttal) during this first sentence along the 
lines of: 
1) If all men are foul, then 
2) Your husband - as a man - must also be foul ' having the 
mind of a psychopath ... " but 
3) Such a conclusion would refute your experience of his 
tender devotion. 
This woman is not, In fact , given any choice wi thin this 
problematisation, as that which Billig et al (op ci t) term 
the particularisation is in fact deployed to show the woman 
that the first position is illogical or irrational; it flies 
in the face of the evidence of her own experience. The woman 
is then offered the more likely alternative that her husband 
suffers from sexual shyness I suggest that what Hodson 
offers lS a pseudo-choice and one that I would argue was 
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intended to appear that way to the reader. Fundamentally, the 
'choice' offered is between a rational and irrational account 
of the husband's conduct where we must remember that 
rationality is valued above irrationality and has important 
relations to gender in that women are routinely constituted 
are more 'prone' to the latter. 
Moreover, the advice offered to this woman might be 
considered in terms of its attribution of responsibility. 
Note that the first alternative seems to produce her 
husband's accountability at a fairly abstracted level of 'all 
men', it is not clear therefore where accountability is meant 
to lie; it appears that somehow men can't help themselves: 
they have abnormal minds and animal physiology. In the second 
choice however, accountability is shifted to her husband but 
as an individual 'victim' - the choice of this word here is 
crucial, I suggest, because while 'sexual shyness' may imply 
pathology, his shyness is something that he personally cannot 
be made fully accountable for, it not only harms the woman 
but her husband as well. What has been offered here is a 
choice not only between the general and the particular but 
more importantly between a rational and irrational account of 
the husband's conduct; one of the al ternati ves offered is 
deployed as a parody of the woman's - potential, at least -
irrationality. 
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Thus, I suggest that the generalisation and particularisation 
constitute elements of a problematisation which operates in a 
more complex way than the production a dilemma, in other 
words, to explain the 'choice' in terms of a generalisation-
particularisation dilemma is to miss a great deal of its 
strategic operation. 
discursive practice 
Moreover, reducing this particular 
(which I term problematisation) to 
ideological dilemmas In an attempt to bridge the gap between 
individual thinking and the 'thinking society' ensures that 
the analysis is destined to remain within an individual-
society dualism (or dilemma) . 
In conclusion, I argue that certainly processes of persuasion 
will form one element in the ways that subj ects come to 
understand and 
'therapeutic' in 
consider their problems 





persuaslon might itself be conceptualised as one technique 
among others in a more over-arching strategy operating 
through technical effects which constitute certain kinds of 
self and in particular offer solutions to problems which 
relate to the self's relation to itself. In this way we are 
able to understand problems as brought into being through 
relations of power rather than merely to support 'interested' 
versions of reality and therefore I propose that the term 
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rhetoric could, within alternative analyses, be replaced with 
the Foucauldian term technologies (or better, technologies of 
persuasion); plural to indicate the manifold theories and 
practices of the therapeutic. 
4.5 A FOUCAULDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
Throughout the first part of this chapter I have attempted to 
show that: 
1) Technical advice offered to counsellors relies upon a 
particular model of communication which fails to account for 
discursivity, 
2) Following from 1, the ethical operation of these 
counselling techniques lS obscured, in part, by the model of 
language use employed, 
3) Existing studies fail to question the positioning of the 
therapeutic process wi thin the ' real' and the values and 
goals of the therapeutic endeavour (along with its deployment 
of psychopathology) while retaining a lingering psychologism, 
4) Alternative approaches which shift attention to the 
rhetorical nature of therapeutics fail to engage both with 
the power relations I aim to analyse here and the practical 
(technical) aspect of discourse, limiting discursive effects 
to the (persuasive) operation of language. 
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In accordance with other critical psychology approaches which 
have been collectively termed the 'new psycho-socio-
linguistics' (Davies & Harre, 1990: 43), informed by elements 
of Foucault's later work (Foucault, 1992), I will show that 
the therapeutic process is a product of discursive work 
rather than reflecting a cognitive process that resides 
outside language. 
However, where this analysis differs from existing discourse 
analytic work is that the notion of strategy - in-keeping 
with a Foucauldian perspective is seen to operate not 
within the individual user of discourse (for example, the 
counsellor) but as bound up within the discourse itself and 
as a means of analysing the operation of power in therapeutic 
discourse. 
Above all, I aim to interrogate counselling discourse for its 
constitution of the client as an ethical subject (of their 
own behaviour) - that is as a process of subjectification and 
thus as related to lines of power and force, more 
specifically here I seek to discover the 'modes of 
subjection' that lS the particular means through which 
callers are 'made subject' to counselling discourse. I have 
suggested that existing studies of therapeutic discourse have 
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failed to recognise its ethical operation; failed to link the 
utterances they map with the operation of power. 
In relation to the data analysis which follows we are thus 
concerned with the shaping effects of therapeutic techniques 
on the client's self understanding. This occurs, I suggest, 
through the production of truth concerning it. From a 
Foucauldian perspective the forms of self found In the 
therapeutic conversations analysed here are produced through 
this technical operation of discourse: 
Such 
Our conception of the psyche, Foucault contends, 
has been sculpted by the techniques that we have 
devised to probe its secrets, to oblige it to give 
up hidden knowledge that will reveal to us the 
truth about who we are. Psychoanalysis is from a 
historical perspective a late addition to that 
enterprise, born of a long but erratic, lineage of 
techniques for the care of the self. (Hutton, 
1988:121) 
a perspective raises questions concerning the 
construction of truth during the therapeutic encounter, as 
opposed to the mainstream "process" questions which assume 
that truth is transcendent. These questions might take the 
form: 
1) How do the techniques available within therapeutic 
practices enable clients to speak the truth about themselves? 
2)What forms of self do these techniques provide? 
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The analysis of data In the second section of this chapter 
will primarily focus upon these two questions. 
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CHAPTER 4 - PART B - ANALYSIS OF DATA 
4.6 INTRODUCTION 
In this initial phase of the. analysis I have found it useful 
to incorporate three elements from CA which relate to two of 
its primary postulates: the sequential structure of 
conversation and the organisation of turns (Sacks et al., 
1974). However, the approach adopted here remains In 
opposition to the notion of structure-in-talk (which we 
discussed earlier, ch. 3.1) (c.f. Boden & Zimmerman 1991). 
The three elements are as follows: 
1) I use the concept of 'adjacency pairs', in particular the 
operation of preference organisation (c.f. Schegloff & Sacks, 
1973; Pomerantz, 1984) - which refers to the likelihood of a 
normative response to the first part of a preferred pair, for 
example a question and answer; In other words, a question 
calls for a normative response in the form of an answer. As 
Forrester (1996:98)suggests: 
It should come as no particular surprise to note 
there are many turn allocation phenomena which come 
in two parts, sequentially organised. A question to 
somebody normally requires that the recipient 
provides answers. And a greeting is likely to be 
followed by a greeting, a summons by an answer, an 
end of a conversation with two-part farewells, an 
invitation by an acceptance. 
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Any other response - termed a dispreferred second part - will 
invite a special kind of accountability within 
interaction. 
2) I use the term 'formulation' as follows: 
A formulation is a form that captures, or claims to 
capture, something about what the previous speaker 
lS trying to say. (Antaki, 1994:83) 
the 
3) I use the term 'summation' to indicate a form of words 
that summarise what the previous speaker is (constituted as) 
trying to say. 
However, in addition to the structural organisation of the 
talk, I am interested in its operation as discursive 
practice. We have seen that this means that I aim to explore 
the technical operation of counselling discourse through the 
identification of the constitution of ethical relations (c.f. 
Foucault's four dimensions, 1992) - including the production 
of truth and factuality and the constitution of self-identity 
(including the provision of techniques of the self) . 
In methodological terms this demands attending to the 
operation of utterances, in part through a close scrutiny of 
adjacency pairs. In this way the sequential organisation of 
the talk allows the analyst to begin to understand the 
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effects of each utterance within the unfolding of the 
conversation; in other words it allows an analysis of the 
'traffic' of conversation which Antaki (1994:121) has 
suggested tends to remain absent in primarily content-driven 
discourse analysis: 
For .. discourse analysts, content is some .. complex 
constellation of cultural theme (variously called 
'repertoires', 'practices', and even, rather 
confusingly, 'discourses', (this time as a count 
noun) .. for others still it is not only the theme 
but the variety of genre or the medium in which it 
is expressed, and perhaps even its physical 
representation. . . none of these notions of 
'content' explicitly calls on the way the traffic 
of the material is regulated - its cohesion, its 
turn-taking, its rhetorical devices and so on. 
Remember we are concerned with the discursive operation of 
these utterances; specifically with their action-orientation 
(c . f. Edwards & Potter 1992), whereby, from a Foucauldian 
perspective, the interaction lS treated as discursive 
practice. What kinds of discursive work can be found then, 
within the transcripts? 
4.7 RESHAPING THE CALLER'S ACCOUNT: A MODE OF SUBJECTION 
BELINDA'S CALL 
I consider the formal aspects of the discourse In the 
following four excerpts from the data, whereby 'formal' 
refers primarily to the effects of the structural 
organisation of the talk, although, as we will see further 
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on, there is a sense in which content and structure cannot 
be considered separately. I will say more about this later. 
As we have noted, Antaki (1994:121) reminds us that much 
discourse analytic work fails to engage with the organisation 
of particular spoken interactions, however he warns that to 
separate the notions of form and content is problematic: 
Thi sis, admi t tedly , a dangerous way 0 f thinking 
about it, since it partitions out two aspects of 
meaning - form and content - which have no business 
being separated ... (Antaki, 1994:121) 
I will show later that discourse analysis can adopt a middle 
position between form and content Vla the use of the 
Foucauldian analytic of 'technique', (discussed in part A) 
In the following analyses I refer to the advisor as 'A' and 
the caller as 'C'. Excerpts from the data are identified by 
the transcript number followed by the line numbers quoted. 
Line numbers given in the text for particular utterances, 
turns or sequences are shown in brackets. 
EXCERPT 1 (T3: 13-36) 
13 c: right well my problem is erm it's a grandmother [clicks 
14 tongue] I have= 
15 
16 A: =not a mother-in-law 
17 
18 c: well i-yes it is a mother-in-law [laughs] 
19 [ 
20 A: a grandmother-in-law 
21 





















and well it's 
family .hhh or 
yes it's the whole 
basically [laughs] 
A: [laughs] so (.5) not another music hall joke I hope 
[ 
c: 
really quite serious actually 
A: 
serlOUS one) (1) yeh sorry belinda 




This segment can be heard as blithe badinage; perhaps the 
advisor is attempting to put the caller at ease via the 
continuation of a theme - the 'mother-in-law' (16, 18) - from 
the previous call. However, a closer inspection of this brief 
segment of conversation reveals something quite different. 
At line (16) A produces the following rejoinder to the 
caller's definition of her problem at (13-14): 
16 A: =not a mother-in-law 
and receives some agreement at (18), then interrupting (over-
speaking) at (20) with: 
20 A: a grandmother-in-law 
This term is then mirrored by C at (22) indicating a full 
agreement. A goes on to provide a summation at (24)and again 
receives some agreement at (26-28). At (30) A then appears to 
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respond to C's inhalation (27) as signalling the end of her 
turn, replying with: 
30 A: [laughs] so (0.5) not another music hall joke I hope 
and pausing for 0.5 seconds, possibly because C continues her 
turn. C then interrupts, resisting A's humorous frame stating 
her problem is ' ... really quite serious actually' (32-33). A 
then interrupts with an apology in a short utterance which 
appears to invite C to present her problem (35-36); that is A 
stops speaking and C begins to detail her problem at (38). 
The above segment, I suggest, provides an illustration of the 
way in which A's turns are actually helping the caller to 
shape her account, that is the precise points at which A 
interrupts begin even at this early stage In the 
interaction to re-form C's account of her problem; 
initially offered as ' .. a grandmother.' (13), moving through 
'mother-in-law' (16, 18), 'grandmother-in-law' (20, 22), and 
the 'whole in-law family' (27) where finally C returns to 
her original presentation of the 'grandmother' (28). A's 
interruptions and the summation at (24), in this case, help 
the caller to shape up precisely who lS involved In her 
problem. 
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Such shaping of the client's account, while obscured by 
'process' research has, In fact, always been incorporated 
into psychoanalytical (technical) theory via Freud's concern 
with narrative deconstruction. As Maranhao (1986:28-29) 
states: 
... in the psychoanalytic situation preference 
should be given to those associations that break 
the flow of the plot spreading the narrative 
sideways. This usually makes it easier for the 
therapist to wedge his [sic] interventions in the 
patients narrative, retelling it In the 
psychoanalytic narrative. 
Shafer (1979, 1980) perhaps most famously explored the 
narrative operation of psychoanalytic practice, re-casting it 
as an interpretive rather than positivist endeavour. Shafer, 
ends his (1980:53) paper by offering that: 
Those traditional developmental accounts, over 
which analysts have laboured so hard, may now be 
seen in a new light: less as positivistic sets of 
factual findings about mental development and more 
as hermeneutically filled-in narrative structures. 
The narrative structures that have been adopted 
control the telling of the events of the analysis, 
including the many tellings and retellings of the 
analysand's life history. 
For us however, what is important here lS not only that the 
counsellor is (re)constructing the caller's narrative but 

















counsellor is able to very quickly shape the caller's 
narrative or story at the moment she is telling it. 
I now wish to move on to consider the way in which A's turns 
begin to resemble interpretations. Silverman & Torrode 
(1980:7) usefully - for our purposes - define interpretation 
as the imposition of neutrality on language: 
In our usage, ' interpretation' refers to the 
practice of treating language as the one 
'appearance' of an extra-linguistic 'reality' pre-
supposed by the interpretation. The practice is 
itself not what it appears to be: It does not do 
what it says. For it is impossible to formulate an 
extra-linguistic reality, e.g. 'nature', 'society', 
or 'grammar' except in language. Thus in pretending 
to uphold a non-linguistic and so neutral reality 
the interpretation in practice imposes its own 
language upon that of the language which it 
interprets. 
I will now explore some of the ways the counsellor achieves 
this. 
EXCERPT 2 (T3:38-82) 
c: .hhh erm [laughs].hh the: I (was) I've been married erm five 
years to this to the son and erm basically he always got 
rewarded for his bad behaviour to keep the peace and not to let 
the child see and all the rest of it .hh he's never accepted the 
consequences of his actions he's .hh one of these people who's 
always sat in the chair and criticised an' .hh never did 
anything with liter without you standing with a rod over him .hh 
now erm 
A: sorry who is this Belin 
[ 
c: my husband sorry husband= 
































c: well I mean he's he's literally he he just is like a spoilt 
everything is a tantrum .hh erm he would use 
[ 
A: I see he he the way he exercises power in 
a marriage is by blowing up 
c: yeh and well and and threatening to wake the child if you 
[ 
A: right 
don't give him sex and blah blah blah and al-all literally 
totally to the end till it got to the point where erm I had to 
actually it was getting really violent and I had to actually .hh 
erm get help to get him away from me 
A: so he actually then became violent towards you 
[ 
c: Oh: yeh (I 
A: so it escalated 
from tantrums and blackmail to to violence 
[ 
c: well it would have got violent before if 
I'd never given in 
A: and are you still with this man 
[ 
C: I used to give in .hhh oh no no I actually had to make 
myself homeless I've now if it hadn't 've been without friends I 
would have literally gone ( ) 
Belinda begins to present her problem at (38) and seems to 
provide an orientation to a narrative, focused on a 
description of her husband's conduct presented In his 
relation to the mother-in-law (16, 18) as ' .. the son .. ' (39) 
A then interrupts the turn at (47): 
47 A: Sorry who lS this Belin-
who is, in turn, interrupted by C with mitigation: 
49 c: my husband sorry husband= 
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A's utterance at (47) I suggest is, in part, operating as an 
instruction, the caller is being shown the correct way to 
present her case. Thus, In addition to shaping-up CIS 
account, A, by indicating a missing element in the part-
narrative (38-45) , also indicates the correct way of 
presenting a problem; in turn available to the over-hearing 
audience (I consider the audience in more detail In chapter 
6). We see at (49) that C shows deference to the special, 
preferred kind of design required by the therapeutic. Then, 
at (51) A provides a formulation while at the same time 
inviting agreement from C: 
51 A: =he didn't do anything if you didn't (0.5) press him 
At (53-54) C fails to provide agreement, offering a 
dispreferred response and introduces a summation regarding 
her husband's conduct - along similar lines to the previous 
description at (38-45) and A once again interrupts with a 
second formulation (56-57): 
56-57 A: I see he he the way he exercises power In a marriage is 
by blowing up. 
Here A, In addition to inviting agreement, shapes up C' s 
account through the provision of entirely new words. 
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The key point here is that during this excerpt A is providing 
C with a model of the correct way to speak to him. Moreover, 
concerning the content of A's formulation, the exchange of 
'blowing up' for 'tantrum'· at (57) appears to remove the 
implici t notion of childishness offered at (53 -54) perhaps 
making it more aligned with the conduct of a married adult. 
At the same time however, something entirely novel is 
introduced the notion of 'the exercise of power' (56). 
These words have so far not been provided by the caller and, 
I suggest, begin to turn the formulation into an 
interpretation. In fact, A's turn at (56-57) is more than a 
summation in two respects; 1) it utilises a combination of 
the use of new words with, 2) the deployment of metaphor 
which replaces C's deployment of simile at (53-54). 
It has been suggested that a metaphor lS rhetorically more 
powerful than a simile (Antaki, 1994: 104) I sugges t that 
within this setting the deployment of metaphor lays greater 
claims to factici ty. Furthermore, the notions of summation 
and formulation seem inadequate to describe the operation of 
A's utterance (56-57). Thus, I argue that we must consider 
this as more than a summary of the immediately previous turn 
(53-54) in that it shifts the form of vocabulary while at the 
same time indicating this as the preferred form. 
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At (59) C provides some agreement and indicates that the 
formulation at (56-57) seems to have shifted the account of 
the husband from a passive, almost childlike description to a 
description of manipulation followed through In the 
subsequent turn by c: 
59 c: yeh and well and and threatening to wake the child if you 
60 [ 
61 A: right 
62 
63 don' t give him sex and blah blah blah and aI-all literally ... 
Although C already alluded to this manipulation at (39-41), 
A's arrangement of words at (51) and (56-57) in addition to 
providing the preferred words to say it, introduces a new 
grammar through; 1) the provision of 'standard' rather than 
colloquial form and, 2 ) condensation into a 'singular' 
utterance, that is, compared with (38-45) 
38 c: .hhh erm [laughs] .hh the: I (was) I've been married erm 
39 five years to this to the son and erm basically he always got 
40 rewarded for his bad behaviour to keep the peace and not to 
41 let the child see and all the rest of it .hh he's never accepted 
42 the consequences of his actions he's . hh one of these 
43 people who's always sat in the chair and criticised an' .hh 
44 never did anything with liter without you standing with a rod 
45 over him .hh now erm 
At (68) A provides a third formulation which once again 
appears to condense C's presentation of more 'facts' In 
quasi-narrative form (59-66) into a singular utterance, again 
inviting agreement: 
169 
68 A: so he actually then became violent towards you 
Again, A additionally provides C (and the overhearing 
audience) with a model for how to say the problem. C appears 
to offer an agreement at (70) and is interrupted by A with a 
fourth formulation (72-73): 
72-73 A: so it escalated from tantrums and blackmail to to 
violence 
C then responds with partial agreement and more factual 
information (75-76). 
At this point we can see that C' s account is gradually 
becoming more aligned with A's questions and formulations. At 
(74) C provides an interrupting response with a single 
'theme' in a form similar to A's four previous formulations, 
this time awaiting A's reply which does not take the form of 
an interruption - as with most of A's other turns: 
75-76 C: well it would have got violent before if I'd never 
given In 
compared with: 
51 A: =he didn't do anything if you didn't (0.5) press him 
56-57 A: I see he he the way he exercises power in a marriage is 































68 A: so he actually then became violent towards you 
72-73 A: so it escalated from tantrums and blackmail to to 
violence 
At (80) C begins her turn while A is still speaking I then 
responds to the question and interrupts herself to answer it. 
We see here as with the entire excerpt the way C' s 
account is delivered In relation to A's questions and 
formulations I so that her responses are becoming more and 
more aligned in their organisation. 
SEGMENT 3 (T3: 80-108) 
c: I used to give in .hhh oh no no I actually had to 
make myself homeless I've now if it hadn't 've been without 
friends I would have literally gone ( 
[ 
A: so y- you you ran away or you escaped 
[ 
c: I literally yeh 
I (did) 
[ 
A: with your child 
c: with my child ( 
[ 
A: who is how old 
c: she's three and a half I literally ran away friends were 
[ 
A: right 
wonderful .hh erm while he was at work [laughs] they they lent 
me a a lorry and I got most of my stuff out like and I they put 
me up an' 
A: a sort of Thelma and Louise: with a difference 
[ 
c: it was 
on income support erm housing benefit 
lovely place (.) wonderful erm but 
grandmother now now I have never 
wond yeh and I'm now 
I've found myself a 
the problem lS the 
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A interrupts once more at (84) with a fifth formulation; 
again providing the preferred words with which to say the 
problem and continues to shape-up the account through the use 




87 yeh I (did) 
so y- you you ran away or you escaped 
[ 
I literally 
That is, if C disagrees with the formulation within A's 
question at (84) she must produce mitigation in the form of 
an exonerative account (often marked with a pause or a 
palliative, see Antaki, 1994:79-80). Within this context 
then, the deployment of formulations in the form of a 
question I suggest invites the preferred response of 
agreement and where a dispreferred second part will more than 
likely be given in relation to the formulation in the first 
part. The key point here is that in terms of discursive 
practice A's formulations (and interpretations) exert a 
powerful force on the caller's discourse which we might 
understand in relation to subjectification. In other words, 
the shaping of C's turns by A might be described as a mode of 
sUbjection. 
At (89) A interrupts appearing to continue his formulation at 





wi th 'with my child'. In the remainder of this excerpt A 
shapes-up C's account with an interrupting question at (93): 
c: with my child ( 
[ 
) 
A: who is how old 
A offers a formulation at (102) which draws upon a popular 
film current at the time of the broadcast: 
103 A: a sort of Thelma and Louise: with a difference 
which gains some form of agreement from C at (105-108) 
105 c: it was wond- yeh I'm 
106 now on income support erm housing benefit I've found myself a 
107 lovely place (.) wonderful erm but the problem lS the 
108 grandmother now now I have never 
The above segments then, provide key illustrations of the way 
in which the advisor shapes the form (and also content, I 
consider this In more detail later in the chapter), of the 
caller's account of her problem. Far from straightforwardly 
clarifying the details of C's account, A provides both 
organisational models for how to say the problem along with 
the preferred words to say it. Thus, the key point is that 
the process of the transformation of the account begins 
before A offers any advice and occurs through the very way C 








4.8 THE REGULATION OF THE EXCHANGE 
As I have already suggested however, it is clear from the 
above analysis that C' s account lS shaped not only through 
the re-working of its organisation but also - and at the same 
time - through the reworking of its content. We have already 
considered the way A's formulation at (56-57) shifts the way 
the caller relates her husband's part within the account away 
from childish and passive conduct and towards a notion of 
manipulation (59-66). In fact, A continues to shape C's 
account in a variety of ways that we can see relate both to 
form and content. 
At (107-108) C reintroduces her initial formulation of the 
problem as the 'grandmother' (13) and is interrupted by A at 
(110-111) with a formulation which condenses C's brief quasi-
narrative: 




w-with with your m- with your mother-in-law 
Thus, A shifts the implicit emphasis on the caller's daughter 
(through C addressing her husband's mother as 'the 
grandmother', 108), replacing this with ' .. your mother-in-
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law' (115). At (117-120) C recounts part of her story in 
relation to her husband, while A at (122) once again shifts 
the dialogue back to the role of the caller: 
122 A: so what's her line to you what's bugging her 
C responds to this question with a parody of the 
grandmother's words (124-126): 
124 c: 
125 he's never hurt her he'd never 
126 (he's) 
her line to me is .hh erm oh 
thi s he'd never tha t . hhh 
and is again interrupted by A's presentation of the correct 
form of speech: 
128-129 A: so she's defending him she can't see anything wrong 
What is important about A's presentation of new words in the 
above extracts is that they provide a focused statement that 
somehow condenses what has come before and does so in terms 
of one of a limited number of pathological scenarios we might 
identify wi thin therapeutic discourse. In addition to this, 
A's turns also - as a result of both their timing and length 
- serve to regulate the cadence and pace of the interaction 
itself, while at the same time providing a model for the 


























A continues to shape C's account with the following questions 
which simultaneously operate as formulations and summations: 
128-129 A: so he's 
defending him she can't see anything wrong 
136 A: for your daughter 
147 A: this is your daughter 
151 A: =and how old is she 
Each of these questions can be understood as highlighting the 
important elements of C's account, the grandmother who can't 
see anything wrong (128-129), the role of the daughter 
(136,147) and the daughter's age (151). In fact, these themes 
resurface towards the end of the exchange (300-313). 
EXCERPT 4 (T3: 155-179) 
A: now try let me try and focus you a bit because your telling 
c: Mm 
me a story (1) no your not doing anything wrong .hh but what 
[ 
C: sorry 
you've gotta do is ask me a question= 
c: =right well the (pro-) 
[ 
A: what is the problem what do you want me to 
help you with Belinda 
[ 
C: well the problem is is the grandmother's attitude this 
man is totally unsuitable .hh er incapable of looking after her 
at all .hh 




why can't he bring her 
176 
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179 A: =1 see= 
In this final excerpt the requirement of a preferred kind of 
account and interaction is· made explicit. At (155-163) A 
questions the form of the caller's presentation. Once more 
displaying for both C and all listeners the correct way to 
conduct a call, which receives mitigation from C at (161). At 
(155-163) and (167-168) A affirms that the caller must 
present a formulated problem which requires more than simply 
telling her story. Thus, from a Foucauldian perspective the 
interaction is not only a story telling or confessional - In 
that A draws out the 'truth' of the caller's experience, 'One 
confesses or is forced to confess' (Foucault, 1990:59), 
rather the caller must ask the doctor a question; the caller 
must be active in her own restoration, possessing a knowledge 
of what the doctor can do for her. 
4.9 THE DEPLOYMENT OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE 
We have seen that as we get further into the analysis it 
becomes clearer that our initial separation between content 
and form is untenable. So far, I have sought to provide some 
key illustrations of the way the form of the caller's account 
is shaped by the form of the advisor's utterances, although 
it has actually been impossible to ignore the content of 
these utterances in the examination of the re-shaping of C's 
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account. I want to move on now to consider more explicitly 
the ways A shifts the content of C's account. 
I suggested earlier that ih conducting this more content 
based analysis there are few methodological systems 
available, little is written about the practicalities of 
discourse analysis (see section 3.2) In fact, Figueroa & 
Lopez (1991) cite this as one of four absences in British 
discourse analytic work. 
I began the analysis by identifying all instances of the 
deployment of metaphor within the data, as I was confident 
that in so doing I would direct the analysis to those parts 
of the interaction where we might find some interesting 
discursive work or, in other words, identify important 
constructive processes within the language-use. However, as 
the analysis progressed the notion of metaphor became less 
and less appropriate to describe what was happening (I 
consider this in more detail later on) . 
In this section I want begin by exploring some of the 
metaphors deployed in some of the material already analysed 
for form (c.f. transcript 3, Belinda) and move on to examine 
more closely the use of figurative language in two other 
interactions (Transcripts 2 + 10, Ann2; Sally). At this stage 
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In the analysis I draw upon semiotic method, aiming to think 
the therapeutic process as semiotic in nature, in other words 
as a process of signification rather than meaning; structural 
rather than interpretive. I use semiotics to refer to the 
analysis of sign systems, derived originally from Saussure's 
(1916/1995) work but modified to give the signifier priority 
over the signified (for useful summaries see for example, 
Walkerdine, 1988:2-5; Silverman, 1994: 71-72,78) 
Sontag, at the beginning of her (1988:5) AIDS and its 
Metaphors states: 
Saying a thing is or is like something-it-is-not is 
a mental operation as old as philosophy and poetry, 
and the spawning ground of most kinds of 
understanding, including scientific understanding, 
and expressiveness. 
Here I use metaphor to refer to the substitution of one thing 
for another, a form of figurative language which (re-)places 
its object within an entirely new arrangement of paradigmatic 
and syntagmatic associations. I take selectively from 
semiotics then the importance of metaphor as an aspect of 
semiosis and concur with Jackobson's (1956) suggestion that 
metaphor is fundamental to the referential function of 
communication, (quoted in Fiske, 1990: 92) . 
Antaki (1994:101) reminds us that: 
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A metaphor will map one domain onto another (for 
example 'emotion' onto 'containment') and, by 
mobilising our analogical abilities, generate an 
indefinitely large number of revealing 
substitutions of concrete images for abstract ones 
(thus, it was all bottled up inside, it all came 
out in a rush, he kept his feelings hidden, and so 
on) . 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980:3) assert that metaphor (at its most 
basic, one word representing another) is not merely a 
literary device but profoundly structures our everyday 
understandings: 
... most people think they can get along perfectly 
well without metaphor. We have found, on the 
contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday 
life, not just in language but in thought and 
action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of 
which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature. 
Lakoff & Johnson claim that language takes second place to 
concepts, using the familiar model of language as 
representation - where a word has a direct relationship to 
the concept it represents, and in turn, the concept has a 
direct relationship to the 'reality' it indexes. Put another 
way, they make their claims from a cogni ti ve rather than 
semiotic position and consider metaphor as bound up with 
cognitive processes which ultimately have their origin in our 
experience of the materiality of our bodies and the world 
with which they interact: 
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· .. metaphor is not just a matter of language, that 
is, of mere words. We shall argue that, on the 
contrary, human thought processes are largely 
metaphorical ... it should be understood that 
metaphor means metaphorical concept. (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980:6). 
Our general position is that conceptual metaphors 
are grounded in correlations within our experience. 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980:154) 
In this way Lakoff and Johnson usefully alert us to the 
systematicity of metaphor, that is they suggest that we can 
trace a system of 'entailment relationships' for a particular 
metaphor by which they mean the conceptual relationships it 
makes possible or 'entails': 
New metaphors, by virtue of 
out a range of experiences 
their entailments, pick 
by highlighting, down-
playing, and hiding. 
characterises a similarity 
of highlighted experiences 
experiences. (p.152) 
The metaphor then 
between the entire range 
and some other range of 
If we accept their claims from a semiotic rather than 
cognitive viewpoint, identifying the deployment of metaphor 
during the therapeutic interaction will index some 
interesting features of the process of signification as it 
operates as an element of discursive practice. 
Note that existing considerations of the role of metaphor in 
psychotherapeutic practice remain with the assumed positive 
therapeutic context we met earlier (ch. 2.2). For example, 
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Barlow et al (1977) relate its use to the production of 
'insight' and Berlin et al (1991) link it to a variety of 
functions including the simplification of material to be 
worked upon and their utility in discussing personal aspects 
of the patient's (their term) problem. 
EXCERPT 6 (T3: 181-227) 
181 c: =the thought of her alone with him for three and a half hours 
182 on the motorway fills me with absolute horror I mean his 
183 attention span (.5) I think there's something wrong with him but 
184 I mean I'm not a doctor but his attention span is about half an 
185 hour [ 
186 [ 
187 A: Belinda you (1) you sound like somebody who 
188 (.) likes to please people and who doesn't to let them down and 
189 I think what we've got in here hidden away in this 
190 [ 













guilt .hh you feel (.75) guilty about the grandmother (y-) 
[ [ 
I don't (want to) terribly 
201 
202 
yes you feel your letting her down .hh you fee-
[ 
203 c: I've I've said I' 11 take her down 
204 there 
205 




c: =why can't he bring her down 





c: =and I say your joking (wha- ) 
to the 100 or or [ 
[ 
supposing he wants to take her 
215 A: 
216 
well well th- th- this this is a the 
217 
lS an issue of not going .hh on being Mrs. Nice for the rest of 
your life .hh and that sometimes 
218 [ 
219 c: see 
220 nervous breakdown on me 
221 
the grandmother threatens 
[ 
[ 
to have a 
182 
222 A: no no no but 
223 this is upsetting you isn't it when I say to you don't be nice 
224 to somebody you get a bit cross with me and you say well I 
225 want to go on being nice .hh sometimes in life .hh truth has to 
226 take precedence over niceness now that is a very important 
227 guiding principle .hh 
At (181-182) C employs a metaphor as follows: 
181-182 c: =the thought of her alone with him for three and a 
half hours on the motorway fills me with absolute horror .. 
which very firmly situates the problem with the caller's 
husband and entails an understanding of the consequences of 
unsupervised contact with his child as 'horrific' - implying 
that such contact would constitute an extremely high risk. A 
then interrupts with a fundamentally different understanding 
of the problem, one which bears little relation to the 
previous turn (187-189): 
187 A: Belinda you (1) you sound like somebody who, 
188 likes to please people and who doesn't like to let them down and 
189 I think what we've got in here hidden away in this 
A suggests C sounds ' ... like somebody who likes to please 
people .. ' (187-188) - where the deployment of simile offers a 
resemblance rather than an equivalence (which would be 
produced with metaphor). A then suggests that something is 
'hidden away' (189) in the 'very complex story' (193) and 
that what is hidden away lS 'guilt' (193), recognisable not 
only to A but also to 'we all' (193-197). 
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During this turn A offers an interpretation which operates in 
a very precise way In that the deployment of a metaphor of 
'hiding' (189) produces the following effects. It implies 
that: 1) It is C who is responsible (conceivably consciously 
or unconsciously) for the hiding, for it is C who has told 
the story - moreover, this is a 'very complex story' (193) 
and perhaps it is easier to hide something in a complex 
rather than a simple story; 2) C has hidden away her 'real' 
feelings - 'you feel guilty' (197) - where this feeling is 
recognisable to all, 'what we all know as guilt' (193 -197) . 
Here the collective pronoun could be taken to include the 
overhearing audience, the advisor and possibly the caller too 
- A invites C (and the overhearing audience) to recognise her 
'real' emotion. 
These two elements of A's interpretation hiding and 
authentic emotion - I suggest combine to produce a compelling 
subjection. C is the responsible party here - she is hiding 
something, moreover what she is hiding - not only from A and 
the overhearing audience but also from herself - is not only 
her ' real' felt emotion - guilt - but also its cause; the 
kind of person she really is, 'someone who likes to please 
people' (187-188). We shall see in a moment that this 
figurative mode of subjection can, In addition, provide 
















It lS interesting to note at this point that these forceful 
effects have been constituted through a combination of very 
colloquial, informal ideas and statements - guilt hidden away 
in a story - the technical language characteristic of some 
schools of psychotherapy and counselling for example, 
psychoanalysis and Gestalt is entirely absent. 
A: Belinda you (1) you sound like somebody 
who likes to please people and who doesn't like to let them 
down and I think what we've got in here hidden away in this 
[ 
c: [sighs 1 
very complex story is what I call guilt and what we all know 
[ 
c: MIn 
as gui 1 t . hh you feel (. 75 ) gui 1 ty about the grandmo ther (y- ) 
Immediately following A's interpretation, C then appears to 
produce some kind of agreement at (199) with an over-spoken 
, terribly' but then continues to present the grandmother's 
perspective as she understands it, until at (215) A 
interrupts with another metaphor and an extreme case 
formulation (c.f. Pomerantz, 1986) which again is deployed as 
an interpretation (215-217): 
A: well well th- th- this this is a the 
is an issue of not going .hh on being Mrs. Nice for the rest of 
your life .hh and that sometimes 
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Here, A once again links the problem to the caller through 
the use of a metaphor which operates as a proper noun - 'Mrs. 
Nice' (216) while at the same time presenting the extreme 
case 'for the rest of your life' (216 -217) This metaphor 
serves (at least) three purposes: 1) It emphasises C's 
posi tion as woman and wife through the form of address 
'Mrs' (216), 2) It constitutes a sense both of inevitability 
and urgency about the disposition (and problem) 'Mrs Nice', 
unless checked it will be life-long, and most importantly, 3) 
it makes the caller the responsible agent in resolving the 
problem, that lS, I suggest, a specifically therapeutic 
responsibili ty - it is her own disposition as well as her 
conduct that is the problem - as someone who likes to please 
people. 
In addition A, by framing the caller's responses to his 
interpretation, also provides evidence for it (222-227): 
222 A: no no no but 
223 this is upsetting you isn't it when I say to you don't be nice 
224 to somebody you get a bit cross with me and you say well I want 
225 to go on being nice .hh sometimes in life .hh truth has to take 
226 precedence over niceness now that is a very important guiding 
227 principle.hh 
suggesting that the hidden guilt is operating not only within 
the situation recounted by the caller but ln the telephone 
interaction itself, once again forcefully situating the 
problem within the caller herself. Thus, a process that 
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psychoanalytically oriented practitioners might term 
'transference' or 'resistance' operates here to augment the 
mode of SUbjection in that the caller herself lS constituted 
as both the cause, and means of rectifying, her problem. 
In fact, wi thin the same turn A gives the remedy for the 
caller's problem in the form of a 'guiding principle' (226-
227) which I suggest offers a key illustration of the ethical 
operation of therapeutic discourse, whereby A is, in fact, 
consti tuting an ethical substance (niceness) along with a 
form of 'telos' (truthfulness). Moreover, A's interpretation 
culminates in a short treatise on the moral status of 
contemporary society which is explicitly pedagogic, almost 
theological In form (225-260 ) and where this ethical 
substance and telos are offered as elements to be worked upon 
by 'our society' (250). 
SEGMENT 7 (T3: 231-260) 
231 A: there are many people who 
232 lying to other people because 
spend .hh months or even years 
233 [ 





they see the overriding priority is 
always sacrifice truth in pursuit 
239 c: 
to be nice .hh now if you 





of niceness you end up with a whole load of lying people now .hh 
I don't want to make it 
[ 
244 c: well this is my problem I I 
245 

















many comments about our society .hh 
c: yeh 
A: but we are becoming increasingly superficially nice .hh and 
[ 
C: you see 
that's not my way (1) mmm that's not my way if you met the 
mother you'd know why the son is like he is 
the price of that is dishonesty 
If we consider this segment in a little more detail, A 
suggests that C's individual experience of hidden guilt (189-
193) along with a disposition not to let people down (188-
189) is something shared by 'many people' (231) whereby the 
condition can endure for 'months or even years' (231) and 
which culminates in 'a whole load of lying people' (241). A 
then expands the boundaries of the group he constitutes at 
(241) 'lying people' to 'our society' (250), expressed as 
'we' (254), where 'becoming increasingly superficially nice' 
(254) has a 'price' (260) which is 'dishonesty' (260). 
Here it is as if A has explicitly worked through one possible 
set of 'entailment relationships' (c. f. Lakoff & Johnson, op 
cit) for his original metaphor 'Mrs Nice' (216) where the 
relationships - which I have suggested operate in an ethical 
manner - move from the individual to the collective level. 
Thus, the mode of sUbjection is expanded to invite all those 
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who recognise themselves within 'our society' to recognise 
CIS problem as, at least potentially, their own. 
ANNE'S CALL (Transcript 2) 
wi th this transcript I want to consider some of the key 
metaphors deployed throughout the interaction, as a great 
deal of the content revolves around these, especially during 
the turn (150-173) where A deploys a series of metaphors 
which operate together to produce the 'facts' of the 
commonali ty of dwindling sexual interest in long-term 
relationships. These metaphors offer powerful images which 
include the dwindling of electrical energy and deep 
subconscious beliefs. (Note that it cannot be ruled out that 
sex may be particularly liable to the deployment of metaphor 
in this context, given the 'delicate' nature of the subject) . 
A, towards the end of turn (73-82) moves from the literal at 
(78-79) to the figurative at (80-81): 
73 A: Right OK .hhh first of all I think a couple of reassurances 
74 are in order because I think this is something your feeling 
75 quite upset about .hh a-and perhaps there's no so much need as 
76 you're imagining .hh it's quite normal .hh er or .hh perhaps not 
77 normal [laughs] I mean er i-it's all too common I should say:: 
78 . hh for sexual life to deteriorate in couples that have been 
79 together for some period of time .hh that is to say that the 
80 initial electricity ( ) that makes the: the sex life very 
81 passionate.hhh often does dwindle (.) with time (.) .hh now I 
82 don't believe that there's 
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What is important here is that the deployment of metaphor (as 
opposed to simile) In this instance offers the figurative 
description of CIS problem at (80-81) as equivalent factually 
to the literal description at (78-79). What I am suggesting 
is that the shift to figurative language - in particular to 
metaphor - offers the benefit of entailing a new range of 
meaning, as Harre (1983:283) describes: 
By standing across a variety of applications a 
metaphor draws them into relation with one another, 
creating the possibility for similarities and 
differences, not hitherto noticeable, to emerge. 
without undermining the truth value of A's claims and 
interpretations which is key to the force of the subjection. 
Further on at (120-121) A introduces the notion of a 
subconscious and in this turn we can see once again the way 
that metaphor operates within A's interpretations. A uses the 
notion of depth 'very deep in our subconscious' and also the 
term 'rooted' (120-121). The subconscious then, is given a 
spatial quality, wi thin which beliefs can take root. This 
however, along with the notion of 'bigger psychological 
changes' (125) does not constitute a metaphor as I have 
defined it earlier, In that these descriptions are not 
deployed to represent or offer equivalence to a given object. 
In fact, there is a sense in which subconscious can only be 
spoken of in metaphor and this lS key to any discussion 
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concerning the role of language In the therapeutic 
interaction. Thus, we see here that metaphor is a condition 
of possibility for knowledge of the interior. Harre 
(1983:283) proposes something similar in relation to personal 
being: 
In the sciences the bridgehead to intelligibility 
is maintained by metaphor. I propose that the 
intelligibility of our private-individual thoughts 
and feelings is maintained by ourselves for 
ourselves, in just the same way. Personal meaning 
is individual metaphor. 
At (146) A combines elements of two previous themes an 
emphasis on 'psychological changes' (114-115, 125) and the 
spatial metaphor of depth and rooting, 'deeply rooted' (151-
154) - but now introduces the notion of 'hang-ups': 
150 A: but once the you've passed that stage of your life and 
151 you've had your children . hh th:: women do get some very 
152 deeply rooted psychological hang-ups about sex .h and that's ... 
This combination of everyday language with the previous 
allusion to the unconscious are deployed as 'one of the 
reasons' for the dwindling of electricity (153-154) A then 
goes on to offer a further account using simile, whereby 
becoming more comfortable with each other is like becoming 
deep friends or brother and sister where a sexual 
relationship seems inappropriate (that is, sexual relations 
would be incestual). Once more what we observe here is far 
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more than the use of mixed metaphors in an effort to persuade 
but the complex construction of ethical relations. For 
example, A's deployment of metaphor at (151-154) provides an 
ethical substance for both the caller herself 'psychological 
hang-ups' and for the caller and her husband together 
'dwindling electricity'. We will see now however that towards 
the end of the exchange another 'substance' is introduced. 
Later in the interaction A introduces another interpretation, 
explicitly identifying a 'problem': 
249 raped which is a very very different situation . hhh (.5) I 
250 think . h that one of the main problems that I see: is that 
251 whatever else has happened in your relationship over the years 
252 . hh there have become . hh erm some communication barriers: I 
253 think 
then A provides a reason for this conclusion: 
257 A: because it sounds like . hh you and your husband don't 
258 discuss your sexual life (.) very much at all 
Here then, the shift to a 'substance' of 'communication 
barriers' moves the problem towards the relationship between 
the caller and her husband. However, at (287-289) A 
introduces the metaphor of rekindling and once more shifts 
the problem towards the caller herself and the way she speaks 
to her husband about their sexual life (295-296). Thus, 
al though the substance 'communication barriers' relates to 

















































must take responsibility for breaking them by undertaking the 
ethical work suggested by A. 
EXCERPT 8 (T2: 287-335) 
A: Right .h so maybe for the same psychological reasons that we 
were discussing earlier .h but now you've found something that 
rekindles: : 
c: Yeh (1) that's it 
[ 
A: .hh your interest .hh and I (.5) would expect that that's 
something that your husband would be very pleased to hear (1) 
. hh but of course it's how you actually speak to him about 
this and I think the answer to that has to be by degrees .hh I 
think that before you can actually maybe openly tell him 
everything that you've told me tonight .hh you have to first 
of all build up some kind of communication channels (.) about 
your sexual life (.) .hh and I think that that's something 
that is maybe going to take some time . hh and I think can 
start with telling him just as you go along . hh what you like 
what you're enj oying . hh and (.) if he is being in some way 
.hh erm passionate but not as as rough as you have enjoyed him 
to be .hh then encourage him to be more passionate actually 
actually tell him 
c: Mm 
[ 
A: at the time .hhh that's when its much easier to discuss sex I 
mean we .hh british are so cool t' s very difficult out of the 
bedroom (.) for us to discuss our sex lives 
c: Yes= 
A: =.hhh but in the heat of the moment (.) you can let some of 
your inhibitions go (.) .hhh and 
I 
c: Yes 
A: that's the time to start encouraging him In the the things 
that you would like to do more 
c: Yeh 
A: . hhh and I think that's beginning then to help you both to 
communicate to each other .hh and it's also helping to 
establish . hh a closer relationship all round because ( .) I 
suspect that after the time that you've been together if there 
are communication barriers they probably not just about your 
sexual life . hh there are possibly some other areas where you 
find it difficult to communicate at a deep level .hh an and 
maybe some of that has come through sexual tensions that have 
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334 built over the years .hhh and particularly over these past few 
335 years that you've mentioned 
A then goes on to detail this ethical work and even wi thin 
this more 'practical' advice, A deploys a range of 
metaphors: 
296 this and I think the answer to that has to be by degrees .hh I 
297 think that before you can actually maybe openly tell him 
298 everything that you've told me tonight .hh you have to first of 
299 all build up some kind of communication channels ( .) about 
301 that is maybe going to take some time .hh and I think can start 
302 with telling him just as you go along .hh what you like 
310 A: at the time .hhh that's when its much easier to discuss sex I 
311 mean we . hh british are so cool t' s very difficult out of the 
312 bedroom (.) for us to discuss our sex lives 
316 A: =.hhh but in the heat of the moment (.) you can let some of 
317 your inhibitions go (.) . hhh and 
326 A: .hhh and I think that's beginning then to help you both to 
327 communicate to each other .hh and it's also helping to 
328 establish .hh a closer relationship all round because (.) I 
328 establish . hh a closer relationship all round because ( .) I 
329 suspect that after the time that you've been together if there 
330 are communication barriers they probably not just about your 
331 sexual life . hh there are possibly some other areas where you 
332 find it difficult to communicate at a deep level . hh an and 
333 maybe some of that has come through sexual tensions that have 
334 built over the years .hhh and particularly over these past few 
335 years that you've mentioned 
Thus, A sets up a notion of stages or steps in relation to 
C's ethical work and eventually offers a 'telos' In the form 









































of metaphor produces more complex effects than simply 
persuasion, providing the caller with a substance to work 
upon, the form that such work should take and the overall 
goal of her therapeutic endeavour. 
SALLY'S CALL 
EXCERPT 9 (TlO: 144-182) 
I'm obviously 
something that I've done (.) you know 
being punished for 
A: Well not necessarily you may have just (.) I mean this may 
be like slipping on an ice mountain you might be walking down 
this ice mountain you take the wrong foot and you start 
slipping and one of the problems about eating disorders is 
that once ( .) you see the body is like a very delicately 
balanced spring in a way and it knows exactly when its had 
enough and it knows exactly when its full up and it knows when 
to stop eating and when to start eating now that mechanism's 
incredibly delicate and what has happened and what happens to 
so many people most bulimics and most eating disorders start 
with some kind of dieting 
[ 
c: yeh mine did 
A: and that seems to upset the body's regulation mechanism (.) 
it like you know you fiddle around with the thermostat on the 
central heating system and once you've got it out of order it 
finds it incredibly difficult to get itself back in in order 
again (.) and so it doesn't help you and I don't think its 
even true to say that you're compulsive eating or your endless 
eating is (.) is really the result of your own failure it's 
because the mechanism of your body sensing when you're full up 
has got overridden (.) now the answer for you is can you get 
control of your weight again and if you can believe In 
yourself and trust yourself and care for yourself then you 
might be able to (.) and I mean the way forward as I see it is 
to really try and commit yourself to a diet and to get into a 
relationship with somebody who will stand by you and rather 
than at this stage being admitted somewhere and spending all 
your parents money if you could afford to go to a counsellor 
even two or three times a week (.) but it's got to be someone 
who I s experienced in this field its no good going to somebody 
( .) you know who's got a counselling diploma from here or 
there or somewhere (.) eating disorders are their own special 
(.) very difficult er problem and you've got to be experienced 
in them if you're going to help somebody 
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At (144-145) the caller (Sally) offers an account of her 
bulimia as 'being punished for something that I've done'. 
This interpretation of the caller's own situation leads A to 
reply with an al ternati ve in the form of a simile i ' like 
slipping on an ice mountain' (148) and A develops this in 
what might be termed 'narrative style' that is, he presents 
the events within the simile ln their order of imagined 
occurrence: 
147 A: Well not necessarily you may have just (.)1 mean this may be 
148 like slipping on an ice mountain you might be walking down this 
149 ice mountain you take the wrong foot and you start slipping ... 
At (151-152), A introduces a second simile concerning the 
body, 'the body is like a very delicately balanced spring' 
and then develops this simile by switching the word 'body' 
with 'it' which, I suggest, has the following effects. The 
deployment of the pronoun ' it' potentially makes reference 
not only to the body (in general) but also to the previous 
reference (simile) which likened the body to a machine, so 
that what began as a resemblance 'the body is like a machine' 
we are now asked to accept as fact. A then places this 
'factual' description within a further metaphor: 
154 to stop eating and when to start eating now that mechanism's 
155 incredibly delicate and what has happened and what happens to ... 
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where the term 'that' appears to refer back to the simile 
'body is like a very delicately balanced spring' (151-152). 
Here again, this is offered as fact rather than resemblance 
and is then related to an aetiology (162-165) where dieting 
'upsets the body's regulation mechanism' (161), which is 
offered as concrete fact and which, in turn, becomes the 
obj ect of a further simile this mechanism is 'like the 
thermostat on the central heating system' (162-163). 
150 slipping and one of the problems about eating disorders is 
151 that once (.) you see the body is like a very delicately 
152 balanced spring in a way and it knows exactly when its had 
153 enough and it knows exactly when its full up and it knows when 
154 to stop eating and when to start eating now that mechanism's ... 
At (165-167), A refers directly to the caller's problem as 
not the result of her own failure and goes on to provide 
another metaphor which draws together the events of all of 
the previous ones, (167-169): 
167 eating is (.) is really the result of your own failure it's 
168 because the mechanism of your body sensing when you're full up 
169 has got overridden (.) now the answer for you is can you get 
Thus, by following the entailment relationships (c.f. Lakoff 
& Johnson, op cit) we can observe that what begins as a 
simile (at 135), becomes a description of the body's 
mechanism (138-141) and finally a factual statement regarding 
the aetiology of the condition itself (bulimia). The metaphor 
of damaged thermostat shifts seamlessly into a description of 
a physiological cause; offered as fact. 
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The key effects of this final metaphor are that: 
1) The body is given a certain autonomy in its physiological 
processes, seemingly exonerating the caller from any 
culpability regarding her condition. 
2) This factuality is conveyed In a pseudo-scientific 
language (for example, an overridden mechanism), and was 
developed through a series of metaphorical references that 
began as similes. In other words, what we are offered as 
fact, relies upon the previous use of simile and metaphor for 
its intelligibility in that A's reformulated account 
initially utilised resemblance but culminated In a 
description of fact, that is the production of truth. 
So far I have indicated the importance of the role of simile 
and metaphor in this excerpt of therapeutic conversation and 
that specifically we can identify a discursive technique 
which involves moving from simile (and resemblance) to 
metaphor (and factuality). What however, are the ethical 
effects of the mobilisation of simile and metaphor? A's 
interpretation initially appears to avert culpability from 
the caller after her self-blaming interpretation at (144-
145), however, if we also consider A's metaphor at (162-165): 
162 it like you know you fiddle around with the thermostat on the 
163 central heating system and once you've got it out of order it 
164 finds it incredibly difficult to get itself back in in order 
165 again (.) and so it doesn't help you and I don't think its 
166 even true to say that you're compulsive eating or your endless 
167 eating is (.) is really the result of your own failure it's ... 
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there lS a sense in which these utterances are anomalous in 
that A appears to produce culpability through the ambiguous 
use of 'you' in relation to dieting, that is, 'you' could 
equally apply to the caller or dieters in general. However, 
at (165-169) A dismisses a general notion of the caller's 
failure in favour of an overridden body mechanism but this 
seeming exoneration shifts once more as A urges C to get 
control of her weight (169-170); so that culpability seems to 
have returned through an implication that control has at 
some time - been lost by the caller: 
169 has got overridden (.) now the answer for you is can you get 
170 control of your weight again and if you can believe in ... 
Thus, through these complicated moves A's deployment of 
metaphor and simile carefully balances the issue of 
responsibility. A's discourse relieves C from the 
responsibility for her condition but at the same time opens a 
space of accountability through her dieting and finally goes 
on to constitute C as responsible for her cure through her 
relation with herself: 
170 control of your weight again and if you can believe in 
171 yourself and trust yourself and care for yourself then you 
172 might be able to (.) and I mean the way forward as I see it is 
173 to really try and commit yourself to a diet and to get into a 
174 relationship with somebody who will stand by you and rather 
175 than at this stage being admitted somewhere and spending all 
176 your parents money if you could afford to go to a counsellor ... 
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Thus, the deployment of metaphor within A's discourse conveys 
sophisticated ethical constructions - averting blame for the 
condition itself but encouraging a therapeutic responsibility 
by making the self accountable to itself. That is, within A's 
turn (170-172) the caller's relation with herself lS 
constituted as the prime material upon which she must work, 
where self-belief, self-trust and self-care is the work to be 
performed. However, at the same time (173-176) A also offers 
self-commitment to a diet and forming a (presumably intimate) 
relationship as key to the caller's cure. 
In this relatively short section of A's turn (161-182), A has 
produced a therapeutic responsibility on behalf of the caller 
which above all entails the care of the self, and at the same 
time offers the form of that self-care as including trust and 
belief. Perhaps what is most interesting is that these broad 
and sweeping imperatives 'trust in yourself' are offered 
without instructions for their exact implementation, implying 
that they are already understood and accepted by both C and 
the overhearing audience. 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
Looking in detail at a range of key exchanges and using 
conversation analytic and semiotic approaches we saw that: 
a) A's discourse has a clear shaping effect upon that of C, 
in one example (Belinda) C' s utterances and account became 
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more aligned with A's; A provided novel words for C to 
express the problem, condensed C's sometimes long and complex 
turns into singular utterances and thus reworked the overall 
organisation of C' s account; In addition, A - at the same 
time - provided models for C (and the overhearing audience) 
for how to execute a call. 
b) A's questions, along with the deployment of figurative 
language, were found to re-shape the content of C's problem 
and to constitute complexes of culpability and exoneration, 
including the attribution of a 'therapeutic' responsibility. 
The (discursive) processes identified in these exchanges were 
considered as techniques which operated In relation to the 
production of truth, thus the shaping-up of C's account by A 
and the deployment of figurative language can be seen as two 
forceful modes of subjection. We also identified other 
ethical features of therapeutic discourse including the 
constitution of ethical substance and telos. 
Finally, we recognised figurative language as a condition of 
possibility for knowledge of the interior which was 
intimately tied to the process of sUbjection and therefore to 
the operation of power. Harre (1983:283) likewise relates the 
operation of figurative language (metaphor) to the operation 
of power (authority): 
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· .. metaphorical discourse provides the wherewithal 
for us to gain epistemic access to ourselves, to 
the personal realignments and reformations or 
transformations of the public-collective endowment 
I called appropriations, and partly brings them 
into being. What we will find in ourselves will 
then be a function of -the metaphors available in 
the pUblic-collective domain .. This is yet another 
facet of the principle that we strive to become 
what the best authorities tell us we are. 
The findings above are somewhat at odds with the transmission 
model of the operation of language we met earlier (c. f. 
Dryden & Feltham, op cit). We have seen that C's original 
problem is re-shaped discursively rather than through 
perceptive listening. Moreover, this re-shaping appears to 
al ter the ethical relations (for example with respect to 
accountability) already present in the problem C brings to 
the exchange. In this sense therapeutic discourse must be 
considered far from disinterested or value-free. 
We also saw that the therapeutic modes of sUbjection 
operating in these encounters could not be adequately 
described In terms of rhetoric or persuasion. The advisor 
does much more here than tell convincing stories. Rather, the 
Foucauldian conception of technique enables us to understand 
the operation of therapeutic discourse (including both its 
form and content) as strategic; a key difference from a 
purely rhetorical understanding. Put another way, the 
variety of discursive techniques (for example, interruptions 
and figurative language) deployed by A produce the strategic 
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effect of shaping-up the caller's account and shifting 
accountability; thus these discursive techniques constitute 
much more than persuasion in relation to 'interest'. 
It is important however, not to ask too much of the brief 
exchanges analysed here, a relatively short phone-call to a 
counselling broadcast may or may not constitute a 
therapeutic/transformative event in the everyday life of the 
caller. However, we can see that the modes of subj ection 
operating within these exchanges do open up new possibilities 
for conduct via the provision of new understandings of 
oneself and its relation both to itself and to others, (c. f . 
Hacking op cit) . 
Finally, we may now return to our two questions offered at 
the end of section A in that the therapeutic modes of 
sUbjection identified here formal shaping-up and the 
deployment of figurative language opera te as techniques 
which are all the more forceful because they operate not 
simply to construct the truth about the caller's problem but 
to enable the caller to tell the truth about themsleves - and 
this is the sense in which the processes identified here can 
properly be termed subjection. Rose (1989:246-247) offers a 
useful description of this form of sUbjection: 
Subjects come to identify themselves with the kind 
of self they are brought to display in their speech 
and conduct in the therapeutic scenario, to take 
responsibility for themselves as ideally that kind 
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of person, to be impelled by the pleasures and 
anxieties in the gaps between themselves and what 
they might be. They become in the passage through 
therapy, attached to the version of themselves they 
have been led to produce. 
What forms of self were provlded by therapeutic discourse in 
these exchanges? Perhaps the most important finding in 
relation to forms of self is that In all the exchanges 
considered here the caller is made the responsible agent in 
resolving their problem. In particular, we can observe a link 
between the deployment of figurative language involving the 
constitution of 'psychological' entities and processes (for 
example 'guilt', 'communication barriers') and the production 
of selves which are urged to account for themselves as both 
the target of and the responsible agent in their own cure. 
However, it is not that the complexes of accountability found 
within these exchanges are produced only through figurative 
language (for example, we saw that A's provision of new words 
effected a shift In the form of accountability within 
Belinda's call, section 4.8), but that the identification of 
the effects of A's deployment of figurative language as a 
mode of sUbjection revealed the complexity of the operation 
of therapeutic discourse in this regard. Finally, we might 
broadly identify the therapeutic responsibility engendered 
during these calls as a form of telos (c.f. Foucault, 1992) 
in that callers are invited to aspire to the image of the 
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self-governing, effective person (c.f. Nelson-Jones, op cit) 
we met earlier. 
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CHAPTER 5 - PART A - COUNSELLING DISCOURSE AND THE PROCESS OF 
PROBLEMATISATION 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 4 I undertook an examination of the therapeutic 
interaction which employed conversation analysis with a 
semiotic approach to explore some formal and figurative 
discursive techniques involved in the therapeutic process. 
This chapter further considers the role of discourse in that 
process through the use of the analytic of 'problematisation' 
elaborated in Foucault's later work (c.f. Foucault, 1988b, 
1992; Castel, 1994), which, I suggest, provides a further 
alternative to the psychologistic and individualistic 
assumptions of the process research discussed in chapter two, 
(2.1, 2.2). 
While in the previous chapter I was concerned with the 
question of how therapeutic concerns became established as 
such, here I am interested in the content of the problems and 
solutions found within the data. In other words, I am 
interested In the features and characteristics of the 
problems that callers present and the reformulated problems 
and solutions offered by the advisor at the end of the call. 
I take the term 'problem' here to mean anything that the 
caller (and subsequently, the advisor) highlights or 
constitutes as an object of concern, for example elements of 
callers' relationships with themselves and others, their 
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histories, aspirations, passions, desires and so on that 
merit attention, reflection and discussion. 
I have suggested that the therapeutic interaction concerns 
the discursive (re-)construction of ethical relations, in 
Foucault's lower level sense (c.f. Couzens Hoy, 1986) of the 
callers self-formation as an ethical subject of their own 
action. Thus, here I employ Foucault's methodological notion 
of 'problematisation' to underscore the processes by which 
the caller's initial problem is re-framed in terms of a 
therapeutic problematisation in an ethical form - a process 
which includes both the (discursive and non-discursive) 
practices that form its conditions of possibility and the 
practices offered to the caller which they are invited to 
apply to themselves (techniques of the self) . 
Although CA - elements from which I utilised in the previous 
chapter would perhaps uncover the complexity of the 
conversational structure In these calls, the Foucauldian 
perspective I offer here alerts us to the significance of 
structure In a way that departs from CA, that is, as 
something that is more than that which the participants 
create. So that, in addition to an analysis of the content 
of the data we are able through the use of Foucault's 
analytic of problematisation to consider the absent 
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structural conditions that make the constitution of the 
therapeutic problems found in the data possible. 
I suggest that in this particular case these absent 
conditions are a set of moral preconditions, in that the kind 
of accounts and problematisations offered by C and A 
(respectively) are only possible to the extent that they both 
share a moral universe; what is absent from the data but must 
be made present in order to make sufficient sense of it, lS a 
shared moral order. 
My primary focus then, will concern the transformation of the 
callers account of their problems; by comparing the callers 
initial formulation with the reformulation aided by the 
therapist (here - as with the previous chapter - conceived in 
terms of the voice of therapeutic discourse), I aim to 
highlight the differences In ethical relations between the 
caller's original formulation and the therapeutic 
problematisation. Thus the empirical element of this chapter 
will focus on a 'before and after' comparison of the content 
of the caller's account of their problem and what I will term 
the (subsequent) therapeutic account. 
The key aim of this chapter then is to explore the processes 
of problematisation which constitute part of the caller's 
Being as worthy of attention (c.f. Foucault, 1992), including 
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the provision of ethical work or techniques of the self which 
the caller can utilise when the phone-call is over as a means 
of transforming their own difficulties. As with the previous 
chapter I will begin by considering some existing work which 
connects to the analysis and outline the methodological 
framework In more detail. 
5.1 PROBLEMATISATION AS A CONVERSATIONAL PROCESS 
We might consider psychotherapy process research - which I 
discussed earlier, chapter (2.1, 2.2) - as operating within 
an ' extra -moral' domain. If one accepts Foucault's (1992 ) 
account of ethics then the discursive process of 
problematisation identifiable within the data may usefully be 
analysed in terms of the formation of ethical relations, re-
inscribing the notion of counselling 'process' within a moral 
and ethical domain. 
Foucault (in Castel, 1994:239) defined problematisation as: 
... not the representation of a pre-existing object, 
or the creation through discourse of an object that 
does not exist. It is the totality of discursive 
and non-discursive practices that brings something 
into the play of truth and falsehood and sets it up 
as an object for the mind. ' 
Thus, by adopting Foucault's notion of problematisation the 
therapeutic process may be reconceptualised In a double 
sense: a) as involving the constitution of 'problems' through 
the establishment of truth and falsity, b) as brought into 
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being by both discursive and non-discursive practices and 
structures. 
Early in his History of Sexuality, Volume 2 (1992) Foucault 
suggests a distinction between interdiction 
problematisation: 
For 
It is often the case that the moral solicitude is 
strong precisely where there is neither obligation 
nor prohibition . In other words the interdiction 
is one thing, the moral problematisation another. 
(p. 10) 
Instead of looking for the basic interdictions that 
were hidden or manifested in the demands of sexual 
austerity, it was necessary 
experience and the forms in 
was problematised, becoming 
an element of reflection, 
stylisation. (p. 23-24) 
to locate the areas of 
which sexual behaviour 
an object of concern, 
and a material for 
Foucault then, problematisation, separated 
and 
from 
interdiction, throws into relief those things with which we 
are obliged to concern ourselves, not morality in the sense 
of a set of rules but the very constitution of those things 
that our moralities might engage with. Foucault (op cit:l0) 
also wondered why our ethical concern over sexuality had 
remained so persistent: 
Why this ethical concern that was so persistent 
despite its varying forms and intensity. Why this 
"problematisation" But after all, this was the 
proper task of a history of thought, as against a 
history of behaviours or representations: to define 
the conditions in which human beings "problematise" 
what they are, what they do, and the world in which 
they live. 
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Here then, 'problematisation' refers to the ways in which we 
come to think about ourselves and the world around us as 
moral domains and the subjects/objects these forms of 
thinking, speaking and acting bring into being. Foucault (op 
cit:ll) then, saw his project as: 
... a matter of analysing not behaviours or ideas, 
nor societies and their "ideologies", but the 
"problematisations" through which being offers 
itself to be, necessarily thought and the 
practices on the basis of which these 
problematisations are formed. 
It is precisely this I suggest that we witness in the 
therapeutic exchange; a process of problematisation which 
constitutes part of the caller's being as worthy of attention 
along with the practices that make this possible - including 
the kind of (ethical) work that the caller must do and the 
goals towards which they must strive. Remember also that 
these ethical relations constitute a complex form of 
subjection. 
However, In considering problematisation as a conversational 
process, I need to say something about Foucault's 
specifically historical use of the term (c.f. Foucault, 
1988b, 1992). Foucault (op cit) and Castel (1994) employ the 
notion of 'problematisation' In relation to a historical 
method, that is, in terms of the genealogy of a contemporary 
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'problem', seeking to address questions such as: how has this 
problem come to take its present form (as something 
questionable and in need of a solution)? what was the play of 
power, discourse and practice that brought it into being?4 
For example, Foucault (1992:36-37) suggests that the form of 
moral enquiry concerning the aphrodisia (sexual pleasure) In 
Antiquity was made possible by a 'field of problematisation' 
which referred to the ways in which the aphrodisia had been 
(historically) constituted as a 'domain of moral concern'. 
Although others have acknowledged the importance of history 
for a full understanding of human interaction (see for 
example, Gergen, 1973 c.f. social psychology), here I seek to 
shift the notion of problematisation away from a historical 
analysis and towards an analysis of the micro-processes 
wi thin the therapeutic interaction. I am not claiming an 
equivalence between the genealogy of a problem's present and 
the brief conversational exchanges analysed here but rather I 
suggest that if we accept that history provides reference to 
an (absent) set of relations that open the space for a 
(present) set of questions and concerns then we might also 
consider the absent conditions required for the processes of 
problematisation found within the data examined here. 
4 Although Castel (1994) reminds us that In using the analytic of 
problematisation we risk proj ecting a contemporary 'problem' back onto 
historical conditions that might have had little concern for it. 
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What I offer then, is a notion of the process of the 
reformulation of 'problems' during the encounter as operating 
through the insertion of what the caller brings into a 
therapeutic field of problematisation although it is 
important to remember that constituting something as a 
'problem' in the first place has already situated it within a 
moral domain and callers will themselves have constituted 
their problem as requiring some kind of therapeutic 
intervention, given they are calling the 'counselling hour'. 
I am thus offering an alternative understanding of the notion 
of problematisation as a process of micro-interaction 
(although here I consider spoken discourse, this could 
equally apply to the reading of a self-help publication, for 
example), which is more than the prioritisation of one 
concern over another (Dryden & Feltham, 1992) or the skilled 
unprejudiced elicitation of client problem management (Egan, 
1990), but the insertion of callers' concerns within a moral 
domain (or a field of problematisation), through - in this 
case - a discursive technology and where we might take our 
analysis beyond the conversation itself to the (absent) 
condi tions ( discursive and non-discursive practices) which 
make it possible. 
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5.2 PROBLEMATISATION AND ETHICAL SELF-FORMATION 
Having offered an argument for the use of Foucault's analytic 
of problematisation In relation to the therapeutic 
conversation, I want now to consider in a little more detail 
how we might go about this, In particular the way that 
probematisation relates to ethical self-formation and how 
this connects to some existing work. 
5.2.1 DISCIPLINE AND ETHICS 
Bloor & McIntosh (1990) produce what they term a typology of 
client resistance from existing interview and participant 
observation data concerning health visiting and therapeutic 
communities. They suggest that the role of surveillance as a 
technique of power and its opposite (for them) concealment as 
a technique of resistance has been 'hardly appreciated' 
(p.159) in analyses of professional-client relationships. 
They aim to provide a typology of the forms of surveillance 
and resistance encountered in their studies. In a similar way 
to Bloor & McIntosh, I seek to provide a description of the 
therapeutic interaction in Foucauldian terms but I am 
concerned less with surveillance and resistance (concealment) 
and more with the issues raised in Foucault's later works 
(that is, rather than his genealogical projects) . 
Although an analysis In terms of surveillance and resistance 
would certainly be worthwhile, there is much more at work In 
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the data considered here than disciplinary power. For 
Foucault (1991), the "science" of discipline meant a science 
of transforming the individual; in madhouses, poorhouses, the 
army, factories, schools, hospitals and so on. I suggest in 
this chapter that therapeutic practice lS more than simply 
the therapeutic's normalising judgements but rather a 
technology of (ethical) problematisation which requires 
individuals to transform themselves. In other words, what is 
of interest with these problematisations are the ethical 
relations constituted within them. So al though caller 
resistance and the surveillance operating through therapeutic 
discourse are both important here; the key question I am 
asking is what are the ethical relations to which the caller 
- in this instance - is required to subscribe? 
5.2.2 MORALITY, ETHICS AND THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE 
Let us firstly remind ourselves that therapists do not 
generally tend to consider their practice as fundamentally 
about morality. Most, I suspect, would say that they offer or 
inform their clients about the range of choices available to 
them. Reflections upon the therapeutic process - as I have 
shown (ch. 4) - tend to offer a disinterested position as the 
following extracts further suggest: 
... a common process which occurs across procedures 
is that therapy consists of training the client to 
think and behave like a scientist ... When they come 
to us they [clients] usually have an 
undifferentiated interpretation of their problems. 
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For 
We challenge them to generate a series of 
alternative hypotheses: and in some cases suggest 
such. We evolve with them a formulation of their 
problem in a way which attributes the difficulty to 
self-defeating ways of thinking and behaving ... In 
other words therapy may be seen as a process in 
which the client is prompted to generate 
alternative hypotheses and evaluate them by 
conducting experiential experiments (Michenbaum & 
Cameron, 1980:30-31) 
One of the aims lS to get people who feel for 
instance that they can't cope, that life is awful 
and that everything is going wrong, to focus on one 
or two issues, and then look at why those 
particular issues might be difficult for them. Very 
often it is a question of reframing. (Cobb in 
Dryden, 1990: 80) 
these practitioners the therapeutic process of 
'formulation' and 'reframing' (respectively) , operating 
through scientific evaluation and focusing, would seem to 
negate any possibility that the therapeutic process might 
operate within a moral domain in that, a) science offers a 
disinterested means of evaluation and, b) focusing works upon 
the problem as constituted by the client who lS therefore 
culpable/responsible for its form. Here then, morality lS 
either negated by scientific method or, if present at all, 
remains with the client rather than the therapeutic process. 
Szasz (1961), in relation to Northern American culture, 
perhaps most clearly warned that (psycho)pathologising 
conduct in some way extricates it from the moral-social-
political domain: 
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[The] evasion of interpersonal and moral conflicts 
by means of the concept of mental illness is 
revealed by the current 'dynamic-psychiatric' view 
of American life... according to which virtually 
every human problem - from personal unhappiness and 
mari tal discord to political conflict and deviant 
moral conviction is regarded as a symptom of 
mental illness. (1961:86) 
Szasz did not claim however that the psychiatrisation of 
American culture provided a means of understanding conduct as 
exterior to moral domains but rather that the moral code 
embodied by psychiatry and psychotherapy was implicit rather 
than explicit: 
Freud [never made] explicit the moral values 
implicit in his theories and methods ... One reason 
for this omission is that Freud liked to frame his 
investigations in the language of empirical 
medical - studies. But in the social sciences it is 
virtually impossible to conduct empirical studies 
wholly devoid of evaluations .. . Furthermore, it is 
easy to demonstrate that Freud and other 
psychiatrists favoured some values and opposed 
others. (1961:244, original emphasis) 
I take a similar position in this chapter - that therapeutic 
discourse has its effects through its operation within a 
moral and especially an ethical domain but where this ethical 
operation is not presented as such. 
Foucault (1992:25) suggests that "morality" refers not only 
to the notion of the "moral code" but: 
.. also refers to the real behaviour of individuals 
In relation to the rules and values that are 
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recommended to them: the world thus designates the 
maner in which they comply more or less fully with 
a standard of conduct, the manner in which they 
obey or resist an interdiction or a prescription; 
the manner in which they respect or disregard a set 
of values. 
Foucault then, was interested in the many different ways that 
we form ourselves as subjects of these moral codes, 
specifically: 
.. the manner in which one ought to form oneself as 
an ethical subject acting in reference to the 
prescriptive elements that make up that code. (p. 
26 ) 
I have suggested that therapeutic discourse lS saturated with 
such prescriptions and interdictions (ch. 4A), however we 
might add that these are articulated in relation to a 
particular form of the therapeutic 'process' which will 
depend upon the therapeutic system at work; for example a 
great deal of therapeutic work involves identifying those 
elements in one's everyday interactions that relate to one's 
owns psychological processes in contrast to those of 
(significant) others; as we saw in the previous chapter, here 
accountability in terms of one's own part in one's problems 
is paramount. 
Thus, the central thesis here is that it lS precisely these 
moral and ethical relations, that is, the ways in which the 
moral code invites certain forms and modes of relations to 
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oneself that are being displayed in the therapeutic 
interaction. The key point in relation to problematisation is 
that truth is produced through a complex set of relations 
between the code (or therapeutic system) and the relation to 
oneself that it invites. 
In chapter 4 we considered the (formal) negotiation of these 
relations during the encounter whereas here we will focus 
upon the therapeutic exchange as a site in which this truth 
is operationalised in terms of accounts , given that I have 
suggested that the therapeutic process might be 
conceptualised, (for the sake of analysis), as consisting of 
an initial 'caller' account which is subsequently transformed 
into a 'therapeutic' account of the problem - created through 
therapeutic problematisation. As Rose, (1989:247) suggests, 
clients (and callers) : 
.. become, in the passage through therapy attached 
to the version of themselves they have been led to 
produce. 
5 .2 .3 THE MORAL ADEQUACY OF SELVES AND THE PRODUCTION OF 
ACCOUNTS 
Cuff (1994:40) connects the constitution of a moral self with 
conversational processes, arguing that the identity of the 
speaker - along with the other identities conveyed in their 
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story - is intricately bound with the 'moral adequacy' of the 
account or versions: 
The teller, in producing an account of what lS 
happening In the world, is also unavoidably 
producing materials which make available possible 
findings about his [sic] characterological and 
moral appearances as displayed in his [sic] talk. 
Conversely, if the teller's moral identity is changed or at 
least brought into doubt then the moral adequacy of the 
account also shifts. For example, Cuff (op cit) reminds us 
that an account of marriage break-up offered by one party 
risks being heard as partisan. As a result the teller may 
orient their version to avoid being heard in such a way (p. 
49-50). For Cuff then, what is of central importance in the 
production and reception of accounts is that they are 
assessed for their moral adequacy which will always operate 
In relation to a moral assessment of the identity of the 
teller. 
Cuff cites Smith's (1973) K ~s Mentally III where the 
identi ty of the teller of the account under scrutiny is 
(implici tly) offered as a maj or element in its production, 
that is, we already know that Alison lS K' s friend. Cuff 
suggests that if we assess Alison as in some way wishing harm 
5 Cuff uses the term 'version' (concomitant with his CA position) 
while I have transposed the term 'account' which fits better with 
contemporary social psychological approaches (for example, Antaki, 1988; 
Harre, Clarke & DeCarlo, 1985:88; Edwards & Potter, 1992:52). However, 
both these terms remain somewhat untheorised in that we may ask whether 
they refer, for example, to an explanation, a vocabulary or a grammar? 
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to K, the moral assessment of the version will shift 
alternatively put, it is our knowledge that Alison is K's 
friend that enables us to accept the objectivity of her 
account, constructed, In part, through reference to many 
different individuals and the consensus this appears to 
provide. Cuff attempts to give a much more central role to 
the moral identity of the teller than Smith who he suggests 
had failed to properly consider the relationship between the 
student (who interviewed Alison and wrote up the account), 
and Alison herself. 
Cuff (1994:20) further suggests that accounts may be 
conceptualised as competing constructions of reality and 
reminds us that they are taken to be correct not because they 
can be empirically verified but because they somehow are 
'credentialled' (meaning legitimated) and at the same time 
'ironicise' all other versions. In other words, Cuff is 
concerned with the production and management of competing 
accounts which he suggests should be conceptualised as 
understood by members as alternative versions (which is 
similar to the 'interested' versions we met earlier, ch. 
3.2) . 
Note however that Cuff argues that the systematic subversion 
of accounts is found in everyday interaction and the content 
of the account under scrutiny itself determines an 
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appropriate alternative whereas I am arguing here that 
therapeutic discourse deploys a limited range of scenarios 
which may be applied to a wide variety of (caller) accounts. 
In this way the content of the account under scrutiny does 
not wholly determine the alternative - again, here we need to 
move beyond the structures found in the conversation itself 
in order to make full sense of the exchange, for therapeutic 
discourse operates in relation to a wider moral order. 
In the exchanges analysed here then, there is more of 
interest than the subversion of the caller's account by an 
expert (c.f. Cuff op cit:78); In fact, Cuff's position offers 
only a limited opportunity to theorise and analyse power 
relations, for example, do we assume that the caller and the 
therapist occupy something approximating an 'ideal speech 
situation'? I take - selectively - from Cuff's arguments the 
link between the moral adequacy of selves (especially the 
speaker) and the moral adequacy of accounts. In suggesting 
that the advisor can be seen to reformulate the caller's 
account - transforming it to offer a shift in the (ethical) 
identity of the caller, I offer a means to analyse what Cuff 
terms the 'moral adequacy' of the teller in greater detail 
using Foucault's four dimensions of ethical problematisation. 
In this way we may consider the therapeutic exchange as less 
an attempt at the transformation of the (moral) identity of 
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the caller but rather the provision of an (ethical) identity 
that enables the caller to transform themselves. 
5.2.4 DISCURSIVE POSITIONING AND MORAL ORDER 
Davies & Harre (1990:58) offer a similar argument to Cuff (op 
ci t) In relation to their methodological model of subj ect 
positioning in social action, including conversation: 
One's beliefs about the sorts of persons, including 
oneself, who are engaged in 
central to how one understands 
Exactly what is the force of 
particular occasion will 
understanding. 
a conversation are 





Davies & Harre (1990:48) outline a methodological technique 
through which to analyse the operation of this subject 
positioning in conversation: 
... positions are identified in part by extracting 
the autobiographical aspects of a conversation in 
which it becomes possible to find out how each 
conversant conceives of themselves and of the other 
participants by seeing what position they take up 
and in what story, and how they are then 
positioned. 
In this chapter, I will utilise this technique of identifying 
the autobiographical aspects in the caller's account of their 
troubles and go on to identify how the caller is subsequently 
positioned in the therapeutic account. Moreover, Harre & van 
Langenhove (1991:399) later considered in more detail the 
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ways in which positioning relates to moralities, suggesting 
that: 
When people are positioned or position themselves, 
this will always include both a moral and a 
personal positioning. (Harre & van Langenhove, 
1991:398) 
... a position is just a set of 'locations' 
variety of polar pairs of moral attributes. 
& van Langenhove, 1991:398) 
on a 
(Harre 
Harre, Clarke & De Carlo (1985:ix) define this third level of 
analysis, relating it to the social construction of emotions, 
as: 
... collective processes and structures, which are 
social in the larger sense. The most important of 
these, we believe, are the mUltiple moral orders 
that enter in one way or another into every aspect 
of our lives, and most particularly into the 
formation of our culturally distinctive emotions. 
Thus, Cuff and Harre & van Langenhove/Davies & Harre share a 
somewhat similar position in that 'moral adequacy' links to 
moral 'positioning' or ' location' In conversation and its 
operation wi thin a wider moral order which presupposes a 
certain 'form of life' and which lies - for us - beyond, In 
some sense, the therapeutic exchange. The key point here is 
that moral location and moral order are intimately bound up 
with spoken interaction. In methodological terms then, I am 
looking for the moral positioning or location in the two 
accounts (caller and therapeutic) found within the exchanges 
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and which are more than alternative versions of reality (c.f. 
Cuff op cit) In that they are not necessarily equivalent in 
legitimacy and authority but are rather bound up with 
relations of power. 
5 .3 CONCLUSION 
I have partly reformulated Foucault's (1988bi 1992) analytic 
of problematisation aiming to address the questioni how are 
everyday problems rendered into therapeutic discourse? In 
relation to the deployment of therapeutic languages of 
description and their moral preconditions. This is a very 
different way of considering the operation of therapeutic 
techniques, not as acting upon an already existing self 
somehow independent of the social relations within which it 
is embedded - but rather as constituting the self as cipher, 
as a puzzlei something to be worked upon and transformed. 
Moreover, I will show that therapeutic discourse (re-
)produces the self in such a way as to radically alter the 
ethical relations within the problem initially presented by 
the caller. It is this (technical) work, I suggest 
discursive and non-discursive (c.f. Hodges, 1995) 
both 
that 
constitutes the very thing that therapists claim to treat. 
To summarise, in this chapter I will consider the therapeutic 
process at a more overarching level than the previous 
chapter, conceptualising therapeutic discourse as a field of 
problems and issues, forms (or \ ontologies') of self and 
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right ways of living which constitute a particular kind of 
(therapeutic) responsibility on behalf of the caller 
conceptualised as a conversational process involving a field 
of problematisation which relies on a wider moral order, 
shared by the participants, for its operation. 
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CHAPTER 5 - PART B - ANALYSIS OF DATA 
5.4 INTRODUCTION 
In the analysis that follows I aim to contrast the contours 
of the caller's account of their problem at the beginning of 
the call with its final shape after therapeutic intervention. 
This does not mean however, that we are able to 
unproblematically trace the content of the problem before and 
after intervention, there is great variability In the 
unfolding of these exchanges, where the form of the caller's 
initial problem and the extent to which A shapes it up varies 
greatly from call to call. However, it is possible to trace 
the broad overall transformation In the content of the 
problem during the call - especially given our interests In 
relation to the production of 'self' - and where there is no 
clear initial account from the caller (or where this is very 
brief) I include within the analysis some of A's early 
shaping up, though it is important to keep in mind that this, 
In fact, represents a phase of negotiation and 
interpretation. As with chapter 4, I use 'A' to refer to the 
advisor and 'C' to refer to the caller. All line numbers from 
transcripts are given in brackets. 
The first three exchanges to be analysed were chosen to 
provide an illustrative range of problematisation with 
respect to the clarity of transformation during each 
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interaction - In that Sally's initial account of her troubles 
is clearly identifiable whereas Ann's initial account, 
although identifiable, is extremely brief (delivered with two 
short utterances) while Belinda's account is inseparable from 
its shaping up by Ai thus these three exchanges provide some 
useful initial scope upon therapeutic transformation within 
this setting. In addition, with respect to the range of 
duration of the calls, Sally's is the briefest followed by 
Ann's and then Belinda's (which is the longest), while the 
breadth of content is concomitantly greatest with Ann's and 
Belinda's exchanges. Moreover, these three calls include 
enough dialogue for us to gain the greatest initial purchase 
on the process of problematisation of interest here. Later in 
this chapter, I move on to consider the 'ontology' of self to 
be found within the data archive and its relation to moral 
order. 
5.5.0 SALLY'S CALL - SUMMARY OF PROBLEMATISATION 
Sally's initial account is delivered in one turn (7-25) 
without interruption and therefore her problem can be clearly 
identified prior to shaping up by A. Sally is bulimic and is 
unable to get the treatment she desperately needs because she 
feels unwilling to let her parents pay for it. After 
therapeutic intervention Sally's problem includes an account 
of the origin and development of her condition and extended 
advice concerning her path to recovery. 
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5.5.1 SALLY'S ACCOUNT OF HER PROBLEM 
7 C: Er: I I don't know that you would erm be able to help I 
8 don't know erm I erm I'm in a very difficult situation (0) I I 
9 have bulimia and I've had it for five years (0) and erm I'm 
10 not a typical bulimic ( 0) erm I don't make myself sick or 
11 anything so erm: I've become very very overweight (0) erm the 
12 problem is that erm because national health cutbacks etcetera 
13 etcetera I've been told that that there literally isn't 
14 anywhere that I could lose the weight (0) the hospital that 
15 will deal with Bulimia can't have me there to lose the weight 
16 (.) the the predicament I'm in is (.) erm my parents who've 
17 both retired now and in their seventies who come from an 
18 ordinary working class background have (0) erm (.) offered to 
19 pay for me to go privately (0) they haven't really got the 
20 money but they're talking about selling their house (0) you 
21 know' cos they don't want to lose their daughter ( 0) 'cos the 
22 way I'm going on obviously I'm in a lot of danger erm (0) the 
23 predicament I'm in is that I I just can't really feel that I 
24 can (0) let them spend their money you know like that 'n they 
25 ( 0) you know 
During this initial uninterrupted turn Sally presents 
herself as follows (7-25): 
1) As someone in a difficult situation (5-8) 
2) A non-typical bulimic, who has suffered for five years (8-
10) 
3) As very very overweight (11) 
4) As a victim of financial problems (11-14) including 
National Health cutbacks (12-13) 
5) As having caring parents; 'they don't want to loose their 
daughter' (21) 
6) As someone in danger - there is a temporal element here: 
'the way I'm going obviously I'm In a lot of danger (21-22) 
7) As someone who cannot take her parents money (16-19) 
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Sally completes her turn by describing her predicament as 
feeling unable to let her parents spend their money (22-25). 
Sally's problem then, is constituted in relation to financial 
concerns (12-14, 22-25) and familial commitments (16-19, 22-
25) i as a result of Health cuts she is unable to get the help 
she requires - a hospital stay and the concomitant weight 
loss. She also feels unable to accept any assistance from her 
parents because they 'haven't really got the money' (19-20). 
However, there is an urgency to the problem as Sally is in a 
lot of danger (22). 
To summarise, Sally accounts for her situation In terms of: 
1) a problem that the Advisor might not be able to help (7) i 
2) financial problems, both general (NHS cutbacks, 12) and 
particular (parents , haven't really got the money', 
and 3) 
Sally 
danger, Sally has become 'very very overweight' 
19-20) 
(11) . 
then, makes herself accountable in terms of her 
parents' financial situation and the urgency of her bulimic 
condition. Note that it lS not the bulimia itself that 
constitutes her problem but the (financial) difficulty In 
procuring treatment. 
5.5.2 THE THERAPEUTIC ACCOUNT 
The therapeutic account of Sally's troubles includes the 
following main themes: 
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1) Sally is someone for whom only food is worthwhile (49-50) 
and the only part of real life safe enough to get involved in 
(71-73) . 
2) Sally is not being punished for something she has done 
(147-157) but her problem began with dieting (155-157) and 
she has In some way upset her body's incredibly delicate 
mechanism (112) which is like a 'delicately balanced spring' 
(151-152) This experience is like slipping off an ice 
mountain (147-148). 
3) Sally lS someone who has upset her 'body's regulation 
mechanism' (161) which is just like a thermostat on a central 
heating system (162-163). 
4) It is untrue to say that Sally's problem (endless eating) 
is a result of her own failure (165-167). 
5.5.3 THE PROBLEMATISATION OF SALLY'S ACCOUNT 
In what ways then, has Sally's initial problem been 
transformed through therapeutic intervention? Sally's account 
has moved from one in which financial problems form a central 
element of physical danger afforded by her bulimic condition 
to a therapeutic account consisting of two maj or parts; 1) 
the origin and operation of Sally's condition; 2) Sally's 
path to recovery, both of which I will now consider in more 
detail. 
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5.5.3.1 ORIGIN AND OPERATION OF SALLY'S CONDITION 
Sally is constituted as, to some extent, the victim of her 
bulimic condition in that the condition operates through food 
becoming the only part of real life safe enough to get 
involved In - in this sense her condition is implicated as a 
II rational II response to the adverse circumstances in 'real 
life' (72) elicited previously during an early phase of 
shaping up (27-47). At (49-50) A offered the summation: 
49 A: So (.) so lS food one of the only worthwhile things In your 
50 life Sally 
Gaining some ascension from C at 52-53: 
52 c: Erm (.3) really because I before that I had anorexia I sound 
53 like a right case history don't I 
These adverse real life conditions then, are as follows; 
a) Living alone in a council flat (35) 
b) Being on benefit and having no savings (35-36) 
c) Coming from a background of abuse and violence (40) 
d) Being unable to get into any relationship (41-42) 
e) Not having worked for five years (47) 
These were elicited at (27-28, 32-33, 38, 44-45). 
The construction of Sally as a victim is further emphasised 
through the constitution of the aetiology of her condition: 
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a) It began with dieting, the operation of which can be 
understood through figurative language (metaphor and simile) 
as follows: 
i) The evolution of the problem is like slipping off an ice-
mountain, 
ii) The body is like a very delicately balanced spring, 
iii) Upsetting the body's regulation mechanism lS like 
fiddling around with the thermostat on the central heating 
system. 
b) Common - it happens to so many people and most eating 
disorders start with some kind of dieting. 
These figurative elements, along with the construction of the 
commonality of Sally's predicament, I suggest imply that 
Sally is a victim both of her circumstances (listed above) 
and the bodily condition which they have produced. In other 
words, Sally's role in her troubles is down-played in that it 
is the delicacy of the body's 'control mechanism' rather than 
Sally herself that is responsible, while Sally's dieting was 
a "rational" (that is, normal) response to adverse 
circumstances. However, the balance between exoneration and 
culpabili ty is a complex one here - which I discussed in 
greater detail in the previous chapter (4.9) Here I am 
interested in the broader transformation of content (and its 
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relation to the process of problematisation) across the 
entire exchange. 
Given this, I suggest that these metaphors and similes (and 
the vivid images they produce) constitute Sally as a victim, 
that is primarily she is not culpable. However, half way 
through A's turn at (161-182) there is an important shift in 
focus towards Sally's relationship with herself. 
5.5.3.2 SALLY'S PATH TO RECOVERY 
In order to get control of her weight again (169-170) Sally 
must believe in herself, trust herself and care for herself. 
Here A offers a clear indication of danger (180-182, 203-
204), mirroring Sally's concern at (22). Thus, In addition to 
practical advice - to get control of her weight, to get NHS 
help, to return to her G. P. and attend counselling rather 
than spending her parent's money (this is the only part of 
the therapeutic account that deals explicitly with the 
problem Sally originally brought to the call), she is urged 
at the same time to: 
i) Commit herself to a diet (173), 
ii) Get into a relationship with someone who will stand by 
her (1 73 -1 74) , 
iii) Develop interests outside food (211), 
iv) Build up her confidence (212), 
v) See other people (212), 
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vi) Believe 1n herself, trust herself and care for herself 
(170-172, 205-206). 
As with the deployment of figurative language discussed in 
the previous chapter, these final elements of advice 
constitute Sally as the active party in her own cure, not 
only through her taking responsibility for procuring 
treatment and getting control of her own weight but also by 
attending to her relationship with herself; self-trust, self-
belief, self-care are key to her recovery. In other words, it 
is not simply hospitalised weight-loss that Sally requires 
but also a certain mode of relationship to herself not 
necessarily self-mastery but a faith in oneself, where 'self' 
forms a key substance upon which to work in addition to the 
body (and its mechanisms) which requires a diet. Sally must 
work on her confidence, her commitment (to dieting) and 
interests outside food. 
The self then, has been introduced by A as a key substance 
for Sally to work upon if she is to overcome her "problem" -
put another way, Sally's 'cure' will, in part, be played out 
on the terrain of the self. Moreover, we might ask exactly 
what is this self as problematised by A and how 1S this 
terrain constructed? (I will also return to this later in the 
chapter, 5.8). As I have already stated, it is perhaps 
imortant that A does not go on to offer even a brief 
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description of this 'self' that Sally must trust, beleive in 
and care for and here the 'self' is not produced as a complex 
psychotherapeutic/psychoanalytic landscape but rather remains 
somewhat two-dimensional; in other words, this self has very 
little in the way of 'contents' (for example, 'psychological' 
processes) and is, in fact, primarily positioned wi thin a 
moral location (or locations). In addition, A offers at least 
the contours of a healthy mode of being or a 'telos': having 
a partner, having a job, seeing other people, being 
confident, having faith ln oneself, having a range of 
interests. 
5.6.0 ANN'S CALL - SUMMARY OF PROBLEMATISATION 
Ann is concerned about her sex-life, she can only enJoy sex 
when her husband is ' very rough' (9 ) During a relatively 
lengthy exchange the advisor offers help relating to the 















5.6.1 ANN'S ACCOUNT OF HER PROBLEM 
c: Hello (.) good evening Alison 
A: Hello Anne how can I help you 
c: Erm (.) i (t) (.) I" can only enjoy sex with my husband if 
he's very rough with me 
A: Right 
c: .hhh a: a otherwise .hh erm I have no .hhh libido if you can 




18 C: whatsoever 
Ann initially conveys her problem in one statement over two 
turns; she can only enjoy sex with her husband if he is 'very 
rough' (9) and she adds in the following turn that otherwise 
she has no 'libido' (13), again emphasising her concern that 
it is only rough sex that she finds enjoyable. 
Thus, Ann presents her problem as follows: 
1) Her problem relates to her sexual relationship with her 
husband (8), 
2) Sex with her husband lS only enjoyable if he is 'very 
rough' (8-9), 
3) Otherwise she has no 'libido' (13). 
At this stage Ann offers no account of the context of her 
'situation' In that she does not offer a cause and does not 
explicitly make herself accountable, although the use of 
'only' at (8) is important in signalling that it is the lack 
of variety that is causing the problem, which in some way 
involves her husband. Ann is very economical In her initial 
presentation possibly because of its sexual nature and her 
initial presentation then undergoes a little shaping up from 
A (20-55) during which Ann is led to present a brief account 
of the history of her problem; she gradually went off sex 
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with her husband as they lived together, although initially 
sex was very frequent. 
5.6.2 THE THERAPEUTIC ACCOUNT 
The therapeutic account of Ann's troubles includes the 
following main themes: 
1) It is common for sexual life to deteriorate in people who 
have been together for some period of time (77-79), this can 
be understood through a metaphor of dwindling electricity 
(80-81) though it is not inevitable (82-87). 
2) One's sex life can be affected by: a) tiredness, sleepless 
nights, being too occupied (107-109); b) psychological 
changes that take place (especially In women) once their 
family is complete (125-140), which are related to a deep 
subconscious belief that parents don't have sex (120-121), 
causing women to feel (almost) as if there is something wrong 
(dirty) about having sex for reasons other than procreation 
(138-146); c) the (sexual) electricity can dwindle when 
partners become more comfortable with each other, like deep 
friends or brother and sister. 
3) It is common for some women to be turned on by a rough 
sexual situation, this is a normal experience (194-195) and a 
normal fantasy for women (195-197). 
4) Most women who could and would enjoy very rough sex with 
their partner (215-216) would not want to be in a situation 
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of a woman being raped (216-217). Pretending is what makes 
the difference (225-226). 
5) Over the years there have become some communication 
barriers (251-253) which may take some time to overcome (300-
301). Ann must tackle the problem of talking to her husband 
by degrees (296), possibly in the heat of the moment [during 
sex] ( 3 0 5 - 3 1 0) . 
6) The communication barriers may relate to areas other than 
the sexual domain (329-331) - areas where it is difficult to 
communicate at a deep level (331-332), possibly caused by 
sexual tensions that have built up over the years (332-335). 
7) Ann's feelings are not wrong [given the context] (339-
342) . 
8) What lS troubling Ann is that her enjoyment is a secret 
one (367-369) that will be limited until she can share it 
with her husband (369-371). 
9) Rough sex has re-kindled some of Ann's sexual drive (394-
396) though she should not limit herself in her love making 
(404-406, 408,411) but return to the variety she had in her 
love making some years ago (412-415). 
5.6.3 THE PROBLEMATISATION OF ANN'S ACCOUNT 
How has Ann's account been transformed by therapeutic 
intervention? Recall that Ann's initial account of her 
problem (including the early shaping up by A), offered the 
specificity of her sexual pleasure with her husband as 
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accountable for her difficulties (it has to be very rough for 
her to enjoy it). Ann then added that she had gradually gone 
off sex (40-41), then enjoyed sex with her husband that was 
quite rough and was 'turned on' (53) when watching a woman 
being forced to have sex on television (51-52). As with 
Sally's exchange the therapeutic problematisation provides an 
account of the origin of Ann's problem (in this case A offers 
several possible causes), however, Ann's 'cure' is played out 
in a different way to Sally's - here the emphasis is placed 
on her relationship with her husband rather than primarily 
her relationship with herself, although Ann is given the key 
role In her difficulties as it is she who has kept them 
secret. 
Despite its nebulous form then, it is possible to isolate 
several important strands of the therapeutic account of Ann's 
troubles. Its main elements might be reduced to three axes 
which I will deal with in turnj 1) the commonality of the 
deterioration of the caller's sexual life (with an elaborate 
account of its origin), 2) the normality of the caller's 
pleasure and its status as not rape, 3) the communication 
barriers that have resulted from the caller's failure to 













5.6.3.1 THE COMMONALITY OF THE DETERIORATION 
At (76-79) A's first reassurance focuses on the commonality 
of deterioration in sexual life In couples who have been 
together for a long period. A originally uses 'normal' (77) 
and, in fact, these two descriptions ('normal' and 'common') 
work alongside each other throughout the earlier phase of the 
call. The cause of this deterioration is offered as having a 
'psychological nature' (114-115, 125) and A deploys 
figurative language to illustrate this (see ch4.9 for a 
fuller analysis) . 
Note however that A suggests the problem is common but not 
inevitable: 
At 
not normal [laughs] I mean er i-it's all too conunon I should 
say:: .hh for sexual life to deteriorate in couples that have 
been together for some period of time .hh that is to say that 
the initial electricity ( ) that makes the: the sex life 
very passionate .hhh often does dwindle (.) with time (.) .hh 
now I don't believe that there's [ [ 
[ [ 
c: nun nun 
A: any reason why it should do and certainly . hh many couples 
are living testimony to the fact that it needn't 
(113) A begins to offer some detailed information 
concerning psychological processes where the term 'most of 
us' appears to once more highlight its commonality (such use 
of collective pronouns has another function which I explore 
in more detail in chapter 6) . 
113 A: Right .hhh now that that's what hits it in the early days but 
114 something else happens which is more of a psychological nature 
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115 .hh which relates to the fact that most of us were not aware as 
116 youngsters of our parents having a sex life (.) 
At (125-126) A offers the problem as a gendered one, relating 
it to the completion of the family: 
125 A: .hhh and so there are bigger psychological changes that take 
126 place and this I find tends to happen especially in women 
A then continues this construction of commonality at (150-
155) 
150 A: but once the you've passed that stage of your life and 
151 you've had your children .hh th:: women do get some very deeply 
152 rooted psychological hang-ups about sex .h and that's one of the 
153 reasons why: erm some of that electricity can dwindle of course 
154 that's only looking at the woman's side it does happen to an 
155 extent in men as well .hh and I think also 
By deploying broad categories - 'women' and 'men' as opposed 
to, for example, some women or some men, the commonality of 
the problem is again emphasised. 
Finally, A's long turn at (155-170) below, offers both a 
reassurance concerning part of the caller's initial 
formulation that enj oying rough sex is quite common for 
women and a reassurance concerning a novel element 
(introduced by A) i the deterioration of sexual life In long-
term relationships. Both these reassurances constitute their 
problems as relating to 'women' although not necessarily 
exclusively. 
155 does happen to an extent in men as well .hh and I think also you 
156 become .hh very much more comfortable with each other you become 
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157 very much like 00 erm deep friends or as often been said 
158 brother and sister so that a sexual relationship sometimes 
159 doesn't even seem quite so appropriate: within the relationship 
160 (.) so there are all kinds of reasons erm and and also .h whilst 
161 in the early days when there was a frequency of the sexual 
162 relationship .00 erm there there was .00 erm the excitement of 
163 the variety er of the the sex that you were enjoying together 
164 .hh but as with most things: when you get on in spending your 
165 years together things become erm a a little erm more regular 
166 you know there's less variety there's less excitement .00 so 
167 there Ire all those kinds of things .hhh the other thing erm to 
168 reassure you on .00 that it is also quite common for women to be 
169 turned on by erm what you describe as a rough erm sexual 
170 situation .hh now it it might be worth for a 
5.6.3.2 THE NORMALITY OF THE CALLER'S PLEASURE 
Here A focuses on the normalisation of CIS experience 
(normalising in the sense of discursively constituting it as 
'normal') giving it the status of fantasy: 
194 A: Right (.5) OK .00 again that lS quite a normal erm 
195 experience it's got it certainly .00 a a very much more normal 
196 fantasy (.75) for women. 00 than than most would admit to (1) 
197 .00 
This fantasy however, lS a secret one one which (by 
implication) most women would not admit to, (this notion of 
secrecy becomes more important later on) At (199-200) C 
introduces the idea of rape and A spends the remainder of 
this segment (before introducing 'communication barriers' at 
250-253) constituting the difference between the caller's 
fantasy and rape: 
211 A: OK .00 well let's take a look at the differences between what 
212 your' e talking about which is your husband making love to you 
213 roughly.OO and a woman being raped .00 the the two are 
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highlighting once again the normality/commonality of the 
caller's fantasy by suggesting that: 
213 you roughly . hh and a woman being raped . hh the the two are 
214 actually quite quite different .hh. and I'm I'm sure that erm you 
215 along with most women who could and would enjoy .hh very rough 
216 sex with their partner .hh would not want to be in a situation 
217 of a woman being raped in the sense that we tend to think of 
218 that where a woman .hh erm is not interested does not want may 
219 or may not know the person .hh erm but lS definitely not 
220 consenting (.) to that act 
Here the normality/commonality theme is elaborated through 
the constitution of what 'most women' would or would not 
enj oy - moving from the normalisation of this pleasure for 
the caller to its normalisation for most women, along with 
not wanting to be raped and where rape is defined as: 
, ... where a woman .hh is not interested does not want mayor may 
not know the person .hh but is definitely not consenting () to 
that act' (218-220) 
A suggests that what is most important is that the caller is 
pretending and operating wi thin the safety and security of 
her relationship (225-253) Thus, we can observe that these 
first two elements of the therapeutic problematisation 
constitute some form of normalising judgement on the part of 
the therapeutic. 
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5.6.3.3 COMMUNICATION BARRIERS 
At (250-253) a change in focus occurs towards problems with 
r communication r (252): 
250 think . h that one of the main problems that I see: is that 
251 whatever else has happened in your relationship over the years 
252 .hh there have become .hh erm some communication barriers: I 
253 think 
254 
255 c: Mnun 
256 
257 A: because it sounds like .hh you and your husband don't discuss 
258 your sexual life (.) very much at all 
Note that this theme occurred earlier: 
250 A: Alright .hhh is there something that you've been able to 
251 discuss with your husband at all 
252 
253 C: No 
254 
255 A: OK so he's completely unaware of any of these feelings .hhh 
256 
257 C: As far as I know= 
A suggests that 'communication barriers' (252) have emerged 
because of the caller's failure to discuss her sexual life 
wi th her husband. A great deal of advice is then offered 
concerning better communication (295-335) which will help to 
establish a 'closer relationship all round' (328) and may 
also help In other areas where there is difficulty to 
communicate at a deep level (332) and that may have been 
caused through sexual tension that built up over the recent 
years (332-335) I thus broadening the communication problem to 
areas outside the sexual domain. 
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At (367-369) A offers a further element to the problem; what 
is troubling the caller is that her pleasure is a secret one 
and at (413-415) A concludes by advising C to return to the 
normality of her past use of pleasure, that is the caller's 
fantasy should be only one element in the complete return of 
a satisfying sex life - it has served to rekindle her ability 
to enjoy sex in general rather than merely this specific act. 
How then, do these elements operate together to form a 
therapeutic account? Elements 1 and 2, I suggest, implicitly 
constitute the caller as understanding her pleasure to be 
abnormal and uncommon and after an extended episode of advice 
concerning better communication the advisor introduces a new 
element to the problematisation; that the secrecy of the 
enj oyment is troubling the caller, where this secrecy will 
limit her enjoyment until she is able to properly share it 
(communicate it) with her husband. In this way 1 and 2 are 
linked to 3 through the caller's secrecy. 
Thus, it is not the caller's pleasure/enjoyment itself, that 
is wrong but her secrecy regarding it (her fantasy has been 
normalised). Here secrecy seems to provide evidence for what 
the advisor has already offered; that certain communication 
barriers have arlsen between the caller and her husband. 
Moreover, the notion of secrecy lS more agentic than the 
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development of communication barriers positioning the 
caller herself, I suggest, as at least partly culpable. 
In summary then, these first two elements of 
normality/causality appear to position the origin of the 
caller's problem (that is, a common situation to which the 
caller has responded in a normal way) in a process beyond the 
caller's control (normalising the problem). A clearly states 
that she wishes to reassure (73-74) in these two respects 
(75-79, 113-116). The two elements are then drawn together at 
(251-253) with the notion of communication barriers where the 
effect of this third element In the problematisation lS 
profoundly different to 1 and 2; whereas 1 and 2 appear to 
offer reassurance through normalisation, 3 seems to produce 
culpability on the part of the caller, not through its cause 
(sexual tension) but through the introduction of the caller's 
secrecy. 
How has Belinda's problem been transformed by therapeutic 
intervention? By constituting the core problem as 
communication barriers/secrecy, the problem of being troubled 
at only enjoying rough sex has been transformed into: 
1) Another (albeit different) problem - this is important, 
the way the problem is dealt with is not to 'solve it', 
rather it is shifted towards the caller's interpretation of 
events (that is, her belief that her experience is abnormal 
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and uncommon) and normalised by the reassurance that it lS, 
ln fact, a very common and normal one shared by many 
people, especially women. 
2) A problem for which the caller (and her husband) are, at 
least, partly responsible. Not only is it the caller's 
interpretation of her experience that is problematic but also 
the secrecy of her enj oyment. In dealing with this secrecy 
(and the related communication barriers) C will be able to 
improve the entire relationship rather than merely her sex 
life. 
3) A problem that can be worked upon by the caller - ln this 
case the caller together with her husband in a very 
particular way (59-60, 293-322) That is C is offered an 
ethical substance 'communication barriers' and guidelines for 
the practices which will constitute the required ethical 
work. 
A's final advice concerns the caller's return to the 
normality of the past: 
404 A: . hh that doesn't necessarily mean . h that the only way in 
405 which you can gain sat sexual gratification from now is to make 
406 love in this rough way what it does mean is this this is the key 
407 that has done the rekindling .hh and it's something that you're 
408 always likely to enjoy .hh I would urge you however: .hh not to 
409 tell yourself that that is the only way you can enj oy making 
410 love .hh because I think there you'd be limiting yourself .hh I 
411 think you'll find that once .h erm through these means however 
412 you can rekindle a more regular more satisfying sex life .hh I 
413 think you can begin then .hh to look for and to enjoy the sort 
414 of variety that you had in your love making some years ago 
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The above segment, I suggest, provides a key example of the 
operation of counselling discourse as not merely the 
provision of normative judgements but rather an offer to the 
caller of certain techniques/practices that will enable her 
to normalise her own future possible conduct (through the 
process of problematisation) . 
What of the form of self conveyed in Ann's problematisation? 
I have suggested that Ann's therapeutic account differs from 
Sally's in that it lS focused less upon the caller's 
relationship with herself and more upon her relationship with 
her husband. However, there is an implied self - I suggest -
in this problematisation, in that Ann's troubles may lie deep 
within her subconscious and given that it may be difficult 
for her to communicate at a 'deep level'. This production of 
depth infers some kind of 'ontological' feature (I discuss 
this in more detail later on, 5.8) of the caller's self; 
pehaps 'depth/superficiality', however, as with Sally's 
problematisation, the caller's self and its relation with 
another (Ann's husband) is above all a morally positioned 
self, in particular as I have shown with respect to 
normality and culpability. 
Finally, Ann's initial problem incorporated a Freudian term 
for sexual drive 'libido' (13) , providing a useful 
illustration of the way the caller's and the advisor's 
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account are not straight-forwardly separable into 'lay' and 
'therapeutic discourse'. De Swaan's (1990:108) concept of 
prot-professionalisation is useful here in that he considers 
the way in which psychotherapeutic professional practice 
offers the layperson a means of understanding themsleves and 
their troubles: 
... psychotherapy proto-professionalisation involves 
a certain amount of knowledge of which troubles are 
treated by psychotherapists and members of related 
helping professions, as well as a tendency to adopt 
certain attitudes and basic concepts of the filed 
of psychotherapy. But in order to be able to 
recognise everyday troubles as problems for a 
therapist, it is necessary to see a certain pattern 
and a repetition in a whole range of actions and 
events. It is also necessary to recognise, in 
oneself or in someone else, intentions and feelings 
which might not be explicitly expressed ... 
Thus, it lS also important that within the same utterance 
Anne defers to the expertise of the advisor, ' .. if you can 
say that for a woman' (13-14) and later makes reference to a 
self-help publication she has read in relation to her 
problem: 
89 c: Yeh I I got a book called how to make .hh love with the same 
90 man for the rest of your life 
91 
92 A: Right 
93 
94 c: to s-see if that would he:l- help me 
95 
96 A: Right well I think there are some some useful erm tips in 
97 that book .hh that can help you along .hh but I think your your 
98 problem lS specific to you and your situation .hh and I 
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Interestingly A then emphasises the unique aspects of Ann's 
problem (97-98), opening the space for a subsequent 
interpretation (that is, a judgement relying upon A's 




therefore offers a more forceful 
In short, the deployment of an 
may be considered a binding mode of 
subj ection in that it subj ectifies the caller as a unique 
individual (even where it incorporates elements of 
normalisation). Furthermore, it is also important to remember 
that such a mode of sUbjection could only operate within a 
moral order that valorises uniqueness. 
5.7. BELINDA'S CALL - SUMMARY OF PROBLEMATISATION 
Belinda's problem concerns the relationships between herself 
and three other persons; her ex-husband, her mother-in-law 
and her daughter. Much of Belinda's account concerns the 
presentation of the four people involved, bound up with an 
account of her domestic situation. After therapeutic 
intervention Belinda's problem is reformulated in terms of 
her own personality characteristics and her obligations as a 
parent. Thus, I analyse this exchange not only in relation to 
the way the caller presents herself but also her presentation 
of the other persons whose relationships and conduct together 
constitute Belinda's problem. 
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It must be noted that as we saw earlier the caller's 
account was heavily shaped by A from the very beginning of 
the episode. Belinda is rarely able to present her problem 
without interruptions which serve - just as with the previous 
transcript to shape up her account, however these early 
interruptions have a more profound shaping effect than in the 
previous two episodes. Here A interrupts with quite lengthy 
turns, in fact, Belinda's longest turn occurs at (35-39). For 
this reason it is more difficult (though not impossible) In 
this episode to make some form of separation between the 
content of the caller's account and its therapeutic 
counterpart. 
5.7.1 BELINDA'S ACCOUNT OF HER PROBLEM 














however, we cannot necessarily accept this as the original 
formulation because C is interrupted at (16) and prevented 
from further elaboration. After several interruptions from A 
(16, 20, 24) she offers a summation at (26-28) as follows: 
right well my problem is erm it's a grandmother [clicks tongue] 
I have= 
A: =not a mother-in-law 
c: well i-yes it is a mother-in-law [laughs] 
A: a grandmother-in-law 
c: a grandmother-in-law 






it's the whole 
grandmother 
and well it's yes it's the whole 
in-law family .hhh or basically [laughs] 
Belinda's account is then shaped up to provide descriptions 
of the people involved (along with her domestic situation and 
its history in that she has left her husband). A summary of 
the main elements of Belinda's account follows in relation to 
each of the persons involved: 
5.7.1.1 BELINDA'S DESCRIPTION OF HER HUSBAND (49) (whom she 
earlier terms 'the son', 39): 
1) Always rewarded for bad behaviour (39-41), 
2) Never accepted the consequences of his actions (41-42), 
3) Sits In the chair and criticises - 'never did anything 
without you standing with a rod over him' (42-45), 
4) Everything is a tantrum (54), 
5) Threatening and violent (59,65), 
6) Someone who has done nothing for his daughter (133-134), 
7) Having 'something wrong with him' (183) and an attention 
span of about half an hour (184-185), 
5.7.1.2 BELINDA'S DESCRIPTION OF HERSELF: 
1) Married for five years to the son (38-39), 
2) She made herself homeless and ran away with her child (81, 
91) , 
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3) Someone with wonderful friends who aided this escape (81-
82, 95-101), 
4) She is on income support with a 'lovely place [to live]' 
(105-107) , 
5) She will never allow 'unsupervised contact' (132-133) 
between her husband and daughter, 
6) Her daughter looks to her for everything (138-142), 
7) She wants her daughter to know she has a 'daddy' (421) and 
responds to her daughters desire to see him (144-145). 
5.7.1.3 BELINDA'S DESCRIPTION OF THE GRANDMOTHER-IN-LAW: 
1) Wants everything to be 'hunky-dory' - wont accept husband 
lied to solicitors (117-118), 
2) Problem is her attitude (170), 
3) Thinks son should have access to child (176-177), 
4) Threatening to have a nervous breakdown (219-220), 
5) Basically a present machine [to her granddaughter] (286-
287) . 
5.7.1.4 BELINDA'S DESCRIPTION OF HER DAUGHTER: 
1) She is three and a half years old (95), 
2) Looks to caller for everything (138-142), 
3) Asked after her father (44-145) and loves to see her 
grandmother (286). 
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5.7.1.5 SUMMARY OF BELINDA'S ACCOUNT 
Belinda's (shaped up) problem then, concerns the qualities 
and characteristics of the persons involved. Her husband is 
irresponsible, threatening and violent, has done nothing for 
his daughter and has ' .. something wrong with him .. ' (183). 
The grandmother-in-Iaw - who is constituted as the focus of 
concern - wants everything to be ' .. hunky-dory .. ' (117-118), 
is threatening to have a nervous breakdown (219-220) and 
thinks her son should have unaccompanied access to the child 
(176-177). There is only a brief description of the daughter, 
who is aged three and a half (95), looks to the caller for 
everything, asked to see her Father (144-145) and loves to 
see her grandmother (286). 
The caller presents her husband and her mother-in-law In a 
negative frame, not only was her husband a difficult and 
violent spouse but her mother-in-law has a problematic 
attitude, that is she will not accept that her son misled the 
solicitors involved In the divorce settlement, although 
Belinda's daughter loves to see her grandmother because she 
is a 'present machine' (287). Her husband is an inadequate 
father and her mother-in-law an inadequate grandmother. 
Belinda presents herself as having ran away with her daughter 
and as having made herself homeless, helped by her wonderful 
friends. She has a lovely place to live and her daughter 
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looks to her for everything. She is someone who wants her 
daughter to know she has a 'Daddy' and who at Christmas was 
keeping everything very very happy. She will never allow 
unsupervised contact between her husband and her daughter. In 
this way Belinda positions herself as a good and responsible 
parent (138-142, 421, 144-145, 132-133), occupying the role 
of carer (268-281) and with the means to provide for her 
daughter (105-107), while her problem is primarily accounted 
for by the grandmother's unwillingness to engage with her 
son's unfatherly conduct. 
5.7.2 THE THERAPEUTIC ACCOUNT 
The therapeutic account of Belinda's troubles includes the 
following themes, (please note that the following analysis 
only includes A's comments, I deal with the broadcast's host 
Robbie Vincent's 
chapter) : 
[transcribed as V] In the following 
1) Belinda sounds like someone who likes to please people and 
doesn't like to let them down (187-189), 
2) What is hidden away in a very complex story is guilt (189-
193) , 
3) Belinda must avoid being 'Mrs Nice' (216) for the rest of 
her life (215-217), 
4) 'Sometimes in life... truth has to take precedence over 
niceness' (225-226) , this lS a 'very important guiding 
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principle' (226-227). Many people spend months or years lying 
to other people; sacrificing truth in pursuit of niceness 
results in 'a whole load of lying people' (241). Society is 
'becoming increasingly superficially nice' 
price of which is dishonesty (260), 
(250-254), the 
5) Belinda's daughter, when she's seven, eight or nine will 
turn around and say 'Mum, where' s my Dad, where' s my Gran, 
why don't I ever see them?' (305-310). All separated single 
paren ts have to deal with this , wha t do you owe your 
child?' (312-317). The other side [of the family] are half 
the daughters family (300-301), 
6) Unless there is abuse or violence towards the child it is 
a better turn for the child to keep the link but on Belinda's 
own terms (317-334), 
7) A Court of Law would respect the rights of both parents 
unless Belinda can show 'something really dreadful' (423) 
(414-424) , 
8) A little bit more 'assertion and truth' (424-428) would 
help in dealing with Belinda's mother-in-law (424-429). 
How has Belinda's account been transformed by therapeutic 
intervention? Recall that Belinda's initial statement offered 
'a grandmother' (13) as her problem. Belinda (through A's 
shaping up), subsequently described the three people involved 
and also (sometimes indirectly) offered a presentation of 
herself. Belinda's ex-husband and mother-in-law were 
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positioned in very negative terms where the grandmother's 
attitude was offered as the primary cause of the troubles. 
Belinda presented herself much more positively as a good and 
responsible parent. She consistently favoured the terms 
'grandmother' or 'grandmother-in-law' (13,22,28,170,219, 
268, 286). 
After therapeutic intervention Belinda's troubles are 
problematised in relation to (figuratively) the type of 
person she is; 'Mrs Nice', and the type of person she must 
become; truthful and assertive, along with her parental 
obligations as they relate to the (future) needs of her 
daughter. The role of her ex-husband and mother-in-law are 
now almost invisible. Note that this shift towards the role 
of the caller In her own troubles is underscored by A's 
(repeated though not entire) substitution of the term 
'mother-in-law' (emphasising the relation to Belinda) for 
grandmother or grandmother-in-law (emphasising the relation 
to Belinda's daughter) (24,115,429, 
'grandmother' or 'gran' at 174, 197, 
although A does use 
310 it is important - I 
suggest - that A uses 'mother-in-law' In the final summation, 
429) . 
TRe therapeutic account can be more closely analysed in two 
main parts: 
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5.7.2.1 THE PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CALLER 
A) BELINDA AS 'MRS NICE' : 
Belinda's 'cure' relates to her character or personality, it 
is not that she is simply behaving in a problematic way but 
that she sounds like somebody who likes to please people. A 
links this to a feeling of guilt on the part of the caller 




















(189) in the story, although it is something that we can all 
recognise (193-197). Again, note that this guilt is linked to 
the caller's personality type rather than the relationships 
(with her ex-husband and mother-in-law) that Belinda 
originally described. 
c: see the grandmother threatens to have a 
nervous breakdown on me [ 
[ 
A: no no 
this is upsetting you isn't it when I say to you 
nice to somebody you get a bit cross with me and you 
I want to go on being nice .hh sometimes in life .hh 
to take precedence over niceness now that is a very 








c: see she loves to see her grandmother 
grandmother is really basically a present machine 
don't did I ought to to to oh I (just) .hh 
because her 
(.75) and I 
A: go on say something nasty 
[ 
c: did I ought (1) did I 
contact with that side of the family 
ought to: (.5) cut the 
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We then see what might be termed a "transference" technique 
deployed by A at (222-225) and (290) [excerpts above]. What 
is most interesting about this is that it happens over the 
phone, that is there is no visual channel, it is entirely 
discursively constituted (although we would need to include 
the entire range of verbal and non-verbal channels for 
example, prosody, paralanguage and so on). Here the caller is 
positioned as repeating her problem behaviour within the 
therapeutic interaction6 , that is her problem is a 
"presenting problem". In this way A offers evidence for his 
interpretation taken from the immediate interaction and where 
if the caller resists she would produce further evidence for 
A's interpretation in the form of "defensiveness" or 
"resistance" for example. I suggest that this deployment of 
transference by A operates: a) discursively, in that C is 
positioned (c.f. Davies & Harre, 1990) as projecting her 
guilty relations onto A, and b) as a very forceful mode of 
subj ection - there lS a sense in which C is trapped wi thin 
this interpretation in that by resisting it she enters a loop 
in which she offers more evidence for A's interpretation. 
B) TRUTH, HONESTY AND SOCIETY 
This excerpt (below) elaborates A's interpretation relating 
to CiS tendency to be I nice I (and at the same time offers 
6 Note that for Freud (1914) transference was linked with a 'compulsion 









































more evidence for it) but also functions to broaden the range 
of the problematisation to 'our society' (250) balancing 
commonality and individuality within the same ethical regime: 
A: no no no but 
this is upsetting you isn't it when I say to you don't be 
nice to somebody you get a bit cross with me and you say well 
I want to go on being nice .hh sometimes in life .hh truth has 
to take precedence over niceness now that is a very important 
guiding principle .hh 
c: yeh 
A: there are many people who spend .hh months or even years 
lying to other people because 
[ 
c: yeh 
they see the overriding priority is to be nice .hh now if you 
always sacrifice truth in pursuit 
c: yeh when you 
of niceness you end up with a whole load of 
.hh I don't want to make it 
lying people now 
[ 
c: well this is my problem I I 
(.5) this is your problem you we have I don't want to make too 
[ 
c: MIn 
many comments about our society .hh 
c: yeh 
A: but we are becoming increasingly superficially nice .hh and 
[ 
c: you see 
that's not my way (1) mmm that's not my way if you met the 
mother you'd know why the son is like he is 
the price of that is dishonesty 
A introduces 'truth' at (225) as the counterpart to 
'niceness' I (226) offers it as a 'very important guiding 
principle' (226-227) and then broadens the range of the 
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problem from the caller (187-188) to 'many people' (231) to 
'society' (250). This broadening of the problem constitutes 
it as a prevalent one in which ' .. you end up with a whole 
load of lying people ... ' (241). A ends with an almost 
prophetic tone: 
, ... we [which follows 'our society'] are becoming increasingly 
superficially nice . hh and the price of that is dishonesty' 
(254-260) . 
In this way A has linked C's individual problem to a broader 
societal problem, engaging a whole ethical regime concerning 
truth and honesty as guiding principles, not only for the 
caller but also for 'our society' as a whole. 
Also of interest is A's varied deployment of pronouns which, 
I suggest, offer a further indication of the nature of the 
ethical regime offered by A. A initially deploys 'you' (223-
224) clearly addressing the caller then 'they' (236) 
immediately following 'many people' (231), then returning to 
'you' (236) - where this time the reference is ambiguous in 
that it could refer to the caller or one of 'many people'. A 
returns to 'you' once again at (241), deploys 'your problem' 
at (246) in response to C's 'well this is my problem' (244), 
'our society' at (250) and finally 'we' at (254). 
Here A appears to move back and forth from the commonality of 



















honesty) and its individual manifestation (not only ln 
relation to C but also to individuaL members of the groups to 
which A refers, 'many people', , our society'); in other 
words, A simultaneously deploys individualisation and 
collectivisation forming a link between the two. Remember 
that this complex of commonality and individuality remains 
part of a broader problematisation, that is, certain 
individual and collective conduct is offered as problematic; 
as in some sense doubtful and questionable: fundamentally as 
a problem requiring a solution. (A's deployment of pronouns 
also has implications for the overhearing audience which I 
address in the following chapter.) 
5.7.2.2 THE DAUGHTERS RIGHTS AND THE CALLER'S OBLIGATIONS AS 
PARENT: 
An important change ln focus on the part of the advisor 
occurs at (295): 
A: well the problem is the problem is this no matter how bad 
[ 
c: it's not I mean they're 
prejudiced they're racist [laughs] they're (everything) 
listen listen .hh no matter how bad the other side is the 
other side are half your daughter's family 
C: Mmm and she loves them 
[ 
A: and she's going to turn round to you when she's seven or 
eight or nlne and say mum 
C: 
(.5) where's my dad where's my gran why don't 
and you're then going to have to face her 
yeh yeh 
I ever see them 








thing that all separated parents 
with 
c: 




.hh (1) what do you owe your child now clearly if there's 
Here the focus shifts from the caller's guilt and society's 
dishonesty, which seem to provide evidence for each other, to 
the problem of whether or not to cut contact with the in-law 
family and the rights and obligations involved. A suggests 
that CIS daughter will (eventually) consider her accountable 
for the whereabouts of her Father and Grandmother, 
emphasising the child's part in the relations father-child, 
grandmother-granddaughter through the deployment of an 
illustration of the daughters future words; where's my 
dad, where's my gran ... ' (310). A then offers an extreme-case 
formulation; all separate single parents have to deal with 
the question of what do you owe your child? and relates the 
obligations of the caller (positioned as parent and raised at 
311-317), to the only conditions (317-321) under which it 
would be permissible to spare the contact (326), otherwise C 
must keep the link. 
5.7.3 THE PROBLEMATISATION OF BELINDA'S ACCOUNT 
Belinda's initial account then, has been problematised In 
relation to two main elements: 
1) The caller's desire to please people and not let them down 











letting down her mother-in-law (197-201), (moreover the 
caller actively resists being 'nasty' 219-225, 286-293), 
manifested in the telephone interaction itself), leading A to 
conclude: 
A: =unless you can show something really dreadful you're gonna 
have a hard job but ohh a 
[ 
c: (er) 
little bit more (oS) assertion and truth would help your case a 
lot In dealing with mother-in-law 
[ 
c: yeh 
At the same time A suggests that this is a problem for many 
people and that it, in fact, relates to our society and the 
increasing dishonesty [in our relationships] 0 
2) The rights of the daughter which entails the caller to 
recognise her obligations as a (mother and) single parent who 
must engage with the question 'what do you owe your child?' 
(263) and accept that only a very extreme (and specific) 
situation, that is abuse or violence (317-321) would justify 
sparing contact with the in-law family, otherwise she must 
'keep the link' (330) but under her own terms (334) 0 Thus the 
caller is urged to make herself accountable through her 
obligations as a mother and single parent, while at the same 
time is offered some freedom to choose the particular form of 




















.hh (1) what do you owe your child now clearly if there's 
[ 
c: you see this is relatively new to me 
somebody abusing your child or being violent to them .hh then 
[ [ 
c: well I've seen ( yeh 
maybe on the balance of probabilities you are doing your child a 
better turn (.5) by (.75) sparing the contact (.5) but 
[ [ 
c: MIn no (they) 
otherwise I think you have got to keep the link 
c: yeh but under my ow under my terms 
A: on your terms 
Finally, in relation to the form of self offered to Belinda 
through therapeutic problematisation there is a somewhat 
more elaborate account here (than with the previous two 
calls) in that Belinda has a 'personality type' with a 
particular tendency - she likes to please people and to keep 
them happy. However, what is perhaps most interesting is the 
lack of a 'psychological' vocabulary In relation to the 
descriptive term which is deployed with great economy by A. 
This description 'Mrs Nice' is, in fact, above all moral and 
once again rather two-dimensional in that it lacks both 
depth and complexity - it is almost as if the caller's self 
has been constituted solely in terms of its moral location, 
though there is a causal effect - the emotion, guilt - and 
moreover we see here the moral location as a condi tion of 
possibility for that emotion (c.f. Harre, 1988:6). 
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5.8 THE 'ONTOLOGY' OF THE SELF IN THERAPEUTIC 
PROBLEMATISATION 
Thus far, I have shown the nature of the transformation of 
the content of the caller's account of their troubles and 
identified in particular that therapeutic problematisation 
tends to shift the ethical operation of that account. I have 
also identified the (trans)formation of the caller's 'self' 
as above all a (re-)location within some form of moral 
order. For the remainder of this analysis I focus upon key 
elements of the therapeutic transformations which occur 
within the data archive, in particular the terrain of the 
self which I have thus far identified as more 'moral' than 
'psychological' . 
Here then, I address the question of the extent to which we 
can identify a 'specialist' psychological or psychoanalytic 
'ontology' of self deployed within the problematisations 
under scrutiny. I use 'ontology' in a somewhat similar way 
to Harre & Gillett (1994:29-30) (though I shall use it in a 
more loosely defined way and therefore place it within 
inverted commas) who define it as: 
... a systematic exposition of the assumptions 
about the basic categories of beings admitted to 
the universe assumed in some scientific field ... It 
should involve a location system, a basic class or 
classes of entities, and some kind of structuring 
relations that hold all these entities together In 
a single world. (Harre & Gillett, 1994:30) 
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I have already argued that, overall, these exchanges tend to 
involve judgements and prescriptions concerning right and 
proper conduct, the rights, duties and obligations of 
certain subject positions (for example, parent) and the 
management of accountability/culpability/responsibility as 
opposed to the deployment of a 'psychological' realm of the 
self. However, there are some implicit and explicit 
references to forms, types of, and process which relate to, 
the self (some of which we have already seen) and I now wish 
to complete this second stage of the analysis with some 
observations regarding these. 
5.8.1 ANN'S (T1) AND JOHN2'S (T7) CALLS 
Ann's problem concerns a failing relationship and involves 
its effects upon her children. She begins her account by 
relating her discovery that her partner was having an affair 
(17). A central element of the problematisation involves a 
'psychological' account concerning the partner's culpability 
which is something that ' ... particularly men do ... ' (123). 
This account however is conveyed in an everyday vocabulary 
as opposed to a specialist one. A deploys the terms 
'instinct' (131) and 'guilt' (129, 130, 132) in an extended 
turn which - I suggest - primarily concerns morally locating 
the partner: 
122 A: Yes hh u- unfortunately we find this all to often (.) and i-
123 it does seem to be something that particularly men do where 
124 they've been unfaithful and that I can only obviously speak from 
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125 my own experience of listening to people hhh but it seems to be 
126 this erm peculiar situation that arises where a man er has been 
127 unfaithful hhh and for some reason finds it impossible to accept 
128 the responsibility for that hhh and it's almost as if he daren't 
129 start feeling the guilt (0) because if he does that guilt will 
130 overwhelm him hhh and so his initial i-instinct is to look 
131 around to see who else to blame hhh and of course usually the 
132 easiest way erm of getting the guilt and the blame of him is to 
133 put it onto the partner who's actually accusing him (0) so that 
134 if he can make it seem to you like it is your fault because you 
135 failed him in some way or you haven't been exciting enough or 
136 whatever hhh then you will actually begin to think that (0) and 
137 you will do your very best to win him back 
Towards the end of the interaction, following advice from A 
concerning decision-making with respect to whether or not to 
continue with the relationship, there is a shift once more 
towards 'emotional factors': 
374 you hh but I think the relationship is far more important than 
375 that hh I-I think it's really more about hh what is going on 
376 between you and your partner hh and how that is affecting the 
377 children hh and I think it's those emotional factors which 
378 really are at the core of this decision that you need to make 
379 hh but it's a lot to work through hh take some time hh 
380 definitely take some advice so that you can be sure that as 
381 and when you reach the decision it's the right one for you 
John's (T7) call concerns failed cosmetic surgery and in this 
exchange the problematisation shifts away from the caller's 
ini tial account which focuses upon the culpability of the 
surgeon/clinic and towards the caller's 'self-image' (173) 
and the 'psychological factors' involved with perceived 
bodily deformity (177-180): 
165 right and I think that's something where cosmetic surgery 
166 has gone wrong ohh erm or has gone wrong in in the eyes of the 
167 patient now I'm not saying in any way that you're imagining 
















that lS always worth looking at .hhh lS how much it is that 
person's self-image 
C: Sure 
A: erm that that is affected 
psychological factors to any er 
feel is is a minor deformity so 
instance and you may have 
.hh and that there are 
anything that somebody may 
to speak .hh so that for 
These two shifts (c. f. Ann and John2) towards the 
'psychological' are interesting for our purposes given the 
lack of description of exactly what these 'emotional' and 
'psychological' factors are, other than terms such as 'guilt' 
for example. That such broad descriptions are adequate and 
functional within these two problematisations is important I 
suggest because these 'factors' appear to primarily 
constitute what might be termed points of internality, that 
is their content appears less relevant than their operation 
In fixing the locus of cOncern. Put another way, the 
deployment of these terms 'emotional/psychological factors' 
appears to function more as a reminder that the callers' 
problems are operating, above all, within an internal terrain 
and that it is here that the solutions must be, at least in 
part, played out. 
5.B.2 GEORGE (T5) , LINDA (TB) AND JOHN'S (T6) CALLS 
A also deploys notions of "repression" and desire, In fact we 
have already examined the hidden guilt within Belinda's 
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exchange (5.7.2.1). George's problematisation includes an 
emphasis upon 'anger' (240, 242) which needs to be placed 
, ou t on the table' (243) and thus we can presumably accept 
these emotions as hidden or possibly 'repressed' (the term 
'hidden' [225J is deployed once in relation to C's 'anger' 
but by the host rather than A) : 
238 A: I think even better would be (.) the two of them together 
239 and really let's have these issues out in the open I think (.) 
240 George is very angry he thinks he's done a lot to help his 
241 wife he's been kicked in the teeth (.) and I think his wife's 
242 very angry they're both angry people and they're expressing it 
243 in different ways and we've gotta get that anger out on the 
244 table ... 
Linda's call provides a further example of this deployment of 
"repression"; here A suggests that the caller is avoiding 
saying the truth, where the immediately previous call was 
Belinda's (who was 'repressing' her guilt, T3): 
33 A: Linda is this possibly another version of the (.) thing we've 
34 just been discussing which is that sometimes your not saying the 
35 truth because it's painful and I .hh I you you just 
Finally, wi thin John's problematisation A constitutes what 
might be termed a motivational process in relation to a 
desire for companionship, conveyed as a drive: 
113 A: Well it it it is a very difficult one isn't it (.) if you 
114 have a need if you are lonely and if you want companionship or 
115 love or a relationship hh it's very easy isn't it to turn to 
116 the wrong person (.) hh and you'll be driven by this desire 
117 and driven by the need hh but not dri ven by the person and 
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Once again, within these exerpts 'psychological factors' 
(hidden anger [T5], avoiding the truth and its painful 
consequences [T8], to be driven by desire [T6]) are deployed 
through a non-specialist vocabulary. Although, for the sake 
of illustration, I have tentatively linked two of these 
deployments to a specialist term 'repression' - such a term 
is never deployed by A, rather only the term 'hiding' lS 
favoured (though by V rather than A) . 
Returning to John's call (T6), this problematisation provides 
a further illustration of the lack of a specialist 
psychological 'ontology' of self and its operation as 
primarily moral location. Although John begins the call with 
an account in which he deploys the term 'obsessive behaviour' 
(4) : 
3 c: Ye:h Good evening (.) hhh rom I heard you were talking earlier 
4 about (.) er obsessive behaviour I'm beginning to wonder whether 
5 I may fall in that category [laughs] actually (.) er rom (.) I 
6 I'll try and keep it brief anyway= 
the bulk of the problematisation within this exchange 
involves the reassurance that the caller has acted properly 
(146-147, 152-153, 160-165, 176-179, 201-203): 
146 A: I (.) I think you've 
147 been very responsible and I think it is very important isn't it 
148 that the older hh the (.) if you are older than you're 
149 prospective partner hh the idea should be that you would be: 
150 have more knowledge of life and (.) be a little more cautious 
151 and a little wiser hhh and I think that's er very sensitive of 
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152 you and er I think it's er (.) it's er hh commendable that you 
153 think in that way hh and I think we have 
201 A: Well I don't think I can er I can quarrel with that and I 
202 think you've handled it very well I think hh the answer we're 
203 left with is that you still need hh someone in your life and 
204 that you should go on hh trying to find the right person (.) 
205 John I hope you do ... 
5.8.3 CHARLES' CALL 
Finally, Charles' call (T4) also affords some purchase upon 
the 'ontology' of self deployed within these therapeutic 
problematisations in that Charles' problem appears to be one 
of an absence of an account of self. It is important however 
that Charles conveys his problem initially as a question of 
the normality of his feelings: 
3 C: Er Hello, I'm just er wondering if er erm what I'm 
4 feeling at the moment is is normal given the circumstances 
5 erm I'm I'm currently in 
At the very beginning of this exchange then, we see that the 
caller invites normalisation in relation to his emotions, 
providing a further indication that therapeutic discourse 
cannot simply be considered as enforcing normalisation 
through its jUdgements, rather the caller's initial problem 
itself consisted of worrles about the (presumably) normal/ 
pathological status of his emotional condition. Put another 
way, the lines of force articulated with therapeutic 
discourse have already impacted upon the caller's self-
understanding prior to the call. 
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Throughout Charles' call what begins as a question of 
normali ty becomes a problem of an absence of an account of 
self and A proposes the analysis of dreams as a means of 
potential access (53-57) and also (indirectly) the 
communication itself: 
77 A: You sound a bit fed up to me as I talk 
78 to you now 
A then goes on I suggest to (implicitly) convey the 
normal responses to Charles' confused situation: 
28 A: ohhh well I mean you're quite right (0) you ask about this 
29 and I want to:: reassure you ( ) that's hardly reassurance 
30 which is to say that (0) when people are overloaded by emotion 
31 and pain and difficulty there is something which in a way just 
32 switches off inside them hh and we see it in people who've 
33 survived accidents (0) people who've been in road crashes and 
34 so on and so forth and I would guess that you're just so 
35 bewildered by all these things happening at once you you don't 
36 know what to feel erm you don't know whether to feel angry 
37 with the people who've made you redundant hh bewildered at 
38 your wife becoming pregnant at this (0) strange time or grief 
39 at your grandfather's loss hh is it something like that 
Towards the end of the call (in this call A runs out of 
time) the problem is re-cast In relation to the caller's 
motivation to deal with it - which A is able to discern from 
the form of the caller's speech: 
141 A: You see I think it's the way you're talking now you're 
142 clearly in a way:: this call and our:: short discussion shows 
143 me that hh you want to ( ) you want to get in there and sort 
144 it out and I think hh I hesitate to always go for some 
145 counselling but even six sessions of sitting down (0) trying 
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146 to get in there I think you've got to get in there and sort 
147 this and sort this out and find out what's going on underneath 
Charles' call is interesting then, becuase it offers a 
different route into the 'ontolgy' of self deployed, in that 
rather than shifting the form of self conveyed initially by 
the caller, A instead proposes the means of uncovering what 
that self might be (in its absence). In fact, the caller 
himself suggests that this 'skill' has at some time been 
lost, providing another example of the shared nature of the 
values involved in these exchanges: 
84 c: I'm not really erm I mean I used to be good 
85 at looking at myself but I'm not very good at it now er 
Finally then, I have shown that the 'ontology' of self 
deployed by A is more moral than psychological In that there 
is only a very limited deployment of a specialist 
psychological vocabulary within these broadcasts. In fact, we 
have seen that in two cases there was only an index of the 
internali ty of the problem where this internality was 
mapped only minimally (Tl & T7). Moreover, we saw at the 
beginning of this chapter and in the previous chapter (4.9) 
the figurative deployment of a personality type 'Mrs Nice' 
(T3:216) where despite the psychological nature of this term, 
that is its reference to a category of person, the 
description was itself reduced to a moral position (though a 
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gendered one). In fact, I propose this form of description as 
a model for understanding the 'ontology' of self revealed 
through these exchanges. While I am not suggesting the 
process of problematisation within this setting is 
exclusively moral, it certainly seems - within these brief, 
/" 
time-constrained exchanges - to have been pa{~ed down to the 
minimal requirement for its operation: locations within a 
moral order. We might wonder whether, in its adaptation to a 
radio setting, therapeutic discourse reveals itself in its 
minimal condition. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
In the exchanges analysed here we can see that after 
therapeutic intervention the ethical operation of the problem 
brought by the caller is profoundly transformed. While Sally 
and Ann's therapeutic problematisations included some 
elements from their initial presentations, during Belinda's 
exchange we witness a complete transformation with no 
recognisable elements from the initial formulation remaining. 
Moreover, in all three exchanges the therapeutic account 
included some form of problematisation relating to the 
caller's ' inner' world where this was entirely absent from 
the initial caller accounts. 
The processes of problematisation which can be gleaned from 
the data include a variety of modes of address to the caller; 
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the exchange of information (sometimes pedagogic and ethical 
in form), the elicitation of confession, authoritative 
judgements, the constitution of substances to be worked upon 
and the provision of advice which includes techniques for 
working upon a related ethical substance. 
The provision of information and advice by A takes the form 
of the 'facts' concerning the caller's difficulties and 
relates to the origin of the problem along with the 
construction of commonality (and normality) which seems to 
enhance factuality in that the information provided lS 
constructed as valid across many cases. Judgements are 
related to moral (and in Belinda's case, legal) obligations, 
while advice ranges from practical concerns, (for example to 
return to your GP, Sally), techniques for tackling the 
problem (in stages, in the heat of the moment, Ann) and modes 
of understanding and techniques for working upon the self 
(self-care, self-trust, Sally; honesty and assertion, 
Belinda; openness as opposed to secrecy, Ann) 
Therapeutic problematisation in this setting then, does not 
operate by simply transforming the caller's problem into an 
ethical one; caller's problems are not directly reduced to a 
relation to self but rather we see the production of what we 
might term a 'thematic complex' (c.f. Foucault, 1992:21) In 
which the relation to oneself forms a central component. 
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From a Foucauldian position we might consider the process of 
problematisation in terms of subjectification, that is we 
might ask the question; what kind of a subject is the caller 
(before and) after therapeutic intervention? I considered 
this question in relation to the 'ontology' of self which was 
identified as more 'moral' than 'psychological'. I further 
suggested that perhaps the most useful means of understanding 
this subjectification is that it operates to produce a shift 
in accountability (that is, in terms of moral location). With 
Ann and Sally's exchange we saw a complex of exoneration and 
culpabili ty, while with Belinda's we saw a complete shift 
toward culpability. 
Moreover, accountability was produced in relation to the self 
along with other elements of the inner terrain (for example, 
personality type) and I suggested that the caller was invited 
to understand their subjectivity as not only ethical with 
respect to Foucault's four dimensions but also as bound up 
with a "therapeutic" moral order which lS related to and 
enables certain forms of life. Thus, what makes this 
"therapeutic" moral order special is the centrality of 
responsibility for and to oneself. Those who share this moral 
order will agree that certain forms of conduct are 
appropriate or inappropriate in particular circumstances and 
accountable In particular ways. 
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We can identify then, that the operation of the therapeutic 
encounter relies upon a shared moral order in a double sense: 
a) it is quite common for callers to present their problem 
already coded - at least partly - in therapeutic terms and, 
b) advisors often use everyday language, in particular 
everyday figurative language. We need to be clear however 
that it is not that the caller has gained some authority 
within this exchange but that - to some extent - they share 
(or wish to share) the values offered by A. These values 
included for example, judgements concerning normality, 
(implicitly) healthy forms of life, the value of 
communication In sexual relationships, the proper use of 
sexual pleasure and the obligations of parenthood which were 
offered in relation to the means through which callers may 
self-manage their 'problem'. 
Finally, for Rose (1996: 145-146) the notion of "therapeutic" 
authority offers a more useful means of understanding 'power' 
as it operates in the 'psy' complex: 
In suggesting ways in which those who have 
authority can exercise it in relation to a 
knowledge of the inner nature of those subject to 
authori ty, psy accords authority a novel ethical 
justification as a kind of therapeutic activity. 
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What lS interesting here is that in the shared moral order 
necessary for the operation of the therapeutic exchange the 
caller invites this exercise of power. 
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CHAPTER 6 - PART A - THERAPEUTIC SUBJECTION AND THE 
OVERHEARING AUDIENCE 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
During the previous two chapters I considered the effects of 
therapeutic discourse through an analysis of its impact upon 
that of the caller. However, in the particular setting of the 
radio broadcast both these discourses (and their interaction) 
will be conditioned in some way by their relation to the 
audience. It is to this relation that I now wish to turn. 
This initial section will outline the primary debates and 
most importantly the numerous problems with audience 
research, then go on to elaborate the notion of ' implied 
audience' (c.f. Chatman, 1978; Deming, 1991). I will consider 
the way such a notion evades some of the problems of audience 
studies and its central theme 'effects research', enabling an 
analysis of the relation of the audience to the discursive 
practices within the broadcast without researching a sample 
of individual members of the radio audience itself. 
6.1 AUDIENCE STUDIES AND THE RADIO PHONE-IN 
In 1986 Crissell (p.191) warned '''Audience studies" is a 
subject rich in questions and well-nigh barren of answers.' 
He continues: 
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Its methodological difficulties are 
they are in some respects greater ln 
radio than television. (p.191) 
huge, and .. 
the case of 
We shall see in this chapter that over ten years later 
Crissell's warning is still relevant though there has been 
some important progress using ethnographic method in which 
some studies have linked the notion of media effects to an 
interaction between texts and subjects/readers (for example, 
Hall, 1977 in relation to ideology; Morley, 1980; Radway, 
1987) 
Although social psychology has historically played an 
important role in audience research, I will reject a 
psychologistic approach in favour of what has been termed the 
'cultural text approach' (McQuail, 1994:224) for reasons 
which will be discussed later. Although at times I use the 
term media 'text ' given this is the term favoured by many 
researchers ln this area, I still wish to understand the 
broadcast primarily as a discursive practice (that is, 
involving the technical deployment of language) . 
Crissell (1986:190) outlines three maln areas of importance 
that the phone-in offers to the student of radio: 1) It might 
be understood as an amalgamation of the private and the 
public, 2) It produces an 'inversion of the radio medium', 
that is the boundaries between callers and professionals 
become blurred, 3 ) It illustrates the variability of 
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consumption on the part of radio audiences and the complexity 
of the relationship between callers and the overhearing 
audience. For our purposes, in relation to the show's 
content, we must keep in mind that its particular nature 
(that is, counselling provision of some kind), makes this a 
special case. I will take each of Crissell's three points of 
interest and expand them in order to begin to make sense of 
the broadcast under analysis in terms of its relation to the 
audience: 
1) There will be a special need to manage the synthesis of 
public and private in that if counselling practice occurs in 
a public medium (other than that, say, of group counselling) 
it presents a serious problem: it risks being understood as 
voyeuristic and therefore ethically problematic (in relation 
to criteria for good professional practice). This voyeurism, 
Crissell (op ci t: 187) reminds us is engendered not only by 
the show's content but also by the interaction between 
telephone and radio media: 
.... the telephone acoustic... combined with the 
frequently confessional nature of the discussion, 
gives .. [the listener] ... the powerful impression of 
listening in on a crossed line, of overhearing 
words which are being addressed to someone else. 
The complexity of the term voyeurism requires some attention. 
Voyeurism denotes a relation to scopophilia - the (sexual) 
pleasure 1n looking. It is interesting that there 1S no 
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comparable term to scopophilia that relates to the aural; or 
for our purposes, the eavesdropper. That the visual takes 
precedence over the spoken word seems a powerful feature of 
Western thought (for example, Berger, 1987:7). 
The term then, signifies a looker along with a gaze that in 
some sense defiles its object while at the same time 
confirming the immoral status of the voyeur. There lS much 
written about scopophilia and voyeurism. Within 
psychoanalytic theory it is considered a sexual perversion 
(Rycroft, 1972:175), film theorists (most notably, Mulvey, 
1973) have used this notion to explain the gendered gaze of 
the camera. I shall remain with the term voyeurism because I 
wish to retain its force in signifying the transgressive 
pleasure of listening-in on someone else's conversation. Here 
such overhearing offers the listener something that is both 
profoundly personal and private yet - via the operation of 
therapeutic discourse something that opens up powerful 
opportunities for (public) identification. 
2) Crissell (1986:187) suggests that the 'authority' that the 
caller gains given their equal invisibility alongside the 
broadcaster, produces a sense of their - albeit temporary -
role as co-performer. The separation between the professional 
and the caller (and the significance of this for the 
overhearing audience), will be an important target of 
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analysis; put in the form of a question: is it the case that 
the caller is able to operate, in some sense, on a par with 
the professional given both that they are requesting 
professional help and the confessional nature of the 
interaction? Also, what role is available to the show's host? 
Note that we have already seen that while callers may be 'co-
performers' they do not appear to hold much authority. 
3) What does the provision of counselling via the media 
suggest about contemporary media consumption? and perhaps 
most importantly, what kind of relationship is engendered 
between listeners and callers (and listeners and 
counsellors)? This area of interest will include assumptions 
made concerning the characteristics of consumers by the 
broadast and the processes available to listeners for 
identifying with callers and/or the host (and with 
therapeutic authority itself) . 
6.2 EARLY AUDIENCE STUDIES 
The power of the media to entertain, influence and persuade 
has been of interest to social psychologists and other social 
theorists since the early days of radio broadcasting. Cantril 
& Allport's (1935 :vii) pUblication The Psychology of Radio 
offers some indication of the theoretical significance given 
to audience research at that time: 
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The radio is a recent innovation that has 
introduced profound alterations in the outlook and 
social behaviour of men [sic], thereby creating a 
significant social problem for the psychologist. 
Radio lS an altogether novel medium of 
communication, pre-eminent as a means of social 
control and epochal in its influence upon the 
mental horizons of men [sic] . Already its 
ramifications are so numerous and confused that the 
psychologist hesitates to take the risks of error 
and misinterpretation besetting a subject so 
intricate and so new. 
We see in this excerpt that the liberal humanist 
underpinnings of social psychology were never far from these 
early reflections on the psychology of radio. Cantril & 
Allport (op cit:259) liken the radio to: 
... a gigantic invisible net which each listener may 
cast thousands of miles into the sea of human 
affairs and draw in teeming with palpable delights 
from which he [sic] may select according to his 
fancy. 
Stainton-Rogers et al. (1995:2) offer a lucid account of the 
intimate relation of social psychology to the post-
enlightenment civilising project which they term psychology's 
'mission'. This mission they say is best summarised by a term 
first used in 1940; 'humaneering' (c.f. Tiffin, Knight & 
Josey, 1940:24) and they go on to link this humaneering 
project to what they term the 'march of civilisation' tale; a 
modernist grand narrative of progress (p.17), and suggest: 
... social psychology has both adapted itself to its 
missionary task and carved out and claimed for 
itself special powers, competencies, interests, 
concerns and entitlements. (p.21) 
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Cantril & Allport (op cit:272) provide a clear opportunity to 
see this humaneering proj ect In its (key) relation to the 
objectivity of science, for them: 
scientific research although in itself impartial 
reaches the fullest justification when it is 
employed not in the advancement of private profit 
but in the promotion of the social and intellectual 
growth of mankind [sic]. 
Social psychology has continued to contribute its standpoint 
and values to the shape of audience studies and Crissell' s 
(1986: 191) summary of the major problems of contemporary 
audience research provides for our purposes a useful 
summary of the area as it stands today. He asks: 
1) What do we mean by 'influence' and how can we 
measure it scientifically? 
2) What factors in the character and background of 
the listener are relevant and to what extent? 
3) How can we differentiate between the experiences of 
individual listeners? 
Crissell (op cit:193) then goes on to list a number of 
qualities including owning and having access to a radio set, 
listening to the whole or part of a programme and listening 
for a minimum amount of time per day, moreover: 
.. radio is variable, not only in the odd and 
arbitrary times we can make use of it but also in 
the amount of attention we pay to it while it is 
on. (p. 209) 
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All the above qualities (catalogued by Crissell) offer 
examples of the psychologistic and individualistic bias In 
audience research (c. f. Ang, 1994). It is precisely these 
problems that I wish to avoid in this chapter through an 
adaptation of the little used analytic of 'implied audience' 
(c.f. Chatman, 1978; Deming, 1991) - which I will turn to a 
little later. 
6.3 CONTEMPORARY AUDIENCE STUDIES 
I want now to consider in more detail the current shape of 
audience studies and how this relates to my concerns in this 
chapter. McQuail (1994) offers three main categories of 
approaches to audience research: 
6.3.1 STRUCTURAL TRADITION 
The term 'structural' is used because the goal of 
such research is essentially descriptive of the 
audience in terms of its composition and its 
relation to the social structure of the population 
as a whole. (McQuail, 1994:295) 
This tradition then, is primarily concerned with the 
provision of accurate and objective descriptions of the 
audience and relies upon the development of technologies of 
measurement (Ang 1994: 204). It will be useful to return to 
Cantril & Allport (1935:268-269) who offer an early example 
of this attempt to know the audience: 
Confusing though the diversity of the listener's 
tastes and abilities may be, the broadcaster can 
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depend upon certain fairly uniform conditions. 
Nearly all listeners, for example, prefer as a 
general rule, music to spoken material, male 
announcers to female, network to local broadcasts, 
and nearly all are at times annoyed by advertising. 
They agree, furthermore, that vulgarity and 
obscenity should be kept off the air, and that the 
religious and racial attitudes of majority and 
minority groups should be respected. 
Representing a more contemporary approach, Crissell 
cit:193) adopts a very similar position: 
... its [audience studies] initial concern must be 
to analyse the audience: in radio terms, to 
discover how many are listening and what their 
social identity is. 
(op 
He goes on however (op ci t: 193), to suggest that there is 
another more essential question implied within 
(McQuail's) 'structural tradition': 
Yet even so simple and numerical an obj ecti ve as 
the first one [above] hides another complex 
question: what constitutes a listener? 
the 
Here, I too wish to address this question but for us the 
listener lS "constituted" in a much more fundamental and 
interesting sense, that is through the discursive operation 
of the broadcast itself and assumptions concerning the 
listener embedded wi thin the programme. The following 
approach however, sought to answer this question of 'what 
constitutes a listener?' through a progression of the 
psychologism of this first tradition. 
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6.3.2 BEHAVIOURIST TRADITION 
... originating primarily in the field of social 
psychology [it] sought to establish the effects of 
media messages on individual behaviour, opinions, 
attitudes and values. (McQuail op cit:296) 
I have already stated that social psychological work has 
played an important role in media effects research; with 
roots in the work of Merton (for example, Merton, 1957) and 
other functionalist approaches, it re-emerged as the 'uses 
and gratifications' approach, (c.f. Morley, 1980:3) Although 
this approach was offered as an alternative to the concerns 
of social psychologists such as Bandura (for example, Bandura 
et al., 1961) it still relied upon functionalism and 
positivism, was individualistic and psychologistic and leant 
towards quantification and experimental method, (McQuail, 
1991:11) For McQuail (1991:10) however, this approach 
succeeded in moving beyond the social learning theorists' 
agenda in which television viewing was reduced to 'sheer 
amount' 
... which could be related to possible 
"addiction" or to the consequences 
indulgence [of children]. 
causes of 
of over-
Thus we might consider Bandura' s work as showing traces of 
the 'humaneering' proj ect (c. f. Stainton Rogers et al, op 
cit) we met earlier, although the moral agenda here concerns 
a complex psychologisation of 'problem' adolescent behaviour 
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operating through a scientific approach (as it relates to the 
search for causality), presented as disinterested. 
Interestingly, although I do not wish to adopt this form of 
analysis here, the 'uses and gratifications' approach 
constructs the 'audience' as active rather than passive 
consumers. Crissell (1986:199) suggests that such 
understanding of the audience is confirmed: 
... by the popularity of 
phone-in. .. depends upon 
prepared to impose itself 
extent of originating it. 
6.3.3 SOCIO-CULTURAL TRADITION 
the phone-in; for the 
an audience which is 
upon media output to the 
... as critical-theory-guided research merged into 
the general rise of media-cultural studies 
research, it became simply axiomatic to expect and 
not too hard to prove that most media messages were 
essentially polysemic and open to several possible 
interpretations [while] the culturalist approach 
involved a view of media use as a significant 
element in 'everyday life', a set of practices 
which could be understood only in relation to the 
particular social context and to other practices. 
(McQuail op cit:297) 
an 
I am concerned here with one strand of this tradition which 
loosely falls under the term audience ethnography, the 
central feature of which lS the ' ... taking account of 
content, act of reception and context together.' (McQuail, 
1994:298) In other words, the close description or 
interpretation (depending on the standpoint of the 
researcher) of media consumption as it is practised by 
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particular audience members. This approach also includes the 
analysis of audience verbal responses to particular 
broadcasts which has been termed ethnography of discourse, 
(Fiske, 1987:63). 
Within this tradition the 'message' is seen as a joint 
product between the media 'text' ln which there may be a 
preferred reading (or differential encoding) and a reading of 
it by the audience which will produce differential decodings. 
In other words, media consumption is conceptualised as a set 
of co-dependent practices; that is, practices of coding and 
decoding in which the reader/consumer will bring a unlque set 
of discourses/meanings to the decoding: only at the moment of 
reading can we properly speak of the 'meaning' of the media 
text. 
Morley's widely cited (1980) study of the 'Nationwide' 
audience sought to elaborate such a theory of the interaction 
between media 'texts' and subjects/readers in relation to 
differential decoding. Morley, while acknowledging the 
broadcaster's desire to offer a particular message to the 
audience, suggested that this was by no means a guarantee 
that the message would be received in that form (1980:9). 
Morley then went on to offer a highly influential framework 
utilising Pecheux' notion of 'interdiscourse', which enabled 
a more complex relation between text and audience (1980:162): 
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This 
· .. The notions of interdiscourse, and of multiple 
and contradictory interpellation of the subject 
open up the space between text and subject. We no 
longer assume that the subject is effectively bound 
by any particular interpellation, and thus provide 
the theoretical space for the subject to be in some 
other relation to the signifying chain from that of 
'regulated process'. 
rethinking of the media subject/consumer may be 
contrasted to earlier approaches to 'media effects' research 
which Morley (1980:1) divides into two overarching 
categories; positive and negative, suggesting that implicit 
to the negative approach exemplified by the Frankfurt 
school - was a hypodermic model where: 
the media... were seen as having the 
'inj ect' a repressive ideology directly 





American researchers however, favoured a more positivistic 
and quantitative approach. This 'positive' approach (Morley, 
op cit:2) in fact shared, along with the negative, an: 
implicit theory of the dimension of power and 
'influence' through which the powerful (leaders and 
communicators) were connected to the powerless 
(ordinary people, audiences). 
In short, for Morley despite an early tendency for media 
effects research to move between these positive and negative 
poles they both occupied a similar unidirectional 
understanding of the process of communication In relation to 
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power. That is, power is conceptualised as something to be 
given or taken away by those who possess it, to or from those 
who do not, (we met such an understanding of power in chapter 
one) . 
In a more recent but no less influential study, Radway (1987) 
reminds us that a proper understanding of the concrete 
practices of media consumption is essential if we are to gain 
a proper picture of the 'meaning' of media to their various 
users. In Radway's ethnography of American housewives' 
reading of Harlequin Books (popular romance) she found that 
the women in her sample read these novels in small breaks in 
their daily domestic and familial routines. For these women 
consumption offered brief moments of escape: 
In picking up a book... they refuse temporarily 
their family's otherwise constant demand that they 
attend to the wants of others even as they act 
deliberately to do something for their own 
pleasure. Their activity is compensatory, then, in 
that it permits them to focus on themselves and to 
carve out a solitary space within an area where 
their self-interest is usually identified with the 
interest of others and where they are defined as a 
public resource to be mined at will by the family. 
For them, romance reading addresses needs created 
in them but not met by patriarchal institutions and 
engendering practices. (Radway, 1987:211) 
In a similar vein, Hobson's (1980) study of housewives' 
consumption of the mass media found that it was profoundly 
linked to gender divisions: 
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[women] . .. combat their own isolation through their 
interest in radio programmes during the day, and 
they see television programmes as a form of 
'leisure' or relaxation. Radio is integral to their 
working day, but early-evening television is 
secondary to the domestic labour which they 
perform. (p .114) 
The programmes which the women watch and listen to, 
together with the programmes which they rej ect, 
reinforce the sexual division of sphere of interest 
which is determined both by their location in the 
home and the structures of femininity that ensure 
that feminine values are secondary (or less 'real') 
than those of the masculine world of work and 
politics, which the women regard as alien yet 
important. (p.114, original emphasis.) 
Radway's and Hobson's work not only describes concrete 
practices of media consumption but more importantly 
identifies a link between existing constructions of gender 
(divisions) and the everyday practices of media consumption 
wi thin which they are implicated - and thus an analysis of 
the overhearing audience must include a consideration of the 
constitution of gender divisions. 
6.4 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE AUDIENCE 
Given the Foucauldian perspective offered within this thesis 
we must recognise that much of the work of audience studies 
involves what I wish to term the social construction of the 
audience, by which I mean more than the production of 
"meaning" but one element of a "form of life" co-constructed 
by subject and text/broadcast. In fact, we might understand 
McQuai1' s first two traditions as constructive in this way 
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and, for convenience sake, offer the third as, In part, a 
reflection on those two approaches. Ang (1994:204-205) 
provides an incisive framework for such an understanding In 
relation to the 'structural' approach and its dependence on 
accurate measurement: 
... this ... search for the perfect measurement 
method, which I have characterised as desperate, is 
based upon the implicit assumption that there is 
such a thing as an 'audience' as a finite totality, 
made up of subdivisions or segments whose 
identities can be synchronically and diachronically 
'fixed'. I have suggested that this assumption is a 
fiction, but a necessary fiction for a television 
industry which increasingly experiences the 
audience as volatile and fickle. 
For Ang (1994:205) this process constitutes the audience as a 
unitary object through, for example, practices 
quantification and is: 
... positively constructed as true by the creation 
of simulations of order in the ranks of the 
audience in the form of ratings statistics and 
other market research profiles. 
of 
For Ang then, the 'audience' is a simulacrum constituted 
through the very processes that claim to measure and 
understand it; ultimately the objectification of the 
'audience' can occur only , ... by imposing (discursive) 
closure on it ... ' (op cit:205) 
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6.5 IMPLIED AUDIENCE 
I want now to elaborate the suggestion that the 'audience' is 
not only constructed through technologies of measurement but 
can be found in the media discourse itself. Moreover, this 
discursive constitution of the audience may occur along two 
planes: firstly, through the assumptions that the text makes 
about its consumers; secondly, the construction of positions 
of identification (c.f. Davies & Harre, op cit) within the 
text which we might consider as points of interpellation. The 
former plane has been termed the 'implied audience' (c. f . 
Deming, 1991; Chatman, 1978) and there is very little work in 
this area. 
The key point here is that if we broadly adopt a 
'cultural text' approach to the audience (c.f. McQuail, 
1994:244) we may side-step the stated need for detailed 
ethnographic research (c. f. Ang, 1991) and analyse the 
audience as it lS found In the media discourse itself, 
enabling an analysis of the discursive processes operating 
during the broadcast in their relation to the audience. Thus, 
we may begin our analysis with the assumption that the 
audience is in some sense a construction; a necessary fiction 
and a simulacrum produced within the media text itself (c.f. 
Ang op cit); necessary in that it constitutes one part of the 
moment of 'reading', (c.f. Morley, op cit) . 
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Note that I am not suggesting that somehow the audience 
exists only in media discourse but rather that this is one of 
several places where we may find it. Geraghty's (1994:39) 
distinction between, 1) the position offered to the consumer 
by the media discourse; 2) the social subj ect positioned 
through race, gender, class; and 3) reactions of individual 
consumers lS pertinent here In that it avoids conflating 
three different levels of analysis and their interaction. In 
this chapter I wish to focus on the first level of analysis 
only, that of the positioning of the audience by the media 
discourse (and concomitantly the 'implied audience'). 
Moreover, by focusing on this first level of analysis we are 
also able to avoid dealing with the (none-the-less important) 
problem of the interaction between the three levels. Morley, 
(1980:18) reminds us that: 
The text cannot be considered in isolation from its 
historical conditions of production and 
consumption. Thus the meaning of the text must be 
thought in terms of which set of discourses it 
encounters in any particular set of circumstances, 
and how this encounter may re-structure both the 
meaning of the text and the discourse which it 
meets. .. the crucial factor in the encounter of 
audience/ subj ect and text will be the range of 
discourses at the disposal of the audience. 
Notwithstanding Morley's important reminder such an analysis 
is beyond the scope of this chapter, however it is important 
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that we do not forget that the analysis here must always 
remain partial in this respect. 
How then might we analyse the positions offered to the 
consumer? Deming (1991:242) defines the 'implied audience' 
as: 
... a construct implicit in the demands made by the 
narrative in order for comprehension to occur ... The 
real audience may bear little resemblance to the 
implied audience, as real viewers operate 
independently of any role cut out for them by 
authors or critics. 
For Deming then, the implied audience is that which lS 
constructed within the textual practice of the narrative 
concerned. Deming (1991:257-258) goes on to offer the 
following interpretation of the 'Hill Street Blues' 
series: 
The HSB narrative projects an implied audience 
unusual in television. While all television 
requires more of the viewer than critics are in the 
habit of admitting, Hill Street's open text insists 
that the audience engage in more conscious efforts 
to fill in and to comprehend the narrative. The 
text positions the viewer as a gazer rather than as 
a "looker and glancer" ... the narrative invites the 
viewer to participate in the discourse rather than 
to identify too strongly with individual 
characters. 
(HSB) 
For Deming (1991:257-258) then, 'implied audience' relates to 
the question: what does the programme require of its 
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audience? I want to adapt this notion so that it will relate 
to our requirements in the following ways: a) to enable a 
close reading of the media text, that is, as it is organised 
as discursive practice, in addition to more overarching 
impressions of the broadcast (or series) which Deming herself 
provides for HSB, and b) to address not only the specific 
question: what does the phone-in require of its listeners? 
but also to the more procedural question (in methodological 
terms): what positions are offered to the listener within the 
media discourse? 
6.6 THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
How might these methodological questions and procedures be 
related to Crissell's (op cit) three areas of interest in a 
form which will usefully structure the analysis of the 
broadcast? If our key question is to be 'what does the 
broadcast require of its audience?' then we might structure 
the analysis within five main areas: 
1) THE MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION AVAILABLE TO THE AUDIENCE. 
In what ways (explicitly and implicitly) is the audience 
brought or invited to identify with the positions of the 
participants in the exchange? How does this relate to the 
consumption of the broadcast? 
2) THE FORMS OF ADDRESS TO THE AUDIENCE. 
How does the broadcast address its audience? (How) do these 
forms of address relate to voyeurism? 
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3) GENDER DIVISIONS IN RELATION TO THE IMPLIED AUDIENCE 
To what extent is the implied audience gendered? 
4) THE OPERATION OF EXPERT AND LAY DISCOURSE. 
In particular, do callers gain authority given the nature of 
the broadcast? 
5) THE (OPEN OR CLOSED) STRUCTURE OF THE BROADCAST (TEXT) 
(c.f. Deming, op cit). 
To what extent and in what ways are the audience required to 
engage with the broadcast? 
These five questions then, will provide the analytic 
framework for the subsequent analysis of data. 
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CHAPTER 6 - PART B - ANALYSIS OF DATA 
6.7 INTRODUCTION 
In part A I adapted Crissell's (op cit) three areas of 
interest to make them applicable to an analysis that would 
relate to the key question (c.f. Deming, op cit) 'what does 
the broadcast require of its audience?' and at the same time 
to a methodological approach which would focus on the 
positions available in the text (c.f. Harre & Davies, 1990). 
Recall that the following five domains were identified and I 
will deal with each of these areas in turn: 
1) The means of identification available to the audience. 
2) Forms of address to the audience. 
3) Gender divisions in relation to the implied audience. 
4) The operation of expert and lay discourse. 
S) The (open or closed) structure of the broadcast. 
6.8 THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEANS OF IDENTIFICATION 
In this section I suggest that particular shifts in the 
deployment of pronouns by the advisor appear to invite a link 
between the unique (private) elements of the caller's 
individual problem and the common elements that relate to a 
shared (public) experience for the overhearing audience. 
Although I will initially deal with key examples of A's use 
of collective pronouns, it will become apparent that this 
often forms part of a generalisation or a reference to some 


















identification) which I consider in more detail later in this 
section. 
EXCERPT 1 
BELINDA (T3: 187-197) 
A: Belinda you (1) 
who (.) likes to please people and who 
down and I think what we've got in here 
you sound like somebody 
doesn't like to let them 
hidden away in this 
[ 
c: [sighs] 
very complex story is what I call guilt and what we all know 
[ 
c: 
as guilt .00 you feel (.75) guilty about the grandmother (y-) 
Here we can begin by examining the question why lS A 
deploying the collective pronoun 'we'? At (193) we find an 
answer In A's utterance which shifts from first-person 
singular to third-person plural: 
very complex story is what I call guilt and what we all know 
[ 
c: 
as guilt .00 you feel (.75) guilty about the grandmother (y-) 
This utterance offers a clear interpretation on the part of 
the advisor , .. is what I call guilt', along with an 
invitation to the overhearing audience - signified by the use 
of 'we all' to recognise what he has identified for 
themselves. Here the implied overhearer is someone who 
recognises what the advisor is offering as self-evidently 
available from C's story. Earlier A uses this shift from his 
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personal but expert (authoritative) judgement to shared 
experience at (189): 
A: .. I think what we've got ... 
In this way A's shift to a collective pronoun might be 
understood as offering an account on behalf of the three 
participants; C, A and V, along with the overhearing 
audience. However, its use is, I suggest, remarkably 
ambiguous in that it is difficult to tell exactly who the 
pronoun is meant to refer to. I will return to this point a 
little later on. 
EXCERPT 2 
BELINDA (T3: 246-260) 
246 (.5) this is your problem you we have I don't want to make too 
247 [ 
248 c: :MIn 
249 
250 many comments about our society .hh 
251 
252 c: yeh 
253 
254 A: but we are becoming increasingly superficially nlce .hh and 
255 [ 
256 c: you see 
257 that's not my way (1) rnmm that's not my way if you met the 
258 mother you'd know why the son is like he lS 
259 
260 the price of that is dishonesty 
At (250) A deploys 'our society' followed by 'we are becoming 
increasingly .. ' (254), once again shifting the uniqueness of 
the caller's problem onto a shared/collective plane, 
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explicitly coded in terms of 'society' not a society 
somehow separate but our society. Thus, with two fairly short 
utterances, A lS able to address the caller's individual 
problem by constituting it as a problem shared by not only 
the entire overhearing audience but the whole of 'society'. 
It is difficult to hypothesise anyone who is excluded from 
the collective deployed by A and here - as with the previous 
example - we begin to see that the therapeutic exchange is 
conditioned by its public consumption (in particular through 
A's - ambiguous in this context - deployment of 'our' before 
'society' ) . 
EXCERPT 3 
JOHN (T6: 113-130) 
113 A: Well it it it is a very difficult one isn't it (.) if you 
114 have a need if you are lonely and if you want companionship or 
115 love or a relationship hh it's very easy isn't it to turn to the 
116 wrong person (.) hh and you'll be driven by this desire and 
117 driven by the need hh but not driven by the person and 
118 what worries me about this young lady and I'm not saying 
119 anything personal about her hh is that she comes along (.) she 
120 finds you wi thin weeks (.5) wi thin weeks she's pressuring you 
121 to marry her (.) now hh I'm I don't believe although w we you 
122 know we're full of stories aren't we about instant love and 
123 looking across a crowded room hh that wha w you you know we're 
124 such complex people nowadays should we hh really trust a 
125 feeling which says wi thin a week or two I'm going to marry 
126 this guy and and you might have said well after three months 
127 if she'd er hh if she'd er come across and expressed all this 
128 interest you could have trusted her but (.) it sounds more 
129 like she's doing it for herself than for her love of you (.3) 
130 and that makes me a bit suspicious 
Here A's use of pronouns begins with 'you', shifts to 'we' 
and then returns once again to 'you'. In this way I suggest 
that A is able to: 
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1) Include himself in the collective 'we', aligning himself 
with the caller and the overhearing audience, thereby 
momentarily - occupying the role of expert while reminding us 
that he too is not immune to the frailties he describes, 
2) Address C and the overhearing audience wi thin the same 
turn, 
3) Offer the pronoun 'you' at the end of the turn as 
potentially including both C and the overhearing audience. 
That is, by the time we get to 'you might have said .. ' (line 
126) the implied audience is successfully involved in the 
exchange. 
EXCERPT 4 
LINDA (T8: 33-37) 
33 A: Linda is this possibly another version of the ( .) thing 
34 we've just been discussing which is that sometimes your not 
35 saying the truth because it's painful and I .hh I you you just 
36 said told the story very quickly but is it right that you look 
37 after the first child 
A's deployment of 'we' at (34) provides a further example of 
the ambiguous position this pronoun seems to occupy in A's 
discourse. As with the previous example, the collective 
pronoun can be taken to mean: (at least) the advisor and the 
host; advisor, host and the previous caller (who may still be 
present as an overhearing listener); these three and Linda 
herself or these four along with the overhearing audience as 
a whole. 




104 A: as opposed to the real baby and I don't want to compare .hh 
105 babies and pets because we' 'II get an outcry but I am going to 
106 say something about it and that is that .hh we all have these 
107 idealisde things don't we you know .hh the child is always 
108 going to be clean and healthy 
109 [ 
110 C: Mmm 
111 
112 and eat it's food and not cry and not have a dirty nappy 
113 not keep us awake at night and not have teething . hh 





Once again we may ask who does the pronoun 'we' refer to in 
the utterance: , .. we all have these idealised things ... ' 
(106-107)? I suggest that here it appears to signify a 
collective without boundaries given that A describes it using 
'we all' (106) i moreover, having idealised things offers no 
other particularity to this collective, there is no 
indication of gender, class, ethnicity or other 
identification indexes therefore the entire overhearing 
audience is invited to position themselves within this 
collective. In other words, the audience is both imagined and 
interpellated as part of this 'we' of collective personality 
types and at the same time invited to recognise themselves in 
this image which might be better termed a mirror-glance or 
mimesis. Thus, we might consider this particular deployment 
of collective pronouns as a mode of sUbjection which 




ANN2 (T2: 310-312) 
310 A: at the time .hhh that's when its much easier to discuss sex 
311 I mean we .hh british are so cool tis very difficult out of the 
312 bedroom (.) for us to discuss our sex lives 
We need with this final example to begin by considering the 
immediately previous turn (to that cited above) which offers 
an understanding of the context of the utterance in question. 
At (293-306) A exclusively addresses the caller's problem in 
terms of the individuals involved (and the means of 
establishing communication channels). 'We' is deployed at 
(311) In relation to the caller's inability to discuss sex 
with her husband, shifting the problem away from the caller 
as an individual to a collective problem for the 'British' 
that is, Anne's problem is no longer her own but reflects a 
national difficulty in discussing sex out of the bedroom 
(311-312). This deployment of a national collective by A can 
be understood as: 
1) A way to warrant her interpretation by reference to 
common, shared knowledge of a common, shared problem, 
2) A way to de-pathologise the caller's problem (and the 
caller herself) by suggesting it is not only her but a whole 
nation who bear this particular problem, 
3) A way to constitute the problem in relation to ethnicity 
(British personality) thus offering some form of aetiology, 
or at least the illusion that A has identified a cause. 
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However, I would suggest a fourth additional reading (perhaps 
operating in parallel with all the previous); A offers the 
overhearing audience a route into the problem: a means of 
identifying with both the caller's problem (that lS relating 
to a shared identity) and with the warrant of professional 
expertise (A has been able to identify a quasi-cause). In 
this way identification shifts 
audience) from particularity 
(on the part of the implied 
or the 'private' (that is 
limited to those who recognise themselves in C' s story) to 
the general or the 'public' (all those who recognise 
themselves In the collective 'British' have this problem). 
Once again the overhearing audience is invited to recognise 
themselves in this scenario through an interpellation focused 
on nationality. Whereas in the previous excerpt there were no 
exclusions from the image ('we all') here there is an 
exclusion of non-British and therefore the overhearing 
audience is both subjected and divided at the same time. 
6.9 FORMS OF ADDRESS TO THE AUDIENCE 
In the previous section I suggested that A's deployment of 
the collective pronoun 'we' constituted the implied audience 
as In some sense recognlslng itself In the caller's 
story. We saw that this interpellation also operated through 
A's constitution of particular collective identities (British 
personality) and even a form of totalised collective identity 
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(the deployment of 'we all'). If the deployment of collective 
pronouns then, operates to provide regimes of identification 
- which may be implicit or explicit - we might, in turn, wish 
to consider the range of A's (and the broadcast's) forms of 
address to the audience and we, in turn, might begin by re-
considering the constitution of collective identity described 
above as a form of address which involves the 'reassurance' 
of a common identity , reassurance' to both C and the 
implied audience. I will consider some further examples of 
this form of address and then move on to two other forms 
which can be identified in these exchanges. 
6.9.1 REASSURANCE OF A COMMON IDENTITY 
EXCERPT 7 
SALLY (T10: 147-157) 
147 A: Well not necessarily you may have just (.) I mean this may 
148 be like slipping on an ice mountain you might be walking down 
149 this ice mountain you take the wrong foot and you start 
150 slipping and one of the problems about eating disorders is 
151 that once (.) you see the body is like a very delicately 
152 balanced spring in a way and it knows exactly when its had 
153 enough and it knows exactly when its full up and it knows when 
154 to stop eating and when to start eating now that mechanism's 
155 incredibly delicate and what has happened and what happens to 
156 so many people most bulimics and most eating disorders start 
157 with some kind of dieting 
In this segment of A's fairly lengthy turn (beginning at 147) 
there is a shift to a more collective problem via the notion 
of maj ori ty; 'so many people' is followed by 'most bulimics 
and most eating disorders' (see ch4.9 for an extended 
analysis of this turn). However, what is also interesting is 
A's 'educational' form of address, that is, A is offering C 
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(and the audience) instruction concerning the nature and 
operation of her condition rather than, for example, a 
(therapeutic) interpretation of her psychological or 
emotional state. 
6.9.2 PEDAGOGICAL FORM OF ADDRESS 
EXCERPT 8 
LINDA (T8: 146-156) 
146 A: =this one .hh is not an ideal baby either (I) only want a 
147 perfect baby like people like .h peole who you know .hh go on 
148 marrying and marrying.h (.) they only want a perfect husband 
149 or a perfect wife a wife who'll have sex every time they want 
150 it and in be terribly exciting and always: you know voluptuous 
151 and sweet smelling.hh of course human beings are not motor 
152 cars .hh and babies are not little teddy bears they're 
153 children.hh and so they're good and bad .hh and what we have 
154 to do as people is we have to learn to accept . hh this good 
155 and bad side now how you're going to ex- (.) how you're going 
156 to get her round to this idea= 
In this turn we see the work of balancing private and public 
identification through: 
1) The deployment of a collective 'people' (implying a 
characterological element) of a particular type (147-148), 
(though the use of 'people' followed by 'they' constitutes a 
distance between C, the implied audience and the 'people' In 
question) , 
2) The obligations of the implied audience who are also 
'people' (154) and where, this time, 'people' appears to 
refer both to the previous collective (144-148) - people who 
go on marrying and marrying - and also to people in general 
























3) The caller's immediate practical problem of the means to 
convince her daughter of these ideas (155-156). 
Most importantly A's discourse once again produces these 
effects through what might be termed a pedagogical form of 
address. Thus, although A as with the example above 
instructs C during this turn, his "lesson" is addressed to 
both C and the implied audience; invited to recognise itself 
in the collective 'people' (154). 
EXCERPT 9 
BELINDA (T3: 305-326) 
A: and she's going to turn round to you when she's seven or 
eight or nine and say mum 
c: yeh yeh 
( .5) where' s my dad where' s my gran why don't I ever see them 
and you're then going to have to face her and this is the thing 





.hh (1) what do you owe your child now clearly if there's 
[ 
c: you see this is relatively new to me 
somebody abusing your child or being violent to them .hh then 
[ [ 
c: well I've seen ( yeh 
maybe on the balance of probabilities you are doing your child 
a better turn (.5) by (.75) sparing the contact (.5) but 
Here A shifts from directly addressing the caller and her 
relation to her daughter (in terms of C's obligations), to a 
collective of 'all separated single parents .. ' (312). Thus it 
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is not only the caller who must face these obligations but 
the collective of all separated single parents, the use of 
, all' appears to constitute the message as an absolute one 
for single parents - there are no exceptions. Although A's 
form of address is, in part pedagogical, there is an emphasis 
upon the common identity deployed in the form of a 
reassurance and possibly also to warrant the claim. Thus, 
this second form of address seems to be related to the 
reassurance of common identity 
rather than purely pedagogical. 
6.9.3 SHARING A SECRET 
as with excerpt five 
There is a third form of address which relates to the implied 
audience and which might be described as (implicitly) 
'sharing a secret'. Here however, the audience lS not 
directly addressed by A but rather is interpellated - In part 
through the absence of a third party in the therapeutic 
exchange. This implication of 'sharing a secret' (or 
overhearing a confession) lS apparent at the beginning of 
each exchange when caller's are often anxious and reticent 
about telling their 'problem' and which is almost always 
marked by the deployment of 'erm' (or 'er') just prior to 
first telling the problem (Sally, 7; Charles, 3; Ann, 7; 
George, 8; John2, 3/4, 8; Belinda, 13; Ann2, 8; Linda, 19; 
John [offering an 'mm'] 3). Only one caller (Paul, 5) does 
not mark their initial telling in that way. 
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Additionally, the host Robbie Vincent's interruptions are -
with some exceptions which I consider later - fairly brief, 
so that for the majority of time the audience hears only the 
caller and the advisor. In fact, during all eleven exchanges 
the only direct address to the audience from any of the three 
participants; A, C and V is from V when he invites audience 
members to call in, for example: 
(Tl: 44-48) 
44 to say the least hh and hopefully come back on a non weee wooo 
45 sort of line hhh if you'd like to talk on a non wee woo line hhh 
46 071-973-9733 071-603-1152 and I hope very much that by er quick 
47 dialling Ann we've been able to: clear you so you don't howl any 
48 more 
Given such a lack of direct communication with the audience, 
we might conclude that this form of address - which I called 
'sharing a secret' In part operates by implying an 
overhearing audience which is voyeuristic. Put another way, 
the non-recognition of the audience during the exchanges 
between the advisor and caller interpellates a - potentially, 
at least voyeuristic gratification on the part of 
overhearers, moreover, a gratification which is a result of 
audience members' interest in, or identification with, the 
caller's essentially private problem: thus forcefully locking 













6.9.4 APPEALS TO LAY KNOWLEDGE (EXCERPTS 10-12) 
EXCERPT 10 (T3: 187-197) 
A: Belinda you (1) you sound like somebody who 
( .) likes to please people and who doesn't like to let them 
down and I think what we've got in here hidden away in this 
[ 
c: [sighs] 
very complex story is what I call guilt and what we all know 
[ 
c: MIn 
as gui It. hh you feel (. 75 ) gui I ty about the grandmo ther (y- ) 
EXCERPT 11 (T6: 121-125) 
121 to marry her (.) now hh I'm I don't believe although w we you 
122 know we're full of stories aren't we about instant love and 
123 looking across a crowded room hh that wha w you you know we're 
124 such complex people nowadays should we hh really trust a feeling 
125 which says within a week or two I'm going to marry 
EXCERPT 12 (T2: 164-167) 
164 enjoying together .hh but as with most things: when you get on 
165 in spending your years together things become erm a a little 
166 erm more regular you know there's less variety there's less 
167 excitement.hh so there 're all those kinds of things .hhh the 
In the excerpts above, A addresses the caller (and by 
implication the overhearing audience) in relation to their 
existing knowledge (other examples include Linda, 106-108, 
147-149, 150), constituting such lay knowledge as evidence 
for interpretations and statements of fact. Either of the 
terms 'you know' / 'we (all) know' is deployed in all these 
examples (with excerpt 11 'you know' is deployed I addition 
to a collective pronoun) and we might identify this form of 
address to the audience as 'appeals to lay knowledge' . 
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6.10.0 GENDER DIVISIONS AND THE IMPLIED AUDIENCE 
There do not appear to be any consistent differences in A's 
mode of address to female and male. However, although women 
callers do not appear more liable than male callers to have 
their troubles problematised as pathological, there does 
appear to be some tendency for women callers to be given a 
therapeutic responsibility that relates explicitly to self 
(Belinda (T3), Ann2 (T2), Sally (T10) as opposed to only 
John2 (T7) for the male callers). Recall from the previous 
chapter that in these particular exchanges the therapeutic 
responsibility was not only linked to, for example, what the 
caller was feeling or how they were behaving but to the kind 
of person they took themselves to be. 
It may be that this tendency relates to 'procedural' 
elements wi thin these calls, (for example, the duration of 
the exchange Paul and Charles' calls were relatively 
brief). However what is perhaps more interesting is the 
possibility that this relates to the form of problems 
brought to the interaction by the callers rather than the 
therapeutic problematisation itself. In other words, it may 
be that the female callers concerned were more likely to 
pathologise themselves through their own initial 
problematisation of their troubles. It was certainly the 










the female callers (Sally and Ann) and this was clearly 
related to statements made by the callers themselves; Sally 
suggested in her initial description of her problem that she 
was 'in a lot of danger' (22) and Ann, towards the end of 
her exchange, stated that she had considered taking her life 
(306-313) : 
c: And then (.) things'll sort of be alright for a week or so 
and then it all goes up again I've even (.) thought about like 
sort of finishing it all hhh 
A: :rxrmm 
C: like committing suicide but erm (.) 
the kids 
then I just think of 
Despite these implications, given the type of analysis 
undertaken here (that is, an in-depth analysis of a limited 
number of exchanges), it lS very difficult to offer any 
meaningful conclusions about the operation of therapeutic 
discourse in relation to gender divisions In general. 
However, there are two exchanges (both with female callers) 
where certain elements of the overall therapeutic 
problematisation relate explicitly to gender divisions and 
which might therefore tell us something about the implied 
audience - interpellated as members of gendered collectives. 
However, before we move on to consider these two exchanges 
in more detail I want to look momentarily at three other 
briefer instances where gender forms an important element of 




168 A: but one of the things I would go for immediately is to ask 
169 whether (0.5) she feels in some way now guilty having taken 
170 her father to court this sounds very complicated but the 
171 problem in so much of this abuse is that the child (.) the 
172 child er loves the parent or in in any way wants the parent to 
173 be a good and special parent (.) and at the same time is angry 
174 and wants justice and so they end up in away punishing and 
175 almost if you like destroying the person they love (.) now 
176 ) very often abuse victims get very very confused because 
177 they I ve been done a terrible wrong but at the same time if 
178 they (.) seek justice they can wipe out the person (.) who 
179 they care about and respect now (.) I just wonder if your wife 
180 is in a great turmoil a muddle about all of that 
During his initial presentation of his troubles, George 
describes his part in his wife's transformation from ' .. a 
very timid girl .. ' (11) to having ' .. the confidence to be a 
woman .. ' ( 16 -1 7 ) This particular description is a highly 
gendered one (in that - crudely - replacing 'boy' for 'girl' 
and 'man' for 'woman' greatly shifts the meaning/sense of 
the utterance) However, this particular element of the 
caller's account of his problem is excluded from the 
therapeutic problematisation although it is taken up by the 
host during his interruptions at (43-49, 103, 107-108 and 
116-118). Interestingly, A during the turn (168-180) above, 
offers an account of the woman I s emotional state as it 
relates to the abuse the caller says she has suffered - in a 
generalised form which lS non-gendered, returning to the 
woman's individual experience only at the end of the turn 
(179-180) . 
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Thus, although the caller's account of his troubles 
constitutes the problem as, ln part, relating to his wife's 
gender (and where the use of the term 'wife' also 
constitutes certain gender-specific rights and obligations), 
this does not appear in the therapeutic problematisation, 
rather A generalises-an account of (some of) the effects of 
abuse which is entirely non-gendered and may therefore be 
recognisable to both female and male overhearers. 
EXCERPT 14 
During Linda's exchange, A addresses the caller as a 
' .. grown up sensible woman ... ' (269-274). However, despite a 
range of references to 'mums', 'grandmums' and motherhood/ 
daughterhood, A's constitution of collectives at (106-108) 
and (147-151) is, in both instances, non-gendered: 
(T8:104-108) 
104 A: as opposed to the real baby and I don't want to compare .hh 
105 babies and pets because we' 'II get an outcry but I am going to 
106 say something about it and that is that . hh we all have these 
107 idealisde things don't we you know .hh the child is always 
108 going to be clean and healthy 
(T8: 146-156) 
146 A: =this one .hh is not an ideal baby either (I) only want a 
147 perfect baby like people like .h peole who you know .hh go on 
148 marrying and marrying .h (.) they only want a perfect husband 
149 or a perfect wife a wife who'll have sex every time they want 
150 it and in be terribly exciting and always: you know voluptuous 
151 and sweet smelling .hh of course human beings are not motor 
152 cars . hh and babies are not little teddy bears they're 
153 children .hh and so they're good and bad .hh and what we have 
154 to do as people is we have to learn to accept . hh this good 
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155 and bad side now how you're going to ex-
156 to get her round to this idea= 
(.) how you're going 
Once again there does not appear to be any clear pattern 
here although it does seem that in general the advisors tend 
to deploy non-gendered collectives. In fact, the deployment 
of a gendered collective lS quite unusual within the 
exchanges analysed here. Even, for example, the deployment 
of ' .. many women .. ' at (86) and 'women' at (88) during 
Paul's exchange relates to a situation in which such a 
deployment is inevitable (that is, given it relates to the 
response to a transvestite partner assuming transvestite 
refers, by definition, to a heterosexual male) . 
Let us now return to the two exchanges In which gendered 
collectives form an important element of the therapeutic 
problematisation (and concomitantly interpellate the 
overhearing audience in relation to gender - or, at the very 
least, offer images of the audience in relation to gender) . 
EXCERPT 15 
ANN 2 (T2) 
During A's turns (113-167) C is offered an elaborate account 
of her problem in the form of a (common) history. It should 
be emphasised that this is not a unique history but 
something: 
115 ...... hh which relates to the fact that most of us were not 
116 aware as youngsters of our parents having a sex life (.) 
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This account of C' s problem (which has a 'psychological 
nature', 114-115), is one then, that applies to 'most of us' 
(115). Note that here this collective is non-gendered, 
whereas a little further on A states (125) 
125 A: .hhh and so there are bigger psychological changes that take 
126 place and this I find tends to happen especially in women 
A subsequently deploys the collective pronouns (jadjective) 
'they/their' at (131-132, 136-140) but then shifts to 
'you'/'your' at (144-146), then to 'women' at (157) and then 
finally includes men to some extent (154-155): 
154 dwindle of course that's only looking at the woman's side it 
155 does happen to an extent in men as well . hh and I think also 
At (169) A deploys the collective 'women' once again but in 
relation to the normalisation of C's problematic experience, 
that is, it is a (normal) common experience for women. 
Slightly later A explicitly tells C that her experience is 
normal: 
194 A: Right (.5) OK .hh again that is quite a normal erm 
195 experience it's got it certainly .hh a a very much more normal 
196 fantasy (.75) for women. hh than than most would admit to (1) 
197 .hh 
A then shifts to what might be considered a third 
normalisation but this time with respect to a gendered 
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collective 'most women' (215) which lS also a special 
collective: 
214 actually quite quite different .hh and I'm I'm sure that erm you 
215 along with most women who could and would enjoy .hh very rough 
216 sex with their partner .hh would not want to be in a 
A then goes on to offer an image of a rape situation which 
' .. we tend to think of .. ' (217-218) and where the deployment 
of the pronoun 'we' lS ambiguous in reference to gender, 
perhaps constituting this image as one shared by both women 
and men: 
217 situation of a woman being raped in the sense that we tend to 
218 think of that where a woman .hh erm is not interested does not 
219 want mayor may not know the person .hh erm but is definitely 
220 not consenting (.) to that act 
What lS most interesting here is the shifting deployment of 
collectives in relation gender. So that, although A's three-
fold normalisation of C's experience is related to gender, 
men are not (always) entirely excluded from these 
collectives which are, in turn, sometimes non-gendered. 
EXCERPT 16 
(ANN T1: 122-212) 
During this exchange A constitutes at (122-124) one element 
of the therapeutic account (in the form of an origin) of C's 
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problem as something to which unfaithful men are 
particularly prone: 
122 A: Yes hh u- unfortunately we find this all to often (.) and i-
123 it does seem to be something that particularly men do where 
124 they've been unfaithful and that I can only obviously speak 
A then offers an elaborate account of this tendency: 
124 they've been unfaithful and that I can only obviously speak 
125 from my own experience of listening to people hhh but it seems 
126 to be this erm peculiar situation that arises where a man er 
127 has been unfaithful hhh and for some reason finds it 
128 impossible to accept the responsibility for that hhh and it's 
129 almost as if he daren't start feeling the guilt (.) because if 
130 he does that guilt will overwhelm him hhh and so his initial 
131 i-instinct is to look around to see who else to blame hhh and 
132 of course usually the easiest way erm of getting the guilt and 
133 the blame of him is to put it onto the partner who's actually 
134 accusing him (.) so that if he can make it seem to you like 
135 it is your faul t because you failed him in some way or you 
136 haven't been exciting enough or whatever hhh then you will 
137 actually begin to think that (.) and you will do your very 
138 best to win him back 
Further on A proposes a second possible account of C' s 
problematic relationship, presented as a gendered collective 
problem, that is a problem \ ... that more often happens in 
men ... ' (186-187) and goes on to describe the intricate 
psychological processes that result form men's inability to 
deal with (familial) responsibility: 
185 A: I thought that Was going to come and and that I think is is 
186 the real crux of the problem hhh that again it's something 
187 that more often (.) happens with men hh it comes really 
188 through hhh an insecurity but is another way of justifying 
189 them in being free to do what ever they want to do hhh and 
190 usually these these are men who have been very romantic very 
191 loving (.) in the courtship stage and usually for some time 
192 afterwards hhh and only gradually as responsibility begins to 
193 encroach upon the relationship and that might be 
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194 responsibility associated with buying a property or with 
195 children coming into the relationship hh as they begin to feel 
196 a little bit trapped a little bit bogged down with that 
197 responsibility hhh so thewy start to fight their way out of of 
198 the corner that they feel they're being boxed into and they 
199 will often tend to do this in in quite subtle ways at first 
200 hhh and quite small ways in which it is the woman who gets the 
201 blame for most things that go wrong in the relationship and 
202 again that can be in very very small ways hhh it's the woman 
203 who often tends to be given a lot of the responsibilities in 
204 the relationship hhh and answerable for things like finances 
205 just as you have been more recently hhh and it will go on to 
206 become these bigger things like for instance if he has an 
207 affair hhh erm somewhere or another that will be twisted 
208 around so that it is your fault hhh and it's not even a 
209 question of your expected to forgive him and welcome him back 
210 hhh it's a question of whether or not he can forgive you 
211 enough to come back hhh and that may be what your'e feeling at 
212 the moment (.) is it 
During this exchange then, Are-constitutes C's problem as 
two related collective problems to which firstly, unfaithful 
men are particularly prone (122-124) and secondly, as 
' .. something that more often happens in men .. ' (186-187). 
Thus, although A does not include all men In these 
problematic groups, two vivid and intricate images are 
deployed of prone and/or unfaithful men thereby producing an 
interpellation to particular sections of the male 
overhearing audience (who may or may not recognise 
themselves or be recognised by other sections of the 
audience as such). 
6.11 EXPERT AND LAY DISCOURSE 
During seven out of the ten exchanges Robbie Vincent 
intervenes, asking questions and offering comments and 


















into the discursive practices operating within these 
exchanges. Here I consider two such interruptions which 
illustrate the constitution of a separation between expert 
and lay discourse. 
EXCERPT 17 
(John T6: 91-106) 
At 
A: John John why do you say you've got obsessional-compulsive 
disorder 
c: Well not [laughs] not the disorder but I I feel if I do: if I 
give in to:: 00 what I would like to do it could become a 
compulsive er situation for me which ( ) 
[ 
V: You mean you could get hooked 
on this young lady John 
C: Well I I I did it could come up to the point of harassment if 
she does not want to respond to me 
V: .00 no but you said (.) what you 
just said was you could get hooked by this young lady couldn't 
you 
(98-99) and (104-106) Robbie Vincent interrupts the 
interaction by offering a 'translation' of the callers 
deployment of a psychopathological term 'obsessive behaviour' 
(deployed by C at 4, 85; note also that A 'corrects' C at 
(91-92) with 'obsessive-compulsive disorder') into a lay term 
'hooked' (98). V then goes on to emphasise this lay term at 
(105). This interruption I suggest indicates the following: 
1) A recognition of the validity of lay understanding - V 
seems to offer an equivalence between 'hooked' and 
'obsessional behaviour', 
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2) It offers a model to the caller to remain with lay 
discourse in the telling of events, indicating: a) it is too 
early in the interaction for the language of diagnosis, b) 
this is not appropriate 'caller discourse' but constitutes 
'expert discourse', 
3) An interpellation to the audience in that points one and 
two might validate the lay understanding of the audience and 
offer it a model for how to execute a (therapeutic) call. 
One might also suggest that if the caller was accepting the 
expert diagnosis, then his use of psychopathological 
discourse would be acceptable as a sign of ascension. Perhaps 
then, the temporal organisation of the exchange is important; 
that is V's interruption suggests that the events that occur 








(possibly as follows) 
l)Lay account, 
2) Expert interpretation, 
3) Negotiation (if any), 
4) Lay acceptance. 
EXCERPT 18 
(George T5: 24-47) 
V: What court are you talking about George you you 
c: This is a high court 
V: Yes but you (.) this court has suddenly arrived In the middle 



















c: Ah beg your pardon 
V: You 
what 





V: you're talking about and we (.) sort of leapt forward a bit 
there 
c: Yeh that's right er 
V: 
high court George 
fairly 
c: 
So why why (0.5) why 




did we end up in the 
from being timid to 
During a substantial segment of this exchange the interaction 
occurs exclusively between V and the caller. At (18) V 
interrupts with a request for clarification concerning one 
particular detail of C' s account which C later offers in 
narrative form (56-59). At (28-29) V explicitly refers to the 
form of C's account and then again at (33-39). V's utterance 
at (33-39) is particularly interesting in that V appears to 
act as intermediary between C and A, speaking almost as both 
overhearer or advisor, thus his occupation of to some 
extent the role of A over the next few turns lS made 
ambiguous. Later on at (89), V produces an utterance that is 
difficult to conceive as coming from A which I suggest can be 
heard as not only a request for information but also a 
judgement (or an accusation). Then at (94) V makes a further 
reference to the form of the caller's account (again 
available as a model to the overhearing audience) . 
327 
V's role then during this interruption is interesting because 
he seems to attempt to reproduce the operation of therapeutic 
discourse as we have seen it previously - and where he 
offers a model, I suggest, (to both C and the implied 
overhearer) of the layperson 'doing' counselling. Moreover, V 
appears to be attempting to do 'expertise' by reference to a 
medical model of diagnosis but clearly defers to A's 
authority (at the end of the call, 229-230) addressing him as 
a 'professional' (230) thereby constituting a boundary 
between lay and expert discourse in relation to A's 
professional status (and once again at the same time offering 
a model to the audience). Thus, it might be argued that while 
the lay person can - in some sense - become a counsellor, 
their discourse is not equivalent to that of the (expert) 
professional. 
6.12.0 THE 'OPEN' STRUCTURE OF THE BROADCAST 
In this section I further explore Robbie Vincent's 
interruptions which - as we have seen - serve a variety of 
functions including offering a model for the audience of how 
to consume (and participate in) the broadcast. In particular 
however, the host's interruptions offer a means of 
understanding the structure of the broadcast as 'open' rather 
than 'closed' (c.f. Deming, op cit) In that the implied 









































constituted as active In their consumption; the broadcast 
requires more from its audience than (passive) overhearing. 
EXCERPT 19 
PAUL (T9: 40-78) 
V: What er Paul 
you 
( .) you said it bothers you er what bothers 
c: Err= 
V: =that your'e wife'll find out (.) that= 
c: Yeah (.5) just what people will think really 
R: Yes (.) er er I was gonna throw others at you erm like Irma 
said did you think your' e unusual (.) your' e alone (.) it's 
gonna affect your' e marriage (.) or is ita combination of 
factors 
C: Yeah a combination all that really 
A: Yeh oh 
V: What do you think your'e wife would say if she knew (.) if 
you told her 
C; Err I don't know to be honest 
A: You nun' . 
V: What'd your guess be 
A: Err go mad I would think 
V: Go mad (.) you think she'd be cross 
C: Yeh I think so 
V: Yeh not (.5) not surprised maybe and not so cross or 
C: errrun cross 
and surprised I would have thought 
V: Mrnm 
During this exchange Robbie vincent's interruptions - as with 


















































closely, however once again v defers to 
authority/expertise at (115-121). 
EXCERPTS 20 & 21 
JOHN2 (T7: 79-134, 230-249) 
V: You said over the years J- you sai-
[ 
c: Well over the year sorry 
V: sorry yeh over the years I was gonna ask you wha this lS 
[ 
c: over the 
something .hh that happened some time ago and I thought (I'd) 
[ 
c: 
literally a year almost to the day 
[ 
litterally a 






c: They couldn't do anything for the first SlX seven months 
because of the scar tissue 
V: MIn 
C : . hh er but (. 5 ) 
done and it's .hh 
I know that there's nothing that can be 
V: outside of talking to Alison as you are now .hh and talking 
again with the surgeon who: did [ 
[ 
C: Mmm 
V: the operation .hh have you talked to anybody else medically 
about [ [ 
[ [ 
C: MIn erm: 
well I can't talk to my family I'm very very very close to my 
family .hh 
V: Right 
C: erm and say from the start they didn't want me to have 
anything done and if I was to ever go back to them and say how 
.hhh upset I was I think I'd destroy them .hh erm 
V: MIn but have you you just before you talk with Alison .hh 











c: I I went to ( 
V: a-a-another 
expert in this field 
c: No I haven't I went to my local GP .hh and had a chat with 
[ [ 
V: Right right 
EXCERPT 21 
230 V: Would you (1) yeh John would you accept 
231 though if somebody was talking to you and said well: you y-y-y 
232 you know you have got problems difficulties and your'e 
233 centering them on your ears and even if you hadn't had the 
234 operation you still might be centering feelings on something 
235 else .hh back to not having had your ears done maybe .h if 




240 V: what what would you say 
241 
242 C: Erm= 
243 
244 V: =you'd dsimiss it erm listen erm 
245 
246 C: Well I would listen 
247 
248 v: Yeh think about it think it might be sense or do you think 
249 that is a .hh completely nonsensical suggestion 
Here again, V adopts the role of the advisor but defers to 
her at (124-130). We have already seen that V's interruptions 
do not operate as those of a second advisor but (therefore) 
as something different. In the above two examples, V's 
interruptions imply an audience that is able to identify with 
the various positions elaborated within these exchanges. In 
other words, V's occupation of a variety of roles implies an 
overhearing audience that can do the same (while consuming 
































BELINDA (T3: 443-471) 
V: yes it er your suggesting there should be a little bit of 
Belinda nasty there niceness is actually very pleasant you don't 




that's right we 
Belinda nasty have I understood what you've said correctly 
[ 
A: 
cause people so much 




difficulty .hh if we don't ever tell them the truth in pursuit 
[ 
V: 'course we can 
of being nice to them 
[ 
that's why I keep telling my friend the reason 
people don't like him is 'cos he's ugly .hh but I say to him 
but I still love you [laughs] and he now understands he is now 
he is now [ 
[ 
A: [laughs] 
fully recovered after years of sadness .hh Linda you have 
obviously got a serious problem ... 
In this excerpt - immediately following Belinda ringing off 
at (441) Robbie clarifies with A what his message to C 
consisted of. There is a sense in which Robbie can be 
understood here to speak as and/or for the overhearing 
audience, at (450) asking: 
.. have I understood what you've said correctly .. 
In turn, this can be read as an implicit reference to the 
pedagogical aspect of the programme, once more offering a 
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model to the audience, this time one in which listeners are 
active in trying to properly understand the didactic elements 
of the broadcast. (Note also that Robbie's attempts at light-
relief (463-471) can be understood in terms of the necessity 
in radio broadcasting of marking boundaries and ensuring 
flow, c.f. Crissell, 1986:214). 
EXCERPT 23 
LINDA (167 onwards) 
167 v: what about Linda's resentment er well Linda 
168 









V: isn't actually sh- you Linda doesn't really resent the 
.hh but she resents the act of having the child 
the irresponsibilty of her daughter erm er 
[ 
A: yes she thinks it's irresponsible why 
when you can't look after your first one 




178 c: well actually this'll be her 










V: sh-where should Linda be homing her: 
resentment in on .hh erm Anthony .hh on her daughter 
A: well I think really yes she she needs to understand herself 
why she's got this painful emotion inside her and that's step 
one .hh and you you're understanding that Linda and you've 



















second step is well .hh can you do anything with this emotion 
that will .hh change the world make the world a better place .hh 
and what you can do is you can perhaps try and tackle your 
daughter on these things we've talked about tonight and see if 
you can get her to see a bit of sense 
c: I have (.) sat there and spoke to both her and her 
boyfriend . hh and said they haven't got a brain between them 
because if they had they wouldn't be in the postition they're 
in .hh er an' I I told her you know you wanna concentrate on 
the child you've got that's here before you think of having 
another one or at least include him when you go out buying 




























































V: she's not going to 
Linda is she 
of sweets .hh or even taking notice that he exists 
c: I don't think so 
[ 
A: sounds like you're up against it 
[ 
V: er and i-i-e-
tell you what 'es lucky 'es got you [laughs] 
c: [laughs] I dunno [laughs] 
[ 





he's lu- (1) well 'es is' n 'e i sn 't he 
c: he loves (' is mam) he's always telling me 
(like) [laughs] 
what what what would you rather 
you rather .hh would you rather 
daughter or would you rather he 
you and knowing that he's loved by 
) what would you ra- would 
he was unhappy with your 
was with you being loved by 
you= 








c: that's why 
'es with me 'cos he's loved 
V: I can hear it in your voice . hh and the other thing 
is Linda you know when the pennies gonna drop with your 
daughter .hh it's what Anthony's just said when she's b'in up 
[ 
c: yeh 
all night with with not just a bit nipple but four lots in the 
nappy as well and non-stop screaming 





I told her I'll 
V: well wha- w- ah you 
well you'll be able to look her staight in the eyes won't you 
maybe the penny will drop 
[ 
c: yeh she's made 'er bed she's gotta lay on it this time 
[ 
A: and also if you 
can help her to be a good mum and make a better job of this 


























































one and she can bring up the second one and maybe the world'll 
be a better place for it 
c: I'm just hoping when the baby's born (.) that my feelings 
don't go to the baby I hope that I can accept this baby 
[ 
A: you mustn't 1-
look you mustn't let 
grown up 
them go to the baby you're a you're a 
[ 
[ 
c: I do try not to 
sensible woman and you can have the feeling .hh but you 
c: Mmm 
mustn't let it out you mustn't take it out on the baby you 
gotta owe that to the baby= 
c: = well my husband said as soon as the baby's born 'e said 
you'll go all (.) gooey again 
[ 
V: 'course you will 
'e said you'll be alright (so don't worry) 
[ 
V: 
1 ike we're real 
softies Linda I 
c: 
'course you know what us 
(wig) at p at the bottom of it we're 
(s'pose) 
[ 
are you Robbie [laughs] 
mums are 
just big 
V: big softies yeh I think w- w-are mums us mums are aren't we 
[ 
c: yeh 
(.5) is that right 
[ 
c: yeh and grandmums 
V: and grandmums aren't we just big softies 
[ 
A: he's 








V: [laughs] you r- you have g- and good 1 uck to 
you Linda and by the way .hh er w-when you started off saying 
[ [ 
c: thanks yes 
well er you know is it is it reasonable is it normal . hh I 
think anybody in your position would be beside themselves with 
































c: I have cried I have 
cried beleive me .hh but I haven't got over that operation she 
had last year I think that is really the root of it all (1) 




C: an awful lot because (.) you know it was a grandchild 
[ 
A: 
can understand completely how you feel 
[ 
w- w-
C: it really I haven't got over it yet 
A: no it's a very problematic 
I 
V: er: our fingers our fingers 
will be crossed for 
( .) good luck= 
you Linda and er I' 11 be thinking 0 f you 
A: =yeh good luck Linda 
V: and you're right Doc. she did get to me .hh it's er just 
after nine thirty we update er the news we'll be back with er 
more of your calls it's the monday counsellig hour . hh er my 
guest is con -c -sul tant psychiatrist Dr. Anthony Fry . hh if 
you'd like to talk over a problem 071-603-1152 .hh 071-973-9733 
be back er be back in a few minutes ... 
In this final extended excerpt the dynamics between the two 
broadcasters in the studio, the caller and the audience 
provide a key illustration of the variety of positions 
adopted by the show's host during the broadcast and at the 
same time relate to the question of what the broadcast 
requires of its listeners. 
At (184-187) A responds to V's question, addressing this 
response to V and then shifting his address to C at (186). 
For a moment then, the caller becomes aligned with the 
overhearing audience - listening to the interaction between V 
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and Ai but one which directly concerns her. This provides an 
example of the complexity of the (shifting) inter-personal 
dynamics within the broadcast. Compare this for example, to 
Anthony Clare's In the Psychiatrist's Chair where the 
listener overhears two speakers only (c. f. Clare, 
1995) .7During these broadcasts A's discourse still provides 
'models' to the audience in relation to the therapeutic 
'process', evidenced for example in the following questions 
asked by Clare during an interview with Les Dawson (Clare, op 
cit:86-88) : 
Clare: Les Dawson how do you feel about talking about yourself? 
Clare: You've mentioned that, a kind of irritation with your children 
when they take for granted things that you just wouldn't have dreamt 
of. Is there a more fundamental scar? What would you say has been the 
single greatest impact on your formation of those early years? What do 
you think it's done to you? 
Clare: What about the fact of being an only child? You don't dwell on 
it much. I wonder, had it much significance? In those days one tended 
to see larger families. 
However, the absence of a host means that there is much less 
opportunity within the programme to offer models of 
consumption to the audience. 
Just prior to the utterance cited above (184-187) Robbie most 
clearly adopts the role of audience member, interrupting at 
(167-182) to ask questions aimed at clarification but, 
7 Though of course here the 'client' is present in the 
visual channel is in operation, though unavailble to 
than through its verbal 'translation'. Also this 
broadcast 'live'. 
studio and thus a 
overhearers other 
programme is not 
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importantly, from a lay position - not directly addressing 
the caller. 
171 v: isn't actually sh- you Linda doesn't really resent the 
172 child. hh but she resents the act of having the child it is 
173 the irresponsibilty of her daughter erm er 
181 v: sh-where should Linda be homing her: 
182 resentment in on .hh erm Anthony .hh on her daughter 
In the two excerpts above (171-173, 181-182) , V puts 
questions directly to A and once again occupies an ambiguous 
position. We can ask the question; On whose behalf does V ask 
these questions? 
1) To clarify for himself? 
2) To clarify for the caller? 
3) To clarify for the audience? 
In fact V provides a mUltiplicity of points of identification 
or positions to occupy and In addition offers models both for 
Linda and for the audience in that these may be understood as 
questions Linda should be asking. 
At (214-215) V's utterance is especially interesting he 
talks directly to C offering a lay opinion (as opposed to 
other instances where V offers a quasi-expert opinion) V 



























V: I can hear it in your voice.hh and the other thing 
is Linda you know when the pennies gonna drop with your 
daughter .hh it's what Anthony's just said when she's b'in up 
c: yeh 
all night with with not just a bit nipple but four lots in the 
nappy as well and non-stop screaming 
At (288-302) V then offers an interesting identification with 
the caller as another mother: 
V: 
like we're real 
softies Linda I 
c: 
'course you know what us mums are 
(wig) at p at the bottom of it we're just big 
(s'pose) 
[ 
are you Robbie [laughs] 
V: big softies yeh I think w- w-are mums us mums are aren't we 
[ 
c: yeh 
(.5) is that right 
[ 
c: yeh and grandmums 
V: and grandmums aren't we just big softies 
At (302 ) V goes on to offer an identification with 
, grandmums' which mirrors C' s introduction of the term at 
(300). Here V appears to share the position of not only the 
caller - mirroring her response at (300) 'as grandmums' but 
other mums and grandmums constituted as a group of which he 
is a member. Although V appears to be offering a playful 
irony In that he cannot be a 'mum' because of his gender, it 
is important that he is able to meaningfully take-up this 
position during the programme. In this way V takes the 





identification is contrary to his gender. Moreover, at (296-
300) C, rather than correcting Robbie's identification with 
her as a mum, broadens the process of identification to 
include her own identity as a 'grandmum' which V then mirrors 
in the following utterance: 
c: yeh and grandmums 
V: and grandmums aren't we just big softies 
I suggest that V's response and C's reaction to it offer a 
distinct model to the audience; bring your own experience to 
bear here. Furthermore, recall Deming's (1994:258) conclusion 
concerning the 'open' nature of the Hill Street blues text: 
... the narrative invites the viewer to participate 
in the discourse rather than identify too strongly 
with individual characters. 
What appears to be happening here is that the audience lS 
invited to identify with the therapeutic discourse itself 
over the caller's particular identity thus broadening the 
process of interpellation and thereby expanding the force of 
the subjection in relation to the overhearing audience. This, 
in fact, provides a model for understanding the broader 
operation of the programme In relation to the overhearing 
audience; as a set of subj ect positions and identities, 
setting out an ethical regime for the audience to enter 
into. 
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The "therapeutic" ethical regimes conveyed during the 
exchanges considered throughout this analysis include 
particular though varied forms of substance, ethical work 
and 'therapeutic' goals - particular in that they relate to 
a 'psy' understanding of ourselves, our relation to 
ourselves and our relations to others and varied in that 
they draw upon a large range of therapeutic scenarios 
already identified within therapeutic discourse. 
Foucault's four dimensions of ethical self-formation do not 
map straightforwardly onto the operation of the broadcast in 
relation to the audience, for example overhearers are not 
directly invited to work upon themselves in this or that 
way, or to constitute part of themselves as this or that 
substance which requires vigilance and/or reparation. 
Rather, I suggest that overhearers are invited to glance at 
themselves during these brief exchanges, to recognise their 
own difficulties (or elements of them) not only in the 
caller's discourse but as also indicated in the therapeutic 
'process' itself that is, the process of reformulating 
one's difficulties in living within not only a new 
(therapeutic) language of description but also in relation 
to particular positions already available within a (to some 
extent) shared moral universe. 
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The key point here is that the processes involved In 
implying particular characteristics of the audience may be 
understood as a mode of sUbjection in that a continuity is 
constituted (as opposed to a discontinuity) between caller 
and overhearer. Put another way, in addition to overhearing 
the elaboration of ethical substances, the ethical work 
which must be applied to these and - to some extent - the 
kinds of personhood towards which they should strive, the 
overhearing audience is interpellated as if these 
'solutions' are (potentially) also their solutions to their 
problems. 
Above all, we have seen the inventiveness of therapeutic 
discourse throughout the three stages of this analysis and 
in this chapter we have examined the special nature of its 
adaptation to a media environment. The truth effects of 
therapeutic discourse move away from the traditional private 
setting and towards a public setting where overhearers are 
interpellated - though not necessarily directly invited to 
work upon themselves - as much more than passive consumers 
of the programme. 
6.13 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I aimed to address the relationship between 
the broadcast and the overhearing audience by identifying the 
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audience implied by the discursive practices within the 
broadcast itself. I will relate the findings via the five 
areas of interest used to structure the analysis. 
1) Forms of identification: 
We saw that A's deployments of a shift to collective pronouns 
(and the constitution of group identities) provided a means 
of identification for the overhearing audience and implied an 
audience which recognised itself In these imagined 
collectives. In this way A was able to include the 
overhearing audience (through a form of mimesis) within an 
essentially private and unique problem. 
2) Forms of address: 
Four modes of address to the audience deployed by A (and the 
broadcast itself) were identified; pedagogical, the 
'reassurance' of a common identity, sharing a secret (which 
implied a voyeuristic audience) and appeals to lay knowledge. 
Thus, these forms of address implied an overhearing audience 
willing to be 'educated', to overhear personal and intimate 
confessions, who may share the (problematic) experiences of 
the caller and whose personal knowledge and experience may be 
relevant to the proceedings. 
343 
3) Expert and lay discourse: 
Here we saw the way that interruptions by the show's host 
served - among other things - as a model for the audience in 
relation to the boundary between the differential authority 
of expert and lay therapeutic discourse. This special context 
of the counselling phone-in appears to refute Crissell's (op 
ci t: 187) claim that the phone-in genre enables callers to 
operate - in some sense - on a par with broadcasters enjoying 
(temporarily) equal authority (at least within this 
counselling setting) . 
4) Implied audience gender: 
An analysis 
collectives 
focusing upon the deployment of gendered 
indicated that while such collectives 
interpellated particular elements of the (male and female) 
overhearing audience, advisors, in fact, tended to deploy 
non-gendered collectives and/or broaden gendered regimes of 
identification to - in part - include both women and men. 
5) Structure of the broadcast: 
Here we saw that the broadcast required more from its 
audience than passive overhearing. The open structure (c.f. 
Deming, op cit) of the broadcast (in particular exemplified 
by the host's interventions), disrupted and fragmented the 
narrative (particularly that of C) implying an audience that 
344 
must do more than simply listen and be drawn into a story; 
rather the overhearing audience is implied as an interrupting 
and questioning one able to identify the \ lessons' to be 
learnt. 
Thus, (A and) the broadcast is able to forcefully subjectify 
the overhearing audience by involving it in the proceedings 
through a variety of means which involve the interpellation 
of the audience as active consumers who, to some or other 
extent, potentially share the problems aired in these calls 
and who are able to identify not only with individual callers 
but also with the therapeutic process itself and the ethical 
regimes conveyed through it. In this way the members of the 
audience, in addition to the callers, are invited to identify 
themselves as certain kinds of person (and as part of one or 
more collectives) having certain kinds of responsibilities; 
both to others and to themselves. 
However, in relation to Foucault's four dimensions of ethical 
self-formation it is not clear that - for the audience - this 
is a work on themselves and, in fact, the narrative often 
becomes pedagogic in relation to the audience and this 
along with the location of overhearers in a variety of 
collectives - might be primarily thought of as a form of 
normalisation operating through a professional claim to 
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therapeutic authority. Crissell (1986:186-187) suggests that 
the audience will hear the caller's discourse as in some 
sense representing the 'community at large'. In this way the 
normalisation offered during these can only be underscored by 
such an understanding of the caller's discourse (in relation 
to audience) . 
Moreover, in contrast to other types of phone-in (for 
example, the late-night chat), here the boundary between the 
professional (A) and the caller (C) is rigidly maintained 
with all callers showing deference to A. Interestingly, it is 
Robbie who appears to blur the boundaries and in some sense 
aligns himself with both the advisor and the caller. In fact, 
the host's role is very different to that of a host on other 
talk shows - there appears to be more at stake in showing the 
audience how to do a call both in relation to the interactive 
nature of the broadcast and the subjectifying nature of the 
operation of therapeutic discourse. Perhaps, above all, we 
see here one way In which therapeutic discourse has 
transformed itself in order to make itself amenable to this 
new (media) role, adapting itself to both the radio medium 
and the call-in genre. 
Returning to the problems of 'effects research' we 
considered earlier, our identification of the 'implied 
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audience' has enabled an understanding of one fiction of the 
audience without (psychologistic) recourse to individual 
audience members and such a method, I suggest, offers an 
opportunity to further our understanding of the interaction 
between subjects/readers and media 'text' (c.f. Morley op 
ci t). However, we can conclude in relation to practices of 
consumption that the media discourse within this radio 
setting offers an identifiable set of positions or points of 
entry to the listener which might be considered a further 
(expanded) mode of subjection. We must remember however, that 
these positions can best be understood as differential 
encodings 
broadcast 
exactly how the audience might consume the 
could only be inferred through ethnographic 
research. In other words - as I suggested in part A - the 
implied audience can illuminate only one level of the overall 
process of reading described earlier (c.f. Morley, 1980; 
Geraghty, 1994). 
347 
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this final chapter I outline the key findings of the 
three-part discourse analysis reported in chapters four to 
six and consider the contribution these offer to the research 
problem and its theoretical context outlined in chapters one 
and two. I go on to discuss the limitations and possibilities 
of the methodological framework adopted for this thesis, 
suggest some possible future research which might move this 
project forward and offer some concluding comments. 
The focal problem addressed within this thesis has been the 
'problem of power' in the ( individual) counselling 
relationship - where 'power' was translated as 'regulatory 
practices of the self' 
relate to ethical 
(c.f. Gordon, op cit) which, in turn, 
self-formation. This approach was 
contrasted with existing formulations of the operation of 
power within psychotherapeutic practice which tend to be 
individualistic and psychologistic (chapter one) . 
7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The three-part empirical analysis aimed to map radio 
counselling discourse in relation to the techniques deployed 
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by the counsellor and their effects upon the caller's 
discourse. The findings were as follows. 
In chapter four I described the dominant 'transmission model' 
of language and communication in counselling theory and went 
on to critique the rhetorical approach in social psychology 
which was arguably an established choice (wi thin 'critical' 
social psychology) for analysing the therapeutic exchange (in 
terms of persuasion). I also suggested that the values and 
ideals of therapeutic discourse were taken-for-granted within 
current manuals and training texts. 
A detailed analysis of one extended excerpt (from T3) showed 
that the advisor I s turns were oriented to the caller IS In 
such a way as to regulate their form in relation to: a) the 
provision of instructions and models to C relating to the 
form of C's discourse, b) A's introduction/exchange of novel 
words, c) the deployment of a mode of discourse which I 
suggested 'singularised ' the content of CIS utterance (while 
'correcting' the grammar). I went on to analyse the 
deployment of figurative language which I suggested provided 
an index to key processes of signification within the 
interaction. I suggested that both A's re-shaping of. C' s 
problem, along with the deployment of figurative language, 
constituted powerful modes of SUbjection. 
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These findings were then contrasted with the accepted role of 
language in counselling manuals and textbooks commonly used 
for training courses. I suggested that the notion of 
'process' within the mainstream approach has been shown here 
to be produced within the discursive practice of the radio 
broadcast itself and that this media therapeutic discourse 
(in the exchanges analysed) operated through, in part, the 
constitution of the client as an ethical subject (which 
included the intricate management of accountability) 
through the provision of new means for callers to understand 
themselves; that lS, novel means of describing their 
histories, aspirations, desires and so on (c.f. Hacking, op 
cit) . 
Thus, the focus of this chapter was to offer some evidence 
for, a) the discursive production of therapeutic 'process', 
and b) the discursive management of accountability through 
ethical self-formation, thus illuminating the role of 
language in the 'counselling process' which operated within 
the radio broadcast as other than the 
transmission/representation of cognition and affect. 
In chapter five I linked the examination of the operation of 
therapeutic discourse with Foucault's analytic of 
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'problematisation' (and its relation to his account of 
ethics), which shifted the analysis more explicitly towards 
the transformation of the content of the exchanges (as 
opposed to their form) and in particular the "ontology" of 
self conveyed therein. Thus, the key aim of this chapter was 
an analysis of the way that everyday problems were rendered 
into therapeutic discourse through an exploration of the 
processes of problematisation which constitute part of the 
caller's Being as worthy of attention. I suggested that these 
discursive processes of problematisation were intimately 
bound to moral preconditions which might be understood In 
terms of a shared moral order (c.f. Harre & Davies, op cit) 











the constitution of ethical 
substances (to be worked upon by the caller in ways described 
by the advisor) and the production - to some extent - of a 
therapeutic 'telos' (or goal). In addition, I suggested that 
the 'selves' conveyed to caller's through therapeutic 
problematisation were more 'moral' than 'psychological', In 
other words, the 'ontology' of self within these broadcasts 
was less a specialist 'psychological' realm and more the 
location of the caller within a moral universe. 
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I concluded that therapeutic problematisation within this 
media setting might best be described as the production of a 
therapeutic \ thematic complex' ln which the relation (and 
accountability) to oneself forms a key element. In turn, 
these complexes of accountability not only concerned the 
relation to oneself but also operated within a "therapeutic" 
moral order in which the self was both the target of and the 
responsible agent for its own reparation. I went on to argue 
that therapeutic problematisation could only be understood as 
operating within a wider moral order which must inevitably 
move the analysis beyond the verbal exchange. Moreover, this 
shared moral order was evidenced in the lack of a rigid 
boundary between \ expert' and \ lay' discourse (though this 
did not necessarily mean that these were equivalent in 
authority) 
In chapter six I moved the analysis towards the relation 
between the discursive practices found within the broadcast 
and the existence of an overhearing audience. I offered the 
analytic of 'implied audience' (c.f. Deming, op cit) as a 
means of understanding the assumptions made and positions of 
identification offered to the audience within the media 
narrative itself. The variety and ambiguity of the positions 
occupied by the show's host (Robbie Vincent) I also suggested 
were especially useful in understanding the "fiction" of the 
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audience to be found within the transcript data (c. f. Ang 
1994) . 
I identified five key ways in which the relation between the 
overhearing audience and the content of the broadcast might 
be understood; means of identification for the audience, 
forms of address to the audience, gender divisions in 
relation to the (implied) audience, the operation of expert 
and lay discourse and the (open or closed) structure of the 
broadcast. I also offered the analytic of 'implied audience' 
as a useful means to avoid some of the pitfalls of existing 
'effects research' in relation to audience studies. 
The analysis showed that 1) the broadcast was in part -
conditioned by the requirement to manage and utilise the 
(potential) problem or conflict between the voyeuristic 
element of the show and its warrant as 
educational/therapeutic to both caller and audience, 2) the 
boundaries between the differential authority of A and C' s 
discourses were rigidly maintained whereas the host (V) 
tended to blur them and this related to the provision of 
models to the audience in this regard, and 3) an analysis of 
the 'implied audience' tells us about the broadcaster's 
assumptions concerning consumption, though this analysis 
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could only illuminate one element of the entire process of 
consumption/reading (c.f. Morley 1980; Geraghty, 1991). 
These results taken together (chapter 6) can be recognised as 
uncovering the various strategies for involving the 
overhearing audience within the broadcast as if they were 
active consumers who potentially shared the problems aired 
within the show, are willing to be 'educated' and to overhear 
'confessions', who were able not only to identify with 
individual callers but with the therapeutic process itself 
(c.f. the open nature of the broadcast) and also who were 
most often collectively interpellated as non-gendered or 
gender-inclusive and I concluded that the prOVlSlon of a 
range of positions for overhearers to adopt (or points of 
interpellation) would exert a powerful subjectifying force 
upon the audience. 
7.1.1 THERAPEUTIC TECHNIQUES 
Above all the three-part discourse analysis enabled the 
identification of a range of discursive techniques implicated 
in the sUbjection of both callers and the overhearing 
audience, these included: 
The shaping-up of the caller's account through interruptions, 
questions, models (for both C and the overhearing audience), 
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the provision of novel words and the 'singularisation' of C's 
turns. Also identified was the deployment of figurative 
language which served to re-shape the content of C's account 
In particular with respect to accountability/culpability, 
while it was 
factuality. 
also implicated In the construction of 
Forms of problematisation were distinguished which operated 
through the provision of advice and 'interpretations' and 
modes of address to the caller, along with a deployment of a 
moral ontology of the self. The overall 'process' was 
understood as the production of a 'thematic complex' in which 
the relation (and accountability) to oneself formed a key 
element while these strategies/techniques appeared to 
operate within and upon a shared moral order. 
Also identified were techniques for the interpellation of the 
overhearing audience; the deployment of a shift to collective 
pronouns by A, four recognisable modes of address to the 
audience, the maintenance of the boundary between the 
differential authority of A and C's discourse, the tendency 
for the deployment of non-gendered collectives by A and the 
open structure of the programme which invited an 
identification with the therapeutic 'process' itself. 
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Above all, through analysing these processes and procedures 
in technical terms it has been possible to map the practical 
operation of radio therapeutic discourse - which is more than 
the production of "meaning" or rhetoric but rather the 
constitution and operation of regulatory practices of the 
self; that is the provision of "therapeutic" languages of 
description which include wi thin them the means of acting 
upon oneself after the broadcast has ended. 
I have proposed that the discursive techniques mapped in this 
analysis might be best understood as elements of a dispositif 
(ch. 3.3.1) - which Miller & Rose (op cit) have called a 
'therapeutic machine' a machine where primary among its 
varied effects is the subjectification of 'patients' and 
'clients' within an ethical regime where clients are invited 
to fold therapeutic discourse (and authority) into 
themselves. 
I suggest that these findings can be understood as the entire 
'apparatus' of the therapeutic brought to bear within these 
five to ten minute exchanges. 
7.2 THE RELEVANCE OF THE FINDINGS 
What sense then, can be made of these findings? Recall that 
the 'process' literature within psychotherapy research was 
dominated by a reductionist, quantitative methodological 
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framework where the central aim was the abbreviation of the 
'process' to measurable variables, evidenced conceptually in 
, ... an ubiquitous faith in the (essential) reality of the 
therapeutic process.' 
'linguistic approach' 
(Hodges, op cit:302) Moreover, the 
to process research maintained an 
ambivalent position in relation to the constitutive nature of 
therapeutic languages, where too its reliance upon a 
reductionist methodology (described above) moved it towards a 
'representational' mode of understanding in relation to the 
operation of discourse. I also suggested that the variety of 
approaches within process research were united by an 
uncri tical acceptance of the posi ti ve (healing) effects of 
psychotherapeutic practices which constituted the only 
context within which such practices were understood (chapter 
two) . 
The research undertaken for this thesis highlights, I 
suggest, the costs involved in adopting the reductionist 
methods outlined above. While these methods certainly allow 
for a great deal of control over the phenomenon to be 
researched, a more qualitative, in-depth analysis of 
naturally occurring talk enables us to consider the intricate 
workings of therapeutic discourse in all its complexi ty -
which must necessarily include the operation of power (all 
but absent from the 'process' literature). Thus, by analysing 
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the technical operation of therapeutic discourse it has been 
possible to offer a novel perspective on the existing 
'process' question; a perspective in which the power 
relations articulated with these discursive techniques may be 
considered in strategic terms (for Foucault intentional and 
non-subjective) thus avoiding the traps of individualism and 
psychologism we met earlier (in chapter one) . 
The key finding of this thesis is that the discursive 
techniques mapped through the empirical analysis offer a 
diagram for the operation of power within counselling (and 
arguably, general psychotherapeutic) practice in that we may 
consider power to be articulated with those therapeutic 
techniques In such a way as to invite callers and the 
overhearing audience to fold therapeutic discourse into 
themselves, (I also suggested that callers - to some extent -
had begun this process before making the call, c.f. De Swann, 
op cit). In this way, therapeutic discourse can be considered 
as 'powerful' in relation its production of desire; not 
simply the desire to be healed but an (ethical) desire to 
heal oneself. 
However, as I have already stated (ch 4.10) it is important 
not to ask too much of the data archive analysed here. Given 
the short duration of calls to the counsellor wi thin the 
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broadcasts considered, perhaps it is inevitable that the 
therapeutic 'process' will operate primarily upon a shared 
moral/ethical universe - not least given that these brief, 
highly condensed and focused exchanges must make sense to 
those who are listening. Despite this, the relatively recent 
phenomenon of media therapeutics remains little researched 
(we saw that White, 1992 is a notable exception) and the 
special nature of the therapeutic discourse analysed here -
given its radio setting - makes a contribution to expanding 
the research in this area, especially the findings which 
relate to the implied audience. 
Earlier In the thesis I briefly mentioned the relation 
between therapeutic authority and advanced liberal government 
which Miller & Rose (1994:60) describe as follows: 
To govern in an advanced liberal way is to pre-
suppose the implantation of certain norms of self 
promotion in ... actors, and a willingness to turn 
to experts for advice in the decisions, both large 
and small, that are entailed in the conduct of the 
enterprise of one's life. Hence they also pre-
suppose the existence of a mUltiplicity of agencies 
of advice and guidance, traversing contemporary 
experience with the languages, criteria and 
techniques by which we might act upon ourselves as 
subjects of freedom. It is here that the 
therapeutic vocation of authority comes into 
consonance with a whole new regime for the conduct 
of free individuals seeking to maximise their 
quality of life in a world of choice. 
In addition to the limitations with regard to generalisation 
mentioned above (c.f. the radio setting), there is a danger 
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in regarding the 'therapeutic' subject as a subject of 
liberal government primarily produced as autonomous and 
respons ible . However, here I have tried to show that in 
relation to therapeutic discourse - such responsibility (and 
accountability) is more subtle; 'therapeutic' responsibility 
can be taken in a variety of ways, many different thoughts 
and practices are compatible with autonomy and 
responsibility: what is perhaps of greatest interest here is 
the variety of models offered for so doing within therapeutic 
discourse. 
In other words, a simple transposition of the 'telos' of 
therapeutic ethical self-formation as the self-governing 
autonomous individual of advanced liberal democracy misses 
the complexity of the operation of responsibility and 
accountabili ty lD a contemporary 'therapeutic' moral order. 
Moreover, the question of the mode of being towards which 
therapeutic subjects are moved (chapter 3.4) cannot be fully 
answered from the discourse analysis undertaken here as 
nowhere in these telephone exchanges is such a 'form of life' 
fully outlined. However, it has been possible to see the 
moral/ethical operation of therapeutic problematisation and 
thus we might conclude that we need to understand the variety 
and complexity of the moral/ethical obligations placed upon 
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therapeutic subjects which is more than simply a call for 
autonomy and self-regulation. 
7.3 PROBLEMS WITH THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
I wish now to turn to some problems with the methodological 
framework adopted for this thesis. I will discuss two major 
areas of concern/doubt in Foucault's work which potentially 
impact upon this thesis; the (for some) problem of gender-
blindness and the issue of reflexivity. 
7.3.1 REFLEXIVITY 
One of the features of Foucault's work which attracted me at 
the very beginning of this proj ect was his emphasis upon 
'truth effects' (as opposed to say, a post-modern rej ection 
of truth, c.f. Lawson & Appignanesi, 1989) and any adoption 
of a Foucauldian framework must include such a theoretical 
position. However, in adopting this position one's own 
discourse must be understood as operating In the same way, 
and thus the truth status of one's own research is 
problematised. Lawson (1985:9-10) describes the problem thus: 
Rooted In the modern concern with the sign, as 
language or theory, reflexi vi ty has surfaced in 
divergent fields ... Empirical observation is 
questioned on the grounds that it is theory 
dependent. Common sense is doubted on the grounds 
of cultural relativism. This questioning, however, 
has led to views which are unstable ... Our 
'certainties' are expressed through texts, through 
language, through sign systems, which are no longer 
seen to be neutral. It appears, therefore, that in 
principle there can be no arena of certainty. 
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To what extent then, are the 'views' within this thesis 
'stable' and 'certain' and moreover to what extent should 
this be considered a problem? The manipulation of that which 
should and should not be subject to (relativist) 
deconstruction has been cleverly termed 'ontological 
gerrymandering' (c.f. the relativity of scientific 'truths'), 
Woolgar (1988:99) describes it thus: 
It is fairly clear that the success (or at least 
plausibility) of critiques of science is that they 
suppose (and present) themselves to be something 
separate (distant) from the science which is being 
deconstructed. This means that the course of 
deconstruction entails various implicit claims at 
differentiation between deconstructor and 
deconstructed. In short, the former presents the 
argument as if s/he was immune from the strictures 
applied to the target of the argument... The 
relativist argument highlights the susceptibility 
to relativism of one set of claims and assumptions, 
while simultaneously backgrounding the fact that 
the very assumptions of relativism are themselves 
equally susceptible. 
However, Foucault's work does not fit easily within these 
relativist discourses in that he aimed at more than the 
deconstruction of 'texts' and this difference from the more 
textually oriented post-structuralists is usefully described 
by Boyne (1990:4) who summarises Foucault's and Derrida's 
mutual distrust: 
For Foucault, Derrida was a defender of the one 
form of understanding that would always remain the 
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same, that would always produce holy wars in the 
name of truth, and sanctified divisions between the 
experts and the ignorant; for Derrida, Foucault's 
subtle defence of the established order was the 
false promise of a Utopia, an image which if 
pursued would always lead to disillusionment and 
the acceptance that nothing can ever change the way 
that the world is. 
However, it is a mistake to search for the 'truth' in 
Foucault's works even Baudrillard (1987:10-11) in his 
'Forget Foucault' suggests this is misguided: 
Foucaul t' s is not... a discourse of truth but a 
mythic discourse in the strong sense of the word, 
and I secretly believe that it has no illusions 
about the effect of truth it produces. That, by the 
way is what is missing in those who follow in 
Foucault's footsteps and pass right by this mythic 
arrangement to end up with the truth, nothing but 
the truth. 
Furthermore, Foucault (1980: 193) , I think, presents an 
excellent account of the problem of reflexivity in relation 
to his own work: 
As to the problem of fiction, it seems to me to be 
a very important one; I am well aware that I have 
never written anything but fictions. I do not mean 
to say, however, that truth is therefore absent. It 
seems to me that the possibility exists for fiction 
to function in truth, for a fictional discourse to 
induce effects of truth, and for bringing it about 
tha t a true discourse engenders or 'manufactures' 
something that does not as yet exist, that lS, 
'fictions' it. 
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Thus the 'fictions' that Foucault produced were 'important' 
fictions which operated within those various settings where 
academic works induce effects of truth. I would argue - in 
relation to my own work - that such a position avoids the 
relativism outlined above through its engagemen t wi th 
concrete practices (and techniques) which are not necessarily 
textual. That is, academic texts both rely upon and produce 
pratical truth effects. 
7.3.2 GENDER-BLINDNESS 
I want now to consider the issue of gender in Foucault's work 
which for some is gender-blind, for example in relation to 
the gendered nature of disciplinary techniques. 
(1992:35) condenses these concerns ln relation 
'discipline' and the body thus: 
... it is necessary to explore how meanings, 
particularly representations of gender, are 
mobilised within the operations of power to produce 
asymmetrical relations amongst subjects. In the 
analysis of institutional regimes, such as the 
prison, it is important to show how and why women 




The problem identified above in relation to Foucault's model 
of "discipline" is a complex one to which most would agree 
there is no simple 'solution'. However, McNay (op cit:193) 
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towards the end of her 'Foucault and Feminism' describes the 
advantages of Foucault's later (ethical) work thus: 
Foucault's rejection of the 'literary turn' of much 
recent philosophy, his corresponding insistence on 
the historical specificity of his categories ... and 
his retention of a notion of the acting self, 
distances his work from that of other French 
philosophers. The exploration of identity posed by 
Foucault is not simply an endless dispersal of the 
subject, or a celebration of heterogeneity qua 
heterogeneity, but lS linked to the overall 
political aim of increasing individual autonomy, 
understood as a humanising quality of social 
existence. 
Above all, I concur with Sawicki (1991:109), who, at the end 
of her 'Disciplining Foucault' , suggests, to take a 
Foucauldian position means to either ignore his ideas and 
methods or to move beyond them. Moreover, Foucault's 
(1988c:154-155) description of the nature of critique offers 
a useful reminder of the purpose of his work as he saw it: 
A critique is not a matter of saying that things 
are not right as they are. It is a matter of 
pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what kinds 
of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of 
thought the practices we accept rest ... Criticism is 
a matter of flushing out ... thought and trying to 
change it: to show that things are not as self-
evident as one believed, to see that what is 
accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted 
as such. 
In a similar way, it has primarily been my alm that the work 
undertaken here makes some contribution to dismantling that 
which appears self-evident in counselling practice and thus 
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to go some way towards opening a space of understanding and 
debate concerning the operation of power in practices which, 
for many, are taken-for-granted as beneficial and 
progressive. 
7.4 FURTHER WORK 
The methodology utilised within this thesis is unusual in its 
bringing together (somewhat) established methods from the 
social psychological readings of discourse analytical 
technique (c.f. Parker, op cit; Wetherell & Potter, op cit) 
with Foucault's account of ethical self-formation. A future 
direction for this project would be an expanded analysis of 
the range of media settings where therapeutic discourse lS 
deployed in some form, for example to include TV and 
newspaper/magazine columns. This would be a useful addition 
to the in-depth analysis undertaken here which focused on a 
relatively short duration of air-time. The techniques mapped 
in this study could be offered as 'hypotheses' to a larger 
scale archive which, in addition, might well include 
transcript data from more 'traditional' counselling and 
psychotherapeutic settings. 
Perhaps the most important outcome of this work has been the 
fruitfulness of the four-dimensional diagram offered by 
Foucault in his later work. Martin et al. (1988:139) describe 
its utility, I think, in its simplest but most germane terms: 
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For Foucault, the psyche is not an archive but only 
a mirror. To search the psyche for the truth about 
ourselves is a futile task because the psyche can 
only reflect the images we have conjured up to 
describe ourselves. 
Foucault's four-way diagram has made possible an analysis of 
the complexity of the operation of power in relation to the 
(self-)formation of self and identity (or the images we have 
created for self-understanding) and, looking ahead, one of 
the most important features of Foucault's approach, for me, 
has been his engagement with political struggles on the 
ground. As Halperin (1995:23) describes: 
From the late 1960' s on, Foucault tirelessly took 
part in the real dirty work of political organising 
going to meetings, writing manifestos, handing 
out leaflets, and even driving three thousand 
kilometers from Paris to Warsaw in the fall of 
1982, less than two years before his death, leading 
a convoy of medical supplies and smuggled printed 
materials that he had helped to collect for the 
beleaguered members of Solidarnosc. 
The scholarly analysis of ethical self-formation, while not a 
template which can be applied to any setting, can certainly 
contribute as Foucault no doubt intended - to struggles 
which alm to think differently about the people we take 
ourselves to be. 
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7.5 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The conception of a therapeutic apparatus or 'machine' (c.f. 
Miller & Rose, 1994) has enabled this analysis to examine the 
technical elements of the 'problem of power' within 
counselling practice - so that rather than simply offering a 
critique, this thesis has tried to uncover the way 
psychotherapy works through the discursive constitution of 
therapeutic 'truth effects', enabling a novel perspective 
upon the 'process' question so critical within mainstream 
psychotherapy research. Moreover, in its adaptation to the 
unique setting of the radio broadcast, the 'therapeutic 
machine' reveals itself in its minimal and therefore most 
illustrative form; the subjectification of persons within our 
present moral and ethical universe. 
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The following conventions were used in transcribing the 
radio exchanges (adapted from Atkinson & Heritage, 1984:ix-
xvi, originally developed by Gail Jefferson) 8. Examples are 
given where appropriate: 
1) OVERLAPPING UTTERANCES: 
An ongoing utterance joined by another is linked with a 
single left-hand square bracket - which also marks the point 
at which the overlapping utterance begins: 
A: Yeh he was in care and on the at risk list 
c: so so so she she has the children and you look after them 
2) CONTIGUOUS UTTERANCES 
An equals sign indicates that there was no discernible gap 
between two utterances (where they do not overlap) : 
C: Mm= 
A: =this one .hh is not an ideal baby either 
3) INTERVALS WITHIN UTTERANCES 
8Atkinson & Heritage (op cit) provide a comprehensive range of notation 
for use with transcript data, however I only required a selection of 
these (which originally also included symbols for visual and non-verbal 
channels). I also incorporated one extra feature used by some 
researchers, marked * 
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Intervals within the flow of talk are timed in tenths of a 
second and given within single parentheses: 
c: so so so she (0.75) she has the children and you look after them 
A pause too short to be timed is indicated using a full stop 
within parentheses: 
c: so so so she (.) she has the children and you look after them 
4) CHARACTERISTICS OF SPEECH DELIVERY 
Extension of a sound or syllable is indicated with a colon 
placed next to the sound or syllable that was extended (more 
colons indicate greater extension) : 
c: so::: so so she she has the children and you look after them 
Emphasis is indicated by underlining: 
c: so so so she she has the children and you look after them 
Aspiration (hhh) and inhalation (.hhh) are indicated by the 
use of a number of letters 'h' placed together (the greater 
the number of letters the longer the inhalation or 
aspiration) : 
c: .hhh so so so she she has the children and you look after them 
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* Where a word appears to have been begun but not completed 
a hyphen is placed at the end of the utterance in question: 
c: to s- see if that would he:l- help me 
Text within square brackets indicates something that was not 
(or could not be) transcribed, which may include details of 
the interactional context and non-verbal characteristics of 
the talk: 
c: well l- yes it is a mother-in-law [laughs] 
5) TRANSCRIPT DOUBT 
Items placed within single parentheses are subject to doubt, 
for example where the utterance could not be heard correctly 
and a best guess is offered. Where no items are given within 
parentheses none of the talk could be discerned: 
c: with my child ( 
[ 
A: who is how old 
6) ELLIPSES AND TRANSCRIPT QUOTATION 
Ellipses are used to indicate that some of the preceding or 
following talk has been omitted, for example when quoting 
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from the original transcripts during the analysis or at the 
end of a single exchange: 
V: good luck to you er Anne Alison thankyou it's er the Monday 
counselling hour ... 
389 
APPENDIX B - TRANSCRIPT DATA 
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TAPE 2: SIDE A: COUNT: 000 
LBC NIGHTLINE 16.3.92 (MONDAY 9-10 PM) 
ALISON MITCHELL 
1C: [Beginning lost] Er (.) yeh hello erm (.) I dunno it's hard 
2 I think (.) I ( ) what I feel I feel as though I really need 
3 someone to talk to 
4 
5A: OK Ann well you've come to the right place 
6 
7C: [laughs] yeh erm (1) it all started a few months ago right 
8 well what it is (.) erm I live I live with a man and erm ( ) 
9 lived with him for what nine nearly ten years now hhh 
10 
11 A: Right 
12 
13C: And we've got two children (.) and like everything's been 
14 going along I mean everyone has their ups and downs (.) which 
15 we did have hh well ( . ) erm it was last october and erm 
16 things started to go really really badly wrong hh well it 
17 turned out I found out he was 'av having an affair (.) erm 
18 this like this young girl she was only twenty 
19 
20A: You you found that out (.) a-at the end of last year you 
21 say 
22 
23C: Yeh and apparently it was only going on for a few weeks but 
24 erm (.) I sort of I sensed that 
25 [ 
26 A: right 
27 
28 (.) there was something going on and erm to tell the truth I 
29 followed him out the pub and I seen him come out (.) and I 
30 just went mad and like we had like this big row hh well 
31 consequently he come back (.) right we're back together but 
32 erm it's just (.J it's just he he's being so nasty he's being 
33horrible hh erm and he's still going down the same pub where 
34 'e met 'er and i fell as though like 'e' s rubbing my nose in 
35 it but then 'e says like ( 
36 
37V: erm Ann we we have a very 
38 small problem erm sorry to interrupt you in full flight but er 
39we were both beginning to struggle a little over the whistles 
40 and everything else to hear what you were saying hh erm so er 
41 what we'll er do is er give Ann a call back and see if we can 
42 get rid of the er coughs and splutters and er explosions and 
43 er bit and pieces which we must sayer erm were disconcerting 
391 
44 to say the least hh and hopefully come back on a non weee wooo 
45 sort of line hhh if you'd like to talk on a non wee woo line 
46hhh 071-973-9733 071-603-1152 and I hope very much that by er 
47 quick dialling Ann we've been able to: clear you so you don't 
48 howl any more 
49 
50 C: Yes hello 
51 
52 V: Super that's better (.) we hope 
53 
54 C: Right 
55 
56 A: Hello Anne I'm sorry I did catch most of what you were 
57 saying hhh did you actually separate for a time after you 
58 discovered (.) the affair did you say 
59 
60 C: Erm well no well it's only like erm I'd say a couple of 
61 days if that that he actually went 
62 [ 
63 A: right yes 
64 
65 C: and then I found out and then (.) the next day he come 
66 round to get some stuff and then he said like (1) erm he 
67 couldn't go like he didn't want to go he didn't want to leave 
68me and he didn't want to leave the children 
69 
70 A: Right 
71 
72C: But as I say like erm well as it happens a week after that 
73 I was rushed into hospital erm I had an operation in hospital 
74hh and erm like everything ( ) it still wasn't right I 
75mean I got a get-well card not hh with I love you it was like 
76erm get well soon the kids are driving me mad sort of thing on 
77 it 
78 
79 A: [laughing] Right 
80 
81 C: And erm I came out of hospital and erm (.) a couple of 
82weeks after that this is going to sound really bad erm (.) me 
83 and me little girl got knocked over by a car 
84 
85A: Oh dear you really have been through it haven't you 
86 
87C: Oh that's nothing I've had s- I've even had worse than so 
88 f- like up till now hhh and (.) it seemed as though like the 
89 weekend was the final straw I mean (.) we both work 
90 
91 A: This 
92 
93 C: 
94 erm he 
is the weekend just passed is it 
[ 
Yeh we both work (.) and 







98 was saying hh he didn't know where 
99 thought I was spending it on like (.) 
100 (I keeping it which) like I wasn't I 
101 him hh he can come shopping with me he 
102 the money hhh but he says no:: (.) 
103 trying to keep money back just to take 




the money was gone he 
just ridiculous things 
mean I've I've said to 
can have the running of 
and I'm convinced he's 




108 whenever we have a row he says you're gonna throw it in me 
109 face so I might as well go now 
110 
111 A: Right ( . ) so he's actually trying to keep the 
112 responsibility firmly in your court hh so as to absolve 
113 himself of any guilt that he might otherwise feel 
114 
115C: Well he did at one time he did tell me (.) that it was my 
116 fault that it happened 
117 
118 A: :M:mm 
119 
120C: That it was all my fault 
121 
122A: Yes hh u- unfortunately we find this all to often (.) and 
123 i-it does seem to be something that particularly men do where 
124 they've been unfaithful and that I can only obviously speak 
125 from my own experience of listening to people hhh but it seems 
126to be this erm peculiar situation that arises where a man er 
127 has been unfaithful hhh and for some reason finds it 
128 impossible to accept the responsibility for that hhh and it's 
129 almost as if he daren't start feeling the guilt (.) because if 
130he does that guilt will overwhelm him hhh and so his initial 
131 i-instinct is to look around to see who else to blame hhh and 
1320f course usually the easiest way erm of getting the guilt and 
133 the blame of him is to put it onto the partner who's actually 
134 accusing him (.) so that if he can make it seem to you like 
135 it is your fault because you failed him in some way or you 
136 haven't been exciting enough or whatever hhh then you will 
137 actually begin to think that (.) and you will do your very 
138 best to win him back 
139 
140 C : [quiet] Yeh but see like a lot of the timeserm see the 
141 kids are getting as well now like erm he takes no notice of 
142 them he won't have nothing to do with them 
143 
144A: But he's still living in the home 
145 
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146 C: Yeh but like I've got the (.) as I say he won't have 
147 nothing to do with the kids I have the kids twenty-four hours 
148 a day hhh 
149 
150 A: Right 
151 
152 C: Apart from well at the moment I'm off sick from work but 
153 erm yeh bu-
154 [ 
155A: Has there ever been any (.) hint from him in the past hhh 
156 erm in in as much as to to give you the responsibility for a 
157 lot of problems in the relationship hhh in in the past 
158 [ 
159C: oh yeh I get everything I 
160 mean he wo he won't 'ave erm (.) nothing I mean he's always 
161 out he is a he's he's not an alcoholic I don- he don- he's a 
162 drinker h- he does drink 
163 
164 A: Right 
165 
166C: hhh and like if there's two pounds in his pocket he'll go 
167 out on it 
168 
169 A: right hhh 
170 
171C: Rather than like sort of ( ) like sort of say here y'are go 
172 and get sort of something for the kids he'd he'd go down the 
l73 pub with it 
174 
175 A: Mmm has he often in your relationship erm either directly 
176 or indirectly hhh given you the impression that that you 
177 should consider yourself lucky that he's around 
178 
179 C: Yeh 
180 
181 A: Mmm I thought that was 
182 I 
183 C: (a couple of times) 
184 
185A: I thought that Was going to come and and that I think is is 
186the real crux of the problem hhh that again it's something 
187 that more often ( . ) happens with men hh it comes really 
188 through hhh an insecurity but is another way of justifying 
189 them in being free to do what ever they want to do hhh and 
190usually these these are men who have been very romantic very 
191 loving (.) in the courtship stage and usually for some time 
192 afterwards hhh and only gradually as responsibility begins to 
193 encroach upon the relationship and that might be 
194 responsibility associated with buying a property or with 
195 children coming into the relationship hh as they begin to feel 
196 a little bit trapped a little bit bogged down with that 
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197 responsibility hhh so thewy start to fight their way out of of 
198 the corner that they feel they're being boxed into and they 
199 will often tend to do this in in quite subtle ways at first 
200hhh and quite small ways in which it is the woman who gets the 
201 blame for most things that go wrong in the relationship and 
202 again that can be in very very small ways hhh it's the woman 
203 who often tends to be given a lot of the responsibilities in 
204the relationship hhh and answerable for things like finances 
205 just as you have been more recently hhh and it will go on to 
206 become these bigger things like for instance if he has an 
207 affair hhh erm somewhere or another that will be twisted 
208around so that it is your fault hhh and it's not even a 
209 question of your expected to forgive him and welcome him back 
210 hhh it's a question of whether or not he can forgive you 
211 enough to come back hhh and that may be what your'e feeling at 
212 the moment (.) is it 
213 
214C: I just feel as though (.) it weren't it weren't I shouldn't 
215 I feel now that I shouldn't have had him back hhh 
216 
217 A: Right 
218 
219 C: [clears throat] and erm (.) because like as I say like (.) 
220 it my he's never been like a romantic type 
221 
222 A: Mhmm 
223 
224 C: right whereas like I am hhh but (.) it seems like ten times 
225 worse now 
226 





I mean I've got a friend here living 
us and erm as it happens like 
[ 
232 A: Right 
233 
234 its his friend hh and he and he's even said like (.) it's it 
235 was now getting beyond a joke 
236 
237A: So he can see that your'e being (.) mistreated 
238 
239 C: Yeh 
240 
241A: Ermm and and that must be therefore something very obvious 
242 for his friend to to feel the need to point it out to you hhh 
243 of course its a huge decision though isn't it hhh you are 
244 talking about erm a huge chunk of your life you're talking 
245 about your children's father hhh erm to make a decision that 
246 eliminates him from the relationship from the family hhh is a 
247 very very big decision isn't it 
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248 
249 C: Yeh 
250 
251A: And not one that I think is easy to make by yourself hh I 
252 think it might be worth your while having a chat with someone 
253hh probably at quite some length maybe over a few sessions hhh 
254 so that you can talk about the whole of your relationship hh 
255as well as what's going on at the moment hhh 
256 
257C: I try to talk to him about it and he just 
258 don't wanna know 
259 
260A: Right and I think that is the difficulty because hh you see 
261 you could go to somewhere like relate hh to talk about your 
262 relationship hh and you could go there by yourself in the 
263 first instance hhh and if through talking you reach a decision 
264 that the relationship has come to the end then perhaps you've 
265 had some help to at least reflect on the relationship in order 
266to help you to reach that decision (.) hhh the other 
267possibility is that through talking hhh you may realise that 
268 that no this relationship really is important to you and its 
269worth saving and you want to save it hhh but then what do you 
270 do after that you have two options available to you but 
271neither of those are your choice to make hhh erm the 
272preferable one of those would involve your partner (.) going 
273 along with you to be counselled with you hh and to help the 
274 two of you to rebuild your relationship hh from what you've 
275 said so far though it doesn't sound like he would be 
276 particularly willing to do this 
277 
278 C: [very quiet] no 
279 
280A: hh and so the your only other option remains if you decide 
281 that you want to stay in the relationship hh that you're going 
282 to at least for the time being hh going to have to stay in it 
283as it is and I think as you say you have to carefully way up 
284 all the factors 'cos you've said that your children are being 
285 adversely affected hh by the atmosphere hh and so you have to 
286 look at which is worse for them is it worse for them to be in 
287 this very difficult situation hh erm with your husband and 
288 you're probably a-at logger heads most of the time hh or would 
289 it be better for them hh erm to be removed ( ) from that 
290 confrontation hh those are decisions that really only you can 
291 make hh but I think you'll benefit from some help in in coming 
292 to those decisions don't you 
293 
294 C: [very quiet] Yeh 
295 
296A: Er I I think hh some counsel would be v e- e- very valuable 
297 to you at this time [ 
298 [ 
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299 C: ) yeh see some of the times I 
300 say to meeself I've had enough I want him to go hh and then i 
301 think look at my financial situation and I can't afford him to 
302 go 
303 
304 A: Right 
305 
306C: And then (.) things'll sort of be alright for a week or so 
307 and then it all goes up again I've even (.) thought about like 
308 sort of finishing it all hhh 
309 
310 A: Mmm 
311 
312 C: like committing suicide but erm (.) then I just think of 
313 the kids 
314 
315 A: Mmm 
316 
317C: (I got) 
318 the family 
319 
I 'ave walked out once and erm oh dear I had all 
'avin a go at me then 
320A: I I think i-it's o-obviously hh a tremendous pressure hh 
321 that you' re living under for things to have got so desperate 
322 that you've even considered taking your own life hh er and 
323 that i think is a situation hh that shouldn't therefore be 
324 allowed to continue hh there are options available to you hh 
325 erm both financial and er in terms of should it become 
326necessary accommodation and so forth hh and i would urge you 
327 Ann to get in touch with hh erm your local citizen's advice 
328 bureau hh and ask them what services and advice are available 
329 locally to help you a-and what benefits and financial 
330 assistance might be available to you and I would urge you to 
331 take that advice before making any decisions ( . ) so that 
332 you're armed with all the facts ( . ) hh erm be-before ( . ) 
333 jumping in at the deep end (.) because I think hhh the the 
334 situation at the moment is so volatile ( .) hh that I think if 
335 you turn around to your partner and say right that's it it's 
336all over go and don't come back hh that that's probably going 
337 to be all he needs isn't it 
338 
339 C: [quiet] Yeh ( 
340 anyway= 
341 
I think I think led go if I said that 
342 A: =Yes hhh so I think that's why you need to be armed with 
343 all your information first hhh before you make a decision hh 
344 you may be worrying about things that you don't need to worry 
345about (1) hh but I think find out exactly what your position 
346 is first= 
347 
348C: [quiet] =yeh 
349 
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350 A: hhh and= 
351 
352 C: = ( like I've said like erm before now like 
353 when we I've suggested splitting up and I've said I've wanted 
354 money for the kild the kids and that (.) 'e said I wouldn't 
355 get nothink' (.) even if it comes to ' im giving up 'is job 
356 'es told me that (.) so that I didn't he didn't have to give 
357me no money 'e would give 'is job up 
358 
359A: Right hh I [mean] again I think that's something worth (.) 
360 certainly consulting with the citizens advice bureau about and 
361 and possibly asking their advice too hh a-about referral to a 
362 solicitor hhh just for information initially hh so that you 
363 can again assess your complete position hhh before confronting 
364 him hhh before making any decisions hh make sure that you have 
365 all of the right advice and i'm not talking about advice like 
366 asking friends and so forth hh I mean taking professional 
367 advice hh about your position before making decisions hh but 
368 yes of course hh the material aspect of it is important you 
369 want to have a roof over your children's head you want to know 
370 that they can be fed hh but you have said that you are working 
371 yourself hhh and so there are ways in which you can be 
372 assisted financially even whilst you are in work to help you 
373 to support your family so there are those options available to 
374 you hh but I think the relationship is far more important than 
375 that hh I-I think it's really more about hh what is going on 
376 between you and your partner hh and how that is affecting the 
377 children hh and I think it's those emotional factors which 
378 really are at the core of this decision that you need to make 
379 hh but it's a lot to work through hh take some time hh 
380 definitely take some advice so that you can be sure that as 
381 and when you reach the decision it's the right one for you 
382 
383V: hhh It's the Monday counselling hour (.) good luck to you 
384 Ann my guest is Alison Mitchell hh a chance for you to talk 
385 over your personal sexual and emotional problems hh if you'd 
386 like to talk through a problem and er get some good sensible 
387 advice hh 071-603-1152 hh 071-973-9733 hh now is a good time 
388 to call we'll update the news for you hh then we'll be back 
389with our counsellor Alison Mitchell hh if you'd like to talk 
390 over a problem (.) get some good advice ( ) this is the 
391 number you need ... 
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Alison Mitchell 
1 V: .hh erm Anne go ahead coincidentally we have an outbreak of 
2 Annes .hh er go ahead to Alison (.) good evening 
3 
4 C: Hello (.) good evening Alison 
5 
6 A: Hello Anne how can I help you 
7 
8 C: Erm (.) i (t) (.) I·· can only enjoy sex with my husband if 
9 he's very rough wi th me 
10 
11 A: Right 
12 
13 C: .hhh a: a otherwise .hh erm I have no .hhh libido if you 
14 can say that for a woman 
15 
16 A: OK 
17 
18 C: whatsoever 
19 
20 A: Right .hhh has that always been the case (.) with your 
21 husband 
22 
23C: Well:: when we were first together (.) sex was (.) 
24 er you knower frequent 
25 
26 A: Right 
27 
28 C: and often 
29 
30 A: Right 
31 
32C: and (.) you know it was not rough but .hhh 
33 
34 A: Passionate 
35 
36 C: Yes 
37 
38 A: right OK 
39 
very 
40C: And gradually as we lived together [clears throat] I think 
41 (of) go off sex . hh 
42 
43 A: Right 
44 
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45C: and one day when we were having sex he wa .hh sort of quite 
46rough (.) and I enjoyed it (.) I didn't tell 'im that 
47 
48 A: Right 
49 
50C: but I did (.) and afterwards (.) when I thought about (2) 
51 sex or (.) sounds awful but when I . hh (1) saw a thing on 
52 television where a woman was being forced to have sex it made 
53me feel .hh (1) turned on 
54 
55 A: OK 
56 
57C: and now .hh it really annoys me 
58 
59A: Alright .hhh is there something that you've been able to 
60 discuss with your husband at all 
61 
62 C: No 
63 
64A: OK so he's completely unaware of any of these feelings .hhh 
65 
66C: As far as I know= 
67 
68 A: =OK can I just ask you roughly how long you've been 
69 together 
70 
71C: fourteen years 
72 
73A: Right OK .hhh first of all I think a couple of reassurances 
74 are in order because I think this is something your feeling 
75 quite upset about .hh a-and perhaps there's no so much need as 
76you're imagining .hh it's quite normal .hh er or .hh perhaps 
77 not normal [laughs] I mean er i-it's all too cornmon I should 
78 say:: .hh for sexual life to deteriorate in couples that have 
79been together for some period of time .hh that is to say that 
80 the initial electricity ( ) that makes the: the sex life 
81 very passionate .hhh often does dwindle (.) with time (.) .hh 
82 now I don't believe that there's [ [ 
83 [
84C: rnm rnm 
85 
86A: any reason why it should do and certainly .hh many couples 
87 are living testimony to the fact that it needn't 
88 
89C: Yeh I I got a book called how to make .hh love with the 
90 same man for the rest of your life 
91 
92 A: Right 
93 
94C: to s-see if that would he:l- help me 
95 
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96A: Right well I think there are some some useful erm tips in 
97 that book .hh that can help you along .hh but I think your 
98 your problem is specific to you and your situation .hh and I 
99 think it's going to take erm both yourself and your husband 
100 .hhh to actually work through this .hh first of all let's take 
lOla brief look at why sex sometimes becomes a bit boring .hhh 0-
102 other sorts of things erm encroach on a relationship for 
103 instance do you have children: 
104 
105 C: m Yes 
106 
107A: Right .hh usually that that's the biggest problem erm that 
108 hits a sex life i-in a relationship usually because of 
109 tiredness sleepless nights .hh erm being too occupied .hh 
110 
111C: Yeh my son's sort of quite grown up 
112 
113A: Right .hhh now that that's what hits it in the early days 
114 but something else happens which is more of a psychological 
115nature .hh which relates to the fact that most of us were not 
116 aware as youngsters of our parents having a sex life (.J 
117 
118 C: :Mmm 
119 
120 A: .hhh and so what happens is that very deep i-in our 
121 subconscious is rooted the belief that parents don't have sex 
122 
123 C: :Mmm 
124 
125 A: .hhh and so there are bigger psychological changes that 
126 take place and this I find tends to happen especially in women 




131A: .hhh that once they have had children and especially once 
132 they feel that their family is complete (.J 
133 
134 C: Yeh er well mine is 'cos I had to have a hysterectomy= 
135 
136A: =Right .hh and that mayor may not be: i i: through choice 
137 that their family is complete but once they they know it is 
138 complete . hh they almost feel as if erm not only that they 
139 needn't have sex any more .hh but almost that they shouldn't 
140 (1 J have sex any more . hh 
141 
142 C: :Mmm 
143 
144A: as if there is something somehow wrong somehow dirty about 
l45having sex .hhh that it's OK while you can justify it for 





150 A: but once the you've passed that stage of your life and 
151 you've had your children .hh th:: women do get some very 
152 deeply rooted psychological hang-ups about sex .h and that's 
153 one of the reasons why: erm some of that electricity can 
154 dwindle of course that's only looking at the woman's side it 
155does happen to an extent in men as well .hh and I think also 
156 you become .hh very much more comfortable with each other you 
157become very much like. hh erm deep friends or as often been 
158 said brother and sister so that a sexual relationship 
159 sometimes doesn't even seem quite so appropriate: within the 
160 relationship (.) so there are all kinds of reasons erm and and 
161also .h whilst in the early days when there was a frequency of 
162 the sexual relationship .hh erm there there was .hh erm the 
163 excitement of the variety er of the the sex that you were 
164 enjoying together .hh but as with most things: when you get on 
165 in spending your years together things become erm a a little 
166 erm more regular you know there's less variety there's less 
167 excitement .hh so there Ire all those kinds of things .hhh the 
168 other thing erm to reassure you on .hh that it is also quite 
169 common for women to be turned on by erm what you describe as a 
170 rough erm sexual situation .hh now it it might be worth for a 
171moment just taking a look at .hh what you're meaning by rough 
172because at one point in our conversation .hh we spoke of the 
173 possibility of transposing the word rough .hh for passionate 
174 
175 C: Yeh 
176 I 
177A: and of course the two can in certain ways be quite similar 




182A: that's why I'd like to look at what you're actually meaning 
183 by .hh rough (.) are you talking about very passionate very 
184 desiring .hh or or are you talking about something different 
185 
186C: Yeh it's not (2) .hhh sorry it's v: I find it very 
187 embarrassing 
188 
189 A: OK Don't worry 
190 I 
191 C: to talk (1) to say .h you knower that er it 
192 turns me on when he: ( .5) it's not passionate it is rough 
193 
194A: Right (.5) OK .hh again that is quite a normal erm 
195 experience it's got it certainly .hh a a very much more normal 
196 fantasy (.75) for women. hh than than most would admit to (1) 
197 . hh 
402 
198 
199C: 'COS I I fell that .hh you know (.) it's not nice when a 
200 woman gets raped 
201 
202 A: Right 
203 
204C: and to be turned on by sex that's very rough 
205 
206 A: right= 
207 
208 
209 C: =seems to me: (1) somehow not right 
210 
211 A: OK • hh well let's take a look at the differences between 
212 what your'e talking about which is your husband making love to 
213 you roughly .hh and a woman being raped .hh the the two are 
214 actually quite quite different .hh and I'm I'm sure that erm 
215 you along with most women who could and would enjoy .hh very 
216 rough sex with their partner . hh would not want to be in a 
217 situation of a woman being raped in the sense that we tend to 
218 think of that where a woman .hh erm is not interested does not 
219 want mayor may not know the person .hh erm but is definitely 
220 not consenting (.) to that act [ 
221 [ 
222 C: (but) sometimes 
223 I pretend that I don't want it 
224 
225 A: Right but you are pretending and that's what makes the 
226difference .hh you are talking about the same kind of act .hh 
227 but within the safety and security of your relationship 
228 
229C: .hh 'cos it is it is a secure relationship we have 
230 
231 A: Mrrun 
232 
233C: No 'es a wonderful husband 
234 
235 A: Right 
236 
237 C: and 'es you know 'es ( .) everything he helps round the 
238 house he he (.) doesn't leave me short of money .hh you know 
239all things like this est 'es brilliant he works hard an' it's 
240 not as if [ 
241 [ 
242 A: Right 
243 
244 C: it's a (.) t-transient (.) thing you it's a [ 
245 [ 
246A: Right s:: so as you say: you feel very safe in 
247 that relationship .hh and that makes it quite different .hh 
248 from what you speak about when you say about a woman being 
403 
249 raped which is a very very different situation . hhh (.5) I 
250 think .h that one of the main problems that I see: is that 
251 whatever else has happened in your relationship over the years 
252 .hh there have become .hh erm some communication barriers: I 
253 think 
254 
255 C: Mrnm 
256 
257 A: becaus-e it sounds like . hh you and your husba.nd-- don't 
258 discuss your sexual life (.) very much at all 
259 
260 C: No we cton' t he.Galls.-E~_ _hh when I we.n.:L off sex.- I found it 
261 difficul t to . hh you know: we did it what I broke down in 
262 tears one day . hh 
263 
264 A: Right 
265 
266C: and said to lim I'm sorry it's not that I don't love you 
267 .hh I just am not interested in in sex 
268 [ 
269 A: Right 
270 
271C: it doesn't I can't get (1) to be crude worked up any more 
272 
273A: Right and when was that 
274 
275C: that was about three years ago before I had my hysterectomy 
276 
277 A: Right .hhh 
278 
279C: and he said tha-
280 [ 
281 A: was that because of the way that you were feeling in 
282 your own health at that time: or 
283 [ 
284 C: no I just wasn't interested it didn't 
285 .hh (.) you know 
286 [ 
287A: Right.h so maybe for the same psychological reasons that 
288we were discussing earlier .h but now you've found something 
289 that rekindles:: 
290 
291C: Yeh (1) that's it 
292 [ 
293A: .hh your interest .hh and I (.5) would expect that that's 
294 something that your husband would be very pleased to hear (1) 
295 . hh but of course it's how you actually speak to him about 
296 this and I think the answer to that has to be by degrees .hh I 
297 think that before you can actually maybe openly tell him 
298 everything that you've told me tonight .hh you have to first 
2990f all build up some kind of communication channels (.) about 
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300 your sexual life (.) .hh and I think that that's something 
301 that is maybe going to take some time . hh and I think can 
302 start with telling him just as you go along .hh what you like 
303what you're enjoying .hh and (.) if he is being in some way 
304 .hh erm passionate but not as as rough as you have enjoyed him 
305 to be .hh then encourage him to be more passionate actually 
306 actually tell him 
307 
308 C: MIn 
309 [ 
310A: at the time .hhh that's when its much easier to discuss sex 
311 I mean we . hh british are so cool t' s very difficult out of 
312 the bedroom (.) for us to discuss our sex lives 
313 
314 C: Yes= 
315 
316A: =.hhh but in the heat of the moment (.) you can let some of 
317 your inhibitions go (.) .hhh and 
318 I 
319 C: Yes 
320 
321A: that's the time to start encouraging him in the the things 
322 that you would like to do more 
323 
324 C: Yeh 
325 
326A: .hhh and I think that's beginning then to help you both to 
327 communicate to each other .hh and it's also helping to 
328 establish .hh a closer relationship all round because (.) I 
329 suspect that after the time that you've been together if there 
330 are communication barriers they probably not just about your 
331 sexual life .hh there are possibly some other areas where you 
332 find it difficult to communicate at a deep level .hh an and 
333maybe some of that has come through sexual tensions that have 
334 built over the years .hhh and particularly over these past few 
335 years that you've mentioned 
336 
337 C: Yeh 
338 
339A: .hhh but I think be assured (1) that your'e feelings are 
340not uncommon (1) .hhh they are (.) not wrong .hh unless (.5) 
341unless [laughs] well I would only say unless they were wrong 
342 in [ 
343 [ 
344 C: (Well) 
345that t s a relief to start with 
346 
347A: your situation (.5) to you and to your husband 
348 
349 C: Yeh I've always been of the belief that whatever you do 
350 together isn't wrong (.) you know it doesn't matter what it is 
405 
351i::if if two people agree in (.5) you know two people agree to 
352 [ 
353A: Well I would absolutely agree w~th that 
354 
355 C: summ'ing then it doesn't matter what anybody else does then 
356 [ 
357 A: Yes 
358 
359 C: i-it's not wrong 
360 
361 A: Well that's right I think i-if it just the two people 
362 involved and they both agree .hh erm then then fine 
363 
364 C: that's it 
365 
366A: .hh an and that's what I think you've got to work out in 
367 the relationship because I think what's troubling you a little 
368 bit at the moment .hhh i-is that this is a secret enjoyment 
369 that you have . hh and one that's likely to be limited until 
370 such time as you can share your pleasure .hh with your husband 
371 .hh 
372 
373 C: Yeh 
374 
375A: erm because he's not a mind-reader erm .hh it might even be 
376 worth mentioning to him at some stage oh do you remember that 
377 time when we made love and you were .hh so much more 
378 passionate than usual 
379 
380 C: Yeh 
381 
382A: well I really enjoyed that then i mean it can be a simple 
383 as that .hh just dropping the hints to him so that he can know 
384 how to act to please you which I'm sure he has the desire to 
385 do 
386 
387 C: Oh he does (1) Yeh .hhh (oh:) I feel a bit better [laughs] 
388 
389 A: good= 
390 
391 C: =speaking to you 
392 
393A: .hh well I think the the other thing just to remember .hh 
394 is always try to keep everything in perspective . hh I think 
395it's probably true to say .hh that this roughness .hh has erm 
396 rekindled some sexual drive in you 
397 
398 C: Yeh 
399 
400A: that had been lacking for some time 
401 
406 
402 C: Yeh 
403 
404A: .hh that doesn't necessarily mean .h that the only way in 
405 which you can gain sat sexual gratification from now is to 
406make love in this rough way what it does mean is this this is 
407 the key that has done the rekindling . hh and it's something 
408 that you're always likely to enjoy .hh 1 would urge you 
409 however: .hh not to tell yourself that that is the only way 
410 you can enjoy making love .hh because 1 think there you'd be 
411 limiting yourself . hh 1 think you'll find that once . h erm 
412 through these means however you can rekindle a more regular 
413more satisfying sex life .hh 1 think you can begin then .hh to 
414 look for and to enjoy the sort of variety that you had in your 
415 love making some years ago 
416 
417 C: OK then 
418 
419 A: Alright 
420 
421 C: Thankyou very much= 
422 
423A: =1 do hope that helps you= 
424 
425 V: =good luck to you er Anne Alison thankyou it's er the 
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DR. ANTHONY FRY 
V: .hhh Belinda how do you think Anthony might be able to help 
C: oh I hope he can= 
V: =well (1) give 'im a go 
[ 
A: =hello Belinda [ 
[ 
C: hello .hh give 'im a go 
V: yes 
C: right well my problem is erm it's a grandmother [clicks 
tongue] I have= 
A: =not a mother-in-law 
C: well i-yes it is a mother-in-law [laughs] 
[ 
A: a grandmother-in-law 
C: a grandmother-in-law 
A; and a mother-in-law at the same time 
[ 
C: 
it's the whole 
grandmother 
and well it's yes it's the whole 
in-law family .hhh or basically [laughs] 
A: [laughs] so (.5) not another music hall joke I hope 
[ 
C: 
really quite serious actually 
no no no ( it's) 
[ 
[ 
A: no a 
serious one) (1) yeh sorry belinda 
C: .hhh erm [laughs] .hh the: I (was) I've been married erm 
five years to this to the son and erm basically he always got 
rewarded for his bad behaviour to keep the peace and not to 
let the child see and all the rest of it. hh he's never 
accepted the consequences of his actions he's .hh one of these 





















































never did anything with liter without you standing with a rod 
over him .hh now erm 
A: sorry who is this Belin 
[ 
c: my husband sorry husband= 
A: =he didn't do anything if you didn't (.5) press him 
c: well I mean he's he's literally he he just is like a spoilt 
everything is a tantrum .hh erm he would use 
[ 
A: I see he he the way he exercises power 
in a marriage is by blowing up 
C: yeh and well and and threatening to wake the child if you 
[ 
A: right 
don' t give him sex and blah blah blah and al-all literally 
totally to the end till it got to the point where erm I had to 
actually it was getting really violent and I had to actually 
.hh erm get help to get him away from me 
A: so he actually then became violent towards you 
[ 
C: Oh: yeh (I 
A: 
from tantrums and blackmail to to violence 
[ 
so it escalated 
C: well it would have got violent before 
if I'd never given in 
A: and are you still with this man 
[ 
C: I used to give in .hhh oh no no I actually had to 
make myself homeless I've now if it hadn't 've been without 
friends I would have literally gone ( 
A: 
C: 
yeh I (did) 
[ 
A: with your child 
C: with my child ( 
[ 
[ 
so y- you you ran away or you escaped 
[ 
I literally 





















































c: she's three and a half I literally ran away friends were 
[ 
A: right 
wonderful .hh erm while he was at work [laughs] they they lent 
me a a lorry and I got most of my stuff out like and I they 
put me up an' 
A: a sort of Thelma and Louise: with a difference 
[ 
c: it was wond yeh and I'm now 
on income support erm housing benefit I've found myself a 
lovely place (.) wonderful erm but the problem is the 
grandmother now now I have never 




w-with with your m with your mother-in-law 
[ 
C: she wants ev- yeh (.5) she wants everything to be hunky-
dory .hh she will not accept my husband actually told his 
solicitors that I had staged the whole thing just to get rid 
of him 
A: so what's her line to you what's bugging her 
[ 
c: 
he's never hurt her 
(he's) 
A: 
her line to me is .hh that erm oh 




defending him she can't see anything wrong 
[ 
c: she can- I didn't expect anything 
else .hh but what I'm saying is I'm never going to let him 
have unsupervised contact while she's so young this is a man 
who's never done anything for her at all without 
A: for your daughter 
c: yah for my daughter never done anything I mean she looks to 
[ 
A: 
me for everything .hh but I've hidden everything from her so 
.hh when we first split up I kept I didn't see him for about a 
month .hh and then she asked after him so I said right would 





















































A; this is your daughter 
C; yeh= 
A; =and how old is she 
c; three and a half 
A: now try let me try and focus you a bit because your telling 
[ 
c: MIn 
me a story (1) no your not doing anything wrong .hh but what 
[ 
c: sorry 
you've gotta do is ask me a question= 
c: =right well the (pro-) 
[ 
A: what is the problem what do you want me to 
help you with Belinda 
[ 
c: well the problem is is the grandmother's attitude this 
man is totally unsuitable . hh er incapable of looking after 
her at all .hh 




A: =1 see= 
why can't he bring her 
c: =the thought of her alone with him for three and a half 
hours on the motorway fills me with absolute horror I mean his 
attention span (.5) I think there's something wrong with him 
but I mean I'm not a doctor but his attention span is about 
half an hour [ 
[ 
A: Belinda you (1) you sound like somebody 
who, likes to please people and who doesn't like to let them 
down and I think what we've got in here hidden away in this 
[ 
c: [sighs] 























































as guilt .hh you feel (.75) guilty about the grandmother (y-) 
[ [ 
c: I don't (want to) terribly 
yes you feel your letting her down .hh you fee-
[ 
c: I've I've said I'll take her down 
there 
A: yes= 
c: =why can't he bring her down 
A: yes yes= 
c: =and I say your joking (wha-
her to the 100 or or [ 
[ 
supposing he wants to take 
A: well well th- th- this this is a 
the is an issue of not going .hh on being Mrs. Nice for the 
rest of your life .hh and that sometimes 
[ 
c: see the grandmother threatens to have 
a nervous breakdown on me [ 
[ 
A: no no no but 
this is upsetting you isn't it when I say to you don't be 
nice to somebody you get a bit cross with me and you say well 
I want to go on being nice .hh sometimes in life .hh truth has 
to take precedence over niceness now that is a very important 
guiding principle .hh 
c: yeh 
A: there are many people who spend .hh months or even years 
lying to other people because 
[ 
c: yeh 
they see the overriding priority is to be nice .hh now if you 
always sacrifice truth in pursuit [ 
[ 
c: yeh when you 
of niceness you end up with a whole load of lying people now 
.hh I don't want to make it 
[ 
c: well this is my problem I I 






















































many comments about our society .hh 
c: yeh 
A: but we are becoming increasingly superficially nice .hh and 
[ 
C: you see 
that's not my way ( 1) mmm that's not my way if you met the 
mother you'd know why the son is like he is [ 
[ 
the price of that is dishonesty [ 
[ 
A: well 
A: well there you are there you are 
[ 
C: you see at christmas erm my daughter was 
running up to my husband and hitting him running up to the 
grandmother and hitting her and then coming up and giving me a 
cuddle now if that's not a statement I don't know what is .hh 
and I ( ) [ 
[ 
A: well little 
children are brilliant at seeing through all this nonsense 
aren't they 
C: 
was keeping everything very happy 
[ 
and I 
very very happy I thought 
A: MIn 
I'd I'd done extremely well ( 
[ 
A: Belinda think what it means to you: 
to someti-
[ 
C: see she loves to see her grandmother because her 
grandmother is really basically a present machine (.75) and I 
don't did I ought to to to oh I (just) .hh 
A: go on say something nasty 
[ 
C: did I ought (1) did I ought to: (.5) cut the 
contact with that side of the family 
A: well the problem is the problem is this no matter how bad 
[ [ 
C: it's not I mean they're 





















































listen listen .hh no matter how bad the other side is the 
other side are half your daughter's family 
c: Mmm and she loves them 
[ 
A: and she's going to turn round to you when she's seven or 
eight or nine and say mum 
C: yeh yeh 
(.5) where's my dad where's my gran why don't I ever see them 
and you're then going to have to face her and this is the 




.hh (1) what do you owe your child now clearly if there's 
[ 
C: you see this is relatively new to me 
somebody abusing your child or being violent to them .hh then 
[ [ 
C: well I've seen ( yeh 
maybe on the balance of probabilities you are doing your child 
a better turn (.5) by (.75) sparing the contact (.5) but 
[ [ 
C: MIn no (they) 
otherwise I think you have got to keep the link 
C: yeh but under my ow under my terms 
A: on your terms 
C: on my terms .hh right I've gotta (take) I've gotta bite the 





well er but well Belinda (.5) yes but but 
[ 
[ 
because they get so emotional 
Belinda you might have to bite a bigger bullet than you 
realise because no: .hh er you can't have contact on he can't 
have contact on your terms 
C: I spoke to a social worker at a family unit and he said he 
























































ever has unsupervised contact (with the child) 
[ 
V: well there you go but you see it 
wouldn't be the social worker's decision .hh would it Belinda 
because the [ 
[ 
c: no 
picture you've painted of this ex-husband of your .hh er is 
that he's going to be properly legally advised and he is going 
to knower that despite you saying no he can still make 
application for contact [ 
[ 
c: oh he 
is (he keeps) well I'm not stopping contact 
V: no 
c: because my daughter will obviously make up her own mind as 
she grows up but I say supervised and he just keeps saying oh 
well I'll take you to court .hh and I just say well fine to 
(it) [ 
[ 
V: fine but but no that's what I was 
saying to you you do realise that don't you Belinda that that 
the decision will [ 
[ 
C: yeh 
not be made by your lawyer or his lawyer 
made by an independent .hh group of 
C: 
three people in a court somewhere 
[ 
C: Mm Mm 
[ 
V: Mm 
C: yes I realise (just 
[ 




V: and you might even have a bigger bullet to bite 
because you will sit at the back of the court stunned .hh when 
they say to the best of our ability and that's all it can be 























































and I'm warning you it happens Belinda .hh er to the best of 
our ability we have come to this [ 
[ 
c: [groans] 
decision .hh and whatever decision is reached one side or the 
other's gonna hate it .h I'm just 
[ 
C: yeh 
warning you Belinda it could be you= 
A: =they are going to lean over backwards you see to respect 
the rights of both parents because they take the view the 
child needs [ 
C: yeh 
both parents so unless you can show 
[ 
C: Oh yes she needs to know she's got a daddy= 
A: =unless you can show something really dreadful you're gonna 
have a hard job but .hh a 
[ 
C: (er) 
little bit more (.5) assertion and truth would help your case 




A: OK belinda 
C: [laughing] thank you 
A: nice to talk to you 
[ 
C: thank you very much 
V: yes it er your suggesting 
Belinda nasty there niceness 
don't like dishonest niceness 
bit of 
A: 
there should be a little bit of 
is actually very pleasant you 
(1) so there must be a little 
[ 
[ 
that's right we 
Belinda nasty have I understood what you've said correctly 
[ 
416 
452 A: w- absolutely Robbie we can we can 




















difficulty .hh if we don't ever tell them the truth in pursuit 
[ 
V: 'course we can 
of being nice to them 
[ 
that's why I keep telling my friend the reason 
people don't like him is 'cos he's ugly .hh but I say to him 
but I still love you [laughs] and he now understands he is now 
he is now [ 
[ 
A: [laughs] 
fully recovered after years of sadness . hh Linda you have 










































TAPE 1: SIDE B: COUNT 335 
LBC NIGHTLINE 11.5.92 (SATURDAY 12-12.45 a.m.) 
DR. ANTHONY FRY 
V: Go ahead to Dr Anthony Fry Charles 
C: Er Hello, I'm just er wondering if er erm what I'm feeling 
at the moment is is normal given the circumstances erm I'm I'm 
currently in 
[ 
A: what are you feeling Charles (.) we're we're running a 
C: 
bit short of time 
[ 
Erm nothing 
C: Very very little erm 
A: 
triggered this off Charles 
after 
C: 
is there anything which has 




A: a traumatic event of some kind 
c: Well erm s-several things come to mind I was made redundant 
(in) December started working for myself (.) my wife fell 
pregnant soon after and my grandfather died about three weeks 
ago 
A: .hhh well I mean you're quite right (.) you ask about this 
and I want to:: reassure you ( ) that's hardly reassurance 
which is to say that (.) when people are overloaded by emotion 
and pain and difficulty there is something which in a way just 
swi tches off inside them hh and we see it in people who've 
survived accidents (.) people who've been in road crashes and 
so on and so forth and I would guess that you're just so 
bewildered by all these things happening at once you you don't 
know what to feel erm you don't know whether to feel angry 
with the people who've made you redundant hh bewildered at 
your wife becoming pregnant at this (.) strange time or grief 
at your grandfather's loss hh is it something like that 
41 C: Erm I dunno ( 
42 
) the pregnancy was planned 




















































c: Erm ( but there was personally a lot of pressure (.) 
on me (.) for that (.) I felt anyway 
A: So you feel a bit resentful about that as well 
[ 
C: I dunno I'm 
quite excited in a way and apprehensive in another but erm 
A: Charles the old psychiatrists and some of the modern ones 
too:: say that when you can't work out what you're feeling or 
what's going on you look into your dreams hh and see if 
there's any recurrent theme or dream do you have dreams 
Charles 
C: Er yeh but er 
A: what are they like 
C: Erm hh recently not (.J I can't remember them and most of 
the time they follow a good structure and erm I they have a 
story (.) most of them but erm recently er its been hh erm 
forgetful shall we say 






C: I don't know really 
I suppose 
A: You sound a bit fed up to me as I 
talk to you now 
C: Erm (1) well 
[ 
A: Just kind of 
[ 
C: I'm not really erm I mean I used to be 




C: I don't 
like doing it (.) er sort of try and hide a lot I suppose 





















































c: Well hh erm in some ways (.) well I don't know to be honest 







confused (.) a bit lost 
[ 
c: panicked a bit er erm (.) lost 
yeh that's a good one 
A: Lost your sense of control and and being master of your own 
life 
c: Er yeh definitely 
A: :Mmm and somehow 




got to start putting that back 
c: well I'm finding it very difficult to 
concentrate on on my work (.) I'm finding a lot of excuses to 
do other things and er er I know I'm doing it but I can't help 
iter sort of waiting to the last minute to do things and 
stuff 
A: I know we're always sort of throwing out the idea of 
counselling and talking is there any close friend who you 
could go and really confide in and really talk to 
c: Erm 
[ 
A: I mean you've gotta get control of your life again even in 
a very small way (.) set up a daily routine ( .) do things 
write out lists begin to become master of your own life again 
c: Er I do write lists out but then they sort of get 
ignored ( ) 
[ 
A: You just feel to:: do you feel very miserable I mean are 
you do you think you're depressed on top of all this or in you 
know 
c: I really don't know I don't know what I feel I don't f I at 
the moment I (.) the last week or couple of weeks I haven't 





see I think it's the way you're talking now you're 
in a way:: this call and our:: short discussion shows 
hh you want to ( ) you want to get in there and sort 
and I think hh I hesitate to always go for some 
420 
145 counselling but even six sessions of sitting down (.) trying 
146 to get in there I think you've got to get in there and sort 
147 this and sort this out and find out what's going on underneath 
148 
149 R: Anthony thank you for being so short (.) Charles our 
150 apologies to you but we'd completely run out of time ... 
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TAPE 1 SIDE B COUNT 211 
LBC NIGHTLINE (SATURDAY 11.5.93 12-12.45 a.m.) 
DR ANTHONY FRY 
1 V: We're joined by George (.) go ahead to Anthony George (.) 
2 good evening 
3 
4 C: Hi (.) good evening to you (.) erm good evening doctor 
5 
6 A: Hello George 
7 
8 C: Erm I've got an unusual situation perhaps not so unusual 
9 for yourself (.) my wife and myself have twenty years 
10 difference between us (.) and what happened (.) when I first 
11 met her she was a very timid girl er I am forty one she's 
12 twenty one and I've known her about four years (.) now the 
13 situation is I found out in the course of talking to her that 
14 she had been abused by her father and that is why she was so 
15 timid er (.) she got learning difficulties (.) and I bought 
16 [sic] her out of her shell a lot and gave her the confidence 
1 7 to be a woman but I've all thetime I've advised her go and 
18 see a psychiatrist who's somebody who's properly trained, she 
19 says no no you've done a good job and all this lot (.) and the 
20 situation is (.) when the pressure of the court came along she 
21 grew more and more distant from me and (.) at the court she 
22 said that hh 
23 [ 
24 V: What court are you talking about George you you 
25 
26 C: This is a high court 
27 
28 V: Yes but you (.) this court has suddenly arrived in the 
29 middle of your conversation 
30 












V: You see assumed knowledge 
what 
C: 
V: you're talking about and we 
there 






( . ) 
Anthony needs to understand 






















































high court George 
fairly 
So why why (0.5) why did we end up in the 








V: (and) thank you very much and then we're in the 
high court why 
[ 
c: yeh what happened is that she had the courage to take her 
father to court (.) erm after you know talking through and 
building up her courage and she got her father to court and 
there was a conviction 
V: Yes but that wouldn't have bin' in the high court though 
c: Erm (.) it was ultimately 'cos originally went to a 
magistrates and then it went to high court 
V: Yeh crown court you mean 
c: Crown court sorry yeh 
V: (yep) er cos' one associates high court with appeals you 
see but 
[ 
c: Oh I see 
V: and er often very expensive civil matters which is why I 
was [ 
[ 
c: Ah right 
V: temporarily confused 
[ 
C: [laughs] 
V: Alright so it went to a higher court and he was er 
convicted of abusing her 
c: That's correct 
























































V: Oh you see you didn't tell us this George 
[ 
c: 
V: No (.) no no so 
you've married her 
c: Yeh 
V: So this shrinking violet became your wife 
C: That's correct 
V: Was it during the marriage that you were able to encourage 
her and help her build her confidence 
C: Er 
V: Or was it before the marriage 
[ 
c: It was before and during the marriage 
V: Fine (.J and was it during the marriage the she plucked up 
courage to (.) er complain about her father's behaviour or 
during the marriage 
C: That was during the marriage because what actually happened 
she originally tried to get registered erm with her reading 
difficulties and her learning difficulties she trying to get 
registered as disabled (.J and it cropped up in conversation 
wi th the social worker (.) and from there the social worker 
contacted the police you know 
V: MInhmm 
C: But as a result what has happened (.J after the conviction 
and that my wife (.) has grown apart from me because the 
pressure of the court case I felt (.J at the time (.) and er 
she announced at the (.) just bef erm about m- middle of march 
that she wanted to divorce me 
A: George 
C: Hello 




143 A: Robbie's been asking you a couple of questions (.) do you 
144 think George that you put a lot of pressure on her to take her 
145 father to court 
146 
147 C: No not me personally 
148 
149 A: W- (.) who do you think put the pressure on her 
150 
151 C: I think what actually happened when she went to get 
152 registered are you there 
153 
154 A: Yes (.) yeh 
155 
156 C: Yeh there was a click sorry (.) when she went to get 
157 registered at social services and be (.) it came up in 
158 conversation (.) that she'd been abused er when she spoke to 
159 the social worker (.) I feel them from there when they, put 
160 the the you know other police on to her to talk to her (.) I 
161 feel that the pressure started building from that side 
162 
163 A: You see obviously the details are difficult but I just 




168 A: but one of the things I would go for immediately is to ask 
169 whether (0.5) she feels in some way now guilty having taken 
170 her father to court this sounds very complicated but the 
171 problem in so much of this abuse is that the child (.) the 
172 child er loves the parent or in in any way wants the parent to 
173 be a good and special parent (.) and at the same time is angry 
174 and wants justice and so they end up in away punishing and 
175 almost if you like destroying the person they love (.) now 
176 ( ) very often abuse victims get very very confused because 
177 they've been done a terrible wrong but at the same time if 
178 they (.) seek justice they can wipe out the person (.) who 
179 they care about and respect now (.) I just wonder if your wife 
180 is in a great turmoil a muddle about all of that 
181 
182 C: [technical problem] me responsible but ( 
183 [ 
184 V: Sorry George we missed 
185 what you said (.) beginning of your sentence you said 
186 
187 C: yes I said I do feel she is holding me responsible probably 
188 because I got her out of the shell you know (.) out of her (.) 
189 er quiet little ways well erm 
190 [ 
191 A: If she finds you responsible the only thing 
192 you can do is to try and explore it with her erm and hope that 





















































out and ending the marriage she can actually tell you about it 
now if she can it may be that there is (.J there is a chance 
to repair the relationship 
[ 
c: Well I certainly wish to repair the 
relationship but I've said to her could she go and see 
somebody like a counsellor or a a ( J or anybody who's 
prepared to try and see it and she is very very scared for 
some reason I don't know why of of psychiatric counselling erm 
you know I think she's ( J the old stigma it's a rubber room 
and straightjackets job 
A: Well er I can only back you on this and say that I think if 
she could get counselling it would be very helpful and that 
the best thing in my view be that you went together because I 
think there is clearly a problem between you 
C: That's right 
A: about about the er this er about the problem 
C: I I've heard it on very very good authority today that my 
wife and my best friend are having an affair now I suppose 
this might be as a reaction against me (.J to spite me I don't 
know 
V: I tell you what George you know you said er well hill Anthony 
was suggesting you both went to see counsellors (.J George it 
might help you if you go to see a counsellor separately and 
perhaps get er your thoughts going along the same road and not 
sort of turning left and turning right er because I think 
there's a lot of hidden anger in you er and when you talk 
about counsellors and you have confidence in them erm from 
what you've said I think a counsellor would do you the world 
of good (. J on a one to one basis with so much going on in 
along complicated story does that make sense to you Anthony 
(.J you're the professional (.J I know it does 
A: I think ( 0 . 75 J I think 
muddle and I'm not surprised 
go on his own but 
V: 
george is obviously in a great 




A: I think even better would be (.J the two of them together 
and really let's have these issues out in the open I think (.J 
George is very angry he thinks he's done a lot to help his 
wife he's been kicked in the teeth (.J and I think his wife's 
very angry they're both angry people and they're expressing it 
in different ways and we've gotta get that anger out on the 
table ... 
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TAPE 1: SIDE A: COUNT 000-096 
L.B.C NIGHTLINE 11:5:92 (SATURDAY 12-12.45 A.M.) 
DR. ANTHONY FRY 
1 A: Hello John 
2 
3 C: Ye: h Good evening (. ) hhh mm I heard you were talking 
4 earlier about ( . ) er obsessive behaviour I'm beginning to 
5 wonder whether I may fall in that category [laughs] actually 
6 (.) er mm (.) I I'll try and keep it brief anyway= 
7 
8 A: =OK John 
9 
10 C: =mm (.) about two years (.3) I'm forty nine years old (.) 
11 I've been divorced for some fifteen years hh (.5) and live on 
12 my own obviously 
13 
14 A: Right 
15 
16 C: Erm (.5) about two years ago I (1) got involved with a 
17 young lady who:: at the time was nineteen which was a 
18 ridiculous thing to start with hhh erm:: I knew her about a 
19 week and she started putting pressure on me for engagements 
20 and weddings and so on and so forth hh to which I hh promptly 
21 not (.) (sort of err) gave into quickly .hhh 
22 





28 er (.) bit cautious 
29 
30 C: Yes= 
31 
32 A: =Yes= 
33 
No I did not (.5) no no 
[ 
You didn't (.) you got a bit 
34 C: =Ermm (.6) which resulted in tremendous pressure being put 
35 on me by her (.) in various ways (.) hhh which (went off) (.) 
36 you know disappearing one month so on and so forth .hhh err 
37 (.) in its conclusion hh she told me she tried to (1) to err 
38 commit suicide and this sort of stuff which really left me 
39 rather bewildered .hh er again she then disappeared and I 
40 haven't seen her for a year hhh erm I do find out through the 
41 grapevine now that having been out with various men of my age 





















































sixty and she's known him three weeks and managed to actually 
persuade him (1) to give her an engagement ring so that she's 
officially engaged hhh erm hh the problem I have is dealing 
with this in as much that hhh erm (0) it's it's nothing to do 
with me in one sense but at the same time I do have a strong 
feelings for her and I don't Know whether I should say 
something or not (0) if you see what I mean 
[ 
A: You you're in a state of 
conflict John because part of you says this was a lovely girl 
[ 
c: Yes 
or a nice friendship and I'd like to be friends with her and 
part of you hh P picks up intui ti vely hh ermm a a sense of 
fear (0) this is too much pressure this isn't the way 
relationships ought to go is that (0) is that really what's 
going on 
c: Not only that but I I I feel judging by the (1) the erm 
urgency of of her dilemma hh erm that she's very vulnerable 
(0) and I think she's been taken advantage of 
A: ohh I see you're worried that this elderly man might be 
taking advantage of her= 
C: =Yes for reasons for reasons of his own err (0) loneliness 
or whatever hhh and 
[ 
A: John John why should'nt you go and talk to her (0) 
what what what worries you about doing that= 
[ 
C: ohhh 
C: =well I have actually written se:veral letters (0) erm she 
li ves at home with her parents I've tried contacting them I 
haven't said anything because I didn't think (that) it was my 
place I hhh I came to the conclusion their not even aware of 
it hhh erm basically she doesn't respond (0) if I try and talk 
to her becau:: er for various reasons er which hh you know she 
hasn't given me really any explanations about any of er (0) 
she doesn't really owe me any I suppose hhh and I I'm fearful 
in falling in one side into o:bsessive behaviour and and hh 
putting you know pressure on her to communicate with me when 
she doesn't want to hh while at the same time 0 hh trying to 
(1) trying to sort of erm demonstrate my concern in a positive 
way and it (as though) 
[ 






















































c: Well not [laughs] not the disorder but I 
I give in to:: hh what I would like to do 
compulsive er situation for me which ( 
[ 
I feel if I do: if 
it could become a 
) 
R: You mean you could get hooked 
on this young lady John 
C: Well I I I did it could come up to the point of harassment 
if she does not want to respond to me 
[ 
R: .hh no but you said (.) what you 
just said was you could get hooked by this young lady couldn't 
you 
C: Well I could (.) in fact having not seen her for some 
period of time ( I still have these feelings going on 
inside me hh are a bit of a worry to me and ofcourse they're 
also a big suprise hhh= 
A: Well it it it is a very difficult one isn't it (.) if you 
have a need if you are lonely and if you want companionship or 
love or a relationship hh it's very easy isn't it to turn to 
the wrong person (.) hh and you'll be driven by this desire 
and driven by the need hh but not driven by the person and 
what worries me about this young lady and I'm not saying 
anything personal about her hh is that she comes along (.) she 
finds you within weeks (.5) within weeks she's pressuring you 
to marry her (.) now hh I'm I don't believe although w we you 
know we're full of stories aren't we about instant love and 
looking across a crowded room hh that wha w you you know we're 
such complex people nowadays should we hh really trust a 
feeling which says wi thin a week or two I'm going to marry 
this guy and and you might have said well after three months 
if she'd er hh if she'd er come across and expressed all this 
interest you could have trusted her but (.) it sounds more 
like she's doing it for herself than for her love of you (.3) 
and that makes me a bit suspicious 
C: .hh well that's right but this is one of the reasons that I 
I actually hh I mean I was talking more in terms of three 
years I mean having a hh I've got a bad marriage behind me hh 
err which ofcourse makes me even more cautious than perhaps a 
normal person would be hhh erm (but) I I'm also 
[ 
A: ) go on (.) John 
C: I'm also aware of the AIDS situation and the difficulties 
that brings about hh erm I I I consider myself as indeed and 
this is the (.4) the thing er as he should be hh the 
experienced older person hh who has to make the the majority 






















































118 A: I (.) I think 
you've been very responsible and I think it is very important 
isn't it that the older hh the (.) if you are older than 
you're prospective partner hh the idea should be that you 
would be: have more knowledge of life and (.) be a little more 
cautious and a little wiser hhh and I think that's er very 
sensitive of you and er I think it's er (.) it's er hh 
commendable that you think in that way hh and I think we have 
to (.) you know there's a terrific emphasis in our culture now 
hh getting what you want (.) getting your satisfaction (.) 
getting your man (.) getting your woman hh you know it's not 
as simple as that (.6) this this other person that you're 
getting (.3) is not a sort of something you go and purchase in 
a shop or hh like a car you can trade the in if they don't 
work hh it's another person .hh so you're right John to have 
these [ 
[ 
c: (Well that) 
thoughts= 
C: =but you see the conflict for me which is really what I 
hand that I have strong feelings for the girl hh at the same 
time I know that it's unrealistic at this particular moment in 
time hhh and I I'm also in a dilemma as whether to speak out 
hh (.) an an and make my objections known hh or to say well I 
haven't got the right she has her own life to lead if that's 
what she wants to do hh er it's a bit of a conflict for me and 
I don't know ( ) 
[ 
A: John I think you could only try as you've done you've 
sent her a few letters you've mentioned it a few times now hh 
if she doesn't choose to respond you can't do more than that 
hh 
C: No (1) but I'm still left with the the feelings you see= 
A: =what that you still like her 
C: hh I I'm still left with the feelings of of ye: h I mean 
err= 
A: =Well maybe there's a middle way forward (.) there's 
something in between marriage and nothing hh and that you 
could perhaps in your next letter say well look hh I still 
care about you (.) I'm still not hh wild about the idea of 
rushing into marriage so quickly but hh if you understand that 
I care and I'd quite like to see you hh could we get together 
and talk about it= 
430 
196 c: =but what I did say doctor ~"as that hh erm (.7) I was very 
197 fearful that she was going to get hurt in this hh and (.) if 
198 she needed me I would be around whenever she wants me and I 
199 left it at that basically hh for the moment 
200 
201 A: Well I don't think I can er I can quarrel with that and I 
202 think you've handled it very well I think hh the answer we're 
203 left with is that you still need hh someone in your life and 
204 that you should go on hh trying to find the right person (.) 












































TAPE 2: SIDE A: COUNT 606 
LBC Counselling Hour (Monday 16.3.92 9-10 pm.) 
Alison Mitchell 
V: .hh John how do you think Alison can help 
C: Right erm . hhh I don't know if she can actually [laughs] 
erm 
V: Well if she can't she can listen 
C: Right erm .hhh very briefly then (.) about a year ago erm I 
saw an advertisement in a (.) in one of the Sunday supplements 
for cosmetic surgery 
A: Right 
C: erm (.) and it (.) basically I've always felt that my:: top 
of my ears just stuck out a little bit too much .hhh 
A: Right 
C: erm something nobody had ever .hh said anything to 
just a personal thing 
A: Mhrrun 
C: and er I took it upon myself to go to the clinic and have a 
chat with one of the administrators there who basically went 
[ 
A: right 
through what they would do . hh erm she made an appointment 
with a consultant which I obviously went to see .hh erm I 
wasn't too impresed with his (1) attitude actually .hh but er 
I went back to the clinic ( , cos) obviously (I) wanted to 
discuss with me what I felt about it. hh and erm I said I 
wasn't too happy but they reassured me that the guy would do a 
god job and he's a top plastic surgeon .hh on that I decised 
to go ahead and have the surgery erm and consequently the guy 
has done (1.5) something that was completely unecessary 
A: Right 























































A: OK can you describe a little bit about what you feel . hh 
ha-has gone wrong 
c: Erm well as I said all I ever wanted was just the top part 
of the ear (.) just brought in a fraction 
A: Right 
c: erm what the guy's actually is er (1) taken away quite a 
large amount of the (contria) bowl as they call it 
A: Right 
c: and brought it right in flat to the head 
A: OK 
c: erm so I've now got a lobe that is quite (1) quite tight to 
the (.) to the head .hh 
A: Yes 
c: an inner part of the ear which is obviously the (low) er 
the the contria bowl which he's cut almost complelety out .hh 
which is now directly flat to the head and the top part is 
still sticking [ 
[ 
A: Right 
c: out .hh erm and I've seen him on many occasions now over 
the year of which he says .hhh he can do something but (1) I 
mean I number one I don't trust him (an) and number two I just 
don't think anything can be done 'es taken so much away 
A: (right) 
[ 
V: You said over the years J- you sai-
[ 
c: Well over the year sorry 
V: sorry yeh over the years I was gonna ask you wha this is 
[ 
c: over the 
something .hh that happened some time ago and I thought (I'd) 
[ 
c: litterally a year 
literally a year almost to the day 
[ 




96 V: us 
97 
98 C: They couldn't do anything for the first six seven months 
99 because of the scar tissue 
100 
















































C: .hh er but (.5) I know that there's nothing that can be 
done and it's .hh 
V: outside of talking to Alison as you are now .hh and talking 
again with the surgeon who: did [ 
[ 
C: Mmm 
V: the operation .hh have you talked to anybody else medically 
about [ [ 
[ [ 
C: l1m erm: 
well I can't talk to my family I'm very very very close to my 
family .hh 
V: Right 
C: erm and say from the start they didn't want me to have 
anything done and if I was to ever go back to them and say how 
.hhh upset I was I think I'd destroy them .hh erm 
V: l1m but have you you just before you talk with Alison .hh 
have you spoken to anybody: .hh 
[ 
C: I I went to ( 
V: a-a-another 
expert in this field 
C: No I haven't I went to my local GP .hh and had a chat with 
[ [ 
V: Right right 
him and erm I mean the first 
C: thing he said to me was (that) was basically that'll teach 
you for going into the woods . hh and not going through (1) 
himself 
A: Well that was very helpful wasn't it 
[ 
C: yeh but I mean I've lost all 





150 c: literally just been carrying it now for a year .hh and i 
151 mean I I can't stand I mean if I catch a glimpse of myself it 
152 just does me in 
153 
154 A: Right 
155 
156 C: and I can't even go home to my family any more 'cos I feel 
157 that everybody's .hh I mean maybe their not but I feel that 
158 everybody's looking at me= 
159 
160 A: =right but maybe you felt a little bit that way before you 
161 had the operation 
162 
163 C: I'm sure I did 
164 
165 A: right and I think that's something where cosmetic surgery 
166 has gone wrong .hh erm or has gone wrong in in the eyes of the 
167 patient now I'm not saying in any way that you're imagining 
168 the mistakes that have been made .hhh but I think one thing 
169 [ 
170 C: Mhmm 
171 
172 that is always worth looking at .hhh is how much it is that 
173 person's self-image 
174 
175 C: Sure 
176 
177 A: erm that that is affected .hh and that there are 
178 psychological factors to any er anything that somebody may 
179 feel is is a minor deformity so to speak .hh so that for 
180 instance and you may have [ 
181 [ 
182 C: Mhmm 
183 
184 A: heard this before and it may even have been mentioned to 
185 you .hh certainly should have been mentioned to you .hh when 
186 you approached the clinic for the cosmetic surgery .hhh that 
187 it it really needed to be wieghed up .hh how much erm there 
188 was a real physical problem that really did need to be 
189 corrected 
190 
191 C: Mhmm 
192 
193 A: .hh a-and how much if at all this was more of a 
194 psychological problem 
195 
196 C: I mean: say nobody's really said any thing to me even since 
197 I've had the operation I mean I've .hh 
198 
199 A: Right 
200 
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201 C: I mean even my girlfriend I mean who I didn't know before 
202 doesn't really see anything wrong with me 
203 
204 A: Right 
205 
206 C: and I can quite understand when people say to me you know 
207 it's it's totally inside my head= .hhh 
208 
209 A: =right 
210 
211 C: but I mean it's completely 
212 
213 A: it's dominating never the less 
214 
215 C: Ah it's terrible I mean 
216 
217 A: Right 
218 [ 
219 C: I cannot control the way I feel I mean I just shut myself 
220 away .hhh 
221 
222 A: Right 
223 
224 C: as quickly as I can and just I just try to sleep 
225 
226 A: right .hhh 
227 
228 C: I mean sometimes I can't take it 
229 [ 
230 V: Would you (1) yeh John would you accept 
231 though if somebody was talking to you and said well: you y-y-
232 Y you know you have got problems difficulties and your'e 
233 centering them on your ears and even if you hadn't had the 
234 operation you still might be centering feelings on something 
235 else .hh back to not having had your ears done maybe .h if 
236 somebody said that to you 
237 
238 C: Mmm 
239 
240 V: what what would you say 
241 
242 C: Erm= 
243 
244 V: =you'd dsimiss it erm listen erm 
245 
246 C: Well I would listen 
247 
248 V: Yeh think about it think it might be sense or do you think 
249 that is a .hh completely nonsensical suggestion 
250 
251 C: No it's not a nonsensical suggestion I mean (.75) but (.5) 






















































completely the opposite to what I wanted and if 
told or showed 




c: me the result in some way .hhh then there's no way I would 
have gone through with it [ 
[ 
A: Yes 
.hh I I think that that is one issue that certainly needs to 
be addressed because .hh erm what ever reason for the 
operation if you made effectively a contract between yourself 
and a service provider in this a surgeon= 
c: =Mhmm 
[ 
A: .hh to carry out a particular service (.5) and and that 
service was agreed in detail .hh and that is not the service 
that's been carried out.hh 
C: Mhmm 
A: then it seems to me that you have cause for complaint 
C: I mean the guy you know he's he's not .hh arguing with me 
an' he he said you know he will do what he can and put it 
right but Imean I still feel 
A: Right I'm sure if anything you feel you'd rather have 
somebody different and somebody that you could have a bit more 
faith in [ 
[ 
C: Well I (mean) number 
one (1.5) that's number one also the fact it costs quite a bit 
of money= 
A: =right and presumably their wanting more 
corrections 
C: 







(1) no he 
C: you know it's just .hh it's just (.75) the fact that I'm 
finding it very very hard now to just 
[ 
A: has it 























































A: =right has it been costing you extra to return to these 
consultations (1) right so they've been 
[ 
c: No (1) no 
A: doing what they can: 
c: sure 
A: .hh to put things right but that doesn't correct the 
mistake that was made in the first place .hh 
[ 
c: No 
A: I mean I think one of the things that you might be advised 
to do in the meantime .hh i-is to get in tough with the 
British Medical Association and ask for some erm advice from 
someone 
C: Mhmm 
A: erm there as to your possible courses of action 
C: right 
A: .hh at this stage and that's purely dealing with the 
practical side of things . hhh and I will give you an an 
address for the British Medical Association 
C: Mhmm= 
A: =but I think also .hhh you do need to go back to your GP 
and if your not happy because of your your GP's attitude then 
maybe consider changing . hh your GP erm but beware that it 
isn't a case of running away from a situation ( ) that seems 
too hard to face 
C: Yeh 
A: I mean OK the guy's made one sarcastic [tape changeover] 
and ask to be referred I think really erm to a psychologist or 
a psychiatrist .hh because I think that's the other half of 
the problem that should have been addressed before cosmetic 
surgery was considered .hh 
V: and get erm a psychologist psychiatrist through his GP 
despite the sarcastic remark I think 
[ 
A: Yes 
V: John'll face up to that .hh the BMA's address in the minute 
we have left 
438 
358 A: BMA House Tavistock Square London WelH 9JP 
359 
360 V: John we wish you luck and maybe call us again in a few 
361 weeks time: to let us know how you I re getting on . hh er my 













































TAPE 2: SIDE B: COUNT 495 
LBC Nighline (Monday 23.3.92 9-10 p.m.) 
Dr. Anthony Fry 
V: .hh Linda (.) you have obviously got a serious problem 
C: Good evening Robbie 
V: Hello go ahead to Dr. Anthony Fry .hh he might have an idea 
for you 
A: Linda Hi there 
[ 
C: Hi (.5) Hello Dr. Fry 
[ 
A: Hello 
C: .hh I do have a problem that really is knawing at me and 
it's getting progresively worse as time goes on 
[ 
V: s: ::pit it out Linda 
C: erm my daughter is expecting another baby I look after her 
first child I have done for two years I'm his legal foster 
mother . hh and she's now expecting another child . hh and I 
seem to resent this baby (.5) and I mean resent and I'm 
resenting my daughter and her boyfriend (.) and it's coming 
out when I talk to them you know that there is resentment in 
my voice and .hh my attitude and I've noticed myself that they 
can't do any right .hhh erm I I spoke to my husband about it 
and said you know I I do need to talk to somebody about it .hh 
because I know it's wrong it's unnatural (1) this new baby has 
done no harm .hh but er it'll be a year ago this April she had 
an operation to get rid of a child .hh then she had a 
miscarriage and now expecting this one .hh 
A: Linda is this possibly another version of the (. ) thing 
we've just been discussing which is that sometimes your not 
saying the truth because it's painful and I .hh I you you just 
said told the story very quickly but is it right that you look 
after the first child 
C: Yeh he was in care and on the at risk list 






















































c: erm I'm not looking after any more [laughs] this ones quite 
enough thankyou [ 
[ 
A: you're not (1) 
but but you seem to be implying that when the second one was 
born you'd be looking after that one as well 
C: no no she's.hh she's in a stable relationship 
A: M:mm 
C: erm she is divorced but this is a stable relationship (they 
seem) . hh erm the chap cares an awful lot for her (.) she 
walks allover him like she did her first husband .hh erm she 
seems to have no respect for anything or any body [ 
[ 
A: but what is 
it what is it Linda that you are resenting you are resenting 
this (circum-) 
[ 
C: the baby that she's carrying 
A: and wha-what do you mean I resent it you mean that you sh 
think she shouldn't have a second baby or your jealous of her= 
C: =no 1('11) be honest I (.) until she can accept her first 
child (.) I don't think she should have any more children 
A: and is she rejecting the first child 
[ 
C: yeh 
A: what and you're the foster mother you actually are going to 
have to bring this child up and you think well= 
[ 
C: she (hardly talks) 
C: ='till he's eighteen yeh 
A: 'till he's eighteen you think what on earth is she doing 
having another child 
C: yeh 
A: well I think 
[ 
C: I mean she doesn't take a lot of notice I mean .hh she 
does come round quite frequently .hh but always to tell me 























































hasn't got .hh what their gonna do .hh things are gonna be so 
different I've heard it all before= 




A: as opposed to the real baby and I don't want to compare .hh 
babies and pets because we' '11 get an outcry but I am going to 
say something about it and that is that .hh we all have these 
idealisde things don't we you know . hh the child is always 
going to be clean and healthy 
[ 
c: Mmm 
and eat it's food and not cry and not have a dirty nappy and 
not keep us awake at night and not have teething .hh the 
idealised child is smiling and happy and clean and loving .hhh 
now 
[ 
c: you've gotit in one 
A: I've got it in one well I'm glad to know 
[ 
c: that's her attitude 
A: I'm glad I I'm getting it right sometimes 
very nice of you to give me that 
c: 








A: now the idealised baby doesn't exist 
c: no 
A: and what she's doing is she's creating in her own mind .hh 
a second version of her first child .h and of course three 
months into the relationship when it bites her nipple or keeps 
her awake or .hh does it's nappy four times in one night or 
whatever it's gonna do . hh she's gonna suddenly say ah this 






















































A: =this one .hh is not an ideal baby either (I) only want a 
perfect baby like people like .h peole who you know .hh go on 
marrying and marrying .h (.) they only want a perfect husband 
or a perfect wife a wife who'll have sex every time they want 
it and in be terribly exciting and always: you know voluptuous 
and sweet smelling . hh ofcourse human beings are not motor 
cars .hh and babies are not little teddy bears they're 
children .hh and so they're good and bad .hh and what we have 
to do as people is we have to learn to accept .hh this good 
and bad side now how you're going to ex- (.) how you're going 
to get her round to this idea= 
c: =1've tried= 
A: =is very very difficult Linda I don't know how you'd do it 




V: what about Linda's resentment er well Linda 
c: yes 
[ 
V: isn't actually sh- you Linda doesn't really resent the 
child .hh but she resents the act of having the child it is 
the irresponsibilty of her daughter erm er 
[ 
A: yes she thinks it's irresponsible why have a second child 
when you can't look after your first one 
[ 
c: well actually this'll be 
her fourth pregnancy (2) erm 
V: sh-where should Linda be homing her: 
resentment in on .hh erm Anthony .hh on her daughter 
A: well I think really yes she she needs to understand herself 
why she's got this painful emotion inside her and that's step 
one .hh and you you're understanding that Linda and you've 
talked to us about it and that's all to the good .hh the 
[ 
c: yeh 
second step is well .hh can you do anything with this emotion 
that will .hh change the world make the world a better place 
.hh and what you can do is you can perhaps try and tackle your 
daughter on these things we've talked about tonight and see if 




















































c: I have (. ) sat there and spoke to both her and her 
boyfriend .hh and said they haven't got a brain between them 
because if they had they wouldn't be in the postition they're 
in .hh er an' I I told her you know you wanna concentrate on 
the child you've got that's here before you think of having 
another one or at least include him when you go out buying 
something for the new baby .hh how about buying him a packet 
[ 
V: she's not going to 
Linda is she 
of sweets .hh or even taking notice that he exists 
c: I don't think so 
[ 
A: sounds like you're up against it 
[ 
V: er and i-i-e- I'll 
tell you what 'es lucky 'es got you [laughs] 
c: [laughs] I dunno [laughs] 
[ 








he loves ('is mam) he's always telling me 
(like) [laughs] 
what what what would you rather () what would you ra- would 
you rather .hh would you rather he was unhappy with your 
daughter or would you rather he was with you being loved by 
you and knowing that he's loved by you= 















I can hear it in your voice .hh and the other thing 
you know when the pennies gonna drop with your 























































all night with with not just a bit nipple but four lots in the 
nappy as well and non-stop screaming 





I told her I'll 
V: well wha- w- ah you 
well you'll be able to look her staight in the eyes won't you 
maybe the penny will drop 
[ 
c: yeh she's made fer bed she's gotta lay on it this time 
[ 
A: and also if you 
can help her to be a good mum and make a better job of this 
second kid well you can bring up one and be a good mum to that 
one and she can bring up the second one and maybe the world'll 
be a better place for it 
c: I'm just hoping when the baby's born (.) that my feelings 
don't go to the baby I hope that I can accept this baby 
A: 





you're a you're a 
[ 
[ 
I do try not to 
sensible woman and you can have the feeling .hh but you 
[ 
c: Mmm 
mustn't let it out you mustn't take it out on the baby you 
gotta owe that to the baby= 
c: = well my husband said as soon as the baby's born 'e said 
you'll go all (.) gooey again 
[ 
V: 'course you will 
'e said you'll be alright (so don't worry) 
[ 
V: 'course you know what us mums are 
like we're real (wig) at p at the bottom of it we're just big 
softies Linda I (s'pose) 
[ 
C: are you Robbie [laughs] 





















































{.5) is that right 
[ 
c: yeh and grandmums 
V: and grandmums aren't we just big softies 
[ 
A: he's he's got 




V: [laughs] you r- you have g-




and good luck to 
you Linda and by the way .hh er w-when you started off saying 
[ [ 
c: thanks yes 
well er you know is it is it reasonable is it normal .hh I 
think anybody in your position would be beside themselves with 
something .hh grief er anger .h pain something 
[ 
c: I have cried I have 
cried beleive me .hh but I haven't got over that operation she 
had last year I think that is really the root of it all (1) 




C: an awful lot because (.) you know it was a grandchild 
[ 
A: 
can understand completely how you feel 
[ 
w-
c: it realy I haven't got over it yet 
A: no it's a very problematic 
w- I 
V: er: our fingers our fingers 
will be crossed for you Linda and er I'll be thinking of you 
(.) good luck= 
A: =yeh good luck Linda 
V: and you're right Doc. she did get to me .hh it's er just 
after nine thirty we update er the news we'll be back with er 
more of your calls it's the monday counsellig hour .hh er my 
guest is con -c -sultant psychiatrist Dr. Anthony Fry .hh if 
you'd like to talk over a problem 071-603-1152 .hh 071-973-
9733 be back er be back in a few minutes ... 
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TAPE 4: SIDE A: COUNT: 000 
L.B.C. NIGHTLINE (Monday .8.91 9-10.00 p.m.) 
ADVISOR: IRMA 
1 C: Hello (.) yeh (.) I'm a little bit nervous er 
2 
3 A: Oh hi Paul 
4 
5 C: Hi the problem I've got is I dress in women's clothes and 
6 it kind of bothers me 
7 
8 A: Mmhh (.5) why err your' e not alone you know (.) I mean (.) 
9 when you say (1) are you married 
10 
11 C: Yeh yeh 
12 
13 A: Does your wife know 
14 
15 C: Nah 
16 
1 7 A: Uh huh rom (.) how long have you been married Paul 
18 
19 C: About four years 
20 
21 A: Have you been to any of the organisations for transvestites 
22 
23 C: No (.75) I haven't (.) no 
24 
25 A: OK err I don't know if Robbie (1) I haven't got the number 
26 with me at the moment (.5) do you want me to (.5) OK (.) maybe 
27 if Paul could ring back (.5) is that alright 
28 
29 V: We'll take Paul's number 
30 
31 A: OK we'll get in touch with you because there (1) your'e (.) 
32 you're (. ) I know you feel that your' e probably the only 
33 person in London if not the world in this situation but your'e 
34 not (.) err it's there (are) a large group of transvestites 
35 and there are organisations that are very helpful (.) and if 
36 your'e (.) er wife were to be included and know this about you 
37 (.) there they will also (.) there are support groups for her 
38 ( .) err you kno"" 
39 
40 V: What er Paul (.) you said it bothers you er what bothers 
41 you 
42 






















































V: =that your'e wife'll find out (.) that= 
c: Yeah (.5) just what people will think really 
R: Yes (.) er er I was gonna throw others at you erm like Irma 
said did you think your' e unusual (.) your' e alone (.) it's 
gonna affect your' e marriage (.) or is ita combination of 
factors 
c: Yeah a combination all that really 
A: Yeh oh 
V: What do you think your'e wife would say if she knew (.) if 
you told her 
c: Err I don't know to be honest 
A: You mm· . 
V: What'd your guess be 
A: Err go mad I would think 
V: Go mad ( . ) you think she'd be cross 
C: Yeh I think so 
V: Yeh not (.5) not surprised maybe and not so cross or 
c: ermm cross 
and surprised I would have thought 
V: Mrom 
A: You'd be surprised how many women respond with warmth and 
kindness to this situation (.7) because you it doesn't mean 
homosexuality 
c: Yeh right 
A: Err ermm and er many women actually don't mind a bit to 
find out (.) finding out their partners transvestites (.) they 
they erm er I've had letters from women who've actually said 
they're very happy with the situation (.) your'e wife may not 
be one of these but I think in your case a support group is a 
good (.) is a good idea Paul (.) just to give you company so 
you know your'e not alone (.) and they'll also be able to tell 
you how best to explain to your wife 

































A: Which eventually is going to i- your'e going to have to do 
and you may discover that with some help and some back up that 
will all (.) all be a lot easier than you think 
C: OK then 
A: It's amazing how tolerant people can be (.5) ermm and how 
much more understanding than we expect 
V: Mrnm. yes er I've actually spoken to many wives and 
girlfriends of transvestites and found that yes 
[ 
A: Yes it's surprising= 
V: =and the fear of the individual like Paul who says oh I 
think she'd get very cross er she probably would Paul er but 
as you talk trough it you might find that she has more 
understanding than you give her credit for (.75) is there (.) 
I'm sorry we haven't got those support numbers handy 'cos Irma 
didn't bring her err 
A: Famous black book 
V: Her famous black book with her (.) well she actually wheels 
in a filing cabinet ( . ) it's very impressive ( . ) is there 
somewhere Paul we can pass it on to you (.) I'll tell you what 
I'll do ermm we will try and find out if there's a number Paul 
where we can in confidence just pass these numbers on to you 
ermm without giving you more worries and fears that err that 
number being passed on might cause more problems ... 
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TAPE 1 SIDE B COUNT 114 
LBC NIGHTLINE (Saturday 11.5.92 12-12.45 a.m.) 
DR. ANTHONY FRY 
1 V: Sally (.) go ahead to Anthony do you think he can help 
2 
3 C: Er (.) good evening Robbie (.) good evening Doctor 
4 
5 A: Hello Sally 
6 
7 C: Er: I I don't know that you would erm be able to help I 
8 don't know erm I erm I'm in a very difficult situation (.) I I 
9 have bulimia and I've had it for five years (.) and erm I'm 
10 not a typical bulimic ( .) erm I don't make myself sick or 
11 anything so erm: I've become very very overweight (.) erm the 
12 problem is that erm because national health cutbacks etcetera 
13 etcetera I've been told that that there literally isn't 
14 anywhere that I could lose the weight (.) the hospital that 
15 will deal with Bulimia can't have me there to lose the weight 
16 (.) the the predicament I'm in is (.) erm my parents who've 
17 both retired now and in their seventies who come from an 
18 ordinary working class background have (.) erm (.) offered to 
19 pay for me to go privately (.) they haven't really got the 
20 money but they're talking about selling their house (.) you 
21 know 'cos they don't want to lose their daughter (.) 'cos the 
22 way I'm going on obviously I'm in a lot of danger erm (.) the 
23 predicament I'm in is that I I just can't really feel that I 
24 can (.) let them spend their money you know like that 'n they 
25 ( .) you know 
26 
27 A: Sally I I get the I get the picture (.) can you just tell 
28 me how old you are 
29 
30 c: I'm thirty three 
31 
32 A: And what are your personal circumstances (.) I mean are you 
33 living with somebody or with your parents 
34 
35 C: Erm I live on my own I've got a council erm flat erm I'm on 
36 [disability] benefit (.) I have no savings or 
37 
38 A: And do you have a partner of any kind 
39 
40 C: No no (.3) I I come from a background of abuse and violence 
41 and what have you erm no I couldn't get into any relationship 






















































A: And you're you're thirty now and have you had a job 
recently 
c: No I haven't worked for erm about five years now 
A: So (.J so is food one of the only worthwhile things in your 
life Sally 
c: Erm (.3 J really because I before that I had anorexia I 
sound like a right case history don't I 
A: Well you sound like a rather tormented person I don't know 
about a right case but go on 




C: when I was four stone three 
[ 
A: Mhrnm 
C: obviously hospitalised ( erm this time erm I'm 
five foot tall and I weigh eighteen stone and I'm dreadfully 
ashamed and I feel really bad [starts to cry] 
A: And the eating the eating in a way has come to be one of 
the only bits of real life which is safe enough for you to get 
involved in perhaps (.) is 
[ 
C: Yeh 
A: I I don't know if that's being too smart but that's what it 
sounds like to me and (.5) I suppose if you had a background 
of abuse and intimidation and nobody's cared for you and 
nobody's respected you 
C: Well (.) my parents have cared for me 
A: They (.) they care but other people abused you did they and 
er 
C: Well it has been (.) but the other thing is that I mean I 
know that (.) I don't understand it 'cos I know I'm putting on 
this weight and I'm still eating and I don't understand why 
because I don't want to really hurt myself erm I can't stop it 
I'm just a problem for everyone you know [crying] 





















































c: I don't get out of bed much and I can't walk all that well 
because of my weight you know 
A: Sally (.) you must know that some people put on weight and 
er get eating disorders for physical reasons now when you had 
your anorexia did they do lots of physical tests and check 
you're hormones out and all that sort of thing 
c: Yes they did 
A: Thyroid glands and all those things 
c: Yes they said it was all perfectly normal 
[ 
A: it was all perfectly 
normal 
c: They said its in my head 
A: Is there any thing else in your life apart form food which 
is any good to you (.) I mean I notice you're listening to us 
tonight (.) is there (.) is there anything else which matters 
to you which you can say look I believe in that that's 
worthwhile 
c: Erm (.) I don't know I've kind of lost faith in everything 
erm 
A: Have you (.) what about you're mum and dad (.) you've lost 
faith in them 
c: No not really but 
A: They love you still do they 
c: Yeh I don't want to sort of (talk) to them too much because 
they are getting on a bit ( .) you know (.) my mum's she's 
crying all the time now and you know and she ( 
lady and I 
A: Do you feel very ashamed of yourself (.) do you fell in 
some ways you're a shameful person 
c: No no not really (.) I it it's erm it (might) sound a bit 
funny if I say it but I'm in a (.) as far as I can see myself 
I haven't harmed anyone in any way that I I know about but 
A: Well that's very important isn't it 
[ 
C: I'm obviously being punished 




















































A: Well not necessarily you may have just (.)1 mean this may 
be like slipping on an ice mountain you might be walking down 
this ice mountain you take the wrong foot and you start 
slipping and one of the problems about eating disorders is 
that once ( .) you see the body is like a very delicately 
balanced spring in a way and it knows exactly when its had 
enough and it knows exactly when its full up and it knows when 
to stop eating and when to start eating now that mechanism's 
incredibly delicate and what has happened and what happens to 
so many people most bulimics and most eating disorders start 
with some kind of dieting 
[ 
c: yeh mine did 
A: and that seems to upset the body's regulation mechanism (.) 
it like you know you fiddle around with the thermostat on the 
central heating system and once you've got it out of order it 
finds it incredibly difficult to get itself back in in order 
again (.) and so it doesn't help you and I don't think its 
even true to say that you're compulsive eating or your endless 
eating is (.) is really the result of your own failure it's 
because the mechanism of your body sensing when you're full up 
has got overridden (.) now the answer for you is can you get 
control of your weight again and if you can believe in 
yourself and trust yourself and care for yourself then you 
might be able to (.) and I mean the way forward as I see it is 
to really try and commit yourself to a diet and to get into a 
relationship with somebody who will stand by you and rather 
than at this stage being admitted somewhere and spending al 
your parents money if you could afford to go to a counsellor 
even two or three times a week (.) but it's got to be someone 
who's experienced in this field its no good going to somebody 
( . ) you know who's got a counselling diploma from here or 
there or somewhere (.) eating disorders are their own special 
(.) very difficult er problem and you've got to be experienced 
in them if you're going to help somebody 
c: Well I tried (.) I saw a counsellor at one stage 
A: But were they an eating disorder counsellor 
c: Erm: she said that she dealt with eating disorders but but 
she said that I'd gone past the counselling on the outside and 
that I needed to go 
[ 
A: Well a short 
C: into hospital 
[ 
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196 A: short period in hospital may well be useful (.) I'm 
197 very suprised at eighteen stone and weighing only er sorry 
198 weighing eighteen stone an d being only (.) how tall were you 
199 
200 C: five foot exactly 
201 
202 A: Five foot (.3) that an NBS hospital won't take you and I 
203 think you should go back to your GP because I think this is 
204 (.) is very threatening condition in terms of health so I'm 
205 going to give you a few bits of advice to close with (.) go on 
206 caring for yourself and believing in yourself ( . ) do 
207 everything you can to get onto a diet (.) try a different GP 
208 and look for a different specialist to try and get NH help (.) 
209 short term help to start the weight loss process and then I'm 
210 sure we could get things moving and you may well be able to be 
211 helped (.) and the more you can develop interests outside food 
212 and build up your confidence and see other people (.) the 
213 better chance you've got of overcoming this 
214 
215 V: Mmm: fingers crossed for you Sally ... 
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